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[74) 1 
CHAPTER3 
Economic Policy 
Document numbers 74---137 
7 4 CAB 129/1, CP(45)112, Annex 13 Aug 1945 
'Our overseas financial prospects': Cabinet memorandum by Lord 
Keynes1 [Extract] 
[This appreciation was circulated by Or Dalton, chancellor of the Exchequer, with a 
covering note saying he was anxious that colleagues should be 'informed, without delay, 
of this most grim problem' . Attlee made a statement to the Cabinet on 16 Aug stressing 
the need to treat the detailed figures and indications of possible lines of approach to the 
US government 'as matters of the utmost secrecy'. He added that there were also 'one or 
two striking phrases in the Memorandum (e.g. in paragraphs 27 and 28) wh ich might 
have unfortunate consequences, if used outside the circle of confidential Ministerial 
discussions' (CAB 12811, CM 23(45)4). Lord Keynes's memorandum has been printed in 
full in DBPO series I, vol Ill , no 6.] 
1. Three sources of financial assistance have made. it possible for us to mobilise 
our domestic man-power for war with an intensity not approached elsewhere, and to 
spend cash abroad, mainly in India and the Middle East, on a scale not even equalled 
by the Americans, without having to export in order to pay for the food and raw 
materials which we were using at home or to provide the cash which we were 
spending abroad. 
2. The fact that the distribution of effort between ourselves and our Allies has 
been of this character leaves us far worse off, when the sources of assistance dry up, 
than if the roles had been reversed. If we had been developing our exports so as to pay 
for our own current needs and in addition to provide a large surplus which we could 
furnish free of current charge to our Allies as Lend-Lease or Mutual Aid or on credit, 
we should, of course, find ourselves in a grand position when the period of providing 
the stuff free of current charge was brought suddenly to an end. 
3. As it is, the more or less sudden drying up of these sources of assistance shortly 
after the end of the Japanese war will put us in an almost desperate plight, unless 
some other source of temporary assistance can be found to carry us over whilst we 
recover our breath-a plight far worse than most people, even in Government 
Departments, have yet appreciated. 
4. The three sources of financial assistance have been-
(a) Lend-Lease from the United States; 
(b) Mutual Aid from Canada; 
1 J M Keynes, fellow and bursar, King's College, Cambridge; leader of UK delegation which negotiated the 
American loan in Washington, September- December 1945; died April 1946 . 
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(c) Credits (supplemented by sales of our pre-war capital assets) from the Sterling 
Area (including credits under Payments Agreements with certain countries, 
especially in South America, which are outside the Area, but have made special 
agreements with it) . 
5. In the present year, 1945, these sources are enabling us to overspend our own 
income at the rate of about £2,100 millions a year, made up roughly as follows (these 
figures were compiled on the assumption that Lend-Lease and Mutual Aid would 
continue on the basis of recent provisions until the end of 1945):-
Lend-Lease (munitions) 
Lend-Lease (non-munitions) ... 
Canadian Mutual Aid 
Sterling Area, &c .. 
£millions 
600 
500 
250 
750 
2,100 
(The Mutual Aid, amounting recently to about £500 millions a year, which we 
ourselves are according is here treated as part of our own domestic expenditure. 
From some, but not all, points of view this should be deducted from the above.) 
6. This vast, but temporary, assistance allows us for the time being to over-play 
our own financial hand by just that amount. It means, conversely, that others are 
under-playing their hands correspondingly. How vividly do Departments and 
Ministers realise that the gay and successful fashion in which we undertake liabilities 
all over the world and slop money out to the importunate represents an over-playing 
of our hand, the possibility of which will come to an end quite suddenly and in the 
near future unless we obtain a new source of assistance? It may be that we are doing 
some things which are useless if we have to abandon them shortly after V -J, and that 
our external policies are very far from being adjusted to impending realities . 
7. To sum up, the overseas balance in 1945 is estimated as follows:-
Imports excl. munitions 
Munitions received under Lend-
Lease and Mutual Aid 
Other Government expenditure 
overseas ... 
Total expenditure overseas 
£ m'llion 
1,250 Exports 
Net invisible income and sundry 
850 repayments, &c. . .. 
Government receipts from 
800 United States and Dominions for 
their forces an~ munitions 
2,900 Total income overseas 
Deficit .. . 
350 
100 
350 
800 
2,100 
2,900 
These estimates have been compiled on the assumption of a continuance of the 
Japanese war and Lend-Lease to the end of 1945. But the early termination of the 
Japanese war is likely to reduce Lend-Lease aid by more than it reduces our 
expenditure; so that, apart from some new sources of aid, the financial position is 
more likely to be worsened than improved in the short run . . .. 
18. The conclusion is inescapable that there is no source from which we can raise 
sufficient funds to enable us to live and spend on the scale we contemplate except the 
United States. It is true that there are sundry resources which have not been taken 
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into account in the above. For example, we still have some capital assets which could 
be gradually realised; and we have an expectation of some further aid from Canada. 
But the above calculation assumes that we have reached equilibrium by the end of 
1948 which we have no convincing reason to expect, and also that we have by that 
date drawn down our ultimate reserves to the minimum. Moreover, the reader may 
have noticed that I have almost altogether omitted any reference to the vast debt of 
between £3,000 and £4,000 millions which we shall be owing to almost every 
country in the world. In other words, it has been tacitly assumed that we have found 
some way of dealing with this which allows us to discharge nothing in the three years 
1946-1948 taken together and, in fact, to add £150 millions to it. Moreover, the 
assumed rate of growth of exports is wildly optimistic, unless our methods change 
considerably . The conclusion holds, therefore, in so far as any firm conclusion can be 
based on such precarious material, that there remains a deficit of the order of $5 
billions which can be met from no other source but the United States. 
19. It is sometimes suggested that we can avoid dependence on the United States 
by a system of semi-barter arrangements with the countries from which we buy. 
This, however, assumes that the limiting factor lies in the willingness of overseas 
markets to take our goods. Whatever may be the truth a few years hence, this will not 
be the position in the early post-war period which we have in view here. The limiting 
facto r will be our physical capacity to develop a sufficient supply of export goods. 
Barter arrangements assume that we have goods to offer in exchange; and that is 
precisely what we shall lack in the next two years. At present the boot is on, and 
pinching, the other leg-the countries from which we buy are trying to make their 
sales to us contingent on our accepting barter terms, under which we supply goods 
which they want but which we unfortunately are unable to provide . . . . 
24. To an innocent observer in the Treasury very early and very drastic 
economies in this huge cash expenditure overseas seem an absolute condition of 
maintaining our solvency. There is no possibility of our obtaining from others for 
more than a brief period the means of maintaining any significant part of these 
establishments, in addition to what we shall require to meet our running excess of 
imports over exports and to sustain the financial system of the Sterling Area. These 
are burdens which there is no reasonable expectation of our being able to carry . Yet 
there are substantial items within the £800 millions which will not be automatically 
cut out merely as a result of the defeat of Japan. 
25. Even assuming a fair measure of success in rapidly expanding exports and 
curtailing Government expenditure overseas, it still remains that aid of the order of 
$5 billions is required from the United States. We have reason to believe that those 
members of the American Administration who are in touch with our financial 
position are already aware that we shall be in Queer Street without aid of somewhere 
between $3 and $5 billions and contemplate aid on this scale as not outside practical 
politics. But this does not mean that difficult and awkward problems of terms and 
conditions do not remain to be solved. The chief points likely to arise are the 
following:- · 
(i) They will wish the assistance to be described as a credit. If this means payment 
of interest and stipulated terms of repayment, it is something we cannot undertake 
in addition to our existing obligations with any confidence that we can fulfil the 
obligations. It would be a repetition of what happened after the last war and a 
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cause of further humiliation and Anglo-American friction, which we should firmly 
resist. If, however, the term credit is no more than a camouflage for what would be 
in effect a grant-in-aid, that is another matter. 
(ii) The Americans will almost certainly insist upon our acceptance of a monetary 
and commercial foreign policy along the general lines on which they have set their 
hearts. But it is possible that they will exercise moderation and will not overlook 
the impropriety of using financial pressure on us to make us submit to what we 
believe is to our grave disadvantage. In fact the most persuasive argument we can 
use for obtaining the desired aid is that only by this means will it lie within our 
power to enter into international co-operation in the economic field on the 
general principle of non-discrimination. We should not seek to escape our 
obligations under Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement, but should, rather, ask 
for the material basis without which it will not lie in our power to fulfil them. In 
my opinion we need not despair of obtaining an agreement which provides 
sufficient safeguards and will not seriously hamper the future development of our 
economy along lines freely determined by our own policies. 
(iii) Bases, islands, air facilities and the like may conceivably come into the 
picture . 
26. Nor must we build too much on the sympathy and knowledge of the members 
of the American Administration with whom we are in touch. It will be a tough 
proposition, perhaps an impossible one, to sell a sufficiently satisfactory plan to 
Congress and the American people who are unacquainted with, and are never likely 
to understand, the true force of our case, not only in our own interests but in the 
interests of the United States and the whole world. For the time being Ministers 
would do well to assume that no arrangement which we can properly accept is yet in 
sight; and that, until such an arrangement is in sight, we are, with the imminent 
cessation of Lend-Lease, virtually bankrupt, and the economic basis for the hopes of 
the public non-existent. 
27. It seems, then, that there are three essential conditions without which we 
have not a hope of escaping what might be described, without exaggeration and 
without implying that we should not eventually recover from it, a financial Dunkirk. 
These conditions are (a) an intense concentration on the expansion of exports, (b) 
drastic and immediate economies in our overseas expenditure, and (c) substantial aid 
from the United States on terms which we can accept. They can only be fulfilled by a 
combination of the greatest enterprise, ruthlessness and tact. 
28. What does one mean in this context by "a financial Dunkirk"? What would 
happen in the event of insufficient success? That is not easily foreseen. Abroad it 
would require a sudden and humiliating withdrawal from our onerous responsibili-
ties with great loss of prestige and and acceptance for the time being of the position 
of a second-class Power, rather like the present position of France. From the 
Dominions and elsewhere we should seek what charity we could obtain. At home a 
greater degree of austerity would be necessary than we have experienced at any time 
during the war. And there would have to be an indefinite postponement of the 
realisation of the best hopes of the new Government. It is probable that after five 
years the difficulties would have been largely overcome. 
29. But in practice one will be surprised if it ever comes to this. In practice, of 
course, we shall in the end accept the best terms we can get. And that may be the 
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beginning of later trouble and bitter feelings. That is why it is so important to grasp 
the reality of our position and to mitigate its potentialities by energy, ingenuity and 
foresight. 
30. Shortage of material goods is not going to be the real problem of the post-war 
world for more than a brief period. Beyond question we are entering into the age of 
abundance. All the more reason not to mess things up and endanger the prizes of 
victory and the fruits of peace whilst crossing the threshold. The time may well 
come-and sooner than we yet have any right to assume-when the sums which 
now overwhelm us may seem chicken-feed, and an opportunity to get rid of stuff 
without payment a positive convenience. 
75 CO 852/555/4, no 9 27 Sept 1945 
'Financial results of the war in the United Kingdom': CO circular 
telegram to governors. Enclosure: memorandum 
Considerable attention has been directed recently to the future difficulties of the 
United Kingdom in attaining a balance in its overseas payments. The attached 
memorandum seeks to explain the character of these difficulties and the way in 
which they have arisen and to indicate some of the possible consequences of financial 
and economic policy. 
The coming to an end of the system of Lend-Lease, which is not in itself a primary 
cause of the difficulties in question but has brought them sharply to notice, has 
resulted, as you are no doubt aware, in His Majesty's Government entering into 
discussions with the United States Government covering the whole field of future 
financial and economic relations between the two countries. The outcome of these 
discussions will have a very important effect on the policy to be pursued with regard 
to the various matters dealt with in the enclosed memorandum, and I shall of course 
endeavour to keep you informed of any developments in the situation which are of 
special interest to the Colonial Dependencies. 
Enclosure to 75 
The announcement recently of the ending of United States Lend-Lease has brought 
sharply to notice the acute difficulties which the United Kingdom will have in the 
post-war period in achieving and maintaining a balance in external payments. Owing 
to the changes resulting from wartime financial developments, one of the most 
urgent preoccupations of His Majesty's Government is how to ensure that the 
country is able to pay in exports for its essential imports. This memorandum is 
intended to explain how this situation has arisen and to suggest some of its possible 
results. It does not call for any general action by Colonial Governments, nor does it 
attempt to discuss the financial effects of the war on the Colonies themselves. 
2. The economic resources needed by the United Kingdom for fighting the war 
has [sic] been provided in two main ways, namely-
(a) internally, by the diversion of productive effort from peacetime to wartime 
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production and by the mobilisation of productive resources not fully used in 
peacetime, including labour, and 
(b) externally, by the receipt, without current payment in goods or services, of 
supplies and services from other countries, including most parts of the Colonial 
Empire. 
3. The mobilisation of internal productive resources, including labour, was fully 
described in the Command Paper Cmd. 6564 published in November 1944 under the 
title "Statistics relating to the war effort of the United Kingdom". It is sufficient to 
say here that this mobilisation was for practical purposes complete and was probably 
not equalled by any other belligerent country. 
4. This memorandum describes the consequences of the means by which the 
goods and services acquired by the United Kingdom from outside for the purpose of 
fighting the war were financed . 
5. The United Kingdom has maintained a small volume of exports throughout the 
war and in particular has endeavoured to maintain exports of certain supplies which 
have been essential to the life of the Colonies and other countries dependent on 
supplies from the United Kingdom, but it is common knowledge that those wartime 
exports have formed only a very small proportion of the value of the imports of goods 
and services received by the United Kingdom for the purpose of carrying on the war. 
A substantial proportion of these goods and services has been obtained from the 
United States on Lend-Lease terms or from Canada under Mutual Aid, but there has 
remained a vast volume of goods and services received by the United Kingdom which 
has had to be financed otherwise. To provide this finance, the United Kingdom has 
had, on the one hand, to dispose of investments owned by its nationals and scattered 
throughout the world valued at thousands of millions of pounds, and on the other, to 
incur obligations to other countries (principally the Empire countries, other than 
Canada, and the Middle East), also to the value of thousands of millions of pounds. 
6. The effect of these two processes, which are, of course, cumulative, is a 
reversal in the financial position of the United Kingdom, which can only be described 
as revolutionary. In the six years of the war, the United Kingdom has changed from 
one of the major creditor countries of the world to the world's principal debtor 
nation. Moreover, practically the whole of this enormous debit has been required, 
not to provide goods or services which have been of benefit to the wealth or welfare of 
the people of the United Kingdom, but solely for war purposes. 
7. The debts by the United Kingdom mentioned in the preceding paragraph have 
taken the form principally of sums in sterling standing to the credit of overseas 
countries (including, among others, the Colonies) in London. These sums are 
commonly referred to as the sterling balances. The Chancellor of the Exchequer 
recently reported to Parliament that they stood at the figure of £3 1/2 thousand 
millions. 
8. A word of explanation may be useful as to the character of this indebtedness. It 
is not, with small exceptions, a debt due by His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom directly to other Empire or foreign Governments. It has arisen by His 
Majesty's Government making payments in sterling for goods and services provided 
by the recipient countries; these sterling receipts could not all be spent at the time 
owing to supply shortages and the unspent balances are today held by the financial 
institutions and individual residents in the countries mentioned in the form of 
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British Government securities, deposits with British banks or other forms of short 
term indebtedness. These holdings form, however, a debt due from the whole 
community in the United Kingdom to the overseas holders in the very important 
sense that they represent a claim exercisable at any time on goods and services 
purchaseable in sterling, i.e. in the main goods and services produced by the 
inhabitants of the United Kingdom. The various forms in which the sterling balances 
are held earn interest at a comparatively low rate, but, however low the average, 
some interest has to be paid currently on these holdings, and it represents, therefore, 
an addition to the total claim against sterling. 
9. The ending of the war thus leaves a problem of external balance with two 
striking features. First, the means by which a balance has been achieved during the 
war are no longer available. Lease-Lend aid from the U.S.A. has already ceased, 
Canadian Mutual Aid will not be continued indefinitely and the sterling area 
countries which have been accepting payment in sterling which they have retained 
unspent will be less willing to go on accumulating sterling balances. Secondly, the 
growth of external indebtedness in the form of the sterling balances rules out a 
simple reestablishment of the pre-war balance of payments; that has been radically 
disturbed by the changes described in paragraph 6. Instead of being a recipient on 
balance of substantial sums in interest on overseas investments which went to pay 
for imports, the United Kingdom must in future make provision for payments of 
interest and principal on the accumulated indebtedness while our net income from 
foreign investments will be seriously reduced. Eventually therefore current exports 
must be expanded sufficiently not only to provide for payment for all our imports, a 
considerable part of which was before 1939 paid for by the receipts from investments, 
but to provide also the means of meeting these accumulated liabilities. In terms of 
value that means that pre-war exports must be doubled in order merely to preserve a 
balance on current account. Until that balance is achieved the maintenance of 
essential imports can be assured only by adding to the indebtedness which has one 
day to be repaid. 
10. The immediate outlook is that for the next few years there will continue to be 
an adverse balance because of (1) the cessation of Lend-Lease and Mutual Aid, (2) the 
impossibility of immediately reducing His Majesty's Government's enormous over-
seas expenditure on military services and supplies, and (3) the inevitable time-lag in 
reconverting industry in order to expand exports. The figure of £3 1/2 thousand 
millions of sterling balances will therefore be substantially increased before the 
United Kingdom reaches the stage even of a balance on current transactions. 
11. The policy to be pursued in these circumstances is naturally one of the 
principal problems of His Majesty's Government. The major choice lies between (a) 
the reduction to the absolute minimum of any further accumulation of indebtedness, 
especially indebtedness in foreign currencies, which would entail, as the Prime 
Minister has indicated, a regime of continued strict austerity in consumption; and 
(b) the acceptance of external credits which would avoid that necessity for the 
present by piling up future obligations. Which of these courses (or any intermediate 
course) is adopted depends greatly upon the discussions now in progress between 
British and American representatives on the consequences of the end of Lend-Lease, 
but it can be assumed that in any event His Majesty's Government are likely to have 
to review very carefully any proposals for new overseas commitments in the near 
future. Policies to which His Majesty's Government are committed and more 
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especially the policy of colonial development and welfare will, of course, be 
continued, but the strictest economy will certainly be required in all overseas 
expenditure, and this is bound to have its effect in the attitude of His Majesty's 
Government during the next few years towards both projects for new overseas 
expenditure which might in other circumstances have been approved and the 
continuance at the present level of some forms of existing expenditure. 
12. There is in fact at present equal cause for concern about any transactions 
which affect adversely the external balance of payments as about transactions which 
merely affect the national budget of State revenue and expenditure, although the 
early reduction of the present enormous annual budget deficit must be a major 
object of financial policy. From the point of view of the external balance, payments 
on private account are just as significant as payments out of Government funds, and 
it is therefore necessary to consider the over-all financial position in any issues of 
policy which involve, for instance, the settlement of the terms of purchase of 
imported products or the raising of loans by external Governments or residents 
abroad on the money market in this country. It is hardly necessary to add that as 
long as the external balance of payments is a matter of acute anxiety, some degree of 
exchange control and restriction of imports involving payment in difficult currencies 
will be necessary. Pending the result of the international discussions already 
mentioned it is difficult to say how severe that control may be but it may necessitate 
some degree of continued austerity in the Colonies as in the United Kingdom itself 
and the disappointment of the natural expectations of Colonial populations for more 
ample supplies of consumer goods. 
13. It would be wrong to conclude from the above paragraphs that the financial 
position of the United Kingdom was desperate. In effect, the United Kingdom has 
fought this war with complete disregard for financial consequences, and has poured 
into it the accumulated capital of generations of saving. Only by doing so has the 
country been able to finance the enormous expenditure incurred, especially in 
overseas territories. Having done that, the fact must now be faced that the country is 
for the time being poorer than it was. There is no lack of confidence in the United 
Kingdom's ability to build up again a strong financial position; the White Paper 
already mentioned itself affords evidence of its industrial capacity and adaptability 
which is encouraging for the more distant future. But the rebuilding of the capital 
position will certainly make heavy calls upon available resources and will leave little 
margin for anything but essentials. It is probable that the period of greatest strain 
will be the next two or three years, and it will be especially important in that period 
so to manage affairs as to avoid the accumulation of unmanageable liabilities. 
16 CO 927/1/1, no 59 12 Nov 1945 
[Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1945]: circular despatch from 
Mr Hall to governors. Enclosures: 2 and 3 
I have the honour to address you on the subject of the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act, 1945, which provides for increased financial assistance towards the 
continuation and expansion of the policy of Colonial development. A copy of the Act 
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is enclosed for convenience of reference. (Enclosure 1 Y 
2. As you are aware, this Act increases the amount of money that may be provided 
by Parliament for schemes of Colonial development and welfare of £120,000,000, and 
extends the period of such assistance to 31st March, 1956. It substitutes for the 
former fixed maximum sum of £5,000,000 in any financial year for development and 
welfare, and £500,000 for research, this new total sum, which can be drawn upon at 
any time within the ten-year period, subject only to a maximum to be issued in any 
one year of £17,500,000. It further provides that the maximum assistance towards 
Colonial research shall not, in the aggregate, exceed £1,000,000 in any financial 
year. The general provisions of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1940, 
otherwise than as just indicated, remain in force. 
3. This increase in the total sum to be provided and the lengthening of the period 
of such assistance by a further five years mark an important turning point in the 
development of Colonial productive resources and the improvement of human 
well-being. It comes at a time when a gradual easing of the war-time shortages of 
materials, equipment and skilled technical and scientific personnel may be hoped 
for. There are great possibilities in the years that lie ahead for raising the standards of 
health, education, social welfare, and general well-being of Colonial peoples if these 
expanded services are based upon improved economic efficiency and increased 
production. The primary requisite still is an improvement of the economic position 
in the Colonial Dependencies, the utilisation of their natural resources to the 
greatest extent possible and the widening of opportunity for human enterprise and 
endeavour. As a contribution towards improvements in Colonial development and 
welfare, the present Act provides a substantial sum of money, but it is not intended 
that this sum should be taken as indicating the total Colonial need for development 
expenditure in the next ten years. The total cost of development that can be 
embarked upon may be expected to be considerably greater than £120,000,000, 
according to the extent to which Colonial Governments can supplement the 
contemplated grants whether from public funds or with the assistance of private 
trade and enterprise. The new Act will, I am confident, enable Colonial Governments 
to draw up plans of development over the ten-year period, and to achieve steady and 
sustained progress towards the great goal of raising the standards of living and 
well-being of their people. 
4. You will naturally wish to know the approximate amount of assistance, out of 
the total sum provided under the new Act, that will be available to the territory under 
your administration. I have, therefore, prepared a scheme for the division of the 
£120,000,000 . A copy of this table is attached to this despatch. (Enclosure 2) . 
5. The first group of allocations covers those services to the Colonial Empire 
which can best be provided for centrally and which are of immense value, directly or 
indirectly, to development generally . The total set aside for these centrally provided 
schemes is £23,500,000, which includes a margin for unforeseen contingencies. A 
list of the more important of such schemes is contained in Section I of the enclosed 
Statement of Allocations (Enclosure 2). The most important, financially, is research. 
Under the new Act provision is made for expenditure on research up to a limit of 
£1,000,000 per annum, but as that scale of expenditure is not expected to be reached 
1 Not printed. 
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for some years, owing to the shortage of first-class research staff, the total over the 
decade is put at £8,500,000. In this total will be included the cost of the Colonial 
Geological Survey of which you have already been advised. Other surveys are also 
provided for under Central Schemes other than Research. The "savings" of 
£1,500,000 thus anticipated on research are therefore available for non-research 
purposes and will, if necessary, be so used. Although included for convenience in this 
"central" budget, it is by no means intended that all research schemes will be under 
direct central control. In appropriate cases research grants will be made to individual 
Colonial Governments, but they will be debited to this general allocation for 
research. 
6. I have thought it unwise to allocate the whole of the remaining balance to 
individual territories at once, since it is obviously impossible today to forecast the 
relative balance of the needs of all territories over the next decade. I have, therefore, 
set aside a sum of £11,000,000 as a general reserve, which will be available for 
supplementary allocations, as necessity arises, either for schemes submitted by the 
Colonial territories themselves or for central schemes. 
7. There remains thus a total of £85,500,000 for allocation to individual 
territories or regional groups of territories. The allocation to each Colonial 
Government of a sum that represents a fair proportion of the total amount available 
has been a difficult task. I am satisfied, however, that the allocations which I have 
made are fair and reasonable. No single criterion was adopted for judging the 
requirements of one Colonial territory as against another. All factors which were 
known to be relevant were taken into account, including the size and population of 
the territory, its known economic resources and possibilities, the present state of 
development, and development schemes known to exist or to be under contempla-
tion, and the financial resources likely to be available locally. 
8. It will be understood that the allocation to each territory does not constitute 
an authority to spend, but lays down a sum within which it is proposed that 
individual schemes should be authorised, provided that schemes which are in 
themselves suitable for assistance and fall within an approved general plan are put 
forward . Subject to the qualification that Colonies possessing responsible govern-
ment are by the terms of the Act excluded from its provisions, and that the position 
might therefore be modified within the period covered by the Act, it makes possible 
the planning of the development programmes of each Territory for the next ten 
years, on the basis of the funds estimated to be available. The money available will be 
the allocation under the Act, shown in the attached table, together with the 
Dependency's own estimated resources for development purposes, i.e., from surplus 
balances, future revenue surpluses or the proceeds of public loans. The poorer 
Dependencies have, of course, less prospect than the richer of drawing upon local 
resources-in some cases no such prospects can be counted on at all-but allowance 
has been made for these variations in determining the allocations under the Act. The 
main purpose of development planning should be to ensure that all the resources 
available are used to the best advantage, that the whole field of possible development 
and welfare is surveyed, and that the sums to be devoted to each project are 
determined, so that the programmes form a well-balanced whole. 
9. The determination of the broad programmes of development requires close 
co-operation between Colonial Governments and His Majesty's Government. The 
initial preparation of such plans is best done in the Colonial Dependencies, but they 
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will require to be carefully reviewed by a central organisation able to take the widest 
point of view before they are accepted as the framework of future development. Many 
Colonial Governments have at my request already prepared comprehensive plans 
covering all the development work which they would propose to undertake during 
the next ten years. I ask that those which have not completed such planning should 
do so as soon as possible and that those which have already submitted plans should 
consider whether any revision of them is necessary in the light of this despatch and 
the allocations now made. 
10. I have included in the memorandum attached to this despatch (Enclosure 3) 
various detailed suggestions on the preparation of comprehensive plans, together 
with a number of other points of detail which will arise in the administration of 
money under the new Act. The essence of the procedure I propose is that each 
Colonial Dependency should first draw up a plan covering all the objects of 
development and welfare expenditure which are thought desirable, without attempt-
ing in the initial stage to limit this to the exact amount of the resources estimated to 
be available. It is essential if sufficiently comprehensive planning is to be achieved 
that on the one side there should be taken into account all the resources likely to be 
available, whether from Colonial Development and Welfare assistance, from local 
revenue sources or publ ic loans or from any other source, and on the other that the 
plans should include all likely major developments on the expenditure side, 
including important increases in the recurrent expenditure of Departments dealing 
with public health, agricultural and other developmental services as well as strictly 
capital expenditure. This comprehensive plan should, however, be realistic and the 
proposals included in it should be graded in a few broad priority categories, so that 
whatever amount of money is in fact available can be devoted to those developments 
which are regarded as of the highest importance. This procedure is necessary, as the 
resources from which development may be financed over the ten-year period, other 
than the Colonial Development and Welfare allocation, cannot of necessity, be 
precisely estimated in advance. Colonial Governments should, however, couple with 
their comprehensive plans an approximate estimate of the total resources which they 
do expect to be able to devote to development, including, of course, the present 
allocation from Imperial funds under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act. 
11. In the formulation of estimates of local resources there is one factor that 
should be specially borne in mind. The contribution to be made from the Imperial 
Exchequer is a real burden on the United Kingdom taxpayer, to be borne at a time 
when the resources of the United Kingdom, external as well as internal, have been 
heavily strained. All parts of the Empire have shared in the sacrifices and burdens of 
war, but the financial burdens borne by the United Kingdom have been very much 
greater than those which have fallen on any other part of the Commonwealth. They 
have been greater absolutely, and they have entailed a most serious worsening of the 
external financial position of the United Kingdom quite unparalleled in any other 
part of the Commonwealth or in any Allied country. In spite of the manifold 
difficulties confronting the United Kingdom on all sides, the additional effort 
necessary to provide the funds set aside under the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act will be gladly made because of the desire to see Colonial development and welfare 
advanced, but it is equally expected that the Colonial Dependencies will play their 
part in the joint effort, as it is indeed in their own interests to do. Rates of taxation 
vary considerably from one Colonial territory to another, and it is important that 
c 
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direct taxation borne mainly by the richer members of the community should be 
reviewed, if this has not been done recently, so as to ensure that local revenues are 
making an adequate and fair contribution towards the cost of the development and 
advancement of the territory. 
12. A proper balance between different objects of development and welfare, 
already referred to in paragraph 8 above, is fundamental to a wise development 
policy. The dual title of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act clearly indicates 
its purpose, namely, parallel progress in the development of the resources of the 
Colonial Dependencies and in the improvement of the welfare of their people. The 
first object is the more fundamental since without economic development it will be 
impossible for the Dependencies to maintain from their own resources the improved 
standards which are desired for them; but in the meantime the social services must 
be improved and in many cases this improvement in the social services will 
contribute indirectly to economic development and general advancement. I empha-
sise the fundamental character of economic development, because the possibilities of 
expansion in the social services are commonly immediately apparent and, as a matter 
of administrative organisation, are directly the concern of particular departments, 
while economic development is at once a more general responsibility and a sphere in 
which the desirable course is less easy to determine. The relative roles played by the 
two parts of a general programme will vary from Dependency to Dependency, but the 
most careful attention should everywhere be given to the improvement of the 
productive efficiency of the Dependency's resources as a whole, both human and 
material. 
13. As already indicated, when plans have been drawn up locally on the above 
lines it will be important that they should be carefully reviewed at the centre. I am 
considering what strengthening of the machinery of the Colonial Office will be 
necessary in order to ensure that such a review is carried out effectively but 
expeditiously and that the best advice will be available. I shall give special 
consideration to the best means of securing the most competent review of 
possibilities of economic development and the means of promoting it. It may be 
necessary for me to suggest how machinery in the territories can be strengthened. 
14. In the preparation of plans, and indeed in all work connected with them, it is 
of the first importance that the interest of the inhabitants of the Dependency should 
be aroused and their opinion consulted and their co-operation secured wherever 
possible. A great part of the value of the assistance given by the new Act will be lost if 
the developments financed or assisted by it are regarded merely as an activity of 
"Government" and not as the concern of the ordinary people of the country. The 
establishment of Development Committees containing unofficial representation is 
one obvious means of ensuring due public participation, and such Committees have I 
know already been formed in many of the Colonial Dependencies. 
15. The need to prepare a comprehensive plan for each Dependency does not, of 
course, entail the holding up of all development while plans are being prepared or 
revised. On the contrary, the passing of the new Act is clearly the signal for an 
intensification of effort. Having regard, however, to the schemes already initiated 
under the 1940 Act and to the difficulty which must still for some little time longer 
exist in obtaining the staff and materials needed to carry out large programmes of 
work, I feel sure that progress in the long run with development programmes will be 
hastened and not delayed if the main immediate emphasis is on the completion of 
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general plans for each Dependency rather than the submission of unrelated proposals 
for the approval of individual new schemes. Nothing that I have said, however, 
should prevent any Colonial Government from submitting such schemes in advance 
of the general plan where these are clearly of immediate urgency and will ultimately 
be included in the general plan. 
16. It will be observed from the attached table of allocations that provision has 
been made in certain instances for regional allocations in order to provide for 
schemes which are of a regional character and for services which may be common to 
the area in question. I regard it as important not only that governments in a given 
area should consult freely with one another in respect of their development plans but 
that consideration should be given to the possibility of encouraging, when appropri-
ate, development upon a regional basis. This applies especially to such areas as East 
Africa, Central Africa and the West Indies. Colonial territories in close geographical 
proximity should find it of advantage, where development, research, communicat-
tions, higher education and several other services are concerned, not only to proceed 
with schemes administered separately by the territories themselves, but also to plan 
in regional terms. They would thereby carry out their own developments in the full 
understanding of regional needs and of the necessity for fitting their programmes 
into the regional picture. I have not thought it necessary at this stage to make a 
regional allocation for West Africa but I trust that the Governments of the Colonies 
in that area will continue to advance the recognition of the regional outlook in 
economic development, communications, higher education and research. 
17. I propose that this despatch should be presented to Parliament as a Command 
paper and I will notify you, in due course, of the date of publication. 
18. In conclusion, I have only to reiterate my conviction of the opportunity 
which is presented to all concerned with Colonial administration in this new chapter 
of Colonial development; my deep sense of the great responsibility whichs rests upon 
us to see that the resources made available, including those made at real sacrifice by 
the people of the United Kingdom, are wisely and economically used; and my 
confidence in the co-operation of Colonial peoples and officials alike in the discharge 
of that responsibility so as to bring permanent advantage and improvement to the 
whole Colonial Empire and enable it to play an increasingly important part in the 
world's affairs. 
Enclosure 2 to 76: Allocation of funds available under the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act, 1945 
Summary 
Central Schemes, including Research 
Allocations to Colonial territories 
General Reserve for supplementary allocations 
I. Allocations to central schemes 
i. Research1 £10,000,000 
less amount estimated to be unspent during period 
1946-56 £1,500,000 
£23,500,000 
£85,500,000 
£11,000,000 
£120,000,000 
£8,500,000 
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ii. Centrally administered schemes 
(a) Higher Education ... 
(b) Training Schemes for the Colonial Service 
(c) Geodetic and Topographical Surveys 
(d) Aeronautical Wireless Communications2 
(e) Meteorological Services2 .•• 
(f) Other Central Schemes, such as the Central Nutrition Unit, 
Contributions to the Imperial Forestry Institute, Higher 
Training in Social Sciences, etc. 
iii. Margin for Supplementary Allocations to Central Schemes ... 
II. Allocations to colonial territories 
West Indies 
Barbados 
British Guiana3 
British Honduras 
Jamaica 
Leeward Islands 
Trinidad4 
Windward Islands 
West Indies-General5 
South Atlantic 
Falklands 
St. Helena and Ascension 
Fiji and Western Pacific 
Fiji 
Western Pacific 
Far East 
Hong Kong 
Borneo and Sarawak 
Malaya 
Indian Ocean 
Ceylon6 
Mauritius 
Seychelles 
[76) 
£4,500,000 
£2,500,000 
£2,000,000 
£1,000,000 
£1,000,000 
£1,000,000 
£20,500,000 
£3,000,000 
£23,500,000 
£800,000 
£2,500,000 
£600,000 
£6,500,000 
£1,200,000 
£1,200,000 
£1,850,000 
£850,000 
£15,500,000 
£150,000 
£200,000 
£350,000 
£1,000,000 
£800,000 
£1,800,000 
£1,000,000 
£1,500,000 
£5,000,000 
£7,500,000 
£1,750,000 
£250,000 
£2,000,000 
[76] 
Middle East 
Aden and Protectorate 
Palestine and Transjordan 7 
Mediterranean 
Cyprus 
Malta8 
Gibraltar 
West Africa 
Gambia9 
Sierra Leone 
Gold Coast 
Nigeria 
East Africa 
Somaliland 
Kenya 
Uganda 
Tanganyika 
Zanzibar 
East Africa- General 
Central Africa 
Nyasaland 
Northern Rhodesia 
Central Africa-General 
South Africa 
High Commission Territories 
Ill. General reserve 
General Reserve 
COLONIAL GENERAL 
Total 
* The General Reserve will be available for both central schemes and colonial schemes. 
1 Including Geological Survey. 
2 Subject to determination of the degree of Colonial liability. 
3 To include any subsidy to British Guiana Airways Service to interior. 
4 To include any subsidy to British West Indian Airways. 
5 To include any allocation that may be made to the Bahamas. 
15 
£800,000 
£1,000,000 
£1,800,000 
£1,750,000 
£50,000 
£100,000 
£1,900,000 
£1,300,000 
£2,600,000 
£3,500,000 
£23,000,000 
£30,400,000 
£750,000 
£3,500,000 
£2,500,000 
£5,250,000 
£750,000 
£3,500,000 
£16,250,000 
£2,000,000 
£2,500,000 
£1,000,000 
£5,500,000 
£2,500,000 
£85,500,000 
£11,000,000* 
6 Provision may be required for existing commitment in respect of Hydro-electric scheme. 
7 Provisional. 
8 Token figure . 
9 Of the Gambia allocation £500,000 to be earmarked for drainage, rehousing and slum clearance at 
Bathurst. 
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Enclosure 3 to 76: Memorandum 
I. Central schemes. (See paragraph 5 of despatch.) 
The following is a list of the schemes for which finance is being provided apart from 
the allocations made to individual Colonies or groups of Colonies and for which no 
provision need therefore be set aside in colonial comprehensive plans. 
(1) All research schemes. 
(2) Scheme for the improvement of the geological survey of the Colonial Empire. 
This scheme will be treated as a research scheme. 
(3) Proposals now under consideration for the provision of higher education 
facilities in the Colonial Empire. (See Cmd. 6647, 6654, 6655). 
(4) A training scheme for assisting selected scholars from the Colonies to qualify 
for the Colonial Service. (Under consideration.) 
(5) Assistance towards post-graduate training of candidates both from this 
country and from the Colonies for the Colonial Service, both administrative and 
technical. (Under consideration.) 
(6) Scheme for a geodetic and topographical survey of the Colonial Empire. 
(7) Scheme for the provision and improvement of aeronautical wireless com-
munications and aeronautical meteorological services . This scheme will not 
include provision for airfields or other air facilities. Provision for these latter 
purposes should, therefore, continue to be included, where assistance is required 
towards them from the Colonial Development and Welfare Vote, in the plans 
submitted by Colonial Territories. 
(8) A scheme for the establishment of a central nutrition organisation for the 
Colonial Empire in London. 
The above list of schemes may be amended or added to later but is given to 
Colonial Governments for their general guidance. Inclusion of any scheme within 
the above list, does not, of course, mean that the financing of services already in 
existence in the Colonies for objects connected with any of the above will necessarily 
be modified. 
11. Preparation of comprehensive plans . (See paragraphs 8 to 15 of the despatch.) 
(1) Expenditure side 
(a) The object of the plan is to give an outline sketch of the developments 
proposed in the Colony over the next ten years, regard being had to its general 
financial status. The plan should embrace all schemes considered necessary for 
the above purpose without reference to the particular source from which they 
will be financed. For further comment on this latter point see under (2) below. 
(b) The plan need be drawn up in broad outline only. Indeed this is desirable in 
order to avoid unnecessary waste of labour at the preliminary planning stage. 
Schemes to be included within the plan can be worked out in detail later. This 
procedure will not, as hitherto, entail any risk of the Colony's not receiving its 
full allocation of Colonial Development and Welfare assistance. While, however, 
schemes included in the plan need not be worked out in detail at the beginning, 
the best approximate estimate possible should be given of the cost of each 
scheme. Otherwise there will be no means of assessing either the total cost of 
the plan or whether it is well balanced. 
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(c) It is contemplated that the total cost of the schemes included in the 
expenditure side of the plan may normally be somewhat in excess of the 
resources now foreseen to be available, but the schemes included in the plans 
should be divided into a few broad priority categories. This is needed in order to 
give elasticity to the plan so that whatever the amount of resources (within 
broad limits) proves in the end to be available, the work undertaken under the 
plan will cover the more essential needs of the Colony first. Adequate attention 
to measures designed to conserve and develop the fundamental natural 
resources of the Colony is particularly important because no object of develop-
ment is likely to have greater long term benefits to the community concerned. 
These remarks, however, are not intended to imply that the same proportionate 
allocation of expenditure as between different main objects will be appropriate 
in the case of each Colony. Local circumstances obviously must be the finally 
deciding factor in each case. 
(d) Balance is desirable, not merely between different fields of expenditure, but 
also in regard to individual schemes. Individual schemes which involve too large 
a proportion of the total cost of the development programme carry with them 
obvious dangers. Similarly, plans should not be composed of a large number of 
small schemes, the inter-relationship of which has not been carefully con-
sidered and co-ordinated. 
(2) Revenue side of the plan 
(a) Items to be included. The financial side of the plan should include the 
following:-
(1) The allocation of assistance under the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Act, to which reference is made in paragraph 7 of the despatch which 
accompanies this memorandum. 
(2) Such part, if any of the Colony's estimated surplus balances at the 
beginning of the ten-year period covered by the new Act, i.e., 1st April 1946, 
as it is considered legitimate to allocate to the development programme. 
(3) Such sums, if any, as it is reasonably expected can be set aside during the 
ten-year period from future revenue sources having regard to possible 
increases of revenue during the ten-year period from development or 
increased taxation. 
(4) The proceeds of any loans which the Colonial Government proposes to 
seek permission to raise in London in order to finance the development 
programme. 
(5) The proceeds of any loans which the Colonial Government expects to be 
able to raise locally for the same purpose. 
Obviously not all the above sources of finance will be available in each Colony, 
and most of the estimates in the case of items other than the Colonial 
Development and Welfare allocation can, at this date, be guesses only. 
Nevertheless, Colonial Governments will doubtless agree that it is desirable in 
framing development plans to make the best estimate possible of all the 
resources likely to be available. The estimates should, of course, later be revised 
from time to time to keep them as realistic as possible. 
(b) Use of Colonial Development and Welfare allocation. As all sums issued 
from the Colonial Development and Welfare Vote, whether by way of free grant 
or of loan count equally against the total sum provided by the Act, it is clear that 
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Colonies will benefit more by taking their assistance in the form of grants rather 
than loans. This does not, of course, mean that it would be legitimate for a 
Colony to ask for a free grant of the whole cost of schemes which are clearly 
suitable for finance by means of loan, e.g., schemes which are expected to be 
revenue earning. Where a scheme is financed by a publicly issued loan, 
consideration could be given to the grant of assistance from the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Vote in the form of a free grant of interest over an 
initial period on the loan capital employed in the scheme. 
Since it is impossible to foresee all objects for which schemes may be required 
over so long a period as the ten years covered by the new Act, it is suggested that 
in framing their plans, all Colonial Governments, in addition to making 
provision for specific objects in priority categories on the lines suggested above, 
should retain at the outset a proportion of their Colonial Development and 
Welfare funds unallocated to specific projects, so that it may be available to meet 
unforeseen excesses of expenditure on approved schemes, and in order to avoid 
any danger that all resources will be so fully mortgaged that nothing will be 
available for contingencies. 
(3) Submission of comprehensive plans 
As soon as each Colonial Government has prepared its comprehensive plan it 
should be forwarded to the Secretary of State so that it may be considered by 
him in consultation with his Advisers. It is not expected that this consideration 
should cause any delay in carrying out the development programme, since, as 
stated in the despatch, it will be open to Colonial Governments to continue to 
submit urgent schemes for approval before the whole plan has been settled. 
Ill. Submission of individual schemes 
Colonial Governments are already fully familiar with the procedure to be followed in 
the submission of individual schemes for assistance under the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Act, since this procedure is already in operation for schemes submitted 
under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1940. The following suggestions 
are, however, made in the light of previous experience with schemes submitted 
under that Act:-
(1) Technical advice. The importance of basing schemes on the best technical 
advice scarcely needs emphasis. Many Colonial Governments, however, will now 
be planning to undertake considerable works and in the case of such larger works 
and particularly works of a specialised character-such, for example, as hospitals, 
irrigation works, water supplies, electricity developments and slum clearance 
schemes involving town planning-the desirability of obtaining the best technical 
advice is particularly great. In cases where it is considered advisable for expert 
advice to be obtained from outside the Colony, the cost of obtaining such advice 
may reasonably form the subject of an application for a free grant from the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Vote. 
(2) Revenue earning schemes. As explained in paragraph 2(b) of Section 11 above, 
free grants will not normally be made from the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Vote to cover the whole cost of schemes, such as housing, electricity and urban 
water supplies schemes, from which Colonial Governments or local authorities 
may expect in due course to derive some revenue. In such cases the appropriate 
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form of assistance would be a grant of the whole or part of the interest payable 
during the initial years on loan monies or in some cases a free grant of a portion of 
the cost. 
It is also usually an equitable arrangement from the point of view of the general 
community that those persons who obtain direct benefit from schemes should be 
made to pay at least part of the cost by such means as, e.g., payment of a rate 
rather than that the whole cost of the work should fall either on the general body 
of taxpayers in the Colony or on the Colonial Development and Welfare Vote as the 
case may be. 
(3) Maintenance of works and residual expenditure. Many schemes, whether of a 
capital or recurrent nature, involve continuing expenditure after the period 
covered by the scheme itself comes to an end. The extent of the residual charges 
should be estimated carefully in order that the Colony's budget will not be 
excessively overloaded with recurrent charges on works or services which are not 
revenue earning. 
Needless to say, the maintenance of works which have been constructed with 
Colonial Development and Welfare assistance is a matter for which adequate 
provision should be made. Colonial Governments will readily appreciate the moral 
obligations of communities who receive such financial assistance and will 
doubtless take steps to see that the works which are undertaken with such 
assistance are kept in a good state of repair. 
(4) Division of cost of schemes . The procedure contemplated in this memoran-
dum and accompanying despatch is that Colonies should draw up programmes of 
development and welfare to be financed partly by means of the allocation of 
Colonial Development and Welfare assistance which is now being communicated 
to them and partly from the other sources specified in Section 11 (2) of this 
memorandum. This procedure will not exclude arrangements whereby certain 
schemes are financed wholly from the Colonial Development and Welfare Vote and 
others from local sources. Nevertheless there is a certain advantage in arranging 
that, particularly where recurrent expenditure is involved, a contribution towards 
the cost of the schemes should wherever possible be made from sources other than 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Vote. The fact that a contribution is being 
made towards recurrent expenditure on a scheme from the beginning reduces the 
burden of adjustment when Colonial Development and Welfare assistance towards 
the particular scheme in question has come to an end, while the payment of a 
contribution towards any scheme from local sources removes any danger that the 
scheme may be regarded solely as a creation of the Imperial Government, in the 
efficient execution of which the local community have no interest. 
77 CO 537/1378, nos 16 & 18 1 July & 1 Aug 1946 
[Colonial sterling balances]: minutes by S Caine. Annex: CO submis-
sion to Working Party 
Mr. Creech Jones 
You asked for a note on colonial sterling balances and certain other points. The 
matters of preference and trade policy are Sir G. Clauson's responsibility and I have 
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passed on your note to him to deal with those aspects. This minute is, therefore, 
confined to the sterling balance position. 
The so-called sterling balances have a fairly definite, but not entirely logical 
meaning. In the main the phrase is intended to cover what are called quick liabilities 
in this country to overseas countries, that is holdings here by overseas governments, 
institutions and private individuals, either in the form of cash or in securities which 
are immediately saleable and could, therefore, be converted quickly into cash and 
spent. The accepted figures, therefore, include all the cash and security holdings of 
overseas governments and currency authorities, e.g. foreign and dominion central 
banks and colonial currency boards and commissions. They include also the U.K. 
assets of overseas banks and overseas branches of British banks. They are theoretical-
ly deficient in that they do not include the direct cash and security holdings of 
private persons. These are excluded not because they are really different in 
substance, but because of the statistical difficulty of getting information about them 
and no doubt because in practice they are thought to be comparatively unimportant 
in amount. 
The latest figures as at 31st March 1946 show that colonial territories (including 
Southern Rhodesia) held just short of £800 million, that is between 20% and 25% of 
the total. The Colonies taken as a group are in fact the largest holders of sterling 
balances after India. This £800 million is made up of three roughly equal categories, 
i.e. currency holdings £249 million, government funds including loans to H.M.G. 
£286 million and commercial banking funds £257 million. Among individual 
Colonies and groups of Colonies, the leading holders were, Malaya £123 million, 
Palestine £119 million, West Africa £109 million, East Africa £100 million, Ceylon 
£80 million. 
The holding of balances of this kind is not, of course, a new thing in colonial 
finance, although their magnitude has greatly increased during the war. The 
currency funds are the reserves against colonial currency issues, which always have 
been held predominantly in London and which automatically increase with the 
increased circulation of money in the Colonies, is dependent on the level of prices 
[sic]. The government funds consist partly of working balances and surpluses held in 
reserve and partly of a great variety of sinking fund and other special funds held 
under statute or otherwise. Special loans to H.M.G. are, of course, a war time 
feature. The commercial banking funds are reserves of colonial banking institutions 
against their local deposits which in practice they find it most convenient to hold in 
London. (The proportion of banking funds so held in this country has increased 
during the war because of the reduction of outlets for the use of banking funds in the 
Colonies and to the diminution of purely private trading operations.) 
Under the American Loan Agreement, H.M.G. is under a general obligation to 
negotiate with all holders of sterling balances arrangements by which if possible 
some portion of the sterling balances will be cancelled and arrangements made for 
the gradual release of the balance. The Secretary of State put in a paper to the 
Cabinet while the loan negotiations were going on pointing out that it would be 
virtually impossible politically to make any cancellation of colonial balances and we 
believe that other Ministers were very much disposed to agree. The Treasury have 
just assembled an Interdepartmental Working Party to consider the colonial balances 
as one of the items on their list and one meeting of the Working Party has been held. 
We have pointed out the great difficulties of any formal cancellation of colonial 
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balances which would look extremely odd as an off-set to our development and 
welfare policy and I do not really think that we shall have much difficulty in 
establishing that cancellation is not practical politics for the Colonies. It may, 
however, be necessary as a gesture to concede some formal temporary handing over 
of part of the currency reserves against a promise that they will be made available at a 
later date for development purposes (this is full of complexities, but there is no [sic] 
general acceptance that this will be technically feasible with no real danger or loss to 
colonial finances, apart from the loss of interest on the balances so dealt with). 
It is more likely that we shall have to come to some formal arrangement on the 
question of the rate at which Colonies may be permitted to spend their existing 
balances. The kind of arrangement at present favoured interdepartmentally is that we 
should say to each Colony or regional group that they must not reduce their total 
balances below certain agreed figures over the next five years. The Colonies would 
then have to take steps by import control to check expenditure if they were in danger 
of over-stepping the mark. I think it is quite likely that such an arrangement could 
be safely made because with the increase which is now going on in produce prices, 
the probability is that for some time to come the Colonies will go on adding to their 
existing balances, that is they will not be able to spend even their current earnings, 
let alone the accumulated money. As already remarked, the currency balances and a 
good deal of the others go up automatically as prices rise and the amount of money 
in circulation increases. We should, moreover, have no difficulty in getting the 
Treasury to agree that any such limitation of the rate of expenditure would be relaxed 
if a Colony were in special economic difficulties (e.g. if Mauritius had another 
hurricane). 
The main point of any arrangement with the Colonies is that it should set a good 
example in form for arrangements with more difficult balances like India and Egypt 
and we by no means despair of being able to agree an arrangement which would be 
satisfactory to the Treasury in form without involving us in any cost in substance. 
There is, however, one school of thought in the Treasury which would like to get 
from the Colonies some contribution in substance towards war costs as well as an 
arrangement which is satisfactory in form and it may, therefore, be necessary to take 
the matter to Ministers at a later stage to see that the Colonies are not in fact 
seriously prejudiced. 
S.C. 
1.7.46 
I attach two papers which have emerged from the working party on colonial sterling 
balances set up at the Treasury request (the interim papers collected for that working 
party are registered in the sub-file 16479/63). I understand that the Treasury are now 
submitting these two papers to the Chancellor of the Exchequer who will then decide 
what action he wishes to propose to colleagues. I think, therefore, that the Secretary 
of State ought to see them at the present stage, although no action is required until 
he hears from the Chancellor. 
The general background is explained in the opening of the first of the two papers 
attached here , i.e. No. 17.1 Because both of our obligations under the American Loan 
Agreement and of the hard necessity to limit as much as possible the ability of 
overseas countries to take exports from the United Kingdom without paying for them 
1 Not printed. 
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on the nail, it is necessary to consider in respect of the Colonies, as well as other 
overseas holders of sterling balances, two things, i.e. whether any part of the existing 
balances can be cancelled, and if so how much, and what limitations should be 
imposed on the speed at which the remaining balances are used for current 
expenditure in the next few years. On the second point, we believe that we can come 
to a reasonable understanding with the Treasury, by which the colonial balances 
would not be run down too quickly. Indeed if the present trend of general prices is 
maintained, it is quite likely that this will constitute no problem, because the 
circulation of money in the Colonies will be maintained or increased and the various 
reserves held against it in London will therefore be in little danger of being reduced. 
There are a number of technical problems connected with any control of the running 
down of these balances, but the only one with which the Secretary of State need be 
troubled at present is that, in order to maintain such control, it will be necessary to 
continue in existence at least a minimum of control of imports into the Colonies. 
That will, of course, be unpopular, but I think its necessity can be adequately 
explained to the public. 
Much more controversial is the cancellation of balances. The Treasury have felt it 
necessary to maintain the proposal that there should be some cancellation of colonial 
balances. The purpose of the second paper put in by the Colonial Office is to set out 
the reasons why we think any such cancellation quite impossible. We have, of course, 
reserved the Secretary of State's position in this, but I hope that in due course when 
it gets to ministerial level, we shall have no difficulty in convincing other Ministers of 
our case. 
Annex to 77 
S.C. 
1.8.46 
The paper which is being submitted by the Working Party on Colonial Sterling 
Balances sets out the Treasury view that some part of the existing balances ought to 
be cancelled. This paper explains the reasons why the Colonial Office consider any 
such cancellation impossible. It should be explained at the out-set that the issue has 
not been submitted at the present stage to the Colonial Secretary who has, however, 
already expressed his views in a paper submitted to Ministers in November, 1945. 
(GEN. 89/9) 
2. Politically, any sort of cancellation would be diametrically opposed to all 
recent declarations of policy by all parties. It would mean exacting a forced 
contribution from territories which, it has been repeatedly declared,\ it is the 
intention of His Majesty's Government to assist as generously as United Kingdom 
resources permit. Reference need only be made to the White Paper on Colonial 
Development published in 1940, to the speeches by Ministers during the passage of 
the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts in 1940 and 1945 and to speeches from 
all parts of the House of Commons in the annual debates in recent years on the 
Colonial Office Estimates. The general sentiment of all those speeches has been that 
we ought to do more for the Colonies and not less. 
3. That is the broad political difficulty. There would almost certainly be 
insuperable obstacles in detail to any action on a common formula for the 
[77) COLONIAL GENERAL 23 
cancellation of sterling balances. Such cancellation would normally require legisla-
tion in all territories affected and it is impossible to believe that every one of the 
Legislatures, most of which have a legal or conventional independence in financial 
matters, would accept any common scheme put before them. The alternative would 
be an Imperial act imposing a species of taxation on the Colonies in a fashion not 
attempted since 1776 and beyond the scale of anything done before that. 
4. It is indeed impossible to contemplate as a real possibility any common 
formula solution. The circumstances of the Colonial territories are nothing like 
uniform and every one of them presents special features which either constitute 
overwhelming arguments against any cancellation whatever or would at least 
necessitate sharp discrimination in the application of such a policy. Examples are:-
(a) Palestine. Although Palestine's sterling balances are large, the Government 
itself has no surplus in hand whatever, having used up its pre-war surplus, 
together with the proceeds of largely increased taxation and local borrowing, in 
meeting special war-time expenditure. Much of this has been the cost of 
subsidising the cost of living which would otherwise have risen still further owing 
to the very high prices fixed for Palestine's imports (in which fixing Palestine has 
been treated with little generosity). Other special features of Palestine's financial 
situation are the very high portion of her balances held in the form of commercial 
banking funds and the fact that a substantial portion originated in gifts and loans 
to Jewish organisations, largely from American sources. On the political side the 
difficulties of exacting any contribution from Palestine at the present moment are 
sufficiently obvious. 
(b) Malaya and Hong Kong. These territories were substantial holders of sterling 
before the war and have not of course increased their holdings significantly since 
1941, apart from additional currency holdings against new issues of currency since 
liberation. They will now have to call on all their reserves to meet essential 
rehabilitation expenditure and it is only too probable that His Majesty's Govern-
ment will have to help further, as is already being done for Hong Kong by way of 
loans-in-aid. 
(c) Malta. Part of Malta's holdings consists of the grant of £10,000,000 already 
paid over by His Majesty's Government towards Malta's war damage expenses and 
the recent decision to increase the grant to £30,000,000 is a clear recognition of 
the complete inability of the Colony to meet those expenses itself. 
(d) East and West Africa. Between them these territories hold a little over 
£200,000,000 or approximately £6 per head of population. Bearing in mind that 
the sterling balances include cover for practically every penny of cash or bank 
deposits held in these territories, this figure represents in effect the whole cash 
resources of these people and can hardly be regarded as excessive when compared 
with the cash and bank deposit holdings of this country, amounting to £135 per 
head. 
5. Reverting, however, to the general case for cancellation, it must surely be 
based on some ground of equity and not simply on a particular interpretation of the 
obligation to "adjust" the balances, arising from the American Loan Agreement. It 
has been suggested elsewhere that a large proportion of the sterling balances 
accumulated by present holders represents the proceeds of excessively high prices 
charged during the war for goods and services supplied by them. The Colonial Office 
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would not agree that there is any foundation for this suggestion in the case of the 
Colonies. Nearly all their main products have been bought in bulk by His Majesty's 
Government at prices designed to cover actual costs plus pre-war profit margins. As 
will be apparent from the attached table2 of comparative increases in the prices of 
imports into the Colonies and the prices of their exports during the actual war 
period, this policy successfully prevented the Colonies from benefiting by high 
prices; on the contrary the net change in the terms of trade was adverse to them, the 
prices of their imports going up more than the prices of their exports. It further 
emerges from these figures that the increase in Colonial sterling balances from 1939 
to date, which, so far as statistics are available, appears to be an increase of about 200 
per cent., has done little more than correspond with the average increase in the 
prices of imports into the Colonies. That is, in terms of purchasing power the 
sterling balances of the Colonies have no greater value than they had before the war. 
6. It is far more true that the Colonies' balances to-day represent the results of 
deprivation of supplies by either voluntary or enforced saving during the war. They 
accepted from the outbreak of war a system of licensing of imports and they 
submitted to rationing of petrol, newsprint and other things which has resulted in a 
diminution in the scale of consumption comparable, after allowing for the difference 
in conditions, with that in this country. This restriction of supplies was undertaken 
consciously and deliberately and with the knowledge that it would lead to an 
accumulation of financial balances which Colonies were encouraged to believe could 
be spent after the war. The general under-lying policy was set out in a circular 
despatch issued by Lord Moyne on the 5th of June, 1941.3 This despatch, in which 
the Treasury concurred, explicitly encouraged Colonial Governments to build up 
surplus balances which could be used after the war for development purposes. 
7. In pursuance of this policy, Colonial Governments have been encouraged in 
the preparation of their long-term development plans to take the maximum account 
of the contributions they can draw from their own accumulated surpluses as well as 
the grants to be made under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. This policy 
again was clearly stated in the Secretary of State's circular despatch of the 23rd4 of 
November, 1945, and has been given explicit effect in the approval accorded to 
individual plans (with full Treasury agreement). A particularly striking case is that of 
Nigeria for which a development plan involving a total expenditure over ten years of 
£55,000,000 was approved last year of which £23,000,000 is to be drawn from 
Colonial Development and Welfare funds and the balance from Nigerian surpluses 
and future revenue and from new loans estimated at £10,000,000. 
8. There are important technical reasons for some of the Colonial accumulations 
of sterling. Part of the Government funds held in London represent automatic cover 
for local savings, e.g. in local savings banks which, especially in the light of war-time 
savings campaigns, must be accorded equal security with savings in the United 
Kingdom itself. Part of the increase of commercial balances is simply a reflection of 
the increased liquidity of local banks due to the running down of commercial trading 
stocks and the financing of much trade directly by Government purchasing 
2 Not printed. 
3 See BDEEP series A, J M Lee & P Rich, eds, Colonial policy and practice, 1925-1945. 
4 Sic; see 76. 
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organisations. The technical considerations are particularly important when it is 
borne in mind that owing to the close integration of Colonial monetary systems with 
the United Kingdom and the almost complete absence of local money markets, 
virtually the whole of Colonial reserves of every kind, public and private, are held in 
London. 
9. If cancellation were to be attempted on the scale suggested, i.e. £100,000,000, 
it is possible that a substantial part of it, perhaps a half, could be secured by diversion 
of funds from the currency reserves. But, as noted in the principal submission of the 
Working Party, this would have no effect on the actual purchasing power of the 
Colonies and if it were desired to have such effect, it would be necessary to raise at 
any rate the greater part of whatever sum were involved by new taxation. It is difficult 
to see how that could be done except in the form of capital levy. Leaving aside the 
enormous and perhaps insuperable practical difficulties of such levy and all questions 
of equity, it is to be noted that the greater part of capital assets in the Colonies is 
owned by United Kingdom companies and individuals, so that much of the real 
burden would be transferred to a selected group of concerns in this country. 
10. Finally, it is necessary to consider some possible or probable consequences of 
action of the kind suggested in the field of future Colonial economic and financial 
policy. In the first place, Colonies would have to try to strike much harder bargains 
in the sale of their products. Hitherto, nearly all their main products have been sold 
in bulk to His Majesty's Government at prices based on actual costs. It is not felt that 
a tight restriction to an actual cost basis can in any case be any longer maintained 
but hitherto it has not been policy to aim at securing the highest price which might 
be obtained in a sellers' market. If, however, Colonies were to suffer cancellation of 
their balances, there would be the strongest possible incentive to them to increase 
their current incomes by securing the highest possible prices for their products. 
Secondly, the act of cancellation of the kind suggested would be bound to be a 
considerable shock to the intricate financial and monetary relationships now existing 
between the Colonies and the United Kingdom and the more advanced Colonies at 
any rate would almost certainly try to increase their financial independence as 
rapidly as possible. They might indeed find it necessary to interpose controls and 
restrictions on the movement of funds to London which, bearing in mind the large 
net dollar earning power of the Colonies, would be very much to the disadvantage of 
the United Kingdom. Taking the most general view, London has hitherto been the 
banker of all the Colonies and a bank is not likely to get new business if it attempts to 
confiscate deposits already made. 
11. The desirability in the interests of all concerned of regulating in orderly 
fashion the speed at which the Colonies attempt to spend their accumulate,d balances 
is not disputed; and it is believed that that regulation can be achieved by continuing 
the existing policies of controlling imports and of maintaining high levels of 
taxation. (The latter point is constantly pressed upon Colonial Governments in the 
discussion of their development finance and the Colonial Secretary has just issued a 
further circular telegram on it.) But the Colonial Office believe that, as explained 
above, the outright cancellation of balances would be contrary to declared develop-
mental policy; would be unjust, and unfair between one Colony and another; would 
constitute a gross breach of faith to Governments which have been officially 
encouraged to build up surplus balances; and would be fundamentally unwise in the 
long-term economic and political interests of the United Kingdom itself. 
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78 CO 852/989/3 14 Jan-18 Nov 1947 
[Marketing of colonial produce]: minutes by E Melville1, S Caine, Sir 
G Clauson, Mr Creech Jones and Mr Rees-Williams 
Mr. Caine 
As you know, I have been giving some thought recently to certain issues which have 
come up in the attempt to apply in practice the general principles of marketing 
policy laid down by the Interdepartmental Working Party on the Prices of Colonial 
Products and subsequently accepted by Ministers. 
These principles, although concerned chiefly with the circumstances in which it 
would be reasonable to negotiate long term contracts for Colonial products with the 
buying Ministries here, were based on certain broad assumptions which have, I 
think, been overlooked, if not actually set aside in the case of certain recent deals 
with the Ministry of Food and the Board of Trade. The assumptions were (a) that the 
Colonies were entitled to a fair commercial deal on the basis either of current world 
market values or of a long term undertaking to provide an assured market at a 
reasonable price; (b) that the Colonies should not discriminate between buyers, i.e. 
that Colonies should accept the best commercial offer, from whatever source it was 
forthcoming, taking account of course of the factor of assured market given by a long 
term contract. 
These assumptions are, in fact, inter-related. Colonies can only get a fair return on 
exports if they are free to sell to the highest bidder, either on a spot sale or on the 
basis of a long term contract. (In practice, it is doubtful whether this criterion can 
ever be satisfied by long term commitments, except of the most flexible kind. Our 
experience to date with long-term contracts which attempt to fix prices for a period 
ahead has been unhappy.) 
Some of the arrangements for the sale of Colonial commodities to which we are 
committed at present violate one or other of these basic assumptions. I think that it 
might be useful, therefore, to take stock of the position now and to ask, if necessary 
from the Secretary of State, for instructions on the general line which we should 
follow in future marketing negotiations. 
The worse case which I have so far come across is that of Nigerian goat skins. 
During the war, and until the breakdown of international allocations for hides and 
skins, all Nigerian goat skins were allocated to the U.K. by means of the Nigerian 
export licensing control. They were bought by the Ministry of Supply from shippers 
at negotiated prices which were, on the whole, rather low. When international 
allocations ceased some six months ago, bids from American users began to come in, 
America having had a fairly substantial share of the trade before the war. these bids 
were at prices higher than the U.K. price but could not of course be accepted because 
of the export licensing control which remained. As a result of representations from 
the American trade and the American Embassy, the Board of Trade made an effort to 
justify their position by attempting to negotiate contracts with each of the shippers. 
This would have at least been defensible on commercial grounds and might have 
obviated the need for export licence control. The shippers, however, refused to play 
1 CO assistant secretary, 1946, head of Production and Marketing Dept 'A', Agriculture. 
[78) COLONIAL GENERAL 27 
seeing a chance of better prices on the American market; and, as an alternative, the 
Board of Trade have now agreed to release 20 per cent of monthly shipments for sale 
to American buyers. We do not yet know how this arrangement will work; but it 
seems clear that the American price will still be higher than the Board of Trade price 
and that there will therefore be considerable pressure from both shippers and 
American buyers to increase the American quota. There may also be demands from 
other potential buyers for a share of the supply. The question is whether this 
arrangement is justifiable either on grounds of Colonial interest or in the light of our 
non-discriminatory obligations in connection with l.T.O. and our declared principles 
of Colonial policy. 
A similar case exists in Gold Coast mahogany. There a war-time arrangement was 
made to allocate supplies between the U.K. and the U.S.A., the former taking 40 per 
cent of shipments. A maximum price was in force. A short time ago the Board of 
Trade said that they wanted to modify this arrangement in order to get more Gold 
Coast mahogany, and the Governor at the same time pressed for the removal of price 
control. The upshot of the discussions, which have been at the Ministerial level, is 
that as from the 1st February it is proposed to allocate, by Gold Coast export 
licensing control, 34 per cent of shipments to the U.S.A. and 66 per cent to the U.K. 
At the same time, price control will be removed. It is almost certain that this will 
create a situation similar to that now existing in Nigerian goat skins and that higher 
prices will be bid by the United States than the Timber Control here is prepared to 
pay. Since the U.K. share of supplies will be guaranteed at 66 per cent there will be 
no incentive for the Timber Control to bring their buying price into line with the 
American price. Again the question arises whether this unilateral attempt at 
allocating a Colonial supply is either in the interests of the Colony or compatible 
with l.T.O. and the U.K.'s general Colonial obligations. 
There are various other instances both on the Board of Trade and Ministry of Food 
side where a similar tendency is being displayed on the part of the U.K. as a buyer to 
consider that she has first claim on Colonial exports and that it is permissible to 
establish this claim at less than the world market price through the use of the 
Colonial export licensing system and other governmental sanctions. The whole of the 
East African sisal crop, for example, is being sold to the Board of Trade at a price 
which is considerably below the world market price; this in spite of the fact that only 
about half is consumed in this country. This is, of course, the tail-end of a wartime 
arrangement; but it seems bad business for East Africa to have to continue it until 
the end of 1947. For the present there is no international ground for challenging the 
right of the Ministry of Food to secure the whole of the output of West African palm 
products; but if l.E .F.C. controls are modified, as they may well be this year, then 
similar issues will arise in connection with the disposal of this crop. In the case of 
cocoa, where the West African Produce Control Board's selling price has followed the 
New York market, the Ministry of Food and Treasury are exercising strong pressure 
upon us to conclude a long term contract with the Ministry of Food which would, in 
fact, aim at securing U.K. requirements of West African cocoa over a period of 
shortage at an advantageous price as compared with free market values. For Jamaica 
and Cameroons bananas, the Ministry of Food is proposing to pay substantially less 
than what they may have to pay for Canary bananas. This is probably an exceptional 
case. But it may still evoke criticism of Colonial exploitation. 
It seems that we in the Colonial Office must have regard to two main considera-
D 
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tions in deciding our line on these problems. The first is the commercial interest of 
the Colony concerned. This we can expect the Colonial Government or Colonial 
producer to press in the first instance. But as representing Colonial interests in 
London we must be ready to give them every possible assistance in presenting their 
case and where necessary to argue it on their behalf. The second consideration 
concerns the Colonial Office as part of H.M.G. It lies in ensuring that the practical 
application of our Colonial policy shall be consistent with the statements we make 
about it. We have been at particular pains to deny recently that there is an element of 
exploitation in our Colonial economic policy. There is prima facie evidence of 
exploitation if we subscribe to any marketing arrangement which does not, all things 
considered, constitute a good business deal for the Colonial producers concerned. It 
seems to me therefore that in considering any concessional arrangement with the 
U.K. whether under a long term contract or otherwise, we must calculate most 
carefully the balance of advantage to the Colony and must decide in favour of it only 
if the advantages to the Colony of the arrangement contemplated clearly outweigh 
the disadvantages of departing from strict commercial practice. I feel, both as 
regards long term contracts and as regards export control arrangements, that the 
onus of proof why they should be entered into or maintained must normally rest with 
the buying Ministry. We must always dissociate ourselves from any arguments 
advanced by these Ministries which savour in any way of exploiting the special 
position of the U.K. to the disadvantage of the Colonies. 
There is, however, a third consideration of a more general kind which may provide 
yet other argument against concessional deals with the U.K. That is the considera-
tion of H.M.G.'s international obligations to avoid discriminatory trade practices, a 
fundamental point in the I.T.O. discussions. I appreciate that no specific undertak-
ings have yet been given (except in connection with the American loan which does 
not affect this issue) and that it might be argued that the period in which we now 
stand - the interim period between war and peace - is one in which certain 
discriminatory practices which would not normally be allowed can possibly be 
justified. The fact remains, however, that the whole of H.M.G.'s discussions on 
international commodity policy have been based on the assumption that export trade 
will normally be non-discriminatory and that regulations on the quantity or 
direction of exports will be imposed only under special conditions, and as a result of 
international agreement e.g. in connection with an international commodity 
agreement, or an international allocation arrangement. H.M.G. has defended 
(without carrying general conviction) its long term contract procedure against 
criticism on this ground. But a defence has been possible at all only because the 
contracts in question were freely negotiated and could therefore be argued to 
represent a reasonable commercial deal. To impose conditions on sales Of Colonial 
products, even under the cloak of a long-term contract is quite another matter and 
our defence is bound to carry even less conviction with international critics. Where, 
therefore, there is any doubt as to the wisdom, on grounds of Colonial interests, of 
favouring the U.K. as buyers of Colonial products, our case for resisting pressure 
from buying Ministries would seem to be reinforced by the general international 
argument against export discrimination . Against this battery of argument considera-
tion of shortages or price control policy in the U.K. cannot surely prevail; especially 
having in mind the relative poverty of the Colonies and their complete exposure to 
fluctuations in the world market prices of essential imports. 
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The purpose of this lengthy note at this stage is first to ask for guidance whether 
the general principles set out above should, in fact, be the governing principles in 
future discussions with the buying Ministries here; and second to suggest that we 
should consult the policy making departments for views particularly on the question 
of discriminatory treatment against foreign buyers of Colonial produce. The simplest 
way might be for you to write semi-officially to Mr. Helmore of the Board of Trade, 
copying the letter to Sir E. Hall-Patch in the Foreign Office (qua international 
relations generally) anq Sir H. Broadley in the Ministry of Food. I doubt whether we 
will get anywhere at this stage by bringing in the people with whom we normally 
negotiate on Colonial sales, e.g. R.M.D. of the Board of Trade, or the Commodity 
Divisions of the Ministry of Food; but they will, of course, have to be instructed on 
the lines of any new policy decisions which may be reached as a result of the 
proposed correspondence. 
E.M. 
14.1.47 
I need not add much to Mr. Melville's statement of a problem which is becoming of 
dominating importance. With the collapse of the war-time systems of international 
allocation and control of commodities in scarce supply, the buying departments here 
are faced with a rapid rise in prices resulting from the re-establishment of 
competitive buying, and it is perhaps natural that in self-defence they are trying to 
secure supplies at lower cost for the benefit of the United Kingdom from Colonial 
territories in which H.M.G. is able to exercise political control or influence. On our 
side, however, we have, as Mr. Melville points out, to consider both our obligations as 
trustees to Colonial producers to see that they are not exploited and our obligations 
under the draft I.T.O. charter and other international declarations not to discrimin-
ate between consuming countries. I think the principles we ought to follow may be 
summarised as follows:-
(1) We should co-operate to the full in any truly international scheme for control 
of commodities in scarce supply and should continue as in the past not merely to 
refrain from any initiative directed towards the termination of such schemes of 
control, but to lend all our influence in support of their continuance or, if 
necessary, their re-institution. 
(2) Where, however, no such international control exists, and we must face the 
probability that nearly all the war-time allocation schemes will disappear before 
long, we must, in the interests of Colonial producers and in order to preserve 
non-discrimination, follow the general level of prices established in competitive 
markets when these cover a very substantial part of the whole trade (that is, we 
would not take account of the small competitive markets at present existing in 
genuinely free sugar say in South America or the Middle East, but we would take 
account of the free market in cocoa in America which consumes something 
approaching half the total world output). 
(3) This would not rule out bulk sales to the United Kingdom, but would 
necessitate those sales being at prices duly related to current world prices, and 
would make very difficult any sale over a long period of years. 
Mr. Melville's minute was drafted before the latest move by the Minister of Food on 
cocoa which has brought that particular problem to a head, and may be the occasion 
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for bringing the whole problem to the early notice of the Cabinet. I think we must 
see a little further where we are going to get to on cocoa, but, if the Minister presses 
for reference to the Cabinet, I think that probably our answer should be to ask for a 
reference of the whole situation dealt with in Mr. Melville's minute to interdepart-
mental discussion, in the first place on the official level, but, in due course, at the 
Ministerial level. 
s.c. 
15.1.47 
I entirely agree with Mr. Caine's remarks. But I might perhaps draw attention to one 
particular aspect of the matter which is likely to be our principal source of trouble. In 
present conditions fixing the export prices of Colonial products to world market 
prices, which means, for most of the commodities in which we are concerned, 
American market prices, is not so much hitching one's wagon to a star as hitching it 
to a Chinese cracker. There is a very high degree of instability in American market 
prices and this instability is likely to continue. On the whole American market prices 
are already below the best. For example, over the last year or so there has been an 
enormous rise in American cotton prices followed by a substantial fall, and cotton 
prices continue to move frequently and substantially, sometimes in one direction 
and sometimes in another. Similarly, other prices such as that of wheat, after an 
enormous rise have come down a bit. In other cases, for example cocoa, oil seeds and 
hard fibres, prices are still about at peak and might go further up before they come 
down again. It is to be hoped that when the machinery for commodity management 
which has been devised as part of the International Trade Organisation gets going 
prices of commodities brought within its scope will be steadied, but it will be some 
time before all the commodities concerned are handled in this way. 
Meanwhile, we must continue to exercise control of the marketing of Colonial 
products and interpose a shock-absorber between the world price and the local price. 
Nothing causes greater confusion and misdirection of effort than frequent changes of 
local prices. One really good thing which came out of the war was that local prices 
have been steadied and insulated from wbrld prices. This involves some arrangement 
like either the cocoa marketing machinery, or Government purchase and resale, or, 
in the case of organised plantation industries, sales by a body representing the 
industry as a whole. When this arrangement is made, it is possible for the purchasing 
and reselling authority to fix an internal price and keep it stationary for quite a 
prolonged period and, if it has to alter it, do so gradually and by small stages, but this 
internal price must be below the initial world price so that the authority can build up 
a fund to protect it against loss if the world price suddenly nosedives ,below the 
internal price. Where there is an active local opinion the authority may well be in 
difficulties if the world market price is substantially above the internal price because 
there may be a demand to increase the latter, even though the authority is convinced 
that the long term world price is likely to be below it and therefore feels compelled to 
retain the margin and build up a fund so as to let the internal price down gently later. 
We have seen this kind of agitation in the Gold Coast already with cocoa. 
As things are at present, purchasing authorities are not likely in the short-run to 
get into the kind of difficulty which is likely to be the most serious one in the long 
run, that is a fall of the world price below the current internal price, and its 
persistence on that low level. Provided that a sufficient fund is built up during the 
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present phase to give the purchasing authority time to let down the internal price 
gently, no harm will be done, but Colonial Governments are certainly not in a 
position to afford indefinitely to keep up internal prices above the world level; all they 
can do is to absorb the shocks and average out. 
The conclusion which I reach is that the interests of the Colonial Empire demand 
that we should not be too good natured to the purchasing departments of His 
Majesty's Government. Even if present world prices are much above cost of 
production in the Colonies, and indeed above the highest internal prices which 
Colonial Governments regard as compatible with preventing inflation, we should still 
charge the full market price and bank the proceeds against a rainy day later. This is, I 
understand, already a policy approved by the Cabinet. All that we have to do is to see 
that it is carried out in individual cases, but I do not underestimate the difficulty 
which we shall have in doing this where world prices are so high as to bring the 
Treasury in to support the purchasing departments on the ground of balances of 
payment considerations. 
On the point of non-discrimination, I think we can get away for some time longer 
with the policy of directing essential supplies to this country, even when there is an 
insistent demand from foreign countries. If the world rationing plans go to pieces, it 
will not be because we have tried to run out of them, but because other countries, 
and in particular the United States, have done so. We are quite entitled to look after 
ourselves so long as things are in short supply provided (i) that what we do is in effect 
to run unilaterally a rationing scheme on the lines which would have been followed if 
it had been an international one and (ii) that we do not use the rationing scheme to 
victimise the Colonies in matters of price. But this state of affairs will only continue 
for about a year. When the International Trade Organisation comes into existence, 
the only way of getting out of the obligation of non-discrimination will be to have a 
commodity arrangement which will take over the job of rationing, and which will not 
be necessarily as indulgent to the claims of the United Kingdom as we are now. 
G.L.M.C. 
16.1.47 
It is now 8 weeks since the Secretary of State instructed that consideration of the 
draft Cabinet Paper on this file should be deferred pending the improvement in the 
general atmosphere for its discussion. There have been some developments in the 
interval but none, I think, that justifies any substantial change in the Paper or gives 
us any reason to feel greater confidence than we did when the Paper was drafted that 
we shall gain our objective or get substantially nearer to it by inter-departmental 
discussion at the official level. 
In so far as the Treasury were behind the buying Ministries in enforcing 'a policy of 
low prices for Colonial products, there has been a slight softening of heart on one 
particular issue which this general problem raises namely, the Colonies' dollar 
earning capacity. As I told you, the Treasury now appear to be inclined to suggest 
drawing a line between Colonial commodities of which we are, as an Empire, net 
exporters and those of which we are as an Empire, net importers. The net export 
commodities they would agree to being traded at the highest market price possible, 
even if this involved raising prices against the U.K. (although on this issue they are 
still hankering after some sort of long-term contract arrangement which would, in 
fact, give the U.K. a price advantage as compared with foreign powers). For net 
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import commodities, on the other hand, the Treasury plan would involve a low price 
policy even if this meant Colonies having to accept less than what might be argued to 
be a fair world market price. 
In fact, this apparent softening of the Treasury heart is little more than an attempt 
to confirm the present price arrangements and as such is, therefore, quite 
unacceptable to us. In cocoa, for example, (a net export) prices are high both to the 
Ministry of Food and to foreign powers. In oilseeds (a net import) the price, at any 
rate in West Africa, is well below fair world valuation. These are two of the largest 
commodities concerned, but the pattern is roughly similar throughout the whole 
field of Government traded exports. On the buying Ministry front, there has been a 
slight advance in the increased price of sisal which has now been confirmed, and an 
increased price is being paid for tin. Broadly speaking, therefore, the Board of Trade 
and Ministry of Supply are, so far as price policy is concerned, pretty well in line with 
our wishes. The only difficulty with these Ministries arises out of their insistence in 
having a specified part of Colonial production reserved by export licensing or other 
means for the U.K., and in the case of sisal for the Dominions as well. This is a 
slightly separate issue and I think it was always our intention that we should concede 
it in return for the acceptance of our major claim that the price paid for all 
purchases, whether allocated or not, should be based on a fair world valuation. 
The Ministry of Food remains on the whole unrepentantly opposed to our main 
claim, although we have I think succeeded in ringing from them a rather reluctant 
acceptance of the principle of a stabilisation fund. I am sending forward separately 
the file about buying prices for groundnuts from which you will see that the best we 
have been able to do is to induce them to pay, in addition to the producer price, an 
equivalent margin for stabilisation to that which is already in existence for palm 
kernels and palm oil. In other words, they are still refusing to accept our claim that 
their buying price should be based on a fair world valuation. Similar difficulties 
continue to arise with other oilseeds, e.g. copra, and we shall shortly be resuming 
discussions about the future sugar price arrangements. It would, therefore, be of the 
greatest assistance to this Department if a ruling could be obtained at the Ministerial 
level on the major question posed in the draft Cabinet memorandum [below, 79], 
namely, whether Colonies should expect to receive the full world market price, 
calculated on the best information available, for all exports irrespective of the 
destination to which they are shipped .... 
Secretary of State , 
E.M. 
15.5.47 
As Mr. Melville's minute above explains, our difficulties with regard to the fixing of 
prices of Colonial products are not diminishing, and it would be very helpful if it 
were now possible to circulate the proposed paper to the Cabinet and get some 
decision on principle. You are aware of the several references which have been made 
lately in both Houses of Parliament to some of the apparent anomalies and 
inconsistencies of our arrangements. It would be very helpful indeed if we were able 
to put forward some consistent principles on which prices were henceforward to be 
fixed in bulk deals between H.M.G. and Colonial producers, and interdepartmental 
discussion has not so far produced ahy serious challenge to the equity of the 
principles set out in the draft paper. It would, of course, also be very useful indeed to 
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have such principles agreed before the forthcoming African Conferences when the 
subject is bound to be raised. 
We have as it happens several important Colonial economic matters which require 
Ministerial attention in the near future, that is this subject, the proposed Colonial 
Development Corporation, and the Colonial sterling balances, on which I shall be 
sending forward the file very shortly. The three subjects are by no means necessarily 
inter-linked, but they do impinge on one another and, although the question of 
precise tactics in handling them vis-a-vis other Ministers and the Cabinet as a whole 
obviously needs thought, I am inclined to think that the balance of advantage lies in 
getting all three subjects before Ministers more or less simultaneously. That is, I do 
not suggest that they should necessarily be considered all at the same meeting of the 
Cabinet insofar as Cabinet discussion will be necessary, but that it would be useful to 
get other Ministers who are not familiar with Colonial economic affairs to consider 
each subject while the others are fairly fresh in mind. 
There is from the Departmental point of view no need to make any revision of the 
draft paper, but I think you wanted to consider it in some detail. 
s.c. 
19.5.47 
I have kept this by me because I am not yet clear about the wisdom of raising this 
matter at this moment in the Cabinet. Moreover, the debate on Cocoa prices a week 
or so ago has disturbed M.Ps. & we may find that the principles we want confirmed, 
questioned by Ministers. The other two matters are going forward but I feel it wise to 
hold this paper up a little longer. 
Mr. Rees-Williams 
Secretary of State 
A.C.J. 
4.6.47 
You will remember that at the meeting of the African Governors' Conference which 
was addressed by Sir Stafford Cripps,2 the point was raised of the fairness of the 
prices being paid by His Majesty's Government for certain Colonial products. The 
general policy in that matter was much discussed earlier th is year and the draft 
memorandum at No. 173 was prepared for submission to the Cabinet. The Secretary 
of State decided at the time that in view of the development of the economic 
situation it would be inopportune to raise the general issues last summer, and the 
memorandum was, therefore, put aside. I am, however, now circulating the file again 
since it may be felt that this discussion gives an opportunity to raise th~ issues of 
policy again. The practical recommendations were contained in paragraphs 25 to 27 
of the memorandum enclosed with (17). 
s.c. 
17.11.47 
It seems to me that the recommendations in paras 25 to 27 are too vague. There are 
few well-established free markets now. It appears to me that what we should aim at is 
2See part 1 of this volume, 66. 3 See 79. 
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(1) bulk selling e.g. of cocoa or ground nuts (2) bulk buying by the Ministry of Food 
(3) of an independent assessment of price by an authority representing the various 
interests and (4) the price not to go entirely to the primary producer but to be 
retained in part by the selling agency or Board as a cushion to level off future prices, 
for research, relief of indebtedness etc. I do not feel it right either that the primary 
producer should receive far too little for his produce or that the British consumer 
caught in swirling upwards world prices should be forced to pay exorbitant prices. If 
the above suggestions are agreed to then the producer, assured of a steady market for 
years to come, can well afford to take a price below the fictitious price at the 
moment. I believe this matter should be raised now in Cabinet and not merely the 
price part of it; in other words the whole of my (1) (2) (3) & (4) hang together. 
79 CO 852/989/3, no 17 
D.R.R.W. 
18.11.47 
Mar 1947 
'Prices of colonial export products': draft Cabinet memorandum by Mr 
Creech Jones. Annex: CO note on price fixing 
I attach a Note on the fixing of prices for His Majesty's Government's bulk purchases 
of Colonial exports. I invite my colleagues' careful attention to this Note, for it deals 
with a question of primary importance in the discharge of our moral responsibility 
for the welfare of the dependent Colonies, and one which is already attracting 
political attention in this country and which is capable of breeding international 
criticism of the most damaging kind. 
2. Though the argument is, I fear, long the point at issue is simple. There are 
cases in which Colonial producers are to-day receiving from His Majesty's Govern-
ment substantially less than current market prices, and there are others in which 
they are being compulsorily denied access to the most favourable markets. 
3. This is a legacy of arrangements which had every justification in war-time. 
Now their only justification is the financial advantage of the United Kingdom. I well 
know how important it is that our overseas payments should be kept to a minimum; 
but I cannot believe that this justifies action which is contrary to the policy of 
opposition to Colonial exploitation for which the Labour Party has always stood and 
which we have established in Chapters XI and XII of the United Nations Charter, as 
general international policy. 
4. In my view, the guiding consideration in negotiating the bulk purchase of a 
Colonial product should be its current world market value as nearly as that can be 
estimated in the absence of fully operating commercial markets. We sho~ld not, by 
means of Colonial export licensing or other controls, force sales to this country at 
less than a fair market price. I recognise the danger that acceptance of these rules 
may adversely affect the United Kingdom's balance of payments, but consider that 
this danger can best be met by broader arrangements for dealing with the disposal of 
Colonial sterling balances. 
5. I believe that international opinion will regard our actions in this matter as a 
crucial test of the sincerity of our oft-proclaimed principles of Colonial Trusteeship. I 
believe also that, if we even appear to be abusing our political sovereignty to secure 
financial advantage to ourselves at Colonial producers' expense we shall irretrievably 
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damage our relations with the dependent Empire and teach its peoples to think that 
they can get fair treatment only by complete political independence. 
6. I invite the Cabinet to endorse the recommendations in paragraphs 25 and 26 
of the Note. 
Annex to 79 
I. Facts of the position 
(a) Pre-war marketing structure 
Before the war, the prices of most Colonial export products were normally 
determined by the play of supply and demand in free international markets, most of 
them being dealt in at auctions or by organised international commodity exchanges. 
The system was by no means perfect in all respects (prices of Colonial exports were, 
like those of other primary products, subject to severe fluctuations both day-to-day 
and cyclical); and plans are now being elaborated, both internationally and 
territorially, to remedy that evil but it had the great merit of providing a yardstick by 
which export values could be easily determined. Moreover as supplies moved freely 
on to the international market in accordance with the play of competitive market 
forces, it was possible to state with absolute sincerity that freedom of access to 
Colonial raw materials was guaranteed to any buyer of any nationality who was 
prepared to pay the current international price. 
(b) War-time adaptations 
2. The war completely changed this marketing structure. Auctions, where they 
had existed, closed down and terminal [sic] markets disappeared or were severely 
restricted. United Kingdom Ministries became bulk buyers of Colonial raw materials 
and food stuffs for the use of the United Kingdom and the Allies. Purchase procedure 
varied from one commodity to another, contracts being made variously with Colonial 
Governments, ad hoc marketing boards or large commercial companies, as conven-
ience dictated; but by the end of the war all important Colonial exports were subject 
to one form or another of bulk purchase. 
3. In fixing export prices under these circumstances, neither the pre-war 
yardstick of internationally established values, nor the usual criterion of competitive 
buying was available. For some products which continued to be sold in substantial 
quantities to the United States, the war-time ceiling prices in that country provided 
some independent measure of value; but in the case of most Colonial plantation and 
mining products purchased in bulk by His Majesty's Government the formula 
adopted was one of pre-war market value plus additional war-time costs as assessed 
from time to time. This formula worked well enough under war conditions and gave 
reasonable satisfaction to the Colonial producers concerned as well as to the buying 
Ministries. 
4. For peasant crops the absence of detailed figures of money costs rendered the 
adoption of a similar basis impracticable; and bulk purchase prices were fixed by 
reference to a complex of factors including the need for stimulating or discouraging 
production, the competitive demands on labour and land of other export commod-
ities and of domestic food crops and the effect of earnings from cash crops on the 
peasant's real purchasing power, having regard to the available supplies of consumer 
goods. 
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5. In the upshot, the prices of most Colonial products at the end of the war 
showed proportionately smaller increases than those which had taken place over the 
same period in the prices of essential imports into the Colonies. It would, however, 
be unprofitable to attempt to strike a balance sheet for the war period between, on 
the one hand, the contribution of Colonial producers to the Allied war effort through 
the provision of large (and often vital) quantities of strategic materials and foodstuffs 
at prices on the average very much lower than might have been secured in a 
competitive market, and on the other hand, the multifarious contributions of the 
United Kingdom and the rest of the United Nations to the maintenance of supplies 
and the defence of the Colonies themselves. Both contributions must be considered 
as part of the general pooling of resources which won the war. Neither the Colonies 
on the one side nor His Majesty's Government on the other should be regarded as 
having a credit balance in hand which could be used to justify specially favourable 
treatment in future business deals. 
(c) Post-war developments 
6. With the gradual freeing of national and international controls, and especially 
with the removal of United States price ceilings and import licensing during 1946, 
something approaching an international market for many Colonial exports began to 
be re-established. There was a steady and substantial rise in the world prices of most 
primary products; and the world prices of most Colonial products rose to a level 
considerably higher than that being paid under United Kingdom bulk purchase 
contracts. The Colonies were meantime having to pay the full world price for their 
imports, including those from the United Kingdom, with the result that the terms of 
trade between the Colonies and the rest of the world tended to move against the 
former. The war-time method of determining prices for Colonial plantation and 
mining exports on the basis of cost of production therefore became unattractive to 
Colonial producers. Equally the arbitrary method adopted during the war for fixing 
the prices of peasant crops became untenable. 
7. The following table shows, for a number of Colonial plantation and peasant 
crops, His Majesty's Government's bulk purchase prices in 1945 and to-day, as 
compared with estimated present world values. It will be seen that in all cases there 
has already been a fairly substantial increase in United Kingdom buying prices. But 
present world values are in all cases still above, and in some cases substantially 
above, the current United Kingdom buying prices. Excluding rubber (which is now 
sold wholly through commercial channels) and cocoa (for which prices are 
determined by the American market) this is the situation of all the major Colonial 
agricultural products and of some non-agricultural products. This poses the first 
problem with which this Note is concerned. 
8. The second problem concerns the reservation of the whole, or of arbitrarily 
determined portions, of Colonial export surpluses for the United Kingdom. During 
the war, a comprehensive system of export licensing was introduced in the Colonies 
under Defence Regulations, originally to deny supplies to the enemy, but later to 
enable Colonial exports to be directed to consuming countries in accordance with 
inter-Allied allocations recommended by the Combined Boards. For an increasing 
number of commodities such international allocation schemes have now lapsed; but 
in some such cases (e.g. hides and skins and timber) measures are still being taken 
by Colonial Governments, under the instructions of His Majesty's Government, to 
direct supplies arbitrarily to this country or to a limited number of approved 
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1945 U.K. Current U.K. Estimated 
bulk purchase bulk purchase current 
price price world values 
A. PLANTATION CROPS (£per ton) 
(1) Sugar (c. & f.) 19.10/- 24.5/- 27 
(Cuban minimum) 
(2) Sisal (f.o.b. 27.10/- 46* J80(Mexican) 
average) l_95(Portuguese) 
(3) Palm Oil 50 75 125 (U.S.A.) 
(ex estate Malaya) 
B. PEASANT CROPS 
(1) Copra (f.o.b. Western 
Pacific) 18.5/- 29.10/- 55 (Philippines) 
(2) Palm kernels (c. & f.) 17.10/- 35 ?50/75 
(3) Palm oil 23.7/6. 45 ?70/100 
(W.A. softs, c & f.) 
*An increase of £20 is now being offered to the East African industry. 
consumers. This has resulted in Colonial producers receiving a price lower than the 
outside market level and in Colonial Governments having to deny (without any 
international dispensation) freedom of access by foreign buyers to Colonial raw 
materials. 
11. Discussion of the problem 
9. These developments raise an important issue of principle; namely how prices 
of Colonial primary products sold to United Kingdom buying Ministries are in future 
to be determined. To answer this question His Majesty's Government must consider 
not only the relative interests of the Colonies and of the United Kingdom, their 
relative commercial bargaining strengths and the effects of price policy on the 
balance of payments position, but also international obligations of two distinct kinds 
namely, the obligations assumed by His Majesty's Government as trustee, in the 
widest sense, of the Colonial Empire and the obligations implied by His Majesty's 
Government's declarations of freedom of access to Colonial raw materials and by 
their acceptance in principle of the American proposals for an international trade 
charter. 
(a) Practical interests of the United Kingdom and the colonies 
10. In approaching this problem, the fundamental common interests which arise 
from the mutual interdependence of the United Kingdom and the Colonies as part of 
a single political organisation must be borne in mind. It is to the advantage of 
neither so to manage its commercial affairs as to do serious harm to the other. But 
business relations between different parts of the Empire, like business relations 
between different sections with [sic] the United Kingdom itself, should be conducted 
on a business basis; and no price settlement can be considered fair which does not 
satisfy the commercial interests of the United Kingdom as buyers, and the Colonies 
as sellers, of raw materials and foodstuffs. 
11. The two parties have a common commercial interest in that bulk purchasing 
is in many cases technically convenient to both sides; and that the security of market 
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obtained by it is often as valuable to producers as the security of supply is to 
consumers. They have also a common interest in long-period stabilisation both of 
the price of particular primary products and of the general level of prices. 
12. But there are important counter-considerations in assessing the value of 
price stabilisation, either particular or general, to the primary producer. 
13. First, valuable as stability in the price of his product is to the Colonial 
producer (especially to the small peasant producer), bulk purchase on a long term 
contract is not essential to secure it. The device of a territorial marketing board 
operating a price stabilisation fund can give the producers in a particular area a very 
effective cushion against price fluctuations while still permitting their products to be 
sold freely and without discrimination on a world market at prices varying from day 
to day. This method is much more flexible in operation than the fixed-price 
long-term contract and, although the two are not mutually inconsistent, it is in most 
cases preferable in Colonial interests. 
14. Secondly, while the Colonies recognise their common interest with the 
United Kingdom, and indeed with the whole world, in preventing a runaway rise in 
general prices and are willing to co-operate fuliy in any general international 
schemes for price stabilisation, they can reasonably ask that they should not be 
forced to bear an undue share of the burden of holding down prices. There have been 
many complaints, the justice of which it is impossible to deny, that His Majesty's 
Government's policy of avoiding high prices operates one-sidedly. Although Colonial 
exports are sold to the United Kingdom at less than world prices, the Colonies have 
to pay fully competitive prices for the manufactured goods they import in return. 
However strong may be the technical and policy objeCtions to any system of 
subsidised or low-price exports to the Colonies, the Colonial producer cannot be 
expected to regard as fair an arrangement whereby he contributes to the general 
good by accepting a lower price for his exports than he could get if he used his 
bargaining position to the full but receives no corresponding advantage of cheap 
supplies. His position is not like that of the home farmer who, even if he sells his 
crop for less than producers elsewhere are getting in world markets (and frequently 
of course his price is higher than that); still has the compensating advantage of 
buying most of his consumption goods at less than world prices, as a result of the 
Exchequer subsidies to the cost of living. 
15. Even if these considerations are ignored and it is accepted that a stable price 
over a period of years is to the general advantage of both buyers and seller, there 
must still be a conflict of interest over the desirable average level in that period. 
Basically, the United Kingdom must benefit over any given period by securing 
imports as cheaply as possible and the Colonies must benefit by selling in ijle highest 
market. · 
To this country in its present serious economic difficulties, any reduction of price 
and consequent reduction in pressure on the balance of payments and in the burden 
of internal price control must be welcome. The Colonies, still desperately poor and 
dependent for their future development on a rise in income and the beginnings of an 
accumulation of capital, must equally welcome higher prices. The conflict of interest 
is inescapable and its resolution demands both skill and, above all, firm moral 
principle. 
(b) Balance of payments considerations 
16. Two highly important considerations arise under this head. First, insofar as 
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higher prices for Colonial Products are made immediately available for expenditure 
by the producer, the inflationary potential in the Colonies is increased and the strain 
on the United Kingdom exporting power intensified. These ill effects will, however, 
be greatly mitigated if, as proposed, an appropriate part of current high selling prices 
is withheld from the producer and put into a price stabilisation fund for use in later 
years of low prices. The current demand on United Kingdom exports will thus be 
reduced and deferred until a time when it will be more convenient and possibly even 
advantageous for her to supply it. 
17. This stabilisation arrangement may not remove wholly the inflationary 
dangers of higher prices for Colonial produce; · but the problem which remains 
merges into the wider issue of Colonial sterling balances on which separate 
departmental discussions are proceeding, and in respect of which there is reasonable 
hope that it will be possible to devise satisfactory means of preventing accumulated 
balances and current earnings being spent at such a rate as to embarrass His 
Majesty's Government. There can be no doubt that it would be much more 
satisfactory to Colonial interests on every ground that fair prices should be paid for 
current sales even if disposal were limited by an agreement not to convert the whole 
proceeds into goods at once. 
18. The second bearing of this problem on the United Kingdom's balance of 
payments is that the higher the prices fixed for certain Colonial products the greater 
will be the amount of dollars earned by the sale of those products to hard currency 
countries. Many Colonial products subject to bulk purchase by the United Kingdom 
(e.g. cocoa, sisal and sugar) are sold for ultimate consumption in the United States of 
America, Canada and other hard currency areas and the proceeds go to swell the 
sterling area pool of dollars . In order to avoid any charge of discrimination foreign 
sales have to be made at prices equivalent to the United Kingdom price. A rise in 
United Kingdom buying prices would thus increase the hard currencies available to 
the United Kingdom. If, of course, the rise led also to a reduction in United Kingdom 
demands, so permitting greater sales abroad, dollar earnings might be still further 
increased. Some figures to illustrate the order of magnitude of the sums involved are 
given in the following table. 
Commodity 
Rubber 
Cocoa 
Sugar 
Sisal 
United States and Canadian dollar earnings on 
sales of certain colonial products 
Estimated earnings 
1947 
$million 
120 
50 
30 
5 
Estimated additional 
earnings for each rise 
of £10 in price 
$million 
12 
5 
12 
1 
Note: Additional major dollar earning exports include copper, tin, tea and 
coffee but precise figures on the above basis are not available. 
(c) His Majesty's Government's obligations to the colonies 
19. The extent to which His Majesty's Government possesses the power to control 
the action of Colonial Governments varies according to the constitutional position of 
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each; but there is certainly a wide field in which His Majesty's Government can, by 
exercising powers to impose price arrangements upon individual export industries, 
act both as buyer and as seller in the same transaction. But as seller His Majesty's 
Government must act in the spirit of Colonial trusteeship in the widest sense. Some 
of the territories have been placed under the International Trusteeship system and 
His Majesty's Government is accountable to the Trusteeship Council for their 
administration. But that is not all. His Majesty's Government played the leading part 
in insisting on the inclusion in the Charter of a general declaration of Colonial 
policy, applicable to all non-self-governing territories, to the effect that the interests 
of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount and that Colonial resources 
shall not be exploited for the benefit either of the holding Power or of the world at 
large. With this declared policy an attempt by His Majesty's Government to secure 
Colonial exports at under their fair value, or in preference to other buyers, is totally 
inconsistent. To pursue this course would inevitably arouse international criticism of 
the most damaging kind. His Majesty's Government would be accused of imperialis-
tic exploitation, the only difference between it and the economic exploitation of the 
19th century being that the State itself was now the guilty party. 
20. It might be argued in defence of such a policy that His Majesty's Government 
are spending in the Colonies considerable sums of British taxpayers' money, 
particularly under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts; but this argument 
would scarcely carry conviction before the bar of international opinion, where His 
Majesty's Government's expenditure on Colonial Development and Welfare has 
hitherto been proclaimed as a contribution made without calculation of material 
advantage. In any event, the Colonial Development and Welfare contributions hardly 
balance in amount what Colonies are losing by not receiving world prices for their 
products; e.g. Nigeria's loss on that account is over £8,000,000 per annum at 
present, while the Colony's Colonial Development and Welfare allocation is less than 
£2,500,000 per annum. 
21. His Majesty's Government could not keep the moral lead which it has given to 
the world in laying down principles and developing the practice of sound Colonial 
administration if it could be shown that Welfare expenditure in the Colonies was not, 
as had been claimed, an act of benevolence but was an investment calculated to yield 
substantial returns in the shape of supplies of Colonial produce for the United 
Kingdom at below market prices. 
(d) International trade obligations 
22. Equally, the direction of supplies of Colonial products to the United Kingdom 
market, either by special contract arrangements or by the exercise of Government 
controls, on terms more favourable to the purchaser than those on which the same 
products were currently being offered on the international market would certainly be 
taken by international critics to conflict with past declarations on freedom of access 
to Colonial raw materials and with the principles which are now being elaborated 
with the United States and other foreign countries as a basis for an international 
trade charter. American opinion has shown itself very sensitive to any suggestion of 
discrimination in the marketing of Colonial products; and in the particular case of 
cocoa informal assurances have been given that the new West African marketing 
organisations will pursue a non-discriminatory selling policy. 
(e) Practical conclusions 
23. On balance, the dominant Colonial interest is to obtain the current world 
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market value for exports. Where a product is the subject of any general international 
commodity regulation scheme, Colonial producers will be entitled to whatever is the 
current price within the range determined by that scheme. Where there is no 
international scheme, the only satisfactory price for Colonial producers is the price 
arrived at in ordinary competitive markets or by freely negotiated buyers as between 
the buying Ministry and representatives of the producers. In either event, it will be 
the responsibility of the Colonial Government or local marketing organisation to 
take any necessary future steps to equalise prices actually paid to producers over 
periods of good and bad world market prices and to prevent unduly large payments in 
times of high prices creating a local inflationary situation. 
24. Unless the United Kingdom's interest, as a buyer, in cheap supplies and the 
Colonial producer's interest, as a sell[er] in obtaining the best possible price in the 
export market can be reconciled on the above lines, it is certain that international 
issues of the most serious nature will arise and that His Majesty's Government will be 
subjected to international criticism to which no satisfactory answer can be given. 
The pressure of such criticism may well compel her to accept with considerable loss 
of prestige, the considerations which are advanced in the preceding paragraphs and 
which are developed below in the form of specific recommendations for action. 
Ill. Recommendations 
25. In general it is recommended that the guiding principles in settling the terms 
of any public trading transaction between the Colonies and the United Kingdom 
should be:-
(a) the payment to Colonial producers of the full market value of their products 
(b) the determination of market value by free negotiation between the buyers and 
sellers, His Majesty's Government scrupulously eschewing the exercise of pressure 
or the use of constitutional powers to impose a settlement in its own interests as a 
consumer of Colonial products; and 
· (c) the making available of Colonial export products to all potential buyers on the 
basis either of freely negotiated contracts or of an internationally agreed allocation 
scheme. 
26. In order to give these general principles greater precision and reduce the area 
for ad hoc negotiations, the following working rules are suggested. 
(1) Fixation of prices 
(a) Where the commodity concerned is the subject of an international commodity 
scheme of the type envisaged in recent I.T.O. and F.A.O. discussions, the Colonial 
price will automatically be fixed within the range determined by the terms of such 
a scheme. 
(b) Where there is no such scheme but the commodity concerned is traded in a 
well-established free market outside the United Kingdom, prices for bulk purch-
ases by the United Kingdom from a Colonial source of supply should follow the 
prices established in the free world market; provided that freely negotiated 
seasonal or medium-term contracts may be entered into for the United Kingdom 
requirements on terms similar to those which the Colonial producers or their 
representatives would be willing to extend to other similarly placed consumers. 
(c) Where there is neither an international commodity scheme nor a well-
established free market but supplies of the commodity concerned, or of competi-
tive commodities, are being drawn by the United Kingdom from both Colonial and 
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non-Colonial sources, the Colonial price should be at least the parity of the 
minimum price being paid by His Majesty's Government for any significant 
proportion of the United Kingdom's total purchases of that commodity; provided 
again that freely negotiated contracts may be entered into on different terms if the 
period of the contract is different from that of the comparable purchase. 
(d) Where there is neither an international commodity scheme nor a well-
established free market and United Kingdom supplies are drawn wholly from 
Colonial sources the prices currently being received by non-Colonial producers of 
the same or of closely competitive commodities should be taken into full account 
in determining the Colonial price. 
(e) In all cases, Colonial producers, or Colonial Governments acting on their 
behalf, should be free to set aside such sums as may be appropriate out of the 
prices calculated as above in price-stabilisation or other special reserves or by way 
of taxation for revenue and developmental purposes; indeed they should be pressed 
to do so in all cases in which the gross price is so high that its payment in full to 
producers would be likely to have inflationary consequences. 
(0 "Freely negoti'ated" in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) above means negotiated by 
regularly appointed representatives of the producers or by Colonial Governments 
acting in the absence of such representatives, without any use by His Majesty's 
Government of their special powers to enforce settlements upon Colonial 
Governments. It implies the right of Colonial representatives to refuse the terms 
offered by His Majesty's Government as a buyer and to sell their products 
elsewhere. 
(2) Reservation of markets by government controls 
This should normally be resorted to only if it is necessary to carry out either an 
internationally agreed scheme of allocation of supplies or an agreement freely 
negotiated with producers or with properly constituted and representative associa-
tions of producers. Other cases may be considered on their merits; but the 
presumption should be against artificial reservation of Colonial supplies in favour of 
any purchaser, bearing in mind His Majesty's Government's international obligations 
with regard to Colonial responsibility, "free access" and non-discrimination. 
27. If the above principles are approved, it is suggested that existing price 
arrangements should be re-examined inter-departmentally and the necessary steps 
taken to bring practice into line with approved policy. Any conflict of interests which 
may in future arise between Colonial producers and a United Kingdom Government 
buying agency should be reconciled in the light of these same general principles. 
80 CAB 129/19, CP(47)169 2 June 1947 
'Planning for expansion': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Morrison (lord 
president of the Council) 
In the Chancellor's memorandum on the Import Programme 1947-48 (C.P. (47) 
167) brief reference is made in paragraph 33 to the importance of making every effort 
to create new sources of supply. This is a vital point. Our economic recovery is being 
strangled by shortages of raw materials, fuel and food. These shortages are dragging 
on far longer and more dangerously than we expected. They underlie many of our 
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other troubles. For example, our dollar shortage is largely due to the continued 
inability of non-dollar countries to send us the supplies they should. Many of our 
man-power difficulties are due to failures in supply of materials or fuel or plant. All 
our planning will be brought to nought and economic crises will recur unless we can 
recreate the ample flow of supplies of commodities which is the life-blood of our 
economy. 
2. From time to time since the war, efforts have been made in this direction. A 
number of Ministers have been working in their various fields with some success. In 
the case of cereals, the 1946 World Food Supplies Committee, under the Prime 
Minister's Chairmanship, was instrumental in securing effective world-wide mea-
sures to conserve the use and to expand the output of food grains beyond anything 
thought possible in so short a time. For ·example, the sown wheat acreage in the 
United States, which was thought incapable of expansion, has been forced up from an 
estimated 69 million acres in the spring of last year to an estimated 76 million acres 
now. Largely as a result of this expanded acreage the 1947 American wheat crop 
promises to reach the remarkably high total of 1,250 million bushels, and this, 
together with the promising Russian crop, is transforming the world cereals outlook. 
There is good reason to hope that world famine has been averted. Moreover as coarse 
grains are no longer having to be diverted so largely for human food we are now able 
to resume the rebuilding of our livestock, and to see more bacon and eggs on the 
horizon. We are also able to look forward to ending the strain of famine prices on our 
balance of payments. Without the intense world-wide pressure exerted by His 
Majesty's Government through so many channels this result would not have been 
possible. In particular, the Foreign Secretary's appeal to the United Nations London 
Assembly, the Conference of European Ministers of Food and Agriculture convened 
in London in April1946, the creation at the instance of the Foreign Secretary of Lord 
Killearn's special organisation in South-East Asia, and the influence exerted through 
all our diplomatic posts, got the world grain problem put high on the agenda where 
it most mattered. 
II 
3. This is a most heartening example. Would it not be well to examine in turn the 
other essential commodities which are in acutely short supply and to make an extra 
effort now to assist the Ministers concerned by putting behind them the whole force 
and authority and drive of the Government? 
4. I will not attempt to deal here with fuel, since the Prime Minister's Fuel 
Committee already exists to achieve these purposes in respect of fuel supplies. 
5. I suggest that a similar governmental effort should be made in respect of steel, 
timber, oilseeds and fats and such other materials and commodities as are likely to 
form bottlenecks in our recovery or to involve us in unnecessarily high expenditure 
of foreign exchange. Looking at the matter from another angle, we should survey the 
areas of the world which are lagging in their contribution to supplies of food and 
materials, such as Russia and her satellites, Indonesia, China and South-East Asia 
generally and the Argentine. We might also further extend and accelerate the 
measures already being taken to stimulate suitable production in the colonial 
empire. 
6. In the case of foreign territories, no United Kingdom Government Department 
E 
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has, of course, any actual responsibility or formal voice in the amount of production. 
We can, however, as in the case of wheat and rice, intervene effectively in various 
indirect ways if we chose to do so. For this purpose we need first -hand information 
from experts on production-farmers, scientists, and engineers, for example-as 
distinct from the expert buyers whose contacts are mainly with middle-men and 
Governments. Overseas producers, like our own, are handicapped by being unable to 
satisfy particular needs of machinery and equipment, transport, technical advice and 
in some cases no doubt encouragement and incentives. The right types of expert, 
given strong diplomatic and publicity backing, could be put into the field as effective 
teams at all points where a big influence could be exerted. Necessary equipment and 
supplies could be advantageously promised even at some sacrifice to ourselves in 
return for vitally-needed imports to this country. In this connexion I welcome the 
mission to Moscow by the Secretary of Overseas Trade and a party of officials, which 
shows how much can be done in a short time to begin to clear away difficulties even 
where they are greatest. We shall never get the stuff without going after it in a big 
way and with the will to win. 
7. We are in danger of making the worst of both planning and laissez-faire worlds 
if we leave the expansion of overseas supplies too much to the self-interest of 
producers who have little incentive in present conditions and are up against heavy 
odds. The Minister of Food has been developing, in such examples as the Canadian 
Wheat Contract and in the Tanganyika groundnut scheme, the type of planned attack 
which might well be more widely adopted. Indonesia, for instance, could undoubted-
ly supply us with hundreds of thousands of tons of some of the commodities we most 
need during the next few years if the Foreign Secretary could bring the Dutch to 
cease their virtual blockade on Indonesian exports and if the Minister of Food could 
send people in to talk business with those who are in a position to deliver the goods, 
including sugar, rice, copra and other products. 
Ill 
8. There are great opportunities which we should use of whipping up production 
of vital materials and food-stuffs overseas through world-wide propaganda and 
through United Nations agencies. Of all the innumerable international conferences 
and meetings hardly any seem to be wholly or even principally concerned with this 
vital job of planning more supplies. 
9. If we can step up world production of food-stuffs and materials, and get on top 
of our fuel difficulties the whole outlook for the future will be changed. Productivity 
can then be much increased. There will be more elbow-room, less frustration and 
less need for detailed controls. The incentive for productive effort will be improved. 
World political stresses will be eased. Trade and financial agreements will be assisted. 
The appalling prices we have to pay for our imports will fall. There is no other 
direction in which the reward of effort, now and on a governmental scale, can be so 
great. 
IV 
10. I therefore ask my colleagues to agree:-
(a) to impress on their Departments that the highest priority should be given to 
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all measures capable of expanding supplies of vital and scarce raw materials, fuels 
and food-stuffs by unorthodox as well as orthodox methods and overseas as well as 
at home; 
(b) that the Ministers immediately responsible should carry out searching reviews 
of "danger list" commodities starting with timber and timber products, steel, 
oilseeds and fats, and (after consultation with other interested Ministers and 
myself) should report in each case to the Lord President's Committee, or where 
necessary to the Cabinet, on the world statistical position and prospects of the 
commodity, the steps taken or proposed to bring about expansion and the steps 
which have been proposed but ruled out on various grounds; 
(c) that the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs, Dominions, Colonies and 
India should be invited to arrange at the appropriate stages for the urgency of 
expanding supplies of scarce commodities both in general and in particular to be 
brought at a high level to the attention of the Governments with whom they deal; 
(d) that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should be invited to arrange for 
British representatives on United Nations and other bodies to expound this theme 
on every suitable occasion and to press for methods of expanding supplies of vital 
commodities to be placed on the agenda of all international bodies which may be 
in a position to assist either by action or by giving a lead to world public opinion; 
and 
(e) that I should arrange, through the Overseas Information Services Committee, 
for suitable publicity to be put out on this theme on the maximum practicable 
scale. 
81 CAB 129/19, CP(47)175 6 June 1947 
'Development of colonial resources': Cabinet memorandum by Mr 
Creech Jones 
My colleagues are already seized of the importance of increasing production in the 
Colonies. I have been considering the machinery for this and am convinced of the 
need for securing not only the provision of basic social services and public works and 
utilities but also the promotion of enterprises which increase production of 
foodstuffs and materials in short supply, to the joint advantage of the United 
Kingdom and the Colonies. The funds of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act 
have had perforce to be used for the first purpose. What is now urgently necessary is 
provision for the undertaking of ad hoc schemes for the development of individual 
agricultural and other industries. 
2. This is not a task which can be efficiently discharged by the scattered efforts of 
small private and public organisations colony by colony. The Colonial Economic and 
Development Council has therefore recommended that a Colonial Development 
Corporation should be set up with adequate powers to promote and undertake the 
expansion of supplies of colonial foodstuffs, raw materials and other commodities. 
3. It is clear that there would be considerable scope for such activities. The 
Colonial Office is at the moment investigating the possibilities, for example, of large 
scale development of rice in Borneo, of linseed in a variety of Colonies, of fertilisers 
and other minerals. I should not wish, however, to limit the functions of the 
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Corporation entirely to the expansion of supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials; I 
would give it scope to develop other industries where these show promise of being 
remunerative and of benefiting the Colonies or the United Kingdom. 
4. The establishment of a separate organisation for each project as it arises is 
open to the serious objections that the initiation of projects is seriously delayed if 
special measures to create a new organisation have to be taken for each individually, 
and that there is serious loss of efficiency if available supplies of experienced and 
expert personnel have to b~ dissipated among a large number of comparatively small 
organisations. A special Corporation is being created to operate the East African 
groundnut scheme and the Minister of Food is proposing that that Corporation 
should be empowered to operate elsewhere also; but that is an exceptional case 
because of the very large scope of the groundnut scheme. I am convinced that a 
Colonial Development Corporation with wider functions is also required. 
5. The general functions I have in mind for such a Corporation are:-
(i) to enquire into new projects and conduct and pay for investigation of a 
commercial character; 
(ii) to operate new industries itself where appropriate; 
(iii) to develop and assist ad hoc undertakings and to provide finance for such 
undertakings by taking up shares, debentures or other forms of capital either 
alone or in association with a Colonial Government or Governments or with 
Governments of other parts of the Commonwealth. 
I have discussed with the Minister of Food the more detailed definition of the 
functions of the suggested Corporation and other provisions for its establishment 
and we are satisfied that adequate arrangements can be made to prevent overlapping 
with the Corporation to be formed under his control and that the two can 
conveniently be provided for in a single Bill. 
6. I propose that the Corporation should have a broad representation of persons 
with experience in business, applied science, administration and trade union matters 
in the Colonies or elsewhere; and that its capital should be obtained as to the greater 
part by the raising of money by public issues under Treasury guarantee with a total 
borrowing power of £100 million, with provision for some initial contribution direct 
from the Exchequer. I should contemplate that new undertakings would normally be 
actually operated by subsidiary organisations which might be incorporated under the 
Companies legislation either of the United Kingdom itself or of the Colony or 
Colonies concerned. Such subsidiaries could then supplement the finance provided 
for them by the Corporation itself by issuing debentures or other stock, which would 
provide an opportunity for the public in the Colonies themselves to invest part of 
their surplus funds either in the stock of the main Corporation or in that of 
subsidiaries. 
7. I should propose to lay it down as a principle that the Corporation should 
conduct its own operations and those of its subsidiaries on public utility principles, 
that it should aim at earning over a period of years sufficient to pay its capital charges 
without aiming at large profits. As its whole object would be to initiate genuinely 
new development, the risk of loss on individual projects would have to be faced, but 
the Corporation would be expected to "break even" on its whole operations over a 
number of years. 
8. In order to provide fully for regular consultation with the Minister of Food, the 
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President of the Board of Trade and the Minister of Supply as well as the Treasury in 
the general operations of the Corporation, so that full account could be taken of the 
needs of this country for physical supplies and of the possibilities of improving the 
balance of payments position of the sterling area as a whole by developing new 
production, I should propose the setting up of a departmental committee which 
would keep in general touch with the operations of the Corporation and give it 
guidance on major matters of policy. 
9. Legislation would be necessary to establish such a Colonial Development 
Corporation and, if we are not to lose much valuable time in getting ahead with the 
task of economic development in the Colonial Empire, it is essential that such 
legislation should be passed during the next session of Parliament. Account has 
already been taken of this and a place is reserved in the legislative programme for a 
Bill to establish both the Corporation discussed here and that required to operate the 
East African groundnut scheme. The necessary provisions will not be very long and I 
believe the measure would give rise to little Party controversy since the necessity of 
economic development in the Colonies is common ground with all Parties and the 
possibility of establishing some such organ of development as this has been the 
subject of comment, in all political quarters. I am, therefore, seeking approval in 
principle in order that my officials may proceed, io consultation with the Treasury 
and the Ministry of Food, to the detailed drafting of a Bill. 
82 CAB 129/19, CP(47)177 8 June 1947 
'Production of foodstuffs and raw materials in the colonies': Cabinet 
memorandum by Mr Creech Jones. Appendix: examples 
The Cabinet will be interested to learn of the steps taken in the Colonial Office 
recently to increase production of foodstuffs and raw materials in the Colonies. 
2. Colonial Governments have been repeatedly urged to do everything possible to 
increase food supplies both for local consumption and for export. Explicit instruc-
tions were sent out to them in the early part of 1946, when the gravity of the 
post-war food crisis was appreciated and these have been frequently followed up. 
3. Agricultural and other economic expansion has a big place in the Ten Year 
Development Programmes of the respective territories under the Colonial Develop-
ment and Welfare Acts. Many of the schemes are already in operation. Particulars of 
some of these are mentioned in the Appendix. 
4. Provision under these Acts has been made for a number of centrally controlled 
schemes aimed at the assistance of economic development, including (a) compre-
hensive organisations for topographical and geological surveys and many research 
projects, (b) training of technical staffs etc. Provision has also been made for the 
restoration to full activity of the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, which 
trains agricultural workers for employment all over the Colonial Empire. An 
Agricultural Adviser, an expert Advisory Committee and an Agricultural .Research 
Committee function to urge forward development work over the whole field of 
agriculture, animal health and forestry. 
5. The Colonial Office has also paid particular attention to particular fields of 
production in which development projects would be of special value at the present 
time. Investigations have lately been systematised by the formation of an Inter-
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Developmental [sic] Committee under Colonial Office Chairmanship, which is 
studying all the products of which we might get increased supplies from the 
Colonies, in consultation with the other Departments and experts in this country. It 
is beginning with the most urgent or promising possibilities such as tobacco in 
Central Africa, rice in Sierra Leone and Borneo, timber in a number of Colonies and 
manila hemp in Borneo. 
6. Where departmental examination suggests prima facie a possibility of expan-
sion, special enquiries are instituted in the Colonies, and expert missions despatch-
ed. Many Colonies are, as a result of such enquiries, examining the possibilities of 
linseed and soya bean production. A mission has just left to look into the possibilities 
of groundnut production in West Africa, following the scheme already initiated in 
East Africa as a result of the report of a similar mission organised last year. Experts 
are looking into the development of coal production in Nigeria and in Borneo, and a 
special mission will examine the possibilities of rice production in Borneo. 
7. A number of undertakings are already in operation. My colleagues are familiar 
with the proposals concerning the East African groundnut undertaking. The 
Nigerian Government has organised a Government Corporation under local legisla-
tion to carry out the development of large ex-German Estates in the Cameroons for 
the production of bananas and other crops. The Nigerian Government has for many 
years operated the coal mines in that country. 
8. I have, however, felt more and more the need for an instrument of wide and 
general powers to undertake specific projects of this kind and I am accordingly 
submitting separately a Memorandum proposing the establishment of a general 
Colonial Development Corporation.1 
9. Private enterprise is also being encouraged to go ahead within the scope of our 
development programmes with new projects where government enterprise is 
difficult. In the West Indies Tate and Lyle, Ltd., in Jamaica Booker Brothers, and 
McConnell and Co. Ltd., in British Guiana are each spending more than £1 million 
on new sugar factories or the modernisation of old ones. Another example among 
many is the recent establishment by the United Africa Company of an up-to-date 
plant for the production of timber and plywood in Nigeria. My Department is 
facilitating these enterprises where necessary (e.g. by expansion of transport and 
docks facilities, etc.) and I have also, in the mining sphere, agreed to several new 
concessions on carefully regulated lines to mining companies to prospect and 
develop in areas where Government organisation cannot for some time be created. 
There are promising prospects, for instance, with regard to the development of lead 
and coal in Tanganyika. 
10. Certain Colonies have had special rehabilitation problems. In Malaya the 
Governments have given very extensive financial and other assistance to the tin, 
palm oil and rubber industries. In Mauritius and Trinidad His Majesty's Government 
have made special grants to assist in the recovery of the sugar industry which had 
lost ground during the war owing to the diversion of labour either to the growth of 
local foodstuffs or to work on military bases. Substantial grants or loans have also 
been made by the Treasury to the recovery from hurricane damage in the case of 
Jamaica bananas and Mauritius sugar. 
11. Production for the future is already being assisted by a number of important 
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projects of research, e.g. into the diseases which are afflicting West African cocoa, 
into the general problems of sugar production in the West Indies and into cotton 
production. It has just been agreed with the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation 
that a general Cotton Research Station should be set up in Uganda, to be financed 
jointly by the Corporation, Colonial Development and Welfare funds, and the African 
Governments concerned. In many Colonies experimental stations and demonstration 
farms have increased. 
12. Yet another factor in encouraging the maximum output is the stabilisation of 
the marketing position so as to give the producer a firm assurance for the future. A 
new permanent organisation to deal with the marketing of West African cocoa has 
now been established and I am paying particular attention to the establishment of 
similar marketing organisations for other Colonial Products, e.g. palm kernels, sisal, 
etc. 
13. There are in many areas big schemes to arrest erosion, secure fertilisers, 
improve irrigation and conserve water, improve animals and agricultural methods, 
develop co-operative practice etc. Also the general problems of the organisation of 
African agriculture in relation to native social conditions and customs have received 
much attention as this is an important factor in expansion. 
14. These activities have of course to surmount many difficulties. Briefly, among 
the practical obstacles to rapid increase of production are:-
(a) The general infertility of land in most of tropical Africa, and the dangers of 
destroying the fertility by wrong methods. 
(b) The shortage and comparative inefficiency of native labour and the danger of 
competition within any given territory of different schemes demanding labour at 
the same time. 
(c) The shortage of technicians, including agricultural, veterinary, forestry and 
geological officers in the Government services. 
(d) The very inadequate existing capital equipment, particularly of the African 
native producer, and the great difficulty of getting quick delivery of new 
equipment, including railway equipment, tractors and other necessities for 
mechanical cultivation. 
(e) Difficulties in securing supplies of imported foods and consumption goods 
which are necessary as inducements to labour. In some Colonies, particularly in 
the East, the shortage of food is a very real obstacle to full productive effort. 
(0 Shortage of fertilisers, of which, under the existing international allocation 
system, Colonies are still getting only a percentage of their ordinary requirements. 
(g) Fears among some producers that the existing conditions of shortage may 
fairly soon be replaced by over-production as is already threatening in the case of 
rubber. 
(h) The physical difficulty that a great many Colonial products, including palm 
and coconut products, cocoa, coffee, tea, rubber and sisal, are tree crops or other 
slow growing plants which do not come to bearing until from three to eight years 
after planting. 
15. I should add that many territories have increased their local food supplies 
(e.g. Nigeria by establishing bacon and cheese factories and in Tanganyika where a 
meat extract factory is being built) and the higher standard of living enjoyed and the 
measures adopted to prevent famine all involve a bigger consumption of products. 
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16. I attach, in an Appendix, a few examples of particular projects included in 
Colonial Development Programmes, and of recent increases in Colonial production. 
Appendix to 82 
A. A few examples of provision for economic development in colonial ten year 
development programmes 
1. Kenya. Provision has been made for a large number of local schemes for soil 
erosion, irrigation and settlement involving a total expenditure of £4,500,000. 
2. Nigeria has made provision for the expansion of the Agricultural, Veterinary 
and Forestry Departments, at a total cost of £3,230,000. 
3. Jamaica has provided for the expansion of agricultural advisory services and 
other features of the Agricultural Department at a cost of £1,378,000 over 10 
years. 
B. Recent increases in colonial production 
1. Timber 
British Guiana. Total production of timber on Crown Lands has increased from 
an average of 1,274,000 cubic feet in 1936/40, to 2,307,000 cubic feet in 1945. 
Gold Coast. Production of hardwood has increased from an average of 
5,690,000 in 1934/38 to 13,090,000 in 1945. 
Nigeria. Output of hardwood increased from 46,800 trees average for the 5 
years 1934/38, of approximately 14,000,000 cubic feet, to 73,903 trees in 1945. 
2. Groundnuts 
Production in Nigeria has increased from 228,000 tons in 1945 to 302,000 tons 
in 1946. 
3. Palm products 
During the last five months purchases in Nigeria from many producers have 
increased to a weekly average of 7,700 tons of palm kernels and 3,900 tons of 
palm oil as compared with 6,700 and 3,100 in 1946. 
4. Sugar 
Production in Jamaica has increased from an average of about 83,000 tons in 
the two years 1935/36 to an estimated production of 167,230 tons in 1947. 
5. Tobacco 
Jamaica's production of cigars has increased from 4,564lbs. in 1939 to 312,704 
lbs. in 1946 and is now practically wholly supplying the demand in this country 
formerly met by Cuba, and so saving dollar expenditure. 
6. Tea 
Exports from Kenya have increased from 9,600,000 pounds in 1938 to 
11,600,000 in 1945, Nyasaland from 10,200,000 to 13,700,000 and Tanganyika 
from 300,000 to 900,000. 
83 CAB 129/20, CP(47)242 23 Aug 1947 
'Production of dollar-earning colonial commodities': Cabinet memor-
andum by Mr Thomas on balance of payments situation 
At the meeting of Ministers held on the 20th August to consider various questions 
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ansmg out of the balance of payments situation, reference was made to the 
possibility of securing assistance in balancing our payments with the United States 
by increasing exports of primary products from the Colonies. I submit the following 
as a prel iminary and general statement of the possibilities in this direction and of the 
action which is being taken. 
2. The Secretary of State for the Colonies has already had some correspondence 
with the Foreign Secretary and other Ministers on th is general subject, and has 
expressed himself as in entire agreement with the idea that we should try to 
re-establish, and indeed improve upon, the pre-war position in which exports of 
primary produce from the Colonies to America were among our principal earners of 
dollars, the Colonies in general having a large favourable balance with dollar 
countries which they spent mainly in the sterling area. 
3. Practical possibilities fall under three heads:-
(i) Cases in which increased supplies could be made available at once for sale to 
the United States if that country were prepared to import more. The only important 
commodity in this class is rubber, but it is one of very great importance. American 
imports of rubber are being artificially restricted by the continued requirement by 
Government regulation that the proportion of natural rubber used by American 
manufacturers shall not exceed 50 per cent., the balance being synthetic. If this 
requirement were removed and the respective shares of natural and synthetic rubber 
in the market were determined by competition, a substantial increase in the 
purchases of natural rubber would result. Possibly America could absorb an 
additional 250,000 tons per annum, which alone would be worth about $75 millions. 
In addition, some improvement of the price would be probable. The dollar gain 
would not all accrue to British territories as some of the additional rubber would 
come from the Netherlands East Indies and possibly Siam and French Indo-China, 
but the improvement in the financial position of those countries would itself be 
indirectly to our advantage. Pressure has already been exercised on the Americans at 
the Rubber Study Group and elsewhere to remedy the present situation, which is 
contrary to the spirit of American policy in relation to I.T.O. etc., as hitherto little 
success has been obtained. A high level approach related to the present crisis might 
be more successful. In addition to the restoration of free competition between 
natural and synthetic rubber an attempt might be made to obtain an undertaking to 
purchase additional quantities to put into an enlarged strategic stockpile. 
(ii) Cases in which no immediate increase in total Colonial output is possible, but 
increased supplies could be made available to America by restriction of United 
Kingdom purchases. These include cocoa, of which the United Kingdom is consum-
ing more than before the war, and where the transfer of, say, 10,000 tons (less than 
10 per cent. of our consumption) to the American market would mean earning some 
$6 millions. Other possibilities are sisal, West African timber, hides and skins and 
tin, but in the case of these raw materials it may be better that the present quantities 
should continue to be imported into this country with a view to ultimate re-export in 
manufactured form. 
(iii) Cases in which there are longer term possibilities of expansion of Colonial 
output over a period of years, e.g. tin, copper, lead and other minerals. In these 
cases, one of the initial difficulties is the provision of the necessary capital equipment 
for the increase of production, which means an additional call on available capital 
goods. 
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4. Action which is already in hand, or is now proposed, includes:-
(i) Appeals for greater effort in production. A number of such appeals have been 
made to Colonial Governments and peoples in the two years since the war ended, and 
it would be a mistake to expect too much from any further appeals of this kind. The 
Secretary of State has, however, just sent out a public message to the peoples of the 
Colonies setting out the general facts of the economic crisis in this country and 
indicating how Colonial peoples can help both by economies in imports and by 
increasing their production. Opportunity will also be taken to emphasise again the 
general background at a Conference of African Governors which has already been 
arranged to take place in November. 
(ii) Examination of possibilities of the United Kingdom releasing supplies for 
export to the U.S.A. The Treasury are understood to be making arrangements for 
these possibilities to be examined in the very near future. 
(iii) Examination of particular possibilities of increased production. As a result of 
the correspondence with the Foreign Secretary already mentioned, a list prepared in 
the Foreign Office of commodities of which the United States is understood to be 
likely to be interested in is already under examination in the Colonial Office. The 
products in this category most likely to be available from the Colonies are minerals 
(tin, lead, copper, bauxite, diamonds, manganese, chrome), rubber, sisal and cocoa. 
This examination is being linked up with the systematic survey of possibilities of 
increasing production of Colonial products for export to the United Kingdom or 
elsewhere which was initiated by the Colonial Office some time ago through an 
Inter-departmental Colonial Primary Products Committee. That Committee is now 
being asked to give immediate attention to the products likely to be of special 
interest from the point of view of export to America. Special attention is also being 
given to steps which could be taken for the increase of Colonial gold output. 
(iv) Expediting of projects already in hand. The two most important things here 
are the rehabilitation of the Malayan tin industry and the development of the lead 
deposits in Tanganyika. In both cases progress is held up by difficulties in securing 
delivery of equipment and in the latter by difficulties of securing technical staff. 
Other Ministers have already been asked to give help getting over these difficulties 
and an indication that high priority should be attached to meeting these needs would 
be of assistance. 
84 FO 800/444, ff34-36 4 Oct 1947 
'Definition of functions of Colonial Development Corporation and 
Overseas Food Corporation': minute by Mr Bevin to Mr Attlee 
(PM/47/139) 
I understand that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Colonial Office has sent 
you a memorandum on this subject, 1 of which he has been good enough to send me a 
copy. The points he raises therein seem to me quite valid, but there are others. 
2. We must be careful that our plans for the development of our Colonial 
Dependencies cannot in any way be represented as springing solely from our own 
1 See 83. 
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selfish interests. It is above all important that in their presentation there is no 
possible suggestion of exploitation of the colonial populations. In either case we may 
find ourselves exposed to bitter criticism in the United Nations and be obliged to 
defend ourselves against quite baseless charges. We know from experience that the 
possibilities of misrepresentation in this field are almost endless. 
3. It is therefore important that in all these schemes it is demonstrable that their 
general purpose is the raising of the standard of life of the colonial peoples as well as 
that of obtaining the food-stuffs, minerals or raw materials that we need. From this 
point of view there would be obvious advantages if all these schemes were under the 
Colonial Office, particularly as the corporations are to be under government control 
which makes us particularly vulnerable to hostile criticism. It would be very easy for 
our Russian fr iends to make a plausible case that the main object of the Ministry of 
Food could not be other than that of obtaining foodstuffs at the cheapest possible 
price. 
4. For these reasons I think the point raised by the Colonial Office is one of 
substance in which I am closely interested. 
5. I am having this question gone into more deeply by officials and may have 
further suggestions to make as a result of their investigations. Meanwhile, this 
minute is to record my interest in this question and to invite your attention to its 
international implications. 
6. I am sending a copy of this minute to Ivor Thomas. 
85 CO 852/989/3, no 26 6 Dec 1947 
[Marketing of colonial produce]: letter from Sir P Mitchell (Kenya) to 
Mr Creech Jones 
In view of the discussions at the recent African Governors' Conference on the subject 
of marketing of Colonial produce, and the fact disclosed there that at any rate in 
official circles in the Colonial Office views are held which appear to me to conflict 
with the real interests of the Colonies as well as of Great Britain, I am taking the 
liberty of sending you a copy of a document I produced when I was High 
Commissioner for the Western Pacific. 1 There is matter in it which might have to be 
altered in the light of subsequent events, but generally speaking I would re-write it 
again to-day in much the same terms. I owe you an apology for sending to so busy a 
man such a long document, and I can hardly hope that you will read the whole of it, 
but the fi rst three or four pages, and the last, contain the gist of the matter. 
I realise fully that it is to the interest of the people of Great Britain to obtain 
tropical products at reasonable prices. Nevertheless, if we are to continue to sell to 
you we must be able to buy from you, and it is therefore essential that the disastrous 
gap between consumer goods prices and produce prices should be narrowed. In fact, 
it is continuously expanding for reasons which are as apparent to you as they are to 
us. If it is not possible intentionally and consciously to introduce a principle different 
from that of obtaining products at the lowest price which by any means the producer 
can be compelled to accept, then in countries with virtually no organisation of 
1 Not printed: 'Post-war reconstruction: note on colonial primary produce markets after the war' 
(February 1944). 
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labour, or very rudimentary organisation of labour, the production will inevitably be 
made cheaper at the expense either of the small producer, or of the labour employed 
by the larger producers. Taking the broad view, therefore, it is as much to the 
interest of a manufacturing country such as Great Britain as it is of a producing 
country in the case of Colonial products, that prices should be paid which will make 
it possible first to escape from the low wage economy which so mitigates [sic] against 
consumption of goods from industrial countries, and secondly, from a level of prices 
to small producers which can only be obtained by selling [sic] the fertility of the soil 
through wrong agricultural methods. 
The whole position appears to me to be the more tragic in that, during two wars, 
the fact that bulk buying can be organised in a satisfactory manner to the advantage 
of all parties has been demonstrated. Nevertheless, in spite of the views expressed by 
Sir Stafford Cripps and yourself at the Governors' Conference, expressions of opinion 
by departmental officials indicated quite clearly that they considered that the sooner 
we returned to the chaotic conditions that existed between the wars, the better. It 
does not seem to me that it has even now been realised in a good many quarters in 
London that those conditions were a ghastly failure, and in themselves a large part of 
the cause of the poverty and misery in many countries, Northern Europe included, 
which in the event led to the establishment of totalitarian states and to war. 
However, I must not repeat the argument in this letter. I will only hope that you 
may be able to find time to read it, and to consider whether, as a matter of policy, it 
should not be laid down that these buying contracts must be based on a policy of fair 
standard of living to the producer and his labourer, not out of any sentimental or 
soft-hearted wish to do good to other people at the expense of the British taxpayer, 
but as a matter of hard common sense in order that those from whom you buy may 
be able to buy from you. The incidental advantages to British merchant shipping are 
also not to be overlooked. 
I have written in similar terms to Sir Stafford Cripps & Mr Harold Wilson,2 
sending them copies of this paper. 
~ President of Board of Trade, 194 7- 1951. 
86 CO 852/989/3, no 28 23 Dec 1947 
[Marketing of colonial produce]: letter (reply) from Mr Creech Jones 
to Sir P Mitchell 
I have received your letter of the 6th December1 enclosing a copy of the note you 
wrote while in Fiji on Colonial Primary Produce Markets after the war, and urging 
that bulk buying contracts should be concluded on the basis of prices fair to 
producers. With that and with the wider proposition that it would be to the 
advantage of producers to obtain much greater stability in the prices of their 
products than has prevailed in the past, there is, of course, no disagreement between 
any of those concerned here with the problem. The matter to which a great deal of 
thought has been given here in the light of extensive war-time experience, and what 
Caine very deliberately stressed in his remarks at the Governors' Conference, is how 
1 See 85. 
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to surmount the practical difficulties and particularly how to ensure that the prices 
paid are in fact fair. I do not think it is really true to say that any view has been 
expressed here in favour of a general return to the conditions of pre-war marketing. 
On the contrary, Caine indicated a number of possible devices for introducing 
greater stability on the assumption that no device would be found uniformly suitable 
for all commodities in all territories. 
Bulk marketing is in many cases the most suitable of the available devices and all 
of us here concerned noted with appreciation the very clear statement of the part 
which bulk marketing can play which you made in your address to the Kenya 
Legislature after your return from the Governors' Conference. In many cases it suits 
both the producers and the United Kingdom excellently for the whole or a large part 
of the output to be the subject of a bulk sale to the U.K. and it so happens that it has 
been possible to fix up mutually agreeable contracts in respect of a number of East 
African products. 
What has all along troubled us, however, has been the actual fixing of the prices, 
which in a number of non-East African cases have not been wholly acceptable to the 
producers. You will remember that Milverton stressed the apprehensions felt in 
Nigeria that bulk marketing arrangements have worked out grossly unfairly to 
producers and there is a growing and disturbing agitation on that subject in Nigeria. 
As it happens, we are faced with somewhat similar complaints at the moment 
elsewhere, e.g. in respect of Malayan tin, and you may have noticed that in Uganda 
considerations presumably of the same kind have led the Uganda Government to 
propose a reversion to free auctioning of cotton for export, although under the 
persuasion of the Colonial Office they have now agreed to keep on with bulk selling 
for the coming season. 
In some of these cases the producers feel strongly that they would have been better 
off in an old-style free market and it was suggested, therefore, in our discussions that 
in fixing prices under bulk contracts some regard ought to be paid to outside market 
conditions. I suppose it was that suggestion which led you to fear that a general 
return to free markets was advocated. In fact I think there is no disagreement 
between us that bulk marketing arrangements on a basis of fair prices ought to be 
sought wherever they can serve the interests of Colonial producers as well as 
consumers in this country and promote greater stability. But bulk buying is a 
powerful weapon which can be used against as well as for the interests of producers. 
Those concerned in the Office have been giving much attention to the problem of 
ensuring that that is not done and I think we have gone a long way now towards 
getting the agreement of other Ministers concerned for a better basis of price-fixing 
for the future. 
87 T 236/696, pp 40-44 3 Feb 1948 
'American private investment in the colonies': draft CO memorandum 
by Sir S Caine 
1. Gen.209/81 discusses American private investment in the United Kingdom. 
Many of the same considerations apply to such investment in the Colonies, but there 
1 Prepared by the Treasury. 
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are some underlying differences in basic conditions which affect the practical policy 
it is desirable to pursue. 
2. The first basic difference is that American private investment on any substan-
tial scale in the Colonies is normally associated with the grant of a specific 
concession by the local authorities. In the memorandum on the United Kingdom 
aspects, considerable attention was paid to the possibility of American buying-up of 
existing undertakings either as single entities or through the purchase of shares on 
the Stock Exchange. Few examples of this kind of thing have yet come to notice in 
the Colonies, and, insofar as purchase of shares is involved, it is of course relevant 
that United Kingdom companies account for the greater part of company holdings in 
Colonial industry (including agriculture and mining) and transactions in the shares 
of such companies are, of course, subject to the same rules as transactions in the 
shares of companies operating within the United Kingdom itself. Local companies 
represent a significant share of the economy in only a few Colonies and organised 
stock exchanges of any significance exist practically only in Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Nor is it likely that there will be many instances in the Colonies of 
American manufacturing concerns wanting to arrange, in partnership with local 
factories, the undertaking of the manufacture of American-type products. The form 
usually taken by American investment is that of an application for a concession for 
specific mineral deposits or the exploitation of some other local natural resources. 
Typical examples recently under consideration are an application by Anaconda for 
gold concessions in British Guiana, and an application by an American concern for 
special rights in connection with tuna fishing in Fijian waters. Applications for 
extensive concessions in the agricultural field are less common principally because 
in most territories there are now considerable limitations on the alienation of land 
for large private holdings. 
3. A second basic difference is that His Majesty's Government, and through them 
Colonial Governments, are under special obligations as regards access of foreign 
powers to Colonial raw materials which make it politically difficult to put any special 
obstacles in the way of American investment in the development or the production of 
such materials. These obligations arise partly in very general form out of the Atlantic 
Charter, partly out of the declarations of policy contained in the United Nations 
Charter, and partly out of the more specific obligations attaching to Trusteeship 
territories such as Tanganyika. 
4. Thirdly, insofar as there is any political or psychological objection to the entry 
of American capital, with the consequence of American control of particular 
undertakings, the situation is different from that of the United Kingdom in that any 
local political objection which there may be may apply generally to any external 
capital, including United Kingdom capital, and may not particularly discriminate 
against American. On the other hand, from the purely United Kingdom point of view, 
there may be even stronger objections to allowing control of individual Colonial 
undertakings to pass into American hands than there is in the United Kingdom, 
because in particular cases there may be a greater danger of political control moving 
in the same direction . 
5. Finally, it may be felt that there are special strategic considerations with 
regard to the control of particular enterprises in the Colonies as it is sometimes 
suggested that foreign ownership might hamper the full utilisation of the products in 
question in time of war. It is doubtful whether there is very much in this, since what 
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really matters is the physical power to control and defend the undertaking in 
question, not its legal ownership, but there may be a sub-stratum of truth in that · 
peace-time consultation with the managers of an undertaking of such a type is no 
doubt easier if it is under British management. 
6. The various political, psychological and strategic considerations will have a 
varying incidence on the individual cases, and, looking at them quite generally, it is 
perhaps true to conclude that they cancel each other out. Any general conclusions 
which emerge therefore would flow rather from the first point of difference which 
has been referred to, i.e. that American private investment in the Colonies is 
normally in new and self-contained undertakings and not in the acquisition in whole 
or in part of established undertakings. 
7. In the memorandum on the United Kingdom, special attention was drawn to 
the danger that American capital, by retaining to itself the equity of the undertaking 
and securing a large proportion of the capital by the issue of local debentures, might 
obtain an undue share of the profits at comparatively small capital risk. Hitherto, 
that pattern of capital structure has not normally been suggested in proposals for 
American investment in the Colonies. There has been if anything an inclination 
towards the opposite danger of American capital being put up wholly on a debenture 
basis and the risk capital being found locally, or of the capital even if it takes the form 
of ordinary shares, enjoying some form of Government guarantee. The danger here, 
of course, is that if the undertaking turns out unsuccessful the territory concerned, 
and therefore the sterling area as a whole, will be burdened with permanent capital 
charges in dollars without having the earnings wherewith to meet them. 
8. In relation both to the United Kingdom and the Colonies, the same underlying 
principle probably applies that American private investment should bear its proper 
share of the risk of the undertaking. It should be provided on terms which make 
future payment of interest and return of capital in dollars contingent on the success 
of the undertaking. It is not unreasonable as a corollary to that to allow full 
enjoyment of the profits if in fact they emerge. Since, as already emphasised, 
American investment in the Colonies is likely to be normally in new undertakings, 
the element of risk is particularly large and it is therefore particularly necessary that 
the new capital should bear its share of that risk. 
10. It is implicit in the above argument that a new undertaking which is 
successful in making local profits will also be earning dollars to cover the remittance 
of such profits. While it is possible that there are cases in which that would not be 
true, it is undoubtedly the case that in the vast majority of probable new enterprises 
at the present time, the new production resulting would be dollar-earning in the 
sense that it would either be saleable for hard currencies or would replace hard 
currency suppl ies which would otherwise have to be purchased by the territory itself 
or by other parts of the sterling area. If, however, a rare case did appear in which 
there was doubt whether there would be dollar earnings or savings, sufficient to 
cover any remittance of profits, it might be desirable to try and prevent any American 
investment involved. 
11. The practical conclusion appears to be that, subject always to special political 
considerations in individual cases, we should not as a matter of general policy oppose 
obstacles to the investment of American capital in new productive undertakings in 
the Colonies, provided that, as is normally the case, the capital is put up 
predominantly on a simple equity basis. 
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88 PREM 8/733 5 Feb 1948 
'Economic development in the colonies': note by Mr Creech Jones for 
Mr Attlee. Appendixes: I & 11 
In the discussion with Ministers on the 9th January1, it was agreed that:-
( a) we should apply ourselves energetically to the economic development of the 
African and other colonies; 
(b) we should prepare over-all plans for co-ordinating and intensifying develop-
ment planning in the colonies and for integrating colonial plans with economic 
policy in the United Kingdom; and 
(c) the United Kingdom should co-operate with other Powers in Africa to expedite 
development. 
It was felt that the Colonial Office machinery for this work should be reviewed and 
strengthened. 
2. Much development is already planned and in progress and the first need is to 
facilitate that and, as an even greater priority, the maintenance of the very valuable 
industries already established in the Colonies. Further development consists in the 
tackling of a number of serious obstacles to progress, including the building up of 
the present very inadequate capital equipment, communication facilities etc. I am 
attaching for the information of my colleagues appendices2 deal ing with 
I. The present situation. 
11. The limitations which face us and how they can be tackled. 
Ill. The central services for development provided by the Colonial Office. 
IV. Development organisations in Africa. 
V. Selection, Training and Refreshing of Staff. 
VI. Road Development in Africa. 
VII. International collaboration in Africa. 
VIII. Regional Organisation in Africa. 
In this note I deal with the organisation necessary in the Colonial Office and other 
immediate steps for the more active prosecution of development plans. 
3. I have given much attention to the economic development of our territories 
over the past few years, and also to the economic organisation of the Colonial Office. 
The appendices mentioned will show how much progress has been made in the 
colonies, and the many improvements made in the Colonial Office machinery. Much 
of what we desire is already under way. I have, however, in the light of the discussion 
by Ministers, again reviewed the Office machinery; and I shall indicate the further 
changes required if our policy is to be expedited and properly implemented. I am 
obliged to ask for additional personnel and for a few special appointments to 
strengthen the economic organisation in the Office. 
4. The Economic Division of the Colonial Office is already planned to deal with:-
(a) Trade and Commercial Relations; 
(b) Marketing organisation, bulk purchasing and regulation of prices of colonial 
products; 
1 See 107. 2 Appendixes Ill to VIII not printed. 
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(c) Supplies of goods, machinery etc. to colonial territories; 
(d) Agricultural, industrial and mineral production and expansion; 
(e) Investigation and research into new economic activities; 
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(0 Econbmic development under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 
including the provision of public utilities and economic services; 
(g) Research into colonial products, pests and diseases; 
(h) Public finance and currency; 
(i) Control of Colonial dollar expenditure and general import policy; 
(j) Communications (air, railways, roads, rivers and shipping); 
(k) Liaison with the planning staffs and other economic departments of H.M.G. 
5. In addition to the Administrative departments of the Economic Division of the 
Office there exist:-
(a) The Colonial Primary Products Committee (interdepartmental), for study of 
the production and expansion of supplies of all colonial commodities; 
(b) The Colonial Economic and Development Council, for study of the broad 
aspects of development, e.g. the Colonial 10-year programmes; 
(c) Advisory Committees on Agriculture, Animal Health and Forestry, Fisheries, 
Labour, Co-operation, Geological Survey and Trypanosomiasis; 
(d) The Colonial Research Committee, the Agricultural, Animal Health and 
Forestry Research Committee and the Colonial Products Research Council; 
(e) Directorates for the organisation of Geodetic, Topographic and Geological 
Surveys throughout the colonies. 
The work of all these bodies is co-ordinated with the Economic Division. Liaison is 
also maintained with the new Colonial Development Corporation, which will be 
concerned with particular development projects, and with the Overseas Food 
Corporation. The Colonial Office is also represented on planning and other 
interdepartmental committees of H.M.G., such as:-
Colonial Development Working Party (under Sir Edwin Plowden) 
Overseas Negotiations Committee 
Export Committee 
London Committee on European Economic Committee 
Customs Union Study Group 
Official Committee on Economic Development. 
6. I now propose to organise the Economic Division of the Office into three 
sections as follows:-
(a) Communications, Commercial Relations and Supplies under Sir Gerard 
Clauson; 
(b) Production, Marketing and Economic Development (including liaison with 
the new Corporations) under Mr. C.G. Eastwood; 
(c) Finance, Intelligence arid Planning and Research under Mr. W. Goreii-Barnes. 
The particular new feature involved in this re-organisation is the creation of an 
Economic Intelligence and Planning Section in the Office. This Section will gather 
together all information about present and possible development, will work closely 
with the Advisory and Research Committees, and will maintain increased liaison with 
the planning staff of H.M.G. 
F 
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7. The Economic Division will thus have under review all economic activities in, 
and relating to, the colonies and the broad plans for their development, and will have 
completed [sic] knowledge of existing and projected schemes for new development, 
both under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act and the new Corporations. It 
will set in motion the necessary investigations both for local schemes and for those of 
the Corporations; it will record statistics about trade, marketing, and exchange; and 
integrate all these matters with the economic policy of the United Kingdom. But to 
do this effectively, the personnel of the Department must be strengthened and it is 
necessary to have a Director of Economic Investigation with a small permanent staff 
to organise ad hoc investigations into particular economic projects and problems, 
such as the economic possibilities of a new railway project or extensive irrigation 
works. 
8. The Division will be in charge of a Deputy Under-Secretary, Sir Sydney Caine, 
and Mr. Rees-Williams will make economic problems the major side of his work. 
9. In addition we must improve the machinery for development in the overseas 
territories. Although all colonies have given much consideration to the matter, in 
preparing and putting into force their 10-year development schemes under the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act, and have already created a good deal of local 
machinery, appointed special staff for development and undertaken surveys of 
possible projects. I have again urged Governors to review their arrangements. As my 
colleagues are well aware very rapid advances have been made in local self-
government and it is today absolutely essential that we should proceed with the 
goodwill and co-operation of local legislatures and peoples, and not by any attempt to 
impose plans from London. I had already discussed the matter with them at the 
African Governors Conference in November; but I propose to arrange a further 
conference in East and Central Africa and another in West Africa to stimulate 
interest and to discuss practical ways of achieving our ends. I am suggesting that Mr. 
Rees-Williams should attend these conferences. I cannot emphasise too strongly 
however that any such conferences will be useless unless our representatives can go 
with authority to say that H.M.G. is going to give the colonial authorities all the help 
in its power not merely in money but in the supply of materials and men. Indeed 
among the central purposes which such conferences should serve should be the 
establishment of machinery for assembling and screening demands for scarce 
materials. We must have not merely a clear declaration of this intention but a 
definite administrative plan for allocating priorities to colonial needs in the spheres 
of iron and steel and certain crucial engineering products. The local machinery for 
economic development must also be made more adequate and expert; and the 
Colonies will equally need to extend their present arrangements for controlling the 
importation and distribution of essential requirements so as to give practical effect to 
agreed priorities for development purposes, to fit in with the central machinery of 
allocation in the U.K. 
10. I would also propose that, to further the drive in the colonies, special 
appointments of liaison officers should be made to maintain close liaison between 
the Colonial Office and the executive agencies in the colonies, to co-ordinate 
information on the development programmes in their respective areas, to be a 
channel through which inspiration and guidance could flow from the centre, and to 
remove any obstacles in the way of implementing development plans. I should need 
one such officer for West Africa, at least one for East and Central Africa and others for 
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South-East Asia and the West Indies. I ask for authority to make four or five such 
appointments but would only fill the posts as men with the necessary experience, 
drive and tact were found. 
11. It is of the great [sic] importance that there should be close links between the 
Colonial Office on the one side and the central planning staff, the Economic 
Secretariat and other central organs of government on the other including (for 
strategic reasons) the Chiefs of Staffs Committee. A Colonial Development Working 
Party has, as already indicated, been set up to examine certain problems arising in 
relation to development programmes. I do not wish to anticipate the findings of that 
body but it seems almost inevitable that some permanent machinery should be 
created, analogous to, or as part of, the Investment Programmes Committee, to 
examine the priority to be given to particular schemes of Colonial development and 
to ensure that they do get such priority. Probably also something like the existing 
Colonial Primary Products Committee will be needed permanently to ensure that the 
needs of the Ministries concerned with supply are brought to the notice of the 
Colonial Office and Colonial Administrations. I should propose also to try and secure 
the representation of the principal other departments concerned on the reconsti-
tuted Colonial Development Council already referred to. Finally it will be important 
to ensure that the Colonial Office is kept even more closely than in the past in touch 
with other aspects of central planning and the creation of a special Intelligence and 
Planning Department of the Office will, I am confident, help in that respect. 
11. [sic] The Colonial Office is already very actively employed in developing 
collaboration in Africa with the French, Belgians and Portuguese and is preparing for 
discussion with the French this month on development plans and the machinery of 
economic collaboration. Further information on this point is contained in the note 
at Appendix VII. 
12. The Colonial Office organisation as now recommended is shown in diagram 
form in the chart attached. [See next page.] 
13. Recommendations:-
(i) The Economic Division of the Colonial Office should be strengthened by 
additional staff and, in particular, by the appointment of a Director of Economic 
Investigation and at least two Liaison Officers. 
(ii) Requirements of plant and materials for development in the colonies should 
be given equal priority with requirements for capital development in the United 
Kingdom and a general directive should be given to the Departments concerned 
with the allocation of materials in short supply so that colonial requirements of 
iron and steel and other essentials for current plans and for approved new projects 
may be met. (The Colonial Development Working Party is already examining in 
detail how the machinery for allocation of iron and steel can be adapted to meet 
colonial needs). 
(iii) Approval should be given to the two proposed conferences on economic 
development in Africa. 
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Appendix I to 88: Colonial economic development - the present situation 
Development of established industries 
1. (a) The Colonies are relatively poorly developed. Nevertheless, they contain 
many flourishing industries and produce much that is essential to the United 
Kingdom and the world. For the United Kingdom, all our requirements of rubber 
and cocoa and a large part of our needs of fibres, vegetable oils, sugar and tropical 
fruits are now being met from colonial sources. 
(b) The production of certain commodities has remarkably expanded during 
recent years. For example:-
(i) Groundnuts (Nigeria): 1945 - 228,000 tons, 
1946 - 322,000 tons. 
(ii) Sugar (Jamaica): 1935/36 - 83,000 tons, 
1947 - 201,700 tons. 
(iii) Hardwood (Gold Coast): 1934/38 - 5,690,000 cu ft. 
1945 - 13,090,000 cu ft. 
(iv) Tea (East Africa): 1938 - 20,100,000 lbs. 
1945 - 25,500,000 lbs. 
(c) Over and above what the colonies supply to the United Kingdom direct, they 
are earning a net surplus of dollars, after meeting their own dollar needs, of some 
$150,000,000 per annum. 
(d) The maintenance and improvement of the established industries of the 
colonies, e.g.-rubber, sugar, sisal, tin, copper and'gold, etc-is the first essential, 
and investment in individually small schemes designed to improve the efficiency and 
productivity of such industries is probably most likely to yield quick returns. The 
most striking of all recent achievements in colonial development, or re-development, 
has been the recovery of the Malayan rubber industry, which in 1947 produced over 
650,000 tons of rubber and earned some $200,000,000 dollars, against 360,000 tons 
and under $100,000 tons in 1939. 
Future possibilities 
2. Undoubtedly there are also many new possibilities which ingenuity, labour, 
and above all the application of capital can bring to fruition . Examples are:-
(a) Groundnuts. 5,000,000 acres of virtually vacant but potentially fertile land 
have been found in East Africa and a further mission has now reported that similar 
areas totalling 2,750,000 acres exist in West Africa. 
(b) Rice. Possibilities of creating new rice-growing areas exist in both West and 
East Africa and in Borneo; and of developing the already established industry in 
British Guiana. 
c) Cattle . There are 25,000,000 head of cattle in Africa, predominantly poor in 
quality and ill-fed. Their improvement and proper use is one of the biggest tasks 
facing us; and although risk of infection by disease must prevent, in the foreseeable 
future, any export of fresh meat, a large trade in canned meat is possible. 
(d) Borneo. The territories of Sarawak and North Borneo are very largely 
untouched jungle but have many possibilities of new agricultural production. 
(e) Minerals. The copper production of Northern Rhodesia can, with enough 
capital, be vastly increased; new deposits, e.g. of lead in Tanganyika and monazite in 
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Sierra Leone, are now being brought to production; it is certain that the geological 
surveys I am now organising will bring many more to light. 
Present development schemes and specific productive projects 
3. The following is a summary of the various services to which grants or loans 
have been devoted under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1940, up to the 
31st March, 1946:-
Class of Scheme 
Agriculture and Veterinary 
Communications and Transport 
Fisheries 
Forestry 
Housing and Land Settlement 
Industrial and Development 
(including Public Utilities) 
Nutrition 
Surveys 
Telegrams, Telephones and 
Wireless (including Broadcasting) 
Water Supplies and Irrigation 
Labour 
Totals 
4,794,604 
4,173,066 
207,152 
523,955 
2,672,531 
454,183 
261,813 
151,482 
265,355 
6,452,117 
7,250 
4. The following is a similar summary of grants and loans approved under the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1945, up to the 31st March, 1947:-
Class of Scheme 
Physical Planning, Surveys and Census 
Communications:-
(a) Civil Aviation 
(b) Ports, Harbours and Water Transport 
(c) Railways 
(d) Roads 
(e) Telecommunications and Posts 
Economic:-
(a) Agriculture and Veterinary 
(b) Fisheries 
(c) Forestry 
(d) Irrigation and Drainage 
(e) Land Settlement 
(0 Soil Conservation 
(g) Electricity and Power 
(h) Industrial Development 
Social:-
(a) Education:-
(i) Primary and Secondary 
(ii) Technical and Vocational 
(iii) Higher 
(b) Nutrition 
(c) Water Supplies and Sanitation 
285,477 
53,000 
2,871 
28,943 
40,000 
2,254,849 
26,093 
363,697 
118,933 
58,613 
56,115 
3,943 
1,399,922 
87,814 
407,820 
126,695 
479,037 
5. In Africa a large number of special productive projects under Government 
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agencies are either already in hand or are at present under investigation. They 
include the following:-
(i) East African Groundnut Scheme, estimated capital expenditure £25,000,000. 
(ii) West African groundnut and other products, estimated capital expenditure 
£25,000,000 - £30,000,000. 
(iii) Rice production extensions are being examined in practically every Tropical 
African dependency. 
(iv) Animal industry. Large potentialities exist, especially in East Africa, Northern 
Nigeria and Northern Rhodesia. The Tanganyika Government has recently 
arranged in association with Messrs. Liebigs for the establishment of a new 
canning factory, and similar developments elsewhere are under consideration. 
(v) Cotton. Extensions of production in Nigeria, Uganda and Tanganyika are being 
considered. Much depends on the securing of assurances of a market. 
(vi) Paper pulp. Possibilities of production of paper pulp from bamboos or grasses 
in East Africa are being actively examined by Government as well as by private 
interests. 
(vii) Fertilisers. Enquiries are being made as to the best method of exploitation on 
Government account of phosphate deposits in Uganda and of the possibilities of 
synthetic production of nitrogen in that area. 
(viii) Railways. Railway extensions are being made in Tanganyika to serve 
(a) part of the area to be developed for groundnut production; and 
(b) a new lead mine. 
An investigation is planned of the possible construction of a railway link between 
Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia. Everywhere the main immediate need of the 
railways is for re-equipment to catch up with the wastage which took place during 
the war. 
(ix) Other possibilities which are at present under examination include the 
introduction of jute production in Nigeria or East Africa, the extension of tung oil 
production in Nyasaland, and improvement of palm oil production in Nigeria. 
(x) Special mention should be made of the Cameroons Development Corporation 
which has been established by the Nigerian Government to take over the former 
German-owned estates in the Cameroons and is developing on those estates the 
production of bananas, palm oil, rubber and possibly tea and cocoa. 
6. In non-African territories there is, for various reasons, less scope for large 
Government projects but investigations are at present under way into:-
(i) development of coal deposits in North Borneo. 
(ii) rice developments in Borneo. 
(iii) an integrated scheme for drainage irrigation and rice production and milling 
in British Guiana. 
(iv) new settlement projects in British Honduras and British Guiana, on which 
the report of the Evans Commission is expected in a few weeks' time. 
7. Private productive projects. Information about these is necessarily incomplete, 
because there is no obligation on private concerns to inform Government of their 
intentions until they reacb a stage at which some specific Government action, e.g. 
the grant of a concession or the issue of import licences, is required. The following 
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are, however, a number of important projects which are in train or known to be 
likely to be undertaken in the immediate future. It will be noted that these include 
no major agricultural developments because it is the general policy of the African 
administrations to avoid any further large alienations of land for plantation purposes 
so that agricultural development may be expected to go forward on the basis either of 
peasant holdings or in some form of State activity, as in the East African Groundnut 
project. The main classes of private development envisaged are:-
(a) Transport. United Africa Company envisage the expenditure of £1,750,000 on 
the modernisation of the Niger River fleet. In nearly all territories considerable 
expenditure on road transport facilities is expected (see Appendix VI). 
(b) Agricultural 
(i) Messrs. Tate and Lyle are just completing a new sugar factory in Jamaica at a 
cost of over £1,000,000, adding 30,000 tons of sugar per annum to the Colony's 
capacity. 
(ii) Messrs. Booker Bros, McConnell and Co. Ltd. are spending some £ 1,250,000 
on improvements and extensions of sugar factories in British Guiana. 
(c) Minerals 
(i) Extension of mining and refining of copper in Northern Rhodesia -
£3,500,000. 
(ii) Lead mine in Western Tanganyika (new deposit, commencement of produc-
tion dependent on railway extension) . 
(iii) Extension of diamond production in Tanganyika (dependent on delivery of 
new machinery). 
(iv) Extension of gold production in the Gold Coast (new issues total £750,000 
approved by the Capital Issues Committee). 
(v) Cameroons mineral exploration. Negotiations are in train for this to be done 
by an exploration company to be found jointly by the Nigerian Government and 
the London Tin Corporation. 
(vi) Extension of tin production in Nigeria. 
(vii) Rehabilitation of tin mines in Malaya. 
(vii i) Systematic exploration of gold possibilities in British Guiana by the 
Anaconda Co. Ltd. 
(ix) Extensive oil refining developments in Trinidad (estimated capital cost 
£10,000,000). 
(d) Timber 
(i) United Africa Company are planning to spend £2,000,000 on timber 
developments in the Gold Coast and Nigeria. 
(ii) In the Gold Coast the firm of Glikstens are erecting a new sawmill and 
plywood factory . 
(iii) Extensive new timber developments in British Guiana by Messrs. Booker 
Bros, McConnell & Co. Ltd. 
(e) Manufacturing. A number of individual factory projects are known, e.g. 
(i) Extension of soap factory in Nigeria by Lever Brothers- £250,000. 
(ii) New brewery, Lagos- £300,000. 
(i ii) Cocoa butter factory in the Gold Coast. 
(iv) Edible oil and fats factory in Uganda (Unilevers) - £850,000. 
(v) Textile production in East Africa - £2,500,000 - probably dependent on 
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support of Colonial Development Corporation. 
(vi) Cement works in Northern Rhodesia- £360,000. 
(f) General Trading Activities. A number of firms such as the United Africa 
Company, the Uganda Company Limited and the leading West Indian and Eastern 
firms have plans for the extension of warehouse and other trading facil ities . The 
United Africa Company in particular envisage the expenditure of £1,000,000 in the 
next few years on warehouses and premises. 
Monetary resources available 
8. The following resources are in sight for development activities:-
(a) Colonial Development and Welfare Funds. £120,000,000 (made up of 
£85,500,000 allocated to individual Colonies and regions, £23,500,000 for central 
services including research, and £11,000,000 for general reserve). 
(b) Local revenues . Moneys available from local Colonial revenues, i.e. surplus to 
current expenditure requirements, and loans to be raised on the Colonies own credit 
are expected to provide over £150,000,000. 
(c) Government Corporations . The Overseas Resources Development Bill pro-
vides for total borrowing powers of £150,000,000 for the two new Corporations. 
(d) Private enterprise. The funds possibly available through this channel are 
unlimited in the sense that, if the Capital Issues Committee give approval, there is 
unlikely to be any difficulty in getting any reasonable amount of private capital for 
profitable projects in the Colonies. The large concerns already established in the 
Colonies are known to command very large resources themselves in their own 
reserves and surplus funds . 
(e) American finance. Consideration is being given to the possibility of securing 
funds from American or international sources for specific projects but nothing 
definite has yet been put forward apart from small isolated proposals for investment 
through private channels. The possible sources of possible American finance are 
(1) the European Recovery Programme under which, if passed by the American 
Congress as now drafted, it will be possible for advances to be made to help 
specific productive undertakings; 
(2) the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It is known 
that the Bank would be interested in loans for sound projects in Colonial 
territories and some discussions have already been held with officials of the 
Bank. Such loans would require the guarantee of His Majesty's Government and 
possible products are now being examined. 
(3) Private investment. Certain proposals for private investment on a small 
scale, particularly in mining enterprises, are now going forward or are under 
examination, but it would probably not be desirable to encourage any such 
investment on a scale which would lead to American private capital acquiring a 
dominating position in individual Colonial territories. 
Appendix 11 to 88: Colonial economic development - the limitations and how they 
can be tackled 
It must be made clear that development of the Colonies is hampered by considerable 
obstacles. These include:-
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(i) The great strength of local conventions in regard to land holding and social 
structure. 
(ii) Problems of soil infertility, water supply, bush clearance and disease eradica-
tion. 
(iii) Scarcity, inefficiency and ill-health of available labour; and lack of scien-
tifically trained men to lead and direct new enterprise and development (e.g. 
agriculturalists, engineers, doctors, veterinary officers, etc). 
(iv) Absence of basic services, (European occupation of most of our larger 
Dependencies dates back barely two generations, and there is little inheritance of 
the long accumulation of social capital-roads, waterworks, schools, hospitals, 
etc.-which we take for granted in western countries) . 
(v) Supply of physical capital. (All new developments need iron and steel, 
machinery, cement and other capital materials; and also consumption goods, 
textiles, hardware, food for the workers engaged on local construction). 
Agencies of development 
2. All available agencies of development must be mobilised to overcome these 
obstacles. The agencies can be grouped into three classes:-
(a) Colonial Governments using funds provided under the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Acts, surplus from their own revenues and loans raised from the public; 
(b) Special Government or semi-Government bodies, including, on the non-
commercial side, University institutions and, on the commercial side, the Colonial 
Development Corporation, the Overseas Food Corporation, and local development 
corporations formed by Colonial Governments such as the Cameroons Development 
Corporation. 
(c) Private enterprise, including the established plantation companies in rubber, 
sugar, sisal etc.; the big general Colonial trading companies like United Africa 
Company or Harrisons and Crosfield; the big mining groups; financial institutions 
specially interested in the Colonies, such as Barclays Overseas Development 
Corporation; and a multitude of smaller local business concerns. 
In the case of projects sponsored by private enterprise, co-ordination can be 
exercised by (i) control of new capital issues, whether in London or in the Colonies; 
(ii) import licensing, which controls inter alia the import of capital equipment; (iii) 
special intervention to secure priority in the supply from this country of equipment 
needed for essential projects; (iv) control of the issue of new concessions of land, 
mineral deposits, etc.; (v) controls over the recruitment of labour. 
The part of local govemments3 
3. It will be difficult for us to operate on a single centralised plan and to reconcile 
that with the individual territories, controlled as they are by semi-autonomous 
Colonial Governments. Indeed, it would not be the wish of Ministers to go back on 
the Labour Party policy of political advancement in the Colonies. It is, therefore, an 
important corollary of all our work that we must seek the co-operation of these 
authorities in the fulfilment of our plans. The winning of local confidence is of 
fundamental importance and to do this we must demonstrate that our policy is no 
3 The page containing paras 3 to 7(a) of appendix !I is missing from PREM 8/733. A replacement copy has 
been taken from CO 537/3030, no 5. 
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less bound up with the progress of colonial peoples than with meeting our own 
problems at home. 
The part of private enterprise 
4. I take the view that in addition to our own Government development 
corporations private business is also of importance in our development plans. Many 
of the small, but very useful, schemes of minor improvement will fall in this field. 
There is ample evidence of widespread private interest in Colonial possibilities, e.g. 
the large extension being undertaken by some of the leading sugar concerns and a 
number of industrial projects known to be planned by the United Africa Company. 
5. Colonial development can be co-ordinated, and broadly supervised and 
inspired, by a central organisation but the execution of the task is one which cannot 
be undertaken by any single organisation or through any single class of organisa-
tions. It involves the action of a large number of Colonial Administrations, of several 
Government corporations, which are themselves likely in turn to create subsidiaries, 
and of a host of private organisations. But there must be co-ordination and an 
intelligent scheme of allocation between the various purposes if available resources, 
particularly of such scarce capital goods as iron and steel and machinery made from 
them, are to be used to the best advantage. 
6. It will be essential that details of the existing plans of development both for Africa 
and for other areas through the various agencies, public and private, already 
mentioned-including much fuller particulars of the physical requirements for their 
execution-should be assembled centrally; and that there should be machinery for 
settling, on the basis of that information, the priorities in demands on the resources 
available, whether of steel from the United Kingdom or of labour within the Colony. 
The essentials for development 
7. These are: 
(a) knowledge of potentialities; (b) a flow of ideas; (c) adequate financial provi-
sion; (d) basic services; (e) technical staff; and (0 material resources in the form 
of iron and steel, plant and machinery, cement, etc. and consumer goods. 
(a) Knowledge of potentialities. Organisations are being created for systematic 
topographical and geological survey of the Colonies; research work is constantly 
going on into new methods of production and new products; and ad hoc arrange-
ments are made as necessary from time to time for specific investigations into 
possibilities of individual crops etc., (e.g. the missions which have drawn up the 
plans for groundnut developments in both East and West Africa.) 
(b) The flow of ideas. Constant stimulus is necessary here. I am doing everything 
to encourage interchange between the Colonial Service and the Colonial Office and 
to keep the minds of both freshened by, e.g. periodical refresher courses and ad hoc 
conferences (see Appendix V). Special missions of enquiry are sent out very 
frequently, e.g. the Commission on settlement possibilities in British Guiana and 
British Honduras, whose report I am now awaiting, the rice mission recently 
despatched to West Africa and a mission now enquiring into the economics of the 
sugar industry in Mauritius. I am also able through the extensive system of Advisory 
Committees in the Colonial Office, to get the advice and help of outside men and 
women of eminence in every field of science and administration (see Appendix IV). 
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We have also created an inter-departmental committee on Colonial Primary Products 
which has already done much useful work in surveying the needs and possibilities of 
new production. Much in the way of new ideas necessarily comes from private 
sources and as already indicated there must be every opportunity to use those ideas. 
(c) Finance. The funds available under the Colonial Development and Welfare 
Acts (£120,000,000 over ten years) and the new Overseas Resources Development 
Bill (£150,000,000 for the two new Corporations) and in the hands of Colonial 
Governments themselves are for the moment adequate to meet the expenditure it is 
in fact possible to incur having regard to the limitations of physical supplies, but 
active and confident planning for the future requires an assurance that additional 
funds will be made available if they are shown to be necessary. It is necessary also to 
ensure that the formalities surrounding access to Colonial Development and Welfare 
and similar funds are reduced to a minimum. 
It is a very real possibility that our own financial resources will in the event prove 
insufficient for all the tasks before us. Indeed today, and for some time to come, what 
we invest in the Colonies is in the last analysis drawn from what we are ourselves 
borrowing from America. Accordingly it seems to me we must look to the possibility 
of direct Colonial borrowing from America either through the International Bank or 
under the European Recovery Programme or both. Such borrowing would have 
special value in providing dollars to buy capital goods not otherwise immediately 
available and is being currently investigated interdepartmentally. 
(d) Basic services. All the principal Governments have drawn up, or are drawing 
up, ten year development programmes in which are incorporated schemes to be 
assisted under the United Kingdom Colonial Development and Welfare Acts as well as 
schemes to be financed from their own revenues or loans to be raised on their own 
credit. These schemes are in general directed to the improvement of the background 
of basic services, especially communications, agricultural services, measures of 
irrigation and soil preservation, education and health services. They include 
substantial expenditure on what is normally classified as welfare, but I cannot too 
strongly emphasise the fundamental economic character of such expenditure. 
Development is held up to-day by the shortage and inefficiency of labour, and the 
inability of many Colonial people to work with the intensity of stronger races. The 
number of workers and their ability to work is directly affected by their state of 
health and therefore by the medical services provided. The efficiency of workers is 
equally directly affected by their education and technical training. I am fully 
convinced, therefore, that the inclusion of these "welfare" services in the ten year 
programmes is absolutely justified on economic no less than humanitarian grounds. 
(e) Technicians. Everything possible should be done to assist training both of 
Colonial and United Kingdom recruits. The work of establishing university colleges, 
technical institutes and trade instruction in the colonies is going steadily on and 
much has been done in the last year; but no quick and radical remedy is likely to be 
found for this shortage for some time. 
(0 Capital goods. The provision of adequate supplies of materials for capital 
development, especially iron and steel, is the major field for early United Kingdom 
assistance. Difficulties are most acute with regard to unmanufactured and semi-
manufactured iron and steel and certain classes of machinery, e.g. electric generat--
ing machinery and agricultural machinery, especially heavy tractors and excavators. 
The problem of allocation procedure to meet Colonial needs is now being urgently 
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examined by the special Colonial Development Working Party recently set up under 
the Central Planning Section. I hope that my colleagues will confirm their intention 
to allot a high priority to these needs and will give prompt and sympathetic 
consideration to the detailed recommendations of this Working Party when received. 
It is equally important to give high priority to Colonial needs of consumption goods. 
It is not simply that "incentive" goods are required in order to persuade the local 
inhabitants to work; the higher incomes generated by development expenditure 
must be matched to a considerable extent by an increased availability of consumption 
goods. Otherwise the Colonies will be faced with a constant threat of inflation. 
Vitally necessary as it is in present circumstances for the Colonies, to limit strictly 
their imports from dollar sources, the dollar imports they are asked to forego must 
be replaced-and, as time goes on, more than replaced-by imports from other 
sources, particularly the United Kingdom; and I feel bound to ask that essential 
Colonial requirements for consumption, as well as for capital goods, be given a very 
high priority by those responsible for guiding our export trade. 
89 T 229/220 26 July 1948 
[Colonial economic policy]: letter from Sir T Lloyd (CO) to the 
Treasury. Annex: CO memorandum on 'The Colonial empire and the 
economic crisis' for the African Conference (AC(48)5) 1 
The Secretary of State has asked me to send you the enclosed memorandum on "the 
Colonial Empire and the Economic Crisis." He sends it with some diffidence because 
of the considerable public discussion which has already taken place on the economic 
problems confronting the world and because Colonial Governors have already 
received a number of memoranda on the matter and have taken action to cope with 
some of the difficulties confronting us at the present. Nevertheless, there is some 
danger that without wide publicity inside the territories on the esseqtial facts of the 
present continuing crisis certain misconceptions of policy may arise and, conse-
quently, some deterioration of relations between Britain and the peoples of the 
territories may occur. Misunderstandings are likely if a wrong approach is made in 
Britain and too little emphasis is given to the place of Colonial Governments and 
peoples in economic expansion; or when it is expected that the Colonial public 
should be as alive as we are ourselves to the economic situation which has come 
about in the world and the particular needs of Western Europe. The public here are 
conscious of the heavy burden they carried in the war relative to their own resources, 
a burden probably heavier than that carried by any other country, and yet they must 
continue to face sacrifice and scarcity with the promise of more to come. They do not 
always find it easy to understand that other people may not fully appreciate their 
difficulties and sacrifices. 
1 This circular letter was sent over Lloyd's signature to all colonial governors. A copy of the letter 
despatched to Malta was sent to the Treasury for information. 
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2. On the other hand, considering the great difference which as yet exists 
between the average standard of living of the British people and that of the vast 
majority of Colonial peoples, it is not easy for the latter to understand why the 
former regard themselves as making any sacrifice at all. There are here obvious seeds 
of discontent and unhappy relations if public pronouncements are not very carefully 
considered and handled. It is important that those overseas should realise that the 
war was concerned with the preservation of the freedom of the peoples everywhere 
and that the prosperity of Britain is an essential factor in promoting the well-being 
and economic prosperity of the Colonial peoples. Equally, while we are all mindful of 
the deep rooted loyalty to Britain in the overseas territories, a false emphasis here 
regarding the present economic difficulties, or an attitude which assumes that 
economic development of the territories may be imposed as if the territories existed 
to meet the present shortages and difficulties of Western Europe, may prejudice good 
relations and increase the political difficulties in the territories. It hardly needs to be 
said that there is no intention on the part of His Majesty's Government to exploit the 
Colonial Empire for the sake of selfish United Kingdom interests or to impede in any 
way the political progress of the Colonial people, even if some individual statements 
made or action taken under pressure of present circumstances may perhaps expose 
us to doubt from certain types of critic. 
3. The Secretary of State is convinced that we can escape most of these 
misunderstandings and turn the present situation to account by using the present 
period of crisis and trial for the whole Empire so as to demonstrate to ourselves and 
to the outside world that the inter-dependence of the Colonial territories and Britain 
is a real and powerful thing. To this end the ready interchange of information is a 
first necessity. I spoke earlier about the tendency on the part of the United Kingdom 
to assume that everybody else automatically realises this country's present difficul-
ties and their causes. Clearly we cannot expect the fullest understanding of our 
difficulties from the Colonial public unless we tell them the facts, and unless this is 
done we ourselves at this end are largely to blame for the misconceptions and 
confusions which are bound to ensue. For example, people in the Colonial Empire 
are no doubt apt to wonder whether the United Kingdom is really in such difficulty as 
is made out, seeing that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is budgeting this year for a 
very large surplus (though admittedly at the cost of very large taxation); and they are 
also no doubt tempted to believe that the assistance which the United Kingdom is 
deriving from the European Recovery Programme puts us in "Easy Street". The 
Secretary of State feels that the Colonial Office can assist in providing material to 
counter any such misconceptions and to emphasise the really serious nature of the 
present economic position. 
4. The enclosed memorandum has been prepared in the Office as a first essay in 
this task of "telling the facts". It sets out the salient facts about the present economic 
and financial crisis in this country and its repercussions in the Colonial field. It is, 
admittedly, not intended to be a public document, and should not be quoted or 
referredto in any public statement. We do hope, however, that the points which it 
seeks to make can in one way or another be made available to the public and that, 
subject to any comments which you or your Advisers may have, it may be found 
useful as background guidance for statements in your territory. 
5. We should of course be most grateful for any comments which you may like to 
make on the problem raised in this letter or on the memorandum itself. I do not 
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forecast a series of regular "bulletins" but the memorandum is intended to be a 
beginning of a continuing process whereby we, from the London end, will try to send 
periodical appreciations of the financial and economic position of the United 
Kingdom. One final point I would urge. The economic aspect of Colonial policy is but 
part of the general plan and purpose of Britain in the Colonies and in no way, in our 
present efforts, diminishes the importance we attach to our present and long term 
policies for special welfare and political responsibility. All publicity should be 
directed to the balanced presentation of the essential features of British policy, even 
if from time to time emphasis is required on one aspect or another. 
I realise that in the special circumstances of Malta, and of your own position there, 
not all of these considerations are applicable; but as this letter and the memorandum 
are being sent to all Governors, we thought it would be right for you to have them. 
Annex to 89 
1. After nearly three years of peace, most of the world is still suffering from the 
consequences of the war. The restoration of normal economic life has been delayed 
by shortages of the materials needed for rehabilitation and by the decrease in 
production, particularly of food stuffs, in war devastated areas, such as the rice 
producing regions of the Far East, aggravated by the increase in world population. 
The United Kingdom, in particular, suffers from the depletion of its internal and 
external resources in the war and from inadequate production as an aftermath of the 
war. 
Production in the United Kingdom and other European countries has been 
inadequate for all current needs of consumption, rehabilitation and development; 
and this, in turn, has occasioned a high degree of dependence on supplies from the 
United States which is reflected in the so called world dollar shortage. 
The United Kingdom normally had an adverse balance of trade with the United 
States, but it has in the past, been able to meet that adverse balance by exports to 
other countries which had a favourable balance with the United States. 
Most of these countries at the present time are no better off than the United 
Kingdom; indeed, as the 'stop-gap' aid for Europe, given by the United States in 
advance of the European Recovery Programme, indicates, many countries are in an 
even more serious position than the United Kingdom. 
The difficulties confronting the United Kingdom in the economic sphere are more 
fully described in Chapter 1 of the 'Economic Survey' for 1948 (Cmd. 7344) . . .. 
2. The serious consequences of these developments for the external financial 
position of the sterling area are vividly illustrated in the statement of the United 
Kingdom balance of payments for 1946 and 1947 in Table X on .p. 15 of this 
document. It will be seen that during 1947 the gold and dollar reserves of the United 
Kingdom (which also constitute the reserves of the rest of the sterling area) 
decreased by no less than £1,023 millions. Whilst the biggest component in this total 
decrease was the deficit of the United Kingdom with the dollar area, it is noteworthy 
that the deficit of the rest of the sterling area with the dollar area increased 
proportionately far more in 1947, and that, whereas in 1946 the sterling area as a 
whole received on balance £80 millions in gold and dollars from other countries, in 
1947 they paid to other countries on balance, £157 millions in gold and dollars . 
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3. In the summer of last year, when it became clear that the drain on the United 
Kingdom gold and dollar reserves was accelerating at an alarming rate, measures, 
which it is unnecessary to recapitulate here, were at once taken by the United 
Kingdom Government to bring the situation under control. At the same time 
co-operation in these measures was sought and obtained, both from the Dominions 
and from the Colonial Empire. As a result of these measures there was, during the 
last five months of 1947, a steady decrease in the rate of drain of the sterling area 
reserves which reached a peak of £156 millions in August, and by December had 
fallen to £48 millions. The first four months of 1948 have unfortunately not shown a 
similar decline in the rate of drain, and it still represents an annual rate of just over 
£500 millions. As the total remaining gold and dollar reserves of the United Kingdom 
amounted at the beginning of 1948 to about £680 millions*, it is clear that still 
greater efforts to remedy the situation are required. 
4. The European Reconstruction Programme, now approved by the United States 
Congress and already in process of implementation by the American administration, 
represents a measure of assistance by one country to peoples outside its borders, 
whose generosity is quite unprecedented in time of peace. Nonetheless, supremely 
important as this assistance is, even if the share of it enjoyed by the United Kingdom 
is sufficient to cover the whole of the net deficit with the Western Hemisphere of the 
United Kingdom and its dependent territories (which is in itself unlikely) there will 
still remain the problem of the deficit of the rest of the sterling area. Moreover, the 
European Recovery Programme is planned to last until 1952 at the latest, and, as 
appropriations will have to be voted annually by the United States Congress, cannot 
be absolutely counted upon as long as that; and, unless the present disequilibrium in 
the balance of payments of the sterling area can be corrected during the period 
covered by the Programme, the Programme will have served only to postpone, not to 
prevent, the inevitable crisis. 
5. In these circumstances the United Kingdom Government had decided that 
whatever American aid may become available to them through the European 
Reconstruction Programme, it will be necessary for them to continue and intensify 
the policies upon which they embarked last autumn with a view to reducing as 
rapidly as possible, the drain upon their gold and dollar reserves. These policies 
which are fully discussed in the Economic Survey for 1948 fall under the following 
main headings:-
(a) Measures designed to increase production, particularly in the basic industries 
and in dollar earning and dollar saving industries, (see especially Chapter II of the 
Economic Survey). 
(b) Measures to increase exports, particularly to hard-currency areas, (see Chapter 
I(b) of the Economic Survey). 
(c) Measures to reduce imports from hard currency areas and to secure essential 
supplies without payment of gold or dollars, (see Chapter I(c) of the Economic 
Survey) and 
(d) Anti-inflation measures in the budgetary sphere, in wage and price policies, 
and in the control of investment programmes, (see Chapter 3 of the Economic 
Survey and the proposals of the United Kingdom Budget for 1948.) 
• Excluding the balance of the Canadian loan which may not be available, but including the whole of the 
South African gold loan. [See part 4 of this volume, 416.] 
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6. By the beginning of 1948 these policies were already beginning to meet with 
some success. For instance, during the first quarter of 1948 the interim index of 
Industrial Production (1946 average = 100) stood at 121, and there had been a 
particularly welcome improvement in production of coal and textiles; and during the 
first quarter of 1948 the volume of United Kingdom exports had reached an average 
of 125% of the 1938 volume. But, as indicated above, the rate at which the drain on 
the reserves was still continuing at that date, showed that much still remained to be 
done. 
7. It would not, perhaps, have been surprising if, in these difficult conditions, the 
United Kingdom had decided that it could not continue to devote any substantial 
proportion of its limited resources in money or materials to Colonial Development. 
In fact, however, the United Kingdom is determined, despite all its difficulties, to 
continue to play its full part in the development of the Colonies. 
The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 was amended in 1945 and the 
amount to be devoted from United Kingdom funds to the development of the 
resources of the Colonies and the welfare of their peoples, was then increased to a 
total of £120 millions. 
Plans for the development of most Colonies, in accordance with this Act, have 
been framed, considered and approved, and many individual items have already been 
initiated. The Overseas Development Act which has now received the Royal Assent, 
provides for the financing from the United Kingdom funds to the Colonial 
Development Corporation, and the Overseas Food Corporation, to the extent of £100 
millions, and £50 millions respectively, and the Secretary of State has recently 
addressed to Colonial Governments a despatch enclosing a Memorandum by the 
Chairman of the Colonial Development Corporation asking for the early submission 
of schemes to increase production in Colonial territories. 
In a lesser degree the revised double taxation arrangements into which most 
Colonies have entered, have enabled considerable revenue to be transferred in many 
cases from United Kingdom Exchequer to the Colonies in which United Kingdom 
Companies function. 
Finally, special consideration has been given to the improvement of existing 
arrangements for ensuring that there is made available to the Colonies from the 
United Kingdom, a fair share of the iron and steel and other capital goods, without 
which the finance thus made available, cannot be effectively utilised. 
8. There are two main considerations which have weighed with the United 
Kingdom in its decision not to waver from the objective of developing the economic 
resources of the Colonies, and raising the standard of living of colonial peoples. 
First, colonial peoples themselves are demanding a higher standard of living with 
the amenities which that implies and the United Kingdom Government considers it 
to be its duty to help to put them on the road to attain them. 
Secondly, it is the considered view of the United Kingdom that the development of 
the economic resources of the Colonies and the possibilities of triangular trade 
which such development opens up, is one of the most important means by which, in 
the long term, it may be possible to bring the balance of payments of the sterling area 
as a whole, once more into equilibrium. The words "long term" are here used 
deliberately; for it is fully realised that increased production in the Colonies must be 
based on the steady improvement of their social, health and educational services and 
on their communications and other basic economic services as well as on the actual 
G 
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initiation of new industrial or agricultural projects. 
9. It must however, be recognised that although there is thus no conflict between 
the interests of the Colonies and the long term interests of the United Kingdom 
Government, the decision of the United Kingdom to continue and intensify its 
support for Colonial Development, does, in a short term, carry with it certain 
dangers against which it will be necessary to guard. 
The United Kingdom Government feels sure that Colonial Governments will wish 
to play their full part in averting those dangers. 
10. The dangers referred to in the preceding paragraph arise from the fact that 
development projects in the Colonies give rise, from the moment of their initiation, 
both to demands for capital goods and to increased incomes, which in their turn, 
create increased demands for consumer goods; whilst the dividends which they can 
be expected to bring in the form of increased production for local consumption and 
for export, are necessarily delayed. These increased demands for capital and 
consumer goods can, for the most part, only be met by imports, either from the 
United States and other hard currency sources, or from the United Kingdom at the 
expense either of United Kingdom exports to other destinations, particularly hard 
currency destinations, or of already inadequate United Kingdom levels of investment 
and consumption. 
11. The United Kingdom Government, for their part, are fully aware that the 
finance made available for Colonial Development must be matched by supplies of 
capital and consumer goods if that finance is not to be rendered ineffective, and it is 
their considered policy to make available for this purpose, as great a quantity of 
supplies as can be released without creating an unbearable strain on their own 
limited resources and thus endangering, in the difficult years immediately ahead, 
both the stability of the United Kingdom itself, and amongst other things, the whole 
future of the policy of Colonial Development. 
12. It must be recognised nonetheless, that, however great the effort made by the 
United Kingdom on these lines, the supplies of capital goods and consumer goods 
which can be made available for the Colonies are not likely to be sufficient to 
support, during the next few years, all the projects of Colonial Development which 
may in themselves, appear desirable, or to enable the increased incomes, which will 
be generated by the projects which are in fact initiated during those years, to be fully 
reflected in a correspondingly increased real standard of living. From this, certain 
conclusions affecting policy of Colonial Governments themselves would appear to 
follow. 
13. First, it is essential that supplies of capital goods which it is possible to make 
available to the Colonies should be used for the most essential purposes; secondly, it 
continues to be necessary for Colonial governments to control imports, and in 
particular, to ensure that restraint is exercised in the importation of less essential 
consumer goods, especially when they have to be paid for in hard currencies; and 
thirdly it will be necessary for all Colonial Governments to be constantly on their 
guard against the dangers of inflation. 
14. It follows from the first conclusion that it would almost certainly be 
necessary for Colonial Governments during the next few years to exercise a 
considerable measure of control over local investment programmes and possibly to 
control or supervise the use of some special categories of scarce capital goods. It 
follows also, that the closest attention should be paid to methods of economising in 
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the use of scarce materials, especially iron and steel, by adopting methods of building 
and engineering construction which call for the minimum requirements of such 
materials. Public Works Departments will, therefore, no doubt give close thought to 
the possibilities of changes in constructional methods and specifications with that 
object in view. Indeed, this consideration points to a conclusion of rather more 
general application-that is, that every encouragement and stimulus should be given 
to the undertaking of the simpler kinds of construction from purely local materials 
and with local and, where possible, voluntary labour, in cases in which hitherto it 
may have been taken for granted that more elaborate constructions requiring 
imported materials and paid labour forces would automatically be adopted. Clearly, 
there are limits to possibilities of that kind, but in many areas it has in fact been 
found that real benefit can be obtained from the construction say, of a very simple 
kind of school building or local dispensary which has thus become available a 
considerable time hefore it would have been possible to provide more elaborate 
buildings, having regard to the prospective availability of supplies for such more 
elaborate construction. 
There are strong arguments for the use of such simple construction at all times, 
but in the present economic difficulties these arguments have special force. If local 
enthusiasm for simple construction of this kind can be stimulated in the less 
developed areas, it may be found that the local communities will give their labour 
voluntarily and without pay. This has been the experience of certain mass education 
campaigns, and quite apart from its immediate value, may provide the key for 
example to the adequate spread of primary education or rural health services in the 
future. 
15. Import control has been the subject of two long saving telegrams which the 
Secretary of State has recently addressed to Colonial Governments. It is not, 
therefore, necessary to dilate upon this subject here. In most Colonial territories, the 
need to control imports, particularly imports from hard currency sources, should be 
readily understood; for they, like the United Kingdom, do not themselves dispose of 
the necessary hard currencies to buy all the goods which they would like to buy from 
hard currency sources. In territories such as Malaya and the Gold Coast, which are 
substantial net earners of dollars, it is, of course, inevitably much more difficult to 
convince public opinion of the need to restrict dollar expenditure. It will, however, 
be appreciated that for territories in this position to claim a right to expend all, or a 
greater part, of the dollars they earn would make nonsense of the whole conception 
of the sterling area; for there is no point in having a pool if each member takes out of 
the pool precisely what he pays into it. The essence of the sterling area system is 
rather that each member should be entitled to have his reasonable needs met from 
some source. 
16. Turning to the problem of inflation, recent increases in the prices of primary 
products (rubber is the only exception among major Colonial products) and the 
resulting increases, not only in the wages of primary producers, but in wages 
generally, have already given rise to inflationary tendencies in many Colonies; and, 
insofar as increased incomes generated by Development programmes, as they gather 
pace, cannot be fully matched by increased imports of consumer goods, the danger of 
inflation will become more acute. 
The theoretically ideal way of meeting such a situation is that voluntary personal 
savings should absorb the excess of purchasing power. Voluntary saving on so large a 
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scale may not always be possible; but, nevertheless, savings campaigns should be 
maintained wherever possible. 
Where savings are inadequate it is the duty of the Government to act on behalf of 
its people and to supplement private and voluntary saving by communal and 
compulsory saving through increased taxation. In the present circumstances in 
which Colonial territories find themselves, the importance of this fundamental point 
can hardly be overstressed. It is commonly argued that in developing territories a 
high level of taxation is an evil. But that is not necessarily so, if the taxation is not 
such as directly to increase costs above a level which leaves a sufficiently attractive 
margin of profit, and if in allocating revenue from taxation due attention is paid to 
development. 
17. On the other hand it is in the Colonies' own vital interests by direct and 
indirect taxation, as may be appropriate, to convert the unsatisfied (and in the 
present circumstances, unsatisfiable) purchasing power, into· a reserve which will 
not only obviate the dangers of immediate inflation, but will also provide financial 
resources against possible lean years to come and for future development and welfare 
at a time when present world shortages of essential capital and consumer goods have 
been overcome. 
It is recognised that it may be no easy matter to convince public opinion that, 
more than 2 years after the end of the war, it is necessary to maintain or even 
increase wartime levels of taxation. 
The real standard of living is, however, ultimately dictated not by the levels of 
spendable money incomes, but by the amount of goods which can be made available 
for consumption. If spendable money incomes were allowed to rise faster than the 
available supply of goods, the only result in the end would be a runaway inflation 
with all the suffering and injustice which would inevitably follow in its train. 
18. In the United Kingdom, where this danger of inflation has similarly been 
present during recent years, any large rise in the cost of necessities has been 
prevented by strict price control, the effectiveness of which is generally conceded to 
depend on an elaborate system of physical controls based on rationing. 
Such a system is unsuitable for, and administratively impossible in most Colonies, 
and effective price control is correspondingly weakened. But even in the United 
Kingdom it has been found essential to supplement physical controls by fiscal 
measures, such as increases in the purchase tax and retention of high rates of both 
direct and indirect taxation. This was, for instance, the reason for the supplementary 
budget introduced last Autumn in the United Kingdom, and, as has been made clear 
in the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech, is the main inspiration of the Budget, 
for 1948/49. When each of these Budgets was introduced, the United Kingdom's 
internal financial affairs were sound if not prosperous. The estimated surplus for the 
year was considerable. But in a situation where there was at one and the same time 
full employment, and an urgent need both to increase exports and to reduce imports, 
the inflationary danger was increasing; and it was solely to avert this danger that it 
was found necessary to reduce available purchasing power by increases in taxation. 
19. In the Colonies, where the physical controls exercised in the United Kingdom 
are absent or less efficacious, it is all the more essential to employ the fiscal measures 
of surplus and increased revenue. 
This is essential in those Colonies where there is, on the one hand, an unusual 
quantity of money available from high commodity prices and expanding investment, 
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and on the other, an insufficiency of consumer goods. Failure to utilise to the 
maximum extent possible the appropriate fiscal weapons will, in such conditions, 
inevitably result in the territory being faced with inflation, and the discontent and 
political disturbances that inevitably follow in its train. 
90 T 236/694 16Aug 1948 
'Economic planning in the colonies': Treasury note of an inter-
departmental meeting of officials ( 13 Aug). 1 Annex: CO memorandum 
The meeting considered the paper on Economic Planning in the Colonies which had 
been prepared by the Colonial Office, and in particular the scheme for preparation of 
annual economic surveys from each of the Colonial economic units. 
The meeting agreed that there was a clear need for some improvement on the 
present ad hoc arrangements for meeting the needs of the Colonies and for relating 
those needs with the maintenance of existing economic activity in the Colonies and 
planned development schemes which had been approved. 
On the other hand, there was undoubted force in the Colonial contention that 
Colonial requirements tended to suffer, in the Whitehall allocating machinery, when 
they came up against either U.K. requirements or requirements of foreign and 
Dominion countries, particularly those scheduled in bilateral agreements. A new 
spirit and a better recognition of Colonial needs, seemed to be wanted, at least as 
much as improvements in organisation, if the wish of Ministers to secure the free 
[sic] economic benefit from the Colonial development plans were to be achieved. 
On the particular scheme proposed in the Colonial Office paper, the following 
objections were made:-
(1) The aim of annual economic surveys as complete as those envisaged in the 
Appendix to the paper, from each Colonial economic unit was too ambitious to be 
practicable in the present intense shortage of trained staff both in the Colonies and 
in Whitehall. 
(2) The surveys proposed, while admirable in intention, were to some extent more 
detailed than we had found practicable to carry out in this country with all our 
resources. 
(3) The paper implied that a vastly greater degree of guaranteed delivery should 
flow from approval by the proposed Colonial Economic Policy Committee than was 
conceivably possible. In this country we had abandoned the system of priorities in 
favour of allocation and we would not wish to see priorities reintroduced. 
(4) Deficiencies in supply against approved requirements could never be reflected 
in a proportionate increase in the Colonial dollar ceiling. 
It was agreed, however, that the background information which would emerge 
from surveys of the sort contemplated would be most valuable in securing the 
1 Present: Treasury SirE Bridges (permanent secretary), Sir B Gilbert (second secretary), SirE Plowden 
(chief planning officer and chairman of Economic Policy Board), T L Rowan (second secretary), A T K 
Grant (assistant secretary), R C Griffiths (private secretary to Sir E Bridges); CO Sir T Lloyd, W L Gorell 
Bames; Board of Trade S L Holmes (second secretary, Overseas Division). 
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allocations required for the Whitehall allocating bodies. It would also be possible, 
without giving the proposed committee guaranteed delivery of approved require-
ments, to put needs approved on this basis on a par with those of countries with 
whom we had bilateral agreements. One of the important things which it was 
desirable should emerge would be a statement of the basic requirements of the 
Colonies to maintain existing facilities. For requirements beyond this level it should 
be possible to give guidance from Whitehall and agree it with the Colonies as to the 
particular fields of development to be encouraged. 
After some discussion it was agreed that, although the scheme at present was 
over-elaborate, it was in the right direction and full support might be given to a 
modification of the scheme on the lines of working through the establishment of 
formal import programmes for each Colonial area, as a first step, and then 
developing in the larger and more important Colonial economic units an economic 
survey which would provide the necessary background information to the import 
programmes which would enable requirements to be supported and justified and 
allocations to be made in London on a firmer basis than hitherto. The machinery for 
dealing with these programmes and surveys in London would need to be so arranged 
as to work in with the O.N.C. and the existing allocations machinery. It should also 
provide for the attendance of Colonial representatives if required, in suitable cases to 
support the case for Colonial requirements before the appropriate bodies in London. 
This was particularly desired by the Colonial Office on political grounds. 
Such a scheme however, did not appear impossible to construct and the meeting 
was confident that the required new spirit in Whitehall towards Colonial require-
ments could be substantially achieved by proceeding on these lines, which should 
not involve a requirement for substantially greater numbers of staff than are now 
available . 
Annex to 90 
I. Introduction 
Until the end of 1947 conscious economic planning in the Colonies was more or less 
confined to the preparation by Colonial Governments of "ten year development 
plans" and the consideration of these plans by the Secretary of State. The value of 
these plans, which it has recently become fashionable to underrate, is considerable; 
for they ensure that the development of those activities and services, for which 
Colonial Governments are themselves responsible, is considered as a whole and they 
provide a most useful yardstick by which the relative merits and priority of individual 
development and welfare schemes, as they come forward for approval, can be judged. 
It remains true, however, firstly that these ten-year plans cover only the Government 
sector-even railways and ports are often left out of account, even though they are 
Government -owned, because they are managed by separate administrations; and 
secondly that they are conceived and expressed solely or mainly in terms of 
finance-at the time when their preparation was set on foot, it was not realised that 
certain kinds of goods and manpower were going to be more difficult to find than 
money with which to pay for them. 
2. It was largely to fill these gaps that the Colonial Development Working Party 
was set up at the turn of 1947-1948 and that, in February, 1948, it was decided to set 
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up, within the Economic Division of the Colonial Office, and Economic Intelligence 
and Planning Department, one of whose main duties it is to provide the link between 
the Colonial Office on the one hand and, on the other, the Colonial Development 
Working Party in particular and the Central Planning machinery of the United 
Kingdom Government in general. 
3. The Colonial Development Working Party has done, and is still doing, very 
valuable work. Its principal method of work is to assemble data, obtained from 
Colonial Governments, from the Crown Agents for the Colonies and from other 
sources of information, about Colonial requirements of those goods such as iron and 
steel, cement, fertilisers, railway equipment etc., without which development cannot 
take place; to consider these requirements against the background of United 
Kingdom supplies and availabilities; and then to submit to Ministries conclusions 
and recommendations about the adequacy or otherwise of existing allocations to the 
Colonies. As a result of this work the allocation of steel for the Colonies has recently 
been doubled (though the word "allocation" is too precise and it must also be 
remembered that the Colonies have since the war been obtaining more than half 
their supplies of steel from sources of supply (discards, surpluses etc.), which are not 
subject to allocation and may soon begin to dry up); and, although actual 
recommendations regarding other goods have not yet been made to Ministers, the 
Colonial Development Working Party's activities have certainly been of great 
assistance to the Colonial Office in their efforts to secure from other departments of 
the United Kingdom Government practical recognition of the fact that the policy of 
colonial development cannot be carried out unless the necessary goods are made 
available. 
4. There has, therefore, been considerable progress-progress which should in 
due course be reflected in further achievements (how many of the critics of the 
organisation of Colonial planning are aware that the Colonies, whose balance of 
payments with the Western Hemisphere was just about in equilibrium in 1947, are 
likely to earn about $150 millions net in 1948?). Why, then, should there be such a 
widespread feeling-and there certainly is both within and without the Colonial 
Office-that all is not well? 
5. The present arrangements have the following shortcomings:-
(a) Over most of the field it is still not possible to relate ends very closely to 
means. Thus, no one is in a position to say what the precise consequence will be if 
the Colonies get 1,000 tons less or more of, say, steel; 
(b) Partly because of this, but also because of defects of organisation, many 
officials in other United Kingdom Departments (though there are noteworthy and 
increasingly numerous exceptions) have no interest in the Colonies and feel that 
they have no responsibility for the effect in the Colonies of their decisions; 
(c) In the Colonies there is still insufficient co-ordination of the various sectors 
(Government, public utility, private) of the economy; 
(d) In Whitehall not nearly enough attention is paid to the economic balance of 
individual Colonies and to the effect on that balance of decisions taken in London; 
(e) Above all-and this is perhaps the main cause of most of the other 
defects-London and the Colonies are far too remote from one another-far more 
remote than is necessary with the ease and speed of modern air travel. 
6. Many of these defects might not matter nearly so much were it not for another 
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change which took place in the economic relations between the United Kingdom and 
the Colonies at the turn of 1947-1948 and which has not so far been mentioned. Up 
to August, 1947 instructions sent to Colonial Governments on import control had 
been couched in general terms and no attempt had been made to enforce detailed 
control from Whitehall. But immediately after the August crisis Colonial Govern-
ments were asked to provide estimates of their imports from the Western Hemis-
phere during 1948 and these hurriedly compiled estimates were subsequently 
imposed upon Colonial Governments as "ceilings" to their expenditure on imports 
from the Western Hemisphere. The operation of this system of "dollar ceilings" is 
controlled in London by a Committee known as the Colonial Dollar Drain 
Committee, consisting of representatives of the Colonial Office, the Treasury, the 
Board of Trade and the Bank of England. This Committee is prepared, on request, to 
review a Colony's dollar ceiling and, if a strong case is made out, to sanction an 
increase. But, mainly because of the Jack of reliable statistics, it cannot be said that 
its methods of review are very scientific or that it is in a position to assess with any 
accuracy the effect of its decision on the economy of any given Colony. 
7. Continued control of Colonies expenditure on dollar imports is inevitable. An 
abandonment of the dollar ceiling system at the present time, though it might 
possibly work out all right in the end, would result immediately in a very 
considerable increase in dollar expenditure such as, in present circumstances, we 
could not afford financially, diplomatically or politically. But its imposition removed 
a safety-valve; and, if it is to be continued without risk of disaster, both it and the 
other operations in the sphere of colonial economic planning will have to be carried 
out more scientifically in the future. 
11. The scheme 
8. It is no easy matter to devise a satisfactory scheme for colonial economic 
planning. Here are some of the difficulties:-
(a) Economically, the colonies a~e far from forming a homogeneous group: the 
economic circumstances of Malaya could not be more different from those of, say, 
Jamaica; most of the economic problems of East Africa are different from those of 
West Africa; and, even within West Africa, the economic position of the Gold Coast 
is utterly different from that of Sierra Leone. Clearly, therefore colonial planning, 
if it is not to be entirely unreal, must be based on a number of individual plans for 
individual territories or, where this is economically justified as it probably is in the 
case of East Africa, groups of territories; 
(b) Again there has, in recent years been a very rapid advance in political 
development and political and national consciousness in most Colonial territories. 
Economic plans will, therefore, tend to be little better than scraps of paper if they 
are made in Whitehall. They must be, and be felt to be, the work of Colonial 
Governments and, so far as possible, of Colonial peoples themselves; 
(c) On the other hand any colonial economic plan will depend for its execution on 
the importation into that Colony of goods many of which can only be obtained not 
only with the cooperation of, but often by the deliberate decisions of, the 
competent departments of the United Kingdom Government. Its approval will, 
therefore, involve commitments at least as much for the United Kingdom 
Government as for the Colonial Governments. 
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9. With these points in mind, the following scheme is proposed:-
(a) The Government or Governments of each economic unit in the Colonies 
should be asked to prepare an annual Economic Survey, starting with a Survey for 
the year 1949. The precise contents of these Surveys would no doubt have to be 
slightly different according to the varying stages of economic development of the 
different territories; but proposals regarding the normal scope of the Surveys are 
contained in the Annex2 to this memorandum. The only absolutely essential point 
is that every survey should contain two import programmes-a programme for 
certain capital goods requirements for various periods up to five years ahead, and 
an annual programme for consumer goods which need only include detailed 
requirements for the most important items, the remainder being expressed in 
terms of value-each showing proposed sources of supply; though the more 
information they contain about the objects of these programmes and the 
consequences of failing to achieve them, the more likely they are to be 
intelligently handled in London. Where appropriate Colonial Governments would 
bring "unofficials" into consultation in the preparation of these surveys; 
(b) These surveys would be considered in London by an official Colonial Economic 
Policy Committee which would supersede both the Colonial Development Work-
ing Party and the Colonial Dollar Drain Committee. The Chairman of this 
Committee would be the Deputy Secretary in Charge of the Economic Division of 
the Colonial Office and the Vice Chairman the Deputy Chief Planning Officer (or 
vice-versa). The other regular members would be the Under-Secretary in charge of 
planning and supplies at the Colonial Office and representatives of the economic 
departments of the United Kingdom Government-Treasury, Board of Trade, 
Ministry of Supply, Ministry of Food etc. 
(c) Representatives of a Colonial Government, who might include unofficials, 
would take part in the discussion of its survey at the Colonial Economic Policy 
Committee. The appropriate Geographical Division of the Colonial Office would, of 
course, also be represented. 
(d) Each Import Programme would be approved, with or without amendment by 
the Colonial Economic Policy Committee or, in the event of disagreement, would 
be submitted to the Economic Policy Committee of the Cabinet (to which the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies would be added for this purpose) with a note on 
the point or points at issue. 
(e) Approval by either the C.E.P.C. or the E.P.C. of the Import Programme for a 
Colony or group of Colonies would automatically carry with it:-
(i) approval of any hard currency expenditure involved in the two import 
programmes; 
(ii) an instruction to the supply departments concerned to secure the export to 
the Colony of the United Kingdom goods provided for in the two import 
programmes. 
(f) for the purpose of carrying out (e) (ii) above each Supply Department would 
establish a special Colonial Section. There would also be, centrally placed, a 
"Co-ordinator of Colonial Import Requirements" whose job it would be to 
2 Not printed. 
84 ECONOMIC POLICY [90] 
co-ordinate and progress [?process] the work in this field of the Supply Depart-
ments, the Crown Agents and the manufacturers and to submit regular progress 
reports to the Colonial Economic Policy Committee. He might require a small 
staff. 
(g) At the first sign of a failure in imports from the United Kingdom or from soft 
sources, a Colony's hard currency ceiling would at once be correspondingly 
increased. 
(h) Colonial Governments would be required to submit, for consideration in the 
Colonial Office and by the Colonial Economic Policy Committee brief quarterly 
reports on the progress of the plans and programmes contained in their Annual 
surveys. 
(i) The normal work of the Colonial Economic Policy Committee would consist in 
the consideration of the Annual Economic Surveys and of Progress Reports 
submitted by Colonial Governments and the Co-ordinator of Colonial Production 
Requirements. It would, however, always be open to the Colonial Office or to any 
other Department to bring separately before the Committee any question of policy 
or principle in the field of Colonial economic policy. 
Ill. The difficulties and dangers 
10. The presentation of the scheme in the preceding section is a little "simplistic" 
and does not bring out some of the difficulties and dangers which would have to be 
overcome. 
11. The first difficulty is that it is unlikely that many Colonial Governments-
particularly those who are still without anything in the nature of the "Economic" or 
"Planning" Secretary or Adviser or proper statistical assistance-would be able 
without help to compile even a fairly elementary survey. The assistance of the 
Economic Liaison Officers, who are now in process of being appointed, would be 
available. But they will be new not only to the Colonies but also to Whitehall. It is 
certain therefore that, to begin with, at any rate, Whitehall (mainly the Economic 
Division of the Colonial Office and the Central Economic Planning StafO would have 
to send appropriate people on visits to the Colonies to assist in the work. (This might, 
indeed well be a permanent feature of the organisation. For nothing but good can 
come of increased exchanges of visits; and it is desirable that first hand experience of 
colonial conditions should not be confined to liaison officers but should, to some 
extent, be shared by those with executive responsibilities). 
12. Then there is the time factor. Economic Surveys for 1949, to be of any real 
value, must be completed by the middle of November and approved before 
Christmas. Is this possible? The answer to this question probably depends on the 
extent of the assistance which London is prepared to make available to Colonial 
Governments in preparing these surveys (see para. 11 above). If Whitehall as a whole 
is not prepared to make a big effort on this, it might be better that the first series of 
surveys should cover the twelve months June 30th 1949-July 1st 1950. 
13. The transition from the existing to the new arrangements would also have its 
dangers. There might well be a tendency to suspend action on various aspects of 
Colonial economic policy until the surveys had been completed, or even until they 
had been approved. This must not be allowed to happen. In particular the work being 
done under the auspices of the Colonial Development Working Party should go 
forward with all possible speed and will, in fact, be found to be of great assistance for 
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the preparation and consideration of the proposed surveys. 
14. Finally, there is a more fundamental difficulty. Can the United Kingdom 
Government be expected to approve any one import programme, involving as it will 
commitments for the supply of scarce materials, until it knows the extent of the 
commitments involved in all the economic surveys? And, if it does, is there not a 
danger that, as a result, too large a share of available scarce supplies will go to those 
Colonies who get their surveys in first? 
15. Until very recently the Colonies have tended to be a sort of "residual 
legatee"-i.e. they have tended to get what was left over after bi-lateral commitments 
etc. had been fulfilled. It would perhaps be poetic justice if, in future, they were, so to 
speak, to get "first pick". Nor is it so unreasonable as it may sound to suggest that 
requirements to meet Colonial economic programmes which have been approved as 
being reasonable, well balanced and calculated to secure a degree and kind of 
development which is in the interest of all concerned, should be a first charge on 
supplies available to the Government which is responsible for the Colonies' 
well-being and development. Nor, again, would the sacrifice to the narrow interests 
of the United Kingdom be so very great; for Colonial requirements of nearly all 
commodities represent but a fraction-and the difference between requirements and 
present allocations but an infinitesimal fraction-of total supplies available to the 
United Kingdom. Yet, that infinitesimal fraction may often be of very great 
importance for the development, or economic balance, of a Colonial territory. 
16. It is hoped, therefore, that the United Kingdom Government will be prepared 
to approve a survey and to accept the commitments involved without waiting for all 
the other surveys-provided of course that they are satisfied that, given our 
responsibilities towards the Colonies and our declared policy of colonial develop-
ment, the plans contained therein are reasonable and desirable. If they are not so 
prepared, there would appear to be two alternatives:-
(a) Either given quantities of given commodities could be allocated to the 
Colonies as a whole and then sub-allocated by the Colonial Office as between 
Colonies, who would then take this rate of supply as a basic assumption for their 
planning, or 
(b) The surveys could be taken in two stages. At the first stage they would only be 
approved in principle. Then, when all surveys had been approved in principle, the 
requirements of scarce commodities would be aggregated and, if for any commod-
ity they seemed excessive, the surveys would, at this second stage, be reviewed 
and, where necessary, modified before final approval as a basis for action. 
(a) above would be very arbitrary and would mean in effect that, as at present, 
decisions would be taken in London without any real appreciation of their effect 
either on the economic balance of individual Colonies or on their contribution to the 
future of the sterling area, (b) would be appallingly cumbrous. It would perhaps be 
better than (a) if one or the other were inevitable. But it is most strongly urged that, 
in this matter, the United Kingdom Government should, in its economic relations 
with the Colonies, be ready to take at least as great a degree of risk of over-
commitment as it takes in conducting bilateral negotiations with foreign countries. 
17. All these difficulties and dangers can easily be overcome if the United 
Kingdom Government as a whole is prepared to take this business of Colonial 
development and Colonial economic planning really seriously and to make the 
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relatively small sacrifices involved in doing so. If they are not, there is likely to be 
continual trouble in our large dollar-earning Colonies, with the ever-present danger 
of our being left only with the considerable liability of those which are bound to cost 
dollars. If they are, then we can look forward over the years to a steady expansion of 
the Colonies' wealth and dollar-earning capacity. It is that way-and not by pressing 
our exports into a precarious American market-that our economic salvation lies. 
But it can only be done if we are prepared to pay in exports-and see that we do pay 
and in goods which the Colonies want-for the imports and dollars they send us. 
91 T 236/694 19 Aug 1948 
'Colonial development': CO memorandum for the Treasury on the 
four-year programme. Annex: indices of annual export targets 
[In forwarding this draft memorandum to Sir E Plowden, the new chief planning officer, 
W L Gorell Barnes (CO assistant under-secretary in the Economic Oept) wrote as follows: 
'If you do play about with it much, I think the most important point, from our point of 
view, is that the balance should be kept between e.g. political and economic considera-
tions, contribution to viability and the direct interests of Colonial peoples, production for 
export and production for the improvement of nutritional standards in the Colonies, etc., 
etc., and I am sure that by now you are fully alive to the dangers of putting exclusive 
emphasis on the first of each of these pairs'.) 
Present position 
1. Unlike the United Kingdom, the Colonies as a group, are substantial net dollar 
earners. This in itself shows that considerable progress has already been made 
towards recovery from the effects of the war, including the damage and devastation 
caused in some of the Far Eastern territories by several years of enemy occupation. 
The rate at which this recovery has proceeded, and the extent to which the Colonies 
have already begun to assist in redressing the balance of payments between the dollar 
area and the rest of the world, is shown by the following figures of net Colonial dollar 
earnings. When the war ended the Colonies were in deficit with the dollar area. By 
1946 the Colonies had managed to balance their payments with the dollar area, and 
in 1947 they developed a favourable balance of about $15,000,000. During 1948 
Colonial net dollar earnings have been running at a rate of about $150,000,000 a 
year. This is a substantial contribution towards European viability. Nevertheless it 
should be remembered that their contribution as dollar savers, by the production 
and export to European countries of raw materials and foodstuffs which would 
otherwise have to be purchased for dollars, is far greater. 
2. The Colonies have managed to increase their net dollar earnings both by 
increasing their production of goods for export to the dollar area and by restricting 
the import of inessential goods from it. The most striking success which has been 
achieved on the positive side of this policy has been the rehabilitation of the rubber 
and tin industries in Malaya after the damage and neglect caused by several years of 
enemy occupation. Production of rubber had risen to 646,376 tons in 1947, during 
which year 456,639 tons were exported to the United States of America the 
approximate value of which was £44,500,000 f.o.b. Singapore. During the first half of 
1948 (January to June inclusive) 198,607 tons, worth £25,600,000 f.o.b. Singapore 
was exported to the United States. The rehabilitation of the tin industry presented 
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greater problems, as it involved considerable supplies of capital equipment such as 
dredges, but exports in 1947 had already reached 32,089 long tons of tin metal, of 
which 17,500 tons, to the approximate value of £7,400,000 at Singapore, were 
exported to the United States of America. It is estimated that exports in 1948 will 
reach 45,000 long tons of tin metal, while exports to the United States in January to 
May inclusive, 1948, have already reached 13,850 long tons which was worth 
approximately £6,900,000 in Singapore. On the negative side, Colonial Govern-
ments, in common with other countries outside the dollar area, have taken steps, 
through their import licensing policy, to restrict the import of inessential goods 
from the dollar area. 
3. The Colonies cannot continue to contribute to European viability on such a 
substantial scale, both as dollar savers and as dollar earners, unless the United 
Kingdom, and other countries outside the dollar area pay for Colonial exports both to 
the non-dollar and the dollar area by exporting to them adequate supplies of 
consumer and other goods of the type they require . It is therefore necessary, when 
considering the desirable rate of export of consumer and capital goods to the 
Colonies, to take into account the need to pay not only for the raw materials which 
are required by the non-dollar area but also for the export surplus with the dollar 
area itself. 
Possibilities of increasing colonial production 
4. Since the war the main effort towards increasing Colonial production has been 
directed towards making up for the neglect and damage caused during the war years, 
and to restoring to their prewar level of efficiency the basic capital equipment in the 
Colonies such as the Colonial railway systems. This task has not yet been completed, 
though it is hoped that the arrears will be made up within the next two years. The 
immediate task will then be to expand the rehabilitated equipment sufficiently to 
handle the increased production which will be forthcoming from development 
projects which are already in hand and will produce results by 1952-53. 
5. In the short term, the main obstacles to the increased production planned for 
1952-53 are shortages of such capital equipment as steel, cement, and railway 
rolling stock, certain kinds of consumer goods and other imports essential to 
development such as fertilisers, and of skilled supervisory staff, technicians and 
tradesmen. Nevertheless, even in the short term production will not for long 
increase, nor will even the existing level of production be maintained, unless 
economic development is accompanied by a corresponding increase in the develop-
ment of social and welfare facilities. 
6. The primary object of development in the Colonies is, of course, to improve 
the standard of living of the inhabitants. This improvement can, in turn, only be 
achieved by economic development resulting in an increase of production sufficient 
to pay for an increased standard of living. It is also true that increased production 
must be accompanied by a corresponding increase in standards of living which are 
the justification and the incentive for the productive effort required. The increase in 
production which is planned in the Colonies is therefore part of a wider development 
programme which will require corresponding investment in social services, such as 
education and health, which will, by improving the health, by increasing the skill 
and technical knowledge of the inhabitants of the Colonies, and by fitting them for 
the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, promote political stability without 
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which orderly progress is impossible, and lay the foundations for further economic 
development. This balanced development will mean that some of the increased 
production which will be achieved by the Colonies will be absorbed by increased local 
consumption, especially foodstuffs, particularly as the general nutritional and living 
standards in the Colonies, in common with many other tropical countries, are far 
lower than those already attained by the more developed countries of Western 
Europe who are participating in the O.E.E.C. 
7. The development of new fields of production, and the opening up of new land, 
is inevitably a long term proposition. Owing to the low level of basic economic 
equipment in the Colonies, particularly transport, the initiation of any new large 
project for increased production almost invariably entails large scale new capital 
equipment in the form of new railway lines and similar installations. It also involves 
training the large numbers of skilled tradesmen and technicians who are required. 
The difficulty is accentuated by the shortages of the type of capital equipment needed 
which means that the large quantities involved in such new development usually 
cannot be immediately made available. 
Colonial production programme 
8. A programme has been produced which sets annual production targets for the 
Colonies, to be attained by 1952/3, for certain major commodities, notably ground-
nuts, sugar, rice, cotton, rubber, tin and copper. This will involve a very considerable 
increase in the production of these commodities, which are all important as dollar 
earners or dollar savers, not only over the production for export at the end of the war 
but also over the prewar export figures. How great a contribution this production 
will make towards European viability in 1952/3, and the level of Colonial net dollar 
earnings then, will depend to a very large extent on the prices then obtainable for 
Colonial produce. It will be necessary to provide considerable assistance in the form 
of capital and consumer goods and of skilled staff, if these production targets are to 
be achieved, and measures will have to be taken to counteract the effects on Colonial 
economies of a high rate of investment. 
Methods of implementation 
(A) Finance 
9. The financial resources available for Colonial development can be conveniently 
considered under two heads. 
10. Firstly there are those projects financed directly by Colonial Governments 
which for the most part and except for certain major undertakings like railway 
improvements and extensions and the development of ports and harbours are 
included in the Ten-Year Development Programmes framed after the passing of the 
1945 Colonial Development and Welfare Act. 
11. These Programmes are financed firstly from the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Vote under which £120 million is available over the ten years 1946-1956, 
secondly from Colonial Governments surplus balances and local revenues and thirdly 
from the loans which Colonial Governments expect to be able to raise in the period. 
The seventeen major plans which have so far been approved are based on the 
following financial resources:-
[91] COLONIAL GENERAL 
C.D. and W. allocations 
Surplus balances, 
revenue, etc. 
Loans 
Total 
£56 million 
£71 million 
£51 million 
£178 million 
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12. While the sums available under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act 
are a known quantity and there is no evidence to suppose that the contributions from 
surplus balances and revenue have been overestimated, difficulty may arise in 
providing loan finance. The possibilities of raising money by borrowing locally are 
very restricted in most Colonies and Colonial Governments will have to borrow 
money in the United Kingdom in order to raise loans of the order mentioned in 
paragraph 11. 
13. In the second category come the finances which are provided for development 
of a commercial nature. These will be found either by private enterprise or by the two 
Government Corporations, the Overseas Food Corporation and the Colonial Develop-
ment Corporation which have authorised capital of £50 million and £100 million 
respectively. So far it has proved comparatively easy to raise money for commercial 
investment in the Colonies presumably because the type of project undertaken by 
private enterprise is usually directly productive and of a fairly short term character. 
(B) Physical supplies 
14. It is not sufficient, however, merely to provide the funds necessary to finance 
development. Owing to the shortage of capital equipment, the types and quantities 
necessary to development may not be available for purchase. It is therefore necessary 
to ensure that adequate supplies of capital equipment and other goods which cannot 
be produced in the Colonies and are necessary for the achievement of their 
development programmes, should be made available. For this reason a United 
Kingdom interdepartmental committee has been studying Colonial requirements of 
capital equipment and other items in short supply, which are essential to the 
achievement of their production targets, and has been taking steps to ensure that 
they are, as far as possible, met from United Kingdom production. 
(C) Local financial policy 
15. The high price which is at present being obtained for many Colonial products 
tends to have an inflationary effect. This effect is greatly accentuated by the rate of 
investment required to attain the development which is planned and by the attendant 
creation of a large new body of cash wage earners. Colonial Governments are fully 
aware of this inflationary tendency and their financial policy is directed towards 
combatting it. In certain Colonies, a portion of the relatively high prices now 
received for produce exported is set aside in specially established funds. This policy, 
which is aimed at providing money primarily for future stabilisation of the price 
received by the producer and secondarily for the future development of the industries 
concerned, helps to combat inflation by reducing the amounts now paid out to 
producers. Reserve funds of this kind have been built up for cocoa and oilseeds in 
West Africa, cotton in Uganda and sugar in the West Indies, Mauritius and Fiji. 
Control over the money lies within the territories concerned and, in varying degrees, 
with representatives of the industry concerned. Again, all Colonial Governments 
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have established systems of price control, though their effectiveness is limited by the 
comparatively primitive character of the communities and of Colonial administra-
tions, as the recent incidents in the Gold Coast have forcibly demonstrated. Large 
numbers of Colonial Governments also subsidise the cost of living in order to prevent 
the beginning of an inflationary spiral by rises in wages to keep pace with the cost of 
living. The policy is, however, to keep expenditure on price subsidisation down to a 
reasonable level. Little success has been achieved by attempts to increase the rate of 
saving, largely because the habit of saving has not yet been developed in the 
economically more primitive Colonial communities. 
16. These local financial measures, designed to prevent inflation, cannot be more 
than palliatives. The danger of inflation can only be overcome by providing 
something on which the inhabitants of the Colonies can, and want to, spend their 
increased incomes. In the immediate future this can be done by ensuring an 
adequate supply of the right kind of consumer goods at prices which the consumers 
are prepared to pay, and by the provision of increased quantities of foodstuffs for local 
consumption. Nevertheless, if production is to be further expanded over a period of 
time, these will not be sufficient. Increased wealth, and the extension of education, 
will bring in its train a desire for increased standards of living which will in its turn 
create new demands. If a sense of frustration, and a consequent loss of incentive, is to 
be avoided, it will be necessary to provide facilities for increased expenditure on such 
things as better housing and improved educational and health facilities . This may be 
done either by providing the educational and training facilities to produce a 
sufficient supply of private practitioners, teachers, craftsmen, etc., or by the 
provision of some of these services by the state, possibly on a contributory basis. In 
either case, this will involve some expenditure in providing the buildings and other 
installations which are indispensable to the extension of such facilities. 
Fields of activity 
17. The annual production targets for the principal Colonial products in 1952/3, 
are annexed to this paper. The following is a brief description of the action being 
taken to achieve some of these targets . 
(A) Groundnuts 
18. Before the war the producing areas were East and, on a larger scale, West 
Africa and these are the only two areas in which large and fairly rapid expansion of 
production seems possible now. 
19. In East Africa the principal producing area is Tanganyika, where a large 
scheme for the production of groundnuts by mechanical methods was started in 
1946. This scheme is now being run by the Overseas Food Corporation under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Food. Exports on a small scale are due to begin in 1949 
and will be increased until full production is reached in about 1953, when it is 
expected that over 450,000 tons of decorticated nuts will be available for export 
annually. 
20. In West Africa the principal producing areas are Nigeria and The Gambia. In 
Nigeria at present the annual exportable surplus is about 330,000 tons (decorticated) 
in a good year, and with existing methods of production it is unlikely that this figure 
will be exceeded. The greater part of production is in the Northern territories and the 
chief difficulty since the war has been the transport of stocks from there to the coast 
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owing to the shortage of locomotives and rolling stock. Stocks awaiting railment at 
Kano at the end of June 1948, including some of the French Niger crop, being about 
260,000 tons. Strenuous efforts have been made to secure the necessary equipment; 
20 new locomotives reached Nigeria on the 31st May, and 52 more are due for 
delivery in 1949. Delivery of the remaining orders for roll ing stock should begin in 
the second half of 1948, and should be completed by 1950, by which date the 
transport position should no longer be a limiting factor . 
21. Future development and expansion is likely to be on the lines of the report of 
the Clay Mission1 which was published in 1948. Briefly, this report concludes that 
appreciable expansion of production can only be achieved by the use of machines and 
considers how mechanised cultivation can be introduced into the existing structure 
of society in West Africa. Large-scale development of this kind cannot be built up on 
the system of peasant cultivation which at present exists and will almost certainly 
have to be run by a corporation. The Colonial Development Corporation, in 
conjunction with the Colonial Office and the Colonial Governments concerned, is 
considering the operation of pilot schemes in West Africa on the basis of the 
proposals made in the report of the Clay Mission . 
(B) Sugar 
22. The average aggregate annual production of the principal Colonial producing 
areas for the period 1937-39 was 965,000 long tons. This figure sank in 1945 to 
725,000 long tons. The figures since then are as follows: 
1946 
1947 
1948 
(estimate) 
1949 
(estimate) 
long tons 
1,020,000 
1,088,000 
1,060,000 
1,150,000 
The chief incentives to the growers to produce more in future can only be assured 
markets and good prices. It is well enough known that with the shortage of dollars 
the U.K. will take up in the foreseeable future all colonial sugar that offers.* 
23 . Every step is being taken to improve the efficiency of the industry in the 
various colonies. The Mauritius Economic Commission made a very thorough 
examination of the sugar industry, and has made certain recommendations in its 
report which is to be published shortly. In -Mauritius during the war a large area 
* (The practicability of giving a formal assurance to this effect is under discussion between the 
Departments of H.M.G. concerned.) 
1 Led by G F Clay, agricultural adviser to the S of S for the colonies, the Clay Mission visited West Africa 
between June and July 1947 briefed 'to investigate the suitability of conditions in the Northern Territories 
of the Gold Coast, Northern Nigeria and The Gambia, for large-scale mechanised production of ground-
nuts for export, in accordance with a programme covering a fixed term of years and, if conditions were 
considered suitable, to make recommendations as to the methods of production to be adopted so as to 
ensure the full co-operation of the local inhabitants, due regard being paid in any such recommendations 
to the social and economic effects on the territories concerned'. 
H 
92 ECONOMIC POLICY (91) 
formerly under sugar cane was ploughed up with a subsidy from H.M.G., and this 
area has been reconverted to sugar also with a subsidy from H.M.G. As a result the 
crop this year is expected to be 345,000 long tons, which is a record, and in 1949 it is 
expected to be even higher. A commission is now at work in Trinidad and the 
Leeward Islands, and one is about to be appointed to British Guiana. 
24. Considerable amounts of money are being provided by H.M.G. for research. 
From C.D. and W. funds about £ 100,000 from the research allocation were made 
available in particular for a large scheme for research in sugar technology. There are 
several research stations in the West Indies doing work on high-yielding and 
disease-resistant varieties; in particular there is the Imperial College at Trinidad 
which is doing considerable work on sugar research and which is supported half by 
Colonial Governments and half by H.M.G. The chief shortage has hitherto been of 
fertilisers, and the total colonial demand for sugar cultivation has not yet been met. 
Every effort is being made to increase supplies, and this year sugar is getting first 
priority of supplies from the colonial allocation. 
(C) Rice 
25. The Colonies cannot hope, within the foreseeable future, to produce enough 
rice to provide an export surplus after their own consumption needs are met. The 
programme for increased production is therefore aimed at decreasing the reliance of 
the Colonies on imported supplies and thereby reducing the drain caused by the need 
to purchase supplies from abroad at prices which are, and are likely to remain, high 
owing to the excess of demand over the supply of this foodstuff which is the staple 
diet of large numbers of colonial peoples. The latest forecast for this year's 
production of rice in Malaya is 340,870 tons from 883,238 acres. This is an increase 
of 83,706 tons and 69,700 acres over the 1946-47 figures. 
26. The West African Rice Mission has now returned to this country and is 
writing its Report. Preliminary estimates give an area of several hundred thousand 
acres in West Africa suitable for the growing of rice, but the growing of rice on such a 
scale can only be accomplished by the use of machinery and with large capital 
investment, besides which it is possible that the price of the rice will be too high. A 
similar mission is now in East Africa examining suitable areas there. In British 
Guiana the Machinery Hire Service has now bought enough equipment to make the 
organisation properly balanced and it is hoped that returns will show considerable 
improvement in the course of the next few seasons. It is understood that proposals 
for large-scale irrigation and for the extension of the Government rice farm will be 
submitted in the near future. The report of the British Guiana-British Honduras 
Resettlement Commission has been received and is being studied in relation to the 
problem of producing more rice in British Guiana. 
27. A scheme for the establishment of an irrigation department in North Borneo 
has been approved and it is hoped that the output of rice can be doubled over a period 
of five years by the drainage and irrigation of existing padi areas and the consequent 
bringing into production of neighbouring lands. A small scheme has been approved 
for experiments in mechanical cultivation of rice in Sarawak. 
(D) Tin 
28. Tin is produced in the Federation of Malaya and Nigeria. Owing to the loss of 
Malaya to the Japanese in the late war the production of tin ore in Nigeria had to be 
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increased with the result that much of the best ground was exhausted. There is now 
no prospect of increasing production in Nigeria, which is likely to be at the rate of 
8,000 tons of tin in ore for the next few years and will then gradually decline unless 
new discoveries are made, which seems unlikely. 
29. Peak production was reached in Malaya in 1940 with a figure of 80,651 tons of 
tin in ore. The industry had to be rehabilitated after the Japanese occupation during 
the late war and for this purpose the Malayan Government made loans totalling over 
£7 million both to the European and Chinese sections of the industry . The following 
figures show the number of tin mines operating in June, 1948 compared with 1940:-
Year Dredges Gravel Hydraulicing Open Others Total 
Pumping Cast 
1940 104 733 34 22 160 1053 
1948 61 393 21 10 75 560 
(June) 
30. The production of tin in Malaya in 1947 amounted to 27,026 tons of tin in 
ore. Production in 1948 was expected to reach 45,000 tons, but during the June 
quarter it was running at the rate of 57,856 tons a year. The Tin Study Group at their 
meeting at Washington in April estimated Malayan production in 1949 at 57,500 tons 
and in 1950 at 84,000 tons. 
(E) Copper 
31. Northern Rhodesia is the only British Colonial producer of copper apart from 
a comparatively small production of concentrates in Cyprus which have to be refined 
at the Nord Deutsche Afinerie in Hamburg as this refinery is the only one in Europe 
possessing the necessary facilities for treating Cyprus copper concentrates. 
32. Northern Rhodesia produces both blister and electrolytic copper. The 
following are figures of total production and estimated production:-
1936 1940 1947 Estimated 
1952/53 
tons tons tons tons 
142,000 262,000 192,000 330,000 
33. It will be seen from the above figures that peak production was reached in 
1940. There has been a decline in production since the end of the war owing to the 
fact that normal development work was postponed and the arrears have now to be 
made up and owing to the transport difficulties mentioned below. Smelters are 
operated in Northern Rhodesia and steps are now being taken to increase the 
capacity of the electrolytic refinery at Nkana, to enable the present capacity of about 
62,000 tons per annum to be doubled. This will effect a large saving in dollars for the 
U.K. as at present Rhodesian copper has to be sent to the U.S.A. for electrolytic 
refining. 
34. Production of Northern Rhodesia copper has been adversely affected by 
railway transport difficulties, and the refineries have had to close down for periods 
owing to the shortage of coal. The coal comes from Southern Rhodesia and owing to 
shortage of wagons and locomotives the railways have not been able to keep both the 
Belgian Congo and Northern Rhodesia mines supplied with sufficient coal. This 
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shortage is also largely due to the competing demands of Southern Rhodesia for the 
transport of chrome ore from the mines there to Beira, which is also the port of 
export for copper. The transport problem is gradually improving as additional 
locomotives and wagons are delivered, and steps have also been taken to improve the 
handling of exports at Beira; but a continuous effort will have to be made to maintain 
and improve the transport position. 
35. There are deposits of copper in Uganda which are now being actively explored 
by a Canadian Company. The deposits are, however, situated in the Western Province 
of the Protectorate and are far removed from railway facilities. So far deposits 
amounting to 1 million tons have been proved but the Company must prove from 7 
to 10 million tons in order to make it an economic proposition to work them. This 
development will entail canalising a river in order to transport the ore to Lake 
Victoria, and it is doubtful if production will be under way before 1953. 
(F) Cobalt 
36. Cobalt is produced in Northern Rhodesia in association with copper. Present 
output is about 400 long tons a year, but the Rhokana Corporation is planning the 
installation of a new refining plant in the copper belt, which should make available 
some 1200 tons of cobalt (metal) a year from 1951 or earlier. All the ore produced 
will then be refined in Northern Rhodesia and the metal and various compounds 
produced on the spot, thus avoiding dependence on Canada and Belgium for refining 
capacity. A margin for the U.S. stockpile should be available from 1951. 
(G) Bauxite 
37. Bauxite is at present being produced in British Guiana, the Gold Coast, and 
the Federation of Malaya and there are deposits in Jamaica. In British Guiana 
production is entirely in the hands of Canadian and U.S. Companies, by far the 
largest being the Demerara Bauxite Company, which is a subsidiary of the 
Aluminium Company of Canada. The Canadian Company's exports of bauxite reached 
a peak figure of 1,200,000 tons in 1945 and are at present running at about 1 million 
tons per annum. The only U.S . Company so far to produce bauxite is the Berbice 
Company. That Company's exports have never exceeded about 100,000 tons per 
annum, and are used mostly for chemical purposes. Two U.S. Companies-Reynolds 
Metal Co. and Permanente Corporation (Kaiser Subsidiary)- held prospecting 
licences for bauxite over considerable areas of the Colony and are now engaged in 
active exploration. Under present conditions British Guiana bauxite is exported 
entirely to Canada and U.S. with only comparatively small quantities (about 40,000 
tons per annum) being exported to the U.K. as a result of sales by the Demerara 
Bauxite Company to the British Aluminium Company. 
38. In Malaya bauxite was produced by Japanese Companies both before and 
during the late war. The Aluminium Company of Canada are interested in obtaining 
bauxite from Malaya, and now have a prospecting party there. The British Alumi-
nium Company have also recently applied for prospecting rights; while the 
Australian Government have expressed their interest in obtaining rights over the 
deposits previously worked by the Japanese. 
39. There are various deposits of bauxite in the Gold Coast and the reserves have 
been tentatively estimated at something in the neighbourhood of 230 million tons. 
The only deposit being exploited at present is that of the British Aluminium Coy. at 
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Sefwi Bekwai in the Western Province of the Colony. Exports are at present at the 
rate of 10,000 tons per month and steps are being taken to increase them to 16,000 
tons. It is hoped eventually to attain a figure of between 200,000 and 300,000 tons 
per annum. The other deposits are in the hands of the Aluminium Co. of Canada, and 
West African Aluminium Ltd., [a] British Company largely financed from South 
Africa. These latter deposits have not yet been worked. 
40. In Jamaica the deposits are estimated at lOO million tons. Rights over these 
are held by the Aluminium Company of Canada and Reynolds Metal Coy. of the 
U.S.A. These companies are now taking steps to work the deposits. The bauxite will 
actually be sent to Canada and the U.S.A. for processing. 
41. Bauxite is the raw material of aluminium, which requires large quantities of 
electricity for its production. The cheapest supplies of electricity are obtained from 
hydro-electric source, and owing to the pressure upon hydro-electric supplies in the 
highly industrialised countries, aluminium manufacturers are seeking fresh sources 
of supply in less developed countries. The British Aluminium Company have received 
a favourable report from their Consulting Engineers on the possibility of establishing 
an aluminium industry in North Borneo with power obtained from a local 
hydro-electric scheme. The total cost of the project is estimated at about £36 
million, but further investigation will be necessary before a decision can be taken to 
proceed with the scheme. This investigation is proceeding, together with a search for 
sources of supply of bauxite in Malaya and adjoining British territories. The 
Aluminium Company of Canada are conducting a survey of certain rivers in British 
Guiana for the purpose of investigating the possibility of a hydro-electric scheme, for 
the manufacture of aluminium in the Colony. This involves the gauging of the 
seasonal flow of the rivers concerned, and it will be a year or two before it is 
completed. A similar investigation is proceeding on the Volta River in the Gold Coast 
with a view to the establishment of an aluminium manufacturing industry there, if 
practicable. 
(H) Lead 
42. The only Colonial territory now producing lead is Northern Rhodesia. The 
mine, which belongs to Rhodesia Broken Hill Development Coy. Ltd., was exhausted 
of the rich oxidised lead ores early in the 1920's, and thereafter further production 
remained at a very low level for many years. The mine, which was formerly worked 
opencast, has recently gone over to shaft working and the sulphide ores now being 
worked are rich in lead. A new plant has recently been completed including a 
concentrator and a lead smelter. As a result the production of pig lead has increased 
from a few hundred tons a year to 15,640 tons in 1947. 
43. Lead deposits have been discovered in Tanganyika and active steps are being 
taken to develop them. The Government is constructing a railway of about 120 miles 
linking up the deposits with the main line. Prospecting is still continuing in order to 
determine the extent of the ore body before active mining operations are begun. 
44. There is also lead in Nigeria which has been worked by Africans for many 
years. The lead has only been worked by pitting and steps are now being taken to 
discover by geophysical methods whether the deposits persist at depth. The 
concession over the deposits is in the hands of a private company and the results of 
the geophysical survey have not yet been published. 
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Possibilities of external assistance 
45. It might be possible to increase some of the Colonial annual production 
targets for 1952-3, and it would certainly be possible to accelerate the rate of longer 
term development, if it were possible to obtain increased supplies of scarce capital 
equipment such as iron and steel, cement and heavy agricultural machinery, and 
also some assistance in the provision of skilled staff, particularly trained agricultural, 
veterinary, and other technical staff. The Economic Co-operation Administration's 
programme will be of direct assistance to Colonial production in so far as it makes 
available to the Colonies increased supplies of such capital goods either directly or 
alternatively by supplying them to the United Kingdom and thereby enabling 
increased exports of these supplies to the Colonies to be released from United 
Kingdom production. 
Long term development 
46. The programme for production in 1952- 3 represents but the first stage 
towards the expansion of Colonial production which will take place over a far longer 
period. This further development will depend not only on the continuance of 
measures necessary to increase production in the short term but also on greater 
knowledge of the resources and potentialities of the Colonies, an extension of such 
basic capital equipment as transport, an increase in productivity through the 
improvement of soil fertility, and on health and education. The preliminary work 
necessary to build the foundations for this further development is already being 
undertaken. 
(A) Research 
47. The assistance of leading United Kingdom experts in guiding and controlling 
research is enlisted through a series of specialist advisory committees, whose work is 
coordinated and supervised by the Colonial Research Council. Over £3,000,000 has 
been allocated for research from Colonial Development and Welfare funds in the last 
two years. It is the policy to encourage the development of research regionally 
wherever possible. East Africa provides an example of the progress which has been 
made in this direction. Research of mutual interest to the three East African 
Governments falls within the purview of the East Africa High Commission, and 
amongst other regional schemes, as [? an] East Africa Agriculture and Forestry 
Research Organisation and an East African Veterinary Research Organisation were 
instituted there last year under the direction of expert scientists secured from the 
United Kingdom. Recent work includes the insecticides campaign against locusts in 
East Africa by means of aeroplane and helicopter spraying, a campaign against 
malaria in Mauritius by means of insecticide control and an inquiry into the serious 
"sudden death" disease of clove trees in Zanzibar. A campaign against scrub typhus in 
Malaya is also being undertaken, and against the swollen shoot disease of cocoa trees 
in the Gold Coast. Progress has been hampered by the serious shortage of scientists 
in nearly every field, but it is hoped to enlist greater numbers as a result of the 
initiation of the new Colonial Research Service which it is hoped to bring into being 
early next year. A very considerable international co-operation already exists in this 
field, particularly between countries with responsibility for territories in Africa who 
face the same general problems. This co-operation is perhaps most strikingly 
demonstrated by the successful international campaign against locusts, but equally 
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constructive, if less spectacular, results are being achieved by close day to day 
contact and exchange of information between scientists engaged on similar work in 
different territories and by international scientific conferences on Colonial problems. 
(B) Surveys 
48. Satisfactory topographical and geological surveys are also essential to 
development programmes in Colonial territories. A Directorate of Colonial Geodetic 
and Topographical Surveys has been set up, and its work has developed to a 
remarkable extent. )1\erial photographic surveys were undertaken in West Africa 
during 1946, and similar surveys have since been carried out under the supervision 
of the Directorate in East and Central Africa, Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak. 
This year it is hoped to carry out further surveys in West Africa. In this work the 
Directorate has the co-operation of the Royal Air Force which, in its African 
Operations, is making use of a method of control by mobile radar developed during 
the war. In compiling the full maps the Directorate uses the most up to date 
technical processes, including the projection of the photographs in relief to provide 
contours. 
49. A Directorate of Colonial Geological Surveys has also been set up with the 
object of co-ordinating geological survey work throughout the Colonial territories. 
Funds are being provided under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act to enable 
geological staffs to be increased for the purpose of completing the geological 
mapping of the Colonial territories within the next five to ten years. The actual rate 
of progress will, however, depend upon the availability of technical staff, which is 
extremely scarce at present as there was no training or recruitment of such staff 
during the war period. This geological mapping work is a necessary preliminary to a 
scientific search for minerals and water supplies. 
(C) Health and education 
50. It is not possible in a paper of this length to give more than a very brief 
indication of the work being done to improve the health and the education of 
Colonial peoples. The improvement of health is being developed along the lines of 
research, preventive and social medicine, mass survey and treatment of community-
wide diseases, increased provision for specialist treatment, intensified training of 
local staff in the Colonies for posts in all grades of the medical service, and the fullest 
possible co-operation between neighbouring territories. In education emphasis is 
being placed upon strengthening the provision for secondary and technical educa-
tion, and on the extension and consolidation of facilities for the training of teachers. 
There are also universities, or university colleges, being developed or extended in 
Hong Kong, Malaya, Malta, East Africa, Nigeria, the Gold Coast and the West Indies, 
while large numbers of students from the Colonies come to the United Kingdom for 
their higher education and for advanced technical and professional training. Steady 
progress is also being made in mass education, the promotion of whiCh is an integral 
part of the work of Colonial administrations. Although the results which are being 
achieved are not spectacular, they are nevertheless substantial and indispensable to 
the future development of the Colonies. The development of co-operation may be 
considered to be another aspect of the task of helping Colonial peoples to help 
themselves. Co-operative Departments are being set up in many Colonies. Great 
importance is attached to this development which is, however, necessarily slow as it 
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is based on the voluntary association of those concerned. This foundation of popular 
support and voluntary effort is, however, a sound one, and progress is likely to 
accelerate as and when the beneficial results of co-operation are more widely felt and 
appreciated. 
(D) Transport 
51. Long term Colonial development also depends on the extension of existing 
transport facilities. This problem is perhaps best exemplified by the railway systems 
of East and Central Africa. In order to open up this territory it will be necessary to 
extend, and to link up on a co-ordinated plan, the individual railway systems in this 
area. This will require large supplies of steel and other capital equipment which it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to spare at present when the demand for this 
type of capital equipment for other essential uses is so high. It would, however, be in 
any case impossible to start new construction without a great deal of preliminary 
investigation and survey work in order to plan the best possible lay out for the 
co-ordinated railway system, to make the necessary detailed survey of proposed 
alternative routes and to ascertain the economic potentialities of the tracts of 
territories which would be opened up by each of them. Discussions are taking place 
with the Colonial Governments concerned about the arrangements which should be 
made to undertake this preliminary work, and in particular to make an early survey 
of the alternative routes proposed in order to link up the railway systems of 
Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia and to estimate the economic potentialities of 
the country which would be open to development by each of them. 
(E) Long term development 
52. Agriculture accounts for by far the greater proportion of Colonial production 
and is the key to long term development. Steady progress is being made with soil 
conservation measures which not only include anti-erosion work but also the 
maintenance and enhancement of fertility, and new systems of agriculture are being 
evolved to replace shifting cultivation. The introduction of mechanised cultivation 
will greatly increase production, and enable a more efficient use of labour, but it will 
bring many economic and social changes. A pilot survey is already studying the 
effects of mechanisation in Africa. Work is also being done to improve the 
management and the quality of cattle and other livestock, and the carrying capacity 
of pastures. The effect of these measures will be to increase the production and the 
quality of food and cash crops and of livestock. There are also a number of other long 
term development projects in operation or under consideration. Among these is a 
scheme for large-scale softwood afforestation in East Africa, designed eventually to 
reduce the United Kingdom dependence on hard currency sources. A special 
Commission has recently recommended a number of large scale projects for 
development in British Guiana and British Honduras, which will do something to 
relieve the unemployment problem in the West Indies and will result in increased 
timber and sugar production. A large hydro-electric project at Jinja is being 
considered which will enable the establishment of secondary industries in Uganda, 
including a factory to manufacture fertilisers which will in turn assist in increasing 
agricultural production. A further example of this class of project is the schemes in 
East and Central Africa to eliminate the tsetse fly from infected areas by clearing 
away the bush and making land available for African settlement. 
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53. These examples show that the foundations are being laid for a more extensive 
development of the Colonies, over a longer period, than is shown in the programme 
for 1952-3. The increase in Colonial production which will mature as a result of this 
work will bring great benefits to the inhabitants of the Colonies and will be of 
considerable permanent value to the rest of the world by increasing the supply of 
scarce raw materials and foodstuffs from outside the dollar area. 
Annex to 91: Indices showing annual export targets (by volume) of selected colonial 
commodities (1936 = lOO) 
A. Foodstuffs 
1 2 3 4 
1936 1946 1950/1953* Column 3 
Targets expressed as 
a percentage 
of probable 
sterling area 
reqts. during 
the period 
1950153 (rough 
estimates) 
Oilseeds 
Groundnuts 100 112 293 
Palm kernels 100 75 100 } 93 (in te.m' 
Palm oil 100 77 130 of oil) 
Copra and coconut oil 100 41 84 
Sugar 100 90 140 48 
Bananas 100 29 81 75 
Cocoa 100 77 72 182 
Rice (production) 100 95 140 0 
B. Raw materials 
Cotton 100 62 111 15--20 
Hard Fibres 100 no 121 175 (approx.) 
Hides and skins 100 77 102 Not estimated 
Rubber (production) 100 109 206 286 
Timber (hardwoods) 100 l12 (1947) 155 Not estimated 
Tin (production) 100 47 (1947) 133 (1950) 220 (1950) 
Copper (production) 100 129 227 78 
Cobalt 100 88 265 Not estimated 
Bauxite 100 778 1139 Not estimated 
Lead 100 2750 6000 (1953 Not estimated 
maximum) 
Manganese 100 186 170 Not estimated 
* Unless otherwise stated the figures in the columns under the heading 1950/53 in this paper and in 
the appendices represent the maximum figures to be reached in those years. 
0 Negligible quantities available for export. 
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92 CO 852/854/1, no 15 30 Sept 1948 
'Some aspects of colonial economic policy': address by Lord Listowel to 
the Overseas League1 
I shall talk this evening about the impetus our policy for the economic development 
of the Colonies has received from the world shortage of primary products, which is 
one of the most general and lamentable consequences of the war. I use the word 
"impetus" deliberately, because the post-war economic crisis has merely accelerated 
a process of economic growth and expansion which had already made good progress 
in the pre-war years. At that time it was ancillary to our primary responsibility for 
raising the standard of living throughout our Colonial territories. For this has always 
depended on the increased production required to pay for it. A higher standard of 
living is, in its turn, a necessary condition of the rapid and successful constitutional 
advance of these territories towards parliamentary institutions and ultimate self-
government. 
It is, I think, of vital importance that everyone should realise that the main 
objective of our development of the agricultural and mineral resources of the 
Colonies is still, as it always has been, to benefit their inhabitants. The contribution 
the Colonies will thus make to the easing of world shortages is a fortunate 
by-product of this basic principle of British Colonial policy. Any misunderstanding of 
our motives would encourage false hopes of an early return to an abundant supply of 
cheap imported foodstuffs among European consumers, and would lead our 
fellow-citizens in the Colonies to complain that we had merely substituted economic 
exploitation by the United Kingdom Government for the selfish exploitation of 
private enterprise which they have so often complained about in the past. It is no less 
essential that the world outside the British Commonwealth, which is from a variety 
of motives, always ready to censure our Colonial policy, should be unable to reproach 
us for seeming at least to improve our material standards at their expense, or for 
pretending to lead them towards political independence while exercising a degree of 
economic control inconsistent with a genuine apprenticeship to self-rule. 
Bearing what I have just said in mind, we shall not be misrepresented if we dwell 
upon the immense contribution the Colonies can make, and indeed are making, to 
meet world shortages of the present day, and to the redressing of the balance of world 
production upset by the predominance of the Western Hemisphere. Although 
extractive and manufacturing industries have been introduced into many Colonies, 
the Colonial peoples are still for the most part engaged in agricultural pursuits and 
activities, and hardly any commodity they produce- whether it be foodstuffs such as 
rice, sugar, fats, edible oils, cocoa, meat, or other necessities such as rubber- is not 
in the category of scarce or rationed commodities. Again, these commodities are 
almost always a substitute for dollar supplies, or capable of being sold in dollar 
markets. Today already, over and above the foodstuffs and materials we get direct 
from the Colonies, they are earning for us a net surplus, after meeting their own 
dollar requirements, of some $150,000,000 per annum. 
1 This address, copies of which were distributed to journals and publicity agents, was prepared in the CO 
Information Dept by Mrs EM Chilver, principal, and secretary, Colonial Social Science Research Council 
and Colonial Economic Research Committee, 1941>--1957; subsequently principal of Lady Margaret Hall, 
Oxford, 1971-1979. 
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It gives some idea of the rapid recovery of the Colonies when we remember that at 
the end of the war they were in deficit with the dollar area. By 1946 they had just 
managed to balance their payments, and in the following year they achieved a 
favourable balance of about 60,000,000 dollars. It was in the current year that their 
net surplus of dollars has been stepped up to about 150,000,000 per annum. The net 
dollar earnings of the Colonies have therefore increased some two and a half times 
since last year. And it should not be forgotten that their contribution as dollar savers, 
by the export of raw materials and foodstuffs which would otherwise have to be 
purchased in a hard currency, is very much greater in value than this. 
But such handicaps as poor soil, climatic extremes, scarce and inefficient labour 
and geographical remoteness, have made our Colonial territories less attractive than 
other parts of the globe to the investor and entrepreneur in time past. Their 
resources have therefore remained largely undeveloped for the lack of capital and 
skill which have been lavished on more remunerative projects of economic 
development elsewhere. From this it follows that public enterprise, sponsored by the 
United Kingdom or Colonial Governments, must step in to provide the capital and 
organisation required to develop the latent wealth of the Colonies, and to supple-
ment and assist the effort of private enterprise to venture into a field where risks are 
considerable and returns subject to a long delay. The possibilities of future 
development of these vast areas are enormous. 
It will give you some idea of the increased production of foodstuffs and raw 
materials for which we are planning if I tell you what our annual target is for the 
years 1950-1953 as compared with the actual output in a typical pre-war year. We are 
expecting to grow about three times the quantity of groundnuts, just under 50 per 
cent. more sugar and rice, to produce twice as much rubber, 50 per cent. more 
timber, 30 per cent. more tin, 10 times as much bauxite and 60 times as much lead, 
as we were producing in 1936. 
These schemes are financed in two ways. Firstly by Colonial Governments, out of 
funds provided partly from locai sources and partly out of Development and Welfare 
monies from the United Kingdom. Secondly, by private enterprise and investment 
assisted by the two Government Corporations, the Overseas Food Corporation and 
the Colonial Development Corporation, which will undertake development that 
ultimately pays for itself and may show a profit. But of course it is not enough to 
provide the funds required to finance development. There is a general shortage of 
capital equipment, and industry at home and in other countries is competing with 
the Colonies for capital goods. We have, therefore, after careful study of Colonial 
requirements of capital equipment in short supply, secured a degree of priority 
which will help to obtain for the Colonies the mechanical assistance they require for 
the achievement of their production targets . For example, we have already arranged 
for the Colonies to receive a greater proportion than they did before the war of the 
total volume of steel production in the United Kingdom, which in itself is already 
greater than before the war. 
Take, for example, three of the most essential foodstuffs of the present time, fats, 
rice and meat. It has been estimated that there are 5,000,000 acres of land in East 
Africa suitable for the cultivation of groundnuts, and that two and three quarter 
million acres are available for the purpose in West Africa. In East Africa, as everyone 
knows, a large scheme for the production of groundnuts by mechanical methods was 
started in 1946. Exports on a small scale are due to begin in 1949, and will be steadily 
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increased until full production is reached in about five years time. At this stage, it is 
expected that over 450,000 tons of these nuts will be available for export every year. 
In West Africa, Nigeria and the Gambia are the Colonies where this crop is mainly 
grown. The present annual quantity exported is about 330,000 tons in a good year, 
and it is unlikely that we shall exceed this figure unless new methods of production 
are introduced. Our main difficulty since the war has been the transport of stocks 
from Northern Nigeria to the coast. But within the next 18 months we expect to be 
able to deliver enough engines and wagons to resolve the transport difficulty. The 
Colonial Development Corporation is considering the launching of mechanised 
production of groundnuts in West Africa in small experimental areas to show where 
an appreciable expansion of production can be achieved by the use of machines. If 
these schemes are successful they may well lead to a much greater output of 
groundnuts in West Africa. 
Then there are extensive uncultivated areas of West and East Africa and in North 
Borneo, which are suitable for rice, and the existing areas in British Guiana are 
capable of considerable expansion. Everyone knows how much the rice-eating 
peoples of Asia have suffered owing to the reduction caused by the war in the output 
of the rice-growing countries in South Eastern Asia. What we are aiming at in the 
Colonies is to grow enough rice to free us from the need for importing supplies, and 
so relieve ourselves of the burden of having to purchase from abroad at high prices, 
and sometimes from dollar sources. This will also release the rice we would 
otherwise have had to import for consumption in other parts of the world. It is 
estimated that there is an area of several hundred thousand acres in West Africa 
suitable for growing rice. But this will involve the use of machinery and much capital 
investment. There are even larger potential paddy areas in East Africa. The 
cultivation of more rice in British Guiana is bound up with large scale irrigation, and 
the settlement of workers from outside the Colony in the rice-growing areas. It is 
therefore likely to be a fairly slow process. In North Borneo they are hoping that the 
output of rice will be doubled within five years time by the drainage and irrigation of 
the existing rice-growing areas, which will have the effect of bringing more land into 
production. 
It is sometimes forgotten, in spite of the difficulty of obtaining meat from the 
sterling area, that the whole of British Africa only sustains about 25,000,000 poor 
quality cattle. If we can diminish the ravages of the tsetse fly, and encourage the 
establishment of canning factories there is a prospect of an immense increase in the 
size and quality of herds. 
But the practical difficulties in the way of rapid development are formidable, and 
we must not expect quick returns. The chief obstacle to rapid development is the lack 
of basic capital equipment in the Colonies. In Africa, especially, this lack is most 
keenly felt in transport. In a highly developed country like the United Kingdom, it is 
possible to open a factory or a new development area, and very few additions will be 
required to the existing transport system. The opening of a new development area in 
the Colonies, however, nearly always involves large-scale new transport facilities, and 
the building of roads and railway lines. For example, a line to a new lead-producing 
area in Tanganyika, over 150 miles long, has recently been completed-this has to be 
quite a normal procedure in Africa. 
It was, I think, Livingstone who, half a century ago, expressed the opinion that any 
economic development over 100 miles from the coast line of Africa is impracticable. 
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While that is no longer true, his dictum illustrates the special difficulty of 
development in Africa. The necessity for rail and road building would in any case 
delay large scale new development, but the delay is accentuated by the shortage of 
the types of capital equipment, such as iron and steel and cement, which are needed 
in large quantities for such construction. This shortage means that it is not possible 
at present to begin large new works, though extensions and improvements are being 
pushed forward where this is possible without real harm being done to essential 
maintenance. 
Transport is, of course, only one item of basic capital equipment which is lacking. 
All forms of iron and steel, cement, fertilisers, agricultural machinery and many 
other goods are scarce. So are some of the commodities which the people need to buy 
for their every day life, and what are called "incentive goods"-articles which you 
would think it worth earning money to buy if you could buy them. New development 
usually entails building new houses for the labour force, constructing sanitary 
systems, providing water and power and a host of other facilities which are not 
already available in the undeveloped areas of the Colonies. These all call for scarce 
materials and skilled labour to construct them. 
The importance of this preparatory, and what might be called nation-building 
phase of development, can be gauged from the following comparison. A rough survey 
of colonial investment last year showed that about 45 per cent. of investment was in 
social services and public utilities, and 40 per cent. in directly productive enterprises. 
Something like 25 per cent. of investment in African territories was expended on 
transport services. 
The process of development has another limiting factor in trained labour and 
higher administrative and technical staff. As many of these needs as possible must be 
met from the local population; the process of nation-building requires the active and 
understanding participation of the colonial peoples themselves. It is no use 
supposing that the slow process of creating a cadre of skilled colonial artisans and 
skilled professional people can be skipped. We believe we owe it to the colonial 
peoples to spare no trouble in this respect. 
We are apt to forget that we in Britain grow up in an atmosphere soaked with the 
habits and ideology of the industrial age. Whether we know it or not, all of us have, 
tucked away in our minds, the principles of the internal combustion engine. Our 
hands fold readily round a spanner; it is not the strange odd-shaped object it must 
appear to a young African apprentice brought straight from a far-away village. Our 
task must be to familiarise people often possessed of a traditional agricultural 
expertise of great value, with the tools of progress. It is this aspect of the educational 
work now being done in the colonial territories which often fails to get the emphasis 
due to it in formal accounts of educational progress. We are rightly proud of the 
advance being made in the provision of facilities for higher education in the colonies 
but perhaps even more important in long-term benefit to the economic and political 
stability of these areas is the great effort now being made to bring basic education to 
the mass of the people. Modern production techniques in agriculture and industry 
are complicated. Instructors cannot instruct by demonstration alone. An elementary 
technical vocabulary is an essential piece of equipment for the workman of to-day. 
He may be called on at any time, for example, to study and understand the handbook 
issued with the mechanical equipment which [? with] which he is armed to do in one 
day the work which even the previous generation could only accomplish through 
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weeks of toil by a band of manual labourers. It is this type of education given in adult 
education movements, in clubs, by administrators and technical officers in the 
course of day-to-day work, which will produce the human capital essential for 
increased production. Investment in skill is more durable and productive than 
investment in material goods; it is multiplied in transmission and if fertilised by an 
imaginative educational policy can raise the powers of self-help of the colonial 
peoples to new heights. These mass education projects are still, of course, in their 
formative stages as this is new territory where doctrine is still being evolved from 
experience. But early results are promising. Another advantage of such training is 
that without it the academic, professional and advanced technical education given in 
the schools and universities would tend to create a gap in social status and political 
consciousness between potential leaders and the ordinary people. 
Another field in which such education may help in the battle for production is to 
produce a climate of opinion in which confidence in the findings of science will grow. 
Let me illustrate this point from the present serious condition of the cocoa industry 
in West Africa. The cocoa tree in the Gold Coast is being attacked relentlessly by a 
disease known from one of its secondary symptoms as "swollen shoot." Much work 
on this disease has been done by the West Africa Cocoa Research Institute in the hope 
of finding a cure for it or of producing a disease-resistant strain of cocoa tree. So far 
the only remedy discovered is the ruthless cutting out of infected trees, as a sick tree 
is contagious because the virus is carried from tree to tree by an insect called the 
mealy bug. The first sign of infection in a tree is a slight discolouration of the leaf; 
after this appears the tree may produce two further, if diminishing, crops of cocoa 
and the farmer is naturally reluctant to see destroyed a tree which, to the untrained 
eye, is healthy and a prospective source of profit. Unscientific opinion is therefore 
easily inflamed against a cutting-out policy by unscrupulous agitators who have 
political motives for stimulating resentment against the authorities. Old suspicions 
die hard and it is in such circumstances that education in broad application can do 
much to help in creating the conditions essential for economic advance. 
The investigation of plant diseases is only one form of the eager research now 
being conducted in the field of Colonial Development. In Africa particularly we are 
only on the threshold of discovery, as it must not be forgotten that men now living 
can recall the first phases of British rule in tropical Africa. Full surveys of resources, 
and research into the best means of using and conserving these resources, must be 
the basis for sound advance. While we concentrate mainly on the development of 
existing industries and the development of background services-communications, 
health, education-we are at the same time allotting a large proportion of our effort 
to research. We much [?must] discover the best methods of sustaining and 
improving the health and vigour of people employed in productive enterprises. This 
involves research into tropical diseases and the application of new drugs, both 
remedial and prophylactic; the development of building techniques suitable for hot 
climates; the utilisation of water resources and the improvement of local diets . Some 
£2,000,000 was allocated to research out of Colonial Development and Welfare funds 
in the year ended 31st March, 1948, nearly double the previous year's allotment. 
Much more could be done in this field if we could get all the young, keen scientists 
we need for this work in the colonies. I hope that some of you listening to me 
to-night may be able to inspire young men to take up this most fascinating and 
rewarding enterprise. 
[92) COLONIAL GENERAL 105 
Mere increases in production are not by themselves enough to ensure a healthy 
economy. Successful marketing is a necessary complement. An essential stimulus to 
production is the confidence of the producer in his ability to sell his crops at a price 
that will at least cover his cost and leave a reasonable margin of profit. 
During the war His Majesty's Government largely undertook the marketing of the 
exportable surpluses of colonial produce; some produce was for consumption in the 
United Kingdom, other items were sold to Commonwealth and foreign countries, as 
the world supply situation required. In some cases, such as West African oilseeds, the 
whole exportable surplus was purchased in bulk through marketing organisations, in 
other cases, such as East African cotton, output which could not be sold elsewhere 
was taken over. In many cases, for example sugar, oilseeds and fibres, the knowledge 
that His Majesty's Government would find them a market encouraged colonial 
producers to maintain, and, in some cases, to expand their output of commodities 
necessary to the Allied war effort. 
To-day, as I have said, we still . have to face a shortage of many essential 
commodities coupled with the dollar difficulty to which I have referred. It is 
therefore as important as ever to encourage colonial producers by guaranteeing 
them markets. On 17th September the Chancellor of the Exchequer made a 
statement of His Majesty's Government's attitude to long-term contracts for colonial 
produce. That attitude must vary much with each commodity, depending on the 
world supply position and prospects, on prices and on the importance of the 
commodity to consumers. His Majesty's Government may make contracts for up to 
10 years and the quantity will normally be limited by the United Kingdom's 
requirements for consumption and re-export. At the same time, colonies are to be 
encouraged to seek foreign markets. Prices are the most difficult factor in long-term 
arrangements because neither party can hope to predict what world trends will be. 
The object is to find a formula fair to both sides. For some commodities, where 
producers remember days of over-production when they could not sell their crops, a 
simple guarantee to take the colony's exportable surplus at a price to be negotiated 
annually will be sufficient. Colonial sugar has, for example, been subject to such an 
arrangement and last week the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food 
announced that His Majesty's Government's guarantee to buy had been extended to 
the end of 1952. Jamaica bananas are covered by His Majesty's Government's 
guarantee for the same period. For other commodities, long-term contracts will 
include perhaps floor and ceiling prices, as in the contract by which the Ministry of 
Food buys East African coffee, or they may provide for annual price negotiations and 
specify the percentage by which the price may rise or fall in any year. These detailed 
arrangements must be adjusted to suit the commodity. His Majesty's Government's 
object is, whilst increasing production of what the United Kingdom needs, to give 
Colonial producers fair prices and a feeling of security. It is hoped to encourage 
statutory producers' organisations and through them to associate Colonial producers 
more and more with the selling of their crops. 
But let us not forget that the prospect of economic progress in the Colonies, 
promising so much for the well-being of producers and consumers in every part of 
the world, depends for its fulfilment upon the mutual confidence and goodwill 
existing between the Colonial peoples and ourselves. If our capital resources and 
technical skill are to increase the latent wealth of the Colonies, we must inspire in 
their inhabitants the firm conviction that the European in their territory is no selfish 
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exploiter or Imperialist, but has their happiness and independence deeply at heart. 
For each member of the team, indigenous and British, has an indispensable part to 
play. And this great venture will succeed only in the degree that we are able to enlist 
the co-operation of the Colonial peoples in a joint effort to maintain and operate a 
working partnership between technically advanced and backward communities for 
the benefit of mankind. 
93 CAB 134/219, EPC(48)92 1 Nov 1948 
'Report of the Colonial Development Working Party': objectives and 
recommendations [Extract] 
I. Introduction 
1. We have surveyed the field of work approved by the Economic Policy 
Committee at its 18th Meeting1 on 6th May, 1948. * In this report we show how the 
broad objectives of colonial economic policy are influenced by current conditions 
and, after reviewing the present pattern of capital investment in the Colonies, we 
suggest the policy which should be pursued in future. We propose targets for colonial 
primary products. We examine the factors determining the scale of future invest-
ment and the extent to which certain kinds of physical resources are likely to be 
available. We consider the possibilities of co-operation with other Colonial Powers in 
the planning of development. Finally, we suggest the need for an interdepartmental 
Committee of officials to keep the progress of colonial development under con-
tinuous review. A summary of our recommendations is given in the next paragraph, 
followed by the report itself. 
11. Summary of recommendations 
Colonial investment policy (Sections Ill-VI) 
2. (i) The broad objectives of economic policy in the Colonies should continue to 
be:-
(a) to restore and improve the capital equipment of the Colonial territories so as 
to provide a firm basis for future development; 
(b) to promote those types of economic activity, whether primary or industrial 
production, in which the territories are best fitted to engage, having regard to the 
balance of their economies and the advantages of external trade; 
(c) to raise the living standards of the Colonial peoples as rapidly as the level of 
their productivity permits; and 
(d) to secure the mutual advantage of the United Kingdom and the Colonial 
territories, having regard to the finance, equipment and skill which the former 
may be able to provide. (Paragraph 3.) 
(ii) The pursuit of these objectives must, in the interests of the Colonies 
• It was intended that we should cover Southern Rhodesia as well as the territories for which the Colonial 
Office is responsible but, except in regard to railways, information was not available in time. 
1 See 125. 
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themselves as well as of the United Kingdom, be influenced by the necessity for the 
early attainment of a balance in the external payments of the sterling area. 
(Paragraphs 5 and 6). 
(iii) Development cannot be confined to directly productive work, but must cover 
the whole field, social as well as economic, so that balanced progress is maintained. 
(Paragraph 17.) 
(iv) In so far as purely commercial considerations are involved, projects should be 
judged in the light of the following criteria:-
(a) The resulting product should satisfy an effective and continuing demand. 
(b) The period between starting work on the project and reaping results should be 
short unless the long-term need is particularly important. 
(c) The proposed development should be a paying proposition over a reasonable 
period of time. 
(d) The scarce resources required for the project should have no better alternative 
use. (Paragraph 20.) 
(v) Colonial Governments should be invited as and when they review their 
development plans or consider new individual projects, to have regard as appropriate 
to the objectives and criteria set out in (i) to (iv) above. United Kingdom 
Departments should do likewise on matters affecting such plans and projects. 
(Paragraph 21.) 
(vi) Means for carrying out this policy already exist and elaboration of the present 
controls on capital investment in the Colonies should not be undertaken. 
(Paragraph 22.) 
(vii) The export targets which the Colonial Office proposed for certain primary 
products should be adopted. (Paragraph 26.) 
Limiting factors (Section VII) 
(viii) The Investment Programmes Committee should be instructed to have 
regard for the needs of colonial investment when considering the levels of home 
investment. The Committee would look to the Colonial Office to provide adequate 
information on plans in a few of the major fields of colonial investment, and on the 
level of colonial requirements for certain materials and equipment. (Paragraph 32.) 
(ix) Development at present must consist chiefly of multiplying over a wide area a 
number of comparatively small improvements. Such large-scale schemes as are 
undertaken must be selected carefully and effort concentrated upon them. 
(Paragraph 36.) 
(x) Subject to the appropriate use of other resources there is no objection on 
general economic grounds to new borrowings for approved developmental purposes 
by Colonial Governments on the London market of the order of £60 million over the 
next 3 or 4 years, which is the extent of their likely requests as at present foreseen . 
Supplies of scarce equipment and materials (Section VIII) 
(a) Railway equipment (paragraph 42) 
(Paragraph 37.) 
(xi) Colonial railway needs for workshop equipment, materials, spares, &c., 
should be specially examined in detail by the Colonial Office with the Ministry of 
Supply to see what early action to overcome deficiencies is practicable. 
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(xii) The Crown Agents, in conjunction with the Ministry of Supply, should 
continue to assist manufacturers wherever they encounter special difficulties in 
obtaining the smooth flow of materials necessary to achieve production program-
mes. 
(xiii) Existing orders for colonial railway equipment should not be disturbed 
without careful consideration of the serious consequences. A small ad hoc commit-
tee should be set up by the Colonial Office to examine quarterly the progress made on 
these orders. 
(xiv) The Crown Agents should ensure (a) that any colonial orders for locomotives 
required for 1950 delivery are placed immediately and that orders for later delivery 
are placed as soon as possible; and (b) that Colonies are regularly advised of the dates 
by which future orders for equipment must be given to ensure that they get a proper 
chance of completion when required. It will be for Colonial Governments to ensure 
that financial approvals are given so that orders can be placed in time. 
(xv) When five-year programmes have been drawn up by the railways the Colonial 
Office (and Commonwealth Relations Office in respect of Southern Rhodesia) should 
arrange for colonial railway representatives to meet the Crown Agents to examine the 
programmes and so far as possible resolve any conflict of needs. 
(xvi) The suggested meeting of colonial railway representatives and the Crown 
Agents should consider all practicable means to secure greater standardisation. 
(xvii) If United Kingdom supplies and foreign purchases cannot together meet 
colonial requirements for steel rails, the Colonial Office (and Commonwealth 
Relations Office in respect of Southern Rhodesia) should make arrangements to 
settle priorities between demands. 
(b) Earth moving equipment (paragraph 44 and Appendix E) 
(xviii) The Ministry of Supply should suggest to Fowler Marshall that East Africa 
may offer a fairly substantial market for their 35 h.p . crawler tractor and that they 
might establish an agency there at an early date. 
(xix) Plans for the production in the United Kingdom of crawler tractors should 
not be confined to machines of the heaviest types but should also provide for 
machines in the 35-80 h.p. range. 
(xx) Colonial destinations should continue to be favoured in granting export 
licences from the United Kingdom for second-hand crawler tractors. 
(xxi) The Colonial Office should examine in detail colonial demands for larger 
wheeled tractors, and if necessary make a case to the Ministries of Supply and 
Agriculture for diversion from the home market. 
(xxii) For all this equipment, Colonial Governments should be clearly informed of 
the current supply position and of possible sterling sources. 
(xxiii) In guidance to manufacturers on the export of new machines, the Ministry 
of Supply and the Board of Trade should not only do their best to safeguard the 
general interests of the Colonies, but should also give special consideration to 
requirements sponsored by the Colonial Office because of their particular import-
ance. 
(c) Other agricultural equipment (paragraph 47) 
(xxiv) The Colonial Office should continue to keep constantly in mind the need for 
evolving new types of agricultural equipment particularly suited to Colonial 
requirements . 
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(d) Cement (paragraphs 49-53) 
(xxv) The Colonial Office should in consultation with the Ministry of Works invite 
the Colonies to adopt, as far as local conditions permit, the new economy methods 
which are now being worked out in the United Kingdom. 
(xxvi) The level of cement supplies to the Colonies from United Kingdom sources 
must be decided well in advance and adhered to in order to avoid dislocation in the 
Colonies. 
(xxvii) If supplies of cement from the United Kingdom are inadequate, the 
Colonies will have to obtain the balance of their minimum essential requirements 
from elsewhere, including hard currency sources if it is not obtainable from soft 
currency sources. 
(xxviii) The Colonies should take the largest possible proportion of their require-
ments from the United Kingdom in the months November to March. 
(e) General (paragraph 64) 
(xxix) The Colonial Office and the Board of Trade should keep under constant 
review in what further ways it might be possible to facilitate colonial purchases from 
new soft currency sources of goods which cannot be supplied from the United 
Kingdom. 
Co-operation with other colonial powers (Section IX) 
(xxx) More rapid action is likely to be secured by joint planning on technical 
subjects and on specific practical schemes than by efforts to secure more elaborate 
co-ordination. Existing informal contacts with other Colonial Powers on research 
and technical subjects and in respect of specific projects should be maintained and 
developed. (Paragraphs 67 and 68.) 
Continuing review of development (Section X) 
(xxxi) An inter-departmental committee should be established consisting of 
representatives of the principal interested Departments, and with the following 
terms of reference:-
To keep under review the broad plans for Colonial economic development and the 
progress made in carrying them out, and their relationship to the Government's 
general economic policy. (Paragraph 71.) 
Ill. Objectives of development 
3. The present interest in Colonial development has been misrepresented as a 
new phase of an old exploitation. This is not true. It is required in the common 
interest of the peoples of the United Kingdom and of the Colonies, both of whom are 
the responsibility of His Majesty's Government. Moreover, the promotion of the 
utmost social, economic and political advancement of the Colonial peoples is a goal 
to which His Majesty's Government is pledged both by explicit statements of policy at 
home and in the Colonies and by international undertakings. The honouring of these 
pledges implies a long-term programme of Colonial development aimed at maintain-
ing and improving the standards of living of the Colonial peoples. This programme 
should have four broad objectives:-
(a) To restore and improve the capital equipment of the Colonial territories so as 
to provide a firm basis for future development. 
110 ECONOMIC POLICY [93) 
(b) To promote those types of economic activity, whether primary or industrial 
production, in which the territories are best fitted to engage, having regard to the 
balance of their economies and the advantages of external trade. 
(c) To raise the living standards of the Colonial peoples as rapidly as the level of 
their productivity permits. 
(d) To secure the mutual advantage of the United Kingdom and the Colonial 
territories, having regard to the finance, equipment and skill which the former 
may be able to provide. 
4. These are the continuing objectives of Colonial economic policy. Capital 
investment-its amount and its distribution-will reflect the line of policy adopted. 
Though considerable development under colonial conditions can be achieved 
without a very great capital outlay by teaching the people how to make more effective 
use of their existing resources by better cultivation and better hygiene, the pace of 
the advance will necessarily be slow- so slow indeed that it may be more than offset 
by a parallel growth of population. Substantial economic and social progress in the 
Colonies, particularly in view of the pressure of population, requires a more speedy 
advance and this implies greater capital investment. Without better transport, wider 
flood and irrigation control, progressive farming and forestry and more technical 
education, most colonial producers will remain, as they have always been, on the 
margin of subsistence, victims of local glut and famine, pests and erosion. But the 
margin for saving in the Colonies themselves is as yet too narrow to provide more 
than a small fraction of the capital investment required. A responsibility for 
contributing towards the deficiency may be accepted by the United Kingdom; but the 
extent to which the responsibility can be fulfilled will depend on its own economic 
health. 
5. Unless the sterling area as a whole succeeds in restoring the balance of its 
external payments at the highest possible level, the United Kingdom itself will be 
unable to provide the overseas capital investment upon which the Colonial territories 
must rely if their economic development is to be accelerated. Again, the unbalanced 
external payments of this and other countries act as a powerful force tending to 
restrict the volume of world trade, whereas the interests of both the United Kingdom 
and the Colonies are best served by a flourishing international market freely 
absorbing all that they can produce. Both these considerations require a short-term 
shift of emphasis in colonial development. The Colonies, in their own interest as 
much as in the interest of the United Kingdom, should aim to make the maximum 
contribution that their resources permit to the early attainment of a balance in the 
external payments of the sterling area. 
6. This is not a fifth objective to be added to those stated in paragraph 3. It is, 
however, a consideration which is bound to influence the policy adopted in pursuit of 
these objectives. We proceed now to see how far work in progress satisfies this 
interpretation of the colonial economic policy needed to-day and whether changes 
might be made to the general advantage . .. 2• 
2 The report was signed by E A Hitchman, deputy to chief planning officer, Treasury, 1948--1949; 
subsequently Sir Alan Hitchman. 
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94 CAB 134/219, EPC(48)112 7 Dec 1948 
'Practical achievements in the colonies since the war': memorandum 
for Cabinet Economic Policy Committee by Mr Creech Jones. Appen-
dix: export figures 
In connection with the discussion on Colonial Development on 9th November, 1948 
(E.P.C. (48) 35th Meeting Minute 4), 1 I circulate for the information of my 
colleagues the following account of practical achievements in the Colonies, since the 
war, in the economic field. 
2. The Report of the Colonial Development Working Party (E.P.C. (48) 92)2 laid 
stress on the fact that, in the present undeveloped state of most Colonial territories, 
much new investment must be in the form of basic equipment which yields returns 
only over a fairly long period. Nevertheless, investment of skill and resources since 
the war has already achieved considerable practical results. The object of this paper is 
to express these results so far as possible in quantitative terms. It deals first with the 
contribution made by the Colonies to the export drive and to the establishment of a 
sound balance of overseas payments for the United Kingdom/Colonies; then with 
progress towards a sound internal financial policy; finally, it gives examples of a few 
concrete achievements in the field of economic and social rehabilitation and 
development. 
I. Export drive 
3. A major success~ has been gained in the Colonial export drive. Appendix A 
brings up to date the export figures given in paragraph 26 and in Appendix C of the 
Colonial Development Working Party Report. On the basis of these figures, an index 
number of the volume of Colonial exports has been prepared (taking 1946 as lOO) 
and is given in Table 1 below:-
TABLE 1 
Index numbers of volume of colonial exports 
(1946 = 100) 
1936 
1946 
1947 
1948 (a) 
[1950-53 (c) 
• Provisional figure January/June only. 
117 
100 
132 
148 (b) 
182] 
b Excluding cocoa (the exports of which are very 
seasonal) and hardwoods. 
c Target figures in C.D.W.P. Report (Appendix C). 
4. For two-thirds of the commodities included in the index number in Table 1 the 
volume of exports in 1947 was in excess of that in 1946; the rapid expansion of rubber 
exports from Malaya was, however, mainly responsible for the large increase in the 
1947 index. Rubber from Malaya again contributed, with tin, a large part of the 
subsequent rise in the volume index, but with the majority of commodities, the 
1 See 129. 2 See 93. 
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rising trend of exports continued during the first half of 1948. The overall increase of 
48 per cent. above the 1946 volume shows a remarkably rapid return on post-war 
rehabilitation expenditure and a heartening progress towards the targets set for 
1950-53. 
11. Dollar earnings and savings 
5. Between 1946 and 1948 the Colonies have enormously increased their direct 
dollar earnings and these were running at an annual rate of from $600 million to 
$700 million during the first half of 1948. At the same time, expenditure of the 
Colonies in the Western Hemisphere has been curtailed. It fell, in spite of higher 
prices and the necessity to increase purchases of certain equipment for development 
purposes, from $500 million in 1947 to an annual rate of $473 million in the first half 
of 1948. This fall shows the first result of the imposition, in the autumn of 1947, of a 
system of dollar ceilings, the full effects of which (because of the time Jag in working 
off existing licences) should begin to show in the second half of 1948. 
6. The Colonies have also made a substantial indirect contribution to the dollar 
balance of the United Kingdom-Colonies Group. The Colonies contribution to 
United Kingdom imports has risen from 5.4 per cent. in 1938 to 9.4 per cent. in the 
first half of 1947 and 10.2 per cent. in the first half of 1948. This rise has undoubtedly 
resulted in a considerable saving of dollars by enabling the United Kingdom to divert 
purchases from hard currency sources. As a further indirect contribution mention 
should be made of the role played by Colonial products such as tin, rubber, cocoa, oil 
seeds and sisal in the successful negotiation of bi-lateral trade agreements. e.g., with 
European countries for increased supplies of food-stuffs for the United Kingdom. 
7. The combined results of increased direct dollar earnings and decreased direct 
dollar expenditure are shown in the figures in Table 2 below of the Colonies net 
surplus with the Western Hemisphere for the past three years. 
TABLE 2 
Colonies' net surplus with Western Hemisphere 
1946 
1947 
1948 (a) 
$Million 
Nil 
+15 
+200 
• Annual rate on basis of July/September figures. 
Ill. Internal financial policy 
8. The total Public Revenue of Colonial Governments (excluding Colonial 
Development and Welfare grants) was approximately £58 million in 1938, some £115 
million in 1946, and about £140 million in 1947 (the figure may well be exceeded 
when the accounts of Colonies, whose financial year does not coincide with the 
calendar year are available). The total in 1948 is likely to be considerably greater than 
in 1947. 
9. These figures of Public Revenue do not, however, give the full picture. Mention 
should also be made of the substantial sums accumulated in special funds on behalf 
of Colonial producers for future price stabilisation and development, instead of being 
taken to general revenue. Table 3 shows the size of the more important funds at the 
end of September 1948. 
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TABLE 3 
Producers' price stabilisation and development 
funds at end of September 1948 
Uganda Cotton Funds 
Uganda Hard Coffee Funds 
East African Sisal Labour Welfare Funds 
Mauritius Sugar Hurricane Funds 
Fiji Sugar Funds 
West Indies Sugar Funds 
West African Oilseeds Funds 
West African Cocoa Funds 
Total (say) 
£million 
9.50 
1.05 
.50 
.08 
.11 
2.54 
15.20 
52.00 
81.00 
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10. The increase in Total Public Revenue, and in Stabilisation and other Funds, 
reflects partly the rise in prices and reduced value of money, but also increasing 
economic development and higher taxation levels. Colonial budgets are increasingly 
used as an instrument of financial and economic policy and as a means of absorbing 
surplus purchasing power. During the last two years income tax has been extended to 
the three major Far Eastern territories. A considerable part of the Development Plans 
of Colonial territories is being financed from surplus revenues. 
IV. Progress with economic and social rehabilitation and development 
11. Perhaps the most striking achievement since the war has been the restoration 
of the civil Government in the territories in the Far East which were overrun by the 
Japanese. The success achieved in the considerable task of re-establishing civil 
Government is reflected (notwithstanding the present terrorist campaign in Malaya) 
in the record output of rubber and in the rapid rise of tin production. Hong Kong 
provides a solid example of prosperity and financial stability in the midst of 
surrounding chaos. The civil Government in Sarawak and North Borneo has had to 
be built up almost from nothing. The Government of North Borneo have already 
produced a 1 0-year plan for reconstruction and development. 
12. The rehabilitation of the Governments in the Far East, and the absence of 
recruiting during the war, has necessitated a large scale effort to recruit staff for all 
Colonial governments. The success achieved is shown by the fact that between June 
1945 and the end of September 1948, approximately 4,100 vacancies were filled in 
the Colonial Service as a whole, a rate of recruitment seven or eight times the 
pre-war average. 
13. Because of the relatively long-term nature of Colonial development the major 
part of the practical achievements so far realised in the economic field have resulted 
from the rehabilitation and expansion of existing industries, particularly industries 
destroyed by the war. The Malayan tin mining industry, for example, was brought 
almost to a complete standstill by the Japanese occupation. In March 1946 only five 
dredges were working. By September 1948 the number had risen to sixty-seven and 
the volume of production had recovered to between 4/6ths and 4/7ths of the average 
of the three pre-war years. Some concrete progress has, however, been made with 
new developments financed largely out of the £180 million of approved expenditure 
under the ten-year Development Plans. A considerable mileage of new first and 
second class roads and some extensions of railways (e.g., the 125 miles' extension to 
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the Mpanda lead mines in Tanganyika) is aiready under construction or has been 
completed; construction has begun on the Freetown deep water quay and on the 
groundnut port at Mikindani, Tanganyika; the construction of the Changi Airport at 
Singapore is well under way; some 378,000 square miles (over four times the area of 
Great Britain) have been air-photographed by the Colonial Geodetic and Topo-
graphical Survey and maps have been published or prepared for 50,000 square miles 
of this area. New plant for copper, cobalt and lead is in course of erection in Northern 
Rhodesia and preliminary work on the site has been begun on the £101/2 million 
Owen Falls Hydro-Electric Scheme in Uganda for which orders for four 150,000 kw. 
generators have already been placed. 
14. In the field of social achievements the anti-malarial campaigns in Cyprus and 
on the coastal belt of British Guiana have made rapid progress. The Cyprus scheme, 
now in its third year, is already well on the way towards achieving its objective of the 
complete eradication of the malaria-bearing mosquito from the island, and a similar 
scheme is being undertaken in Mauritius. Amongst the many rural development and 
settlement schemes undertaken since the war, the Anchau Scheme in Northern 
Nigeria, although not of first importance in itself, has provided valuable experience 
on tsetse clearance and resettlement of African populations. Here a corridor 70 miles 
long and 10 miles wide was cleared of tsetse, 5,000 people resettled in new villages 
and in one town, and 60,000 people freed from the menace of sleeping sickness. A 
start has been made, too, with the building of new schools and some, such as the 
Central Medical School in Fiji, have already been completed and begun tuition. 
Although little or no permanent construction has yet taken place -new Universities, 
e.g., the West Indian University in Jamaica and the West African University Colleges 
at Ibadan and Achimota have already begun work in temporary accommodation. 
15. A great deal of work has also been done, particularly in East Africa, on soil 
conservation. For instance, in 1947 over 700 miles of contour banking was 
constructed in the central provinces of Tanganyika and every farm in a complete 
District of the Southern Highlands Province in Tanganyika has been laid out to 
control erosion. Considerable success has also been achieved in the drive to increase 
rice production in the Federation of Malaya where the acreage under rice in the 
1947-48 season increased by 68,000 acres over the area in the 1946-47 season, an 
increase in one year of over 7 per cent. in the total acreage. It is hoped and intended 
that there should be further increases of the same order or [? of] magnitude in 
subsequent years. There has also been a most successful campaign against the red 
locust in Central Africa. Vigorous extermination measures by the International Red 
Locust Control Service operating from Northern Rhodesia and using aircraft 
supplied from C.D. and W. funds, as well as ground teams, successfully wiped out all 
incipient swarms by March 1948. Very extensive measures have also been taken 
against the desert locust in East Africa and the Middle East. These measures have 
successfully prevented any large scale destruction of crops in the threatened 
territories which are now reported clear from all swarms. A new and extremely 
important field of research into the use of insecticides has been actively developed. A 
Colonial microbiological research institute has been established in this area and it is 
anticipated that it will eventually be a Commonwealth, if not a world, centre of 
information in this particular sphere. 
Appendix to 94: Exports of major colonial primary products 
Products 
1. Groundnuts(c) 
2. (i). Palm Kernels 
2. (ii). Palm Oil 
3. Copra and Coconut Oil(d) 
4. Sugar 
5. Cocoa 
6. Cotton 
7. Sisal 00 0 
8. Hides and Skins(f) 
9. Hardwoods(g) 
10. Copper (as concentrates)(j) 
11. Tobacco 000 
12. CobaltU)(k) 
13. Bauxite(j) 0 00 
14. Lead(j) 0 0 0 
15. ManganeseU) 
16. TinU)(k) ... 
17. RubberU) 0 00 
a Including some provisional figures. 
b Provisional. 
c Decorticated. 
d In terms of copra. 
e 1935-36; 1945-46. 
fA skin has been taken as 1lf2 lbs. 
Units 
... . .. 000 tons 
000 0 00 000 tons 
00 0 000 000 tons 
00 0 000 tons 
000 000 000 000 tons 
00 0 00 0 ... 000 tons 
... 000 000 000,000 lbs. 
00 0 000 000 000 tons 
000 00 0 000 cwts. 
000 000 000,000 c.ft. 
000 000 tons 
0 00 ... 00 0 000,000 lbs. 
000 000 000 tons 
... 000 ... 000 tons 
00 0 000 000 tons 
... . .. . .. 000 tons 
0 00 000 0 00 000 tons 
000 000 000 000 tons 
1936 1946 1947(a) 
295 329 300 
482 363 386 
192 147 171 
279 114 147 
983 881 965 
398(e) 306(e) 283 
192 119 134 
125 138 121 
310 240 413 
17.7(h) 19.8(h) 19.8 
154 199 205 
14.6 21.5 23 
870 467 380 
158 1,230 1,385 
570 8,239 15,640 
527 765 589 
77 20 36 
396 430 707 
~~-
------
g Where necessary a ton has been taken as 45 c.ft. 
h 1934-35; 1947. 
i Sufficient data not yet available. 
1948 1950-53 
six months targets in 
(Jan-June) C.D.W.P. 
only (b) Report 
157 870 
187 480 
98 250 
84 233 
472 1,380 
226 285 
66 213 
69 150 
157 319 
(i) 27.5 
117 315 
11.5 42 
210 1,200 
984 1,900 
6,420 20,000 
303 840 
25 93(1) 
384 814 
~-
i Figures relate to production: in the case of bauxite the 1947 and 1948 figures relate to exports. 
k Metal content. 
I 1950. 
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95 CAB 134/223, EPC(49)137 14 Nov 1949 
[Sterling balances]: Cabinet Economic Policy Committee paper: 
report of the Working Party on Sterling Balances. Appendix Ill: 'Notes 
on the treatment of the balances since the war and possible future 
prospects' [Extract] 
[This report was drawn up by an interdepartmental working party under Treasury 
chairmanship. It was considered by the Economic Development Working Group, who 
recommended that it should be taken (a) as a brief for the UK representatives at 
consultations in Washington, and (b) as a guide to the approach to be adopted to any 
short-term problems which might arise while discussions with the Americans and 
Canadians were still in progress. Sir S Cripps recommended the EPC to accept these 
proposals; he recognised that the policy of individual piecemeal approaches to the 
balances of single countries (or groups of countries), as set out in para 22 and para 3l(c), 
might delay a general settlement, but 'no other approach seems possible' (cover note).) 
A. Factual description 
General 
The terms of reference of the Working Party were very open and we have thought it 
would be most convenient if we designed our Report so that it could serve as a brief 
which could be used by the United Kingdom representatives taking part in the 
continuing consultations arranged during the Washington talks. This Report is, 
therefore, divided into the following sections:-
A. A factual description of the form, trends and present treatment of the Sterling 
Balances (paragraphs 1 to 11). 
B. An examination of the effect of the running down of the balances on the 
economy of the United Kingdom (paragraphs 12 to 17). 
C. The relation of the problem of the Sterling Balances to problems of strategy 
and economic development (paragraphs 18 to 20). 
D. Factors determining our approach to the problem, including objectives we 
should aim at, and possible difficulties with the United States Government and the 
Governments of the countries holding the Balances (paragraphs 21 to 29). 
E. Suggested course of action (paragraphs 30 to 38). 
More detailed information on certain points is contained in the following 
Appendices:-1 
Appendix I. A Statement of the Amount of the Sterling Balances held by each 
country since 30th June, 1945. 
Appendix 11. The Main Movements in the Balances since the War and the Reasons 
for them. 
Appendix Ill. Notes on the Treatment of the Balances since the War and Possible 
Future Prospects (based on Notes by the Bank of England) . 
Appendix IV. The Sterling Area. 
Appendix V. The Indian Defence Expenditure Plan. (Note by the Commonwealth 
Relations Office.) 
Appendix VI. United Kingdom Loans and Gifts since the War. 
1 All omitted here, except appendix lli from which an extract is printed. 
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Appendix VII. Section 10 of the American Loan Agreement (6th December, 1945). 
The two Reports of the Official Committee on Economic Development (Overseas) on 
Economic Development in the Middle East and in South-East Asia and the Far East 
are also relevant to Section C of this Report. All figures in the text of the Report for 
the "present" totals of the sterling balances and of movements to date relate to 31st 
August, 1949, unless otherwise specified. 
2. Of the £3,150* million of sterling balances at present held by all countries, 
£2,100* million is held by members of the Sterling Area, and of the remainder over 
£400 million belongs to countries (Egypt, Israel and Jordan) which were members of 
the Sterling Area when their balances were accumulated. The balances represent 
liabilities to depositors who may be either official (Government, Currency Commis-
sioners and Central Banks) or private bodies and individuals. They are not segregated 
in any bank or group of banks and the total amount cannot be estimated with very 
great accuracy. Some of the money is in the form of cash but the greater part is held 
in sterling securities, mostly short-dated. 
The largest holders are:-
India 
Colonies 
Egypt 
Australia 
Irish Republic 
Pakistan 
The growth of the balances 
£million 
603* 
582 
339 
318 
191 
103* 
3. The fact that the United Kingdom now has total sterling liabilities of this size 
is, of course, directly due to the Second World War-although not all the individual 
balances had reached their present size by the end of the war. In order to understand 
the position fully it is necessary to consider successively-
(a) the growth of the balances during the war; 
(b) changes since the war, which have, in fact, involved a reduction of the 
balances by £600 million. (The effective date for the "end of the war" is taken as 
31st December, 1945, in order to cover expenditure which was incurred after the 
actual cessation of hostilities but was directly attributable to the war.) 
4. The growth of the balances during the war was mainly due to--
(a) direct military expenditure by the United Kingdom in the countries con-
cerned, largely for the maintenance of United Kingdom forces or the raising of 
local troops/ 
(b) payment in sterling for essential imports by the United Kingdom, which we 
were unable to requite in kind owing to the fact that our economy was directed to 
the making of war and not to the balancing of payments.* 
• Excluding annuities bought from the United Kingdom Government for £171 mill ion and £8 million 
respectively, mainly for payment of sterling pensions. 
t There were special considerations in the case of India which are referred to in Appendix V. 
* The accumulation of unrequited imports, and therefore the rise of the sterling balances was assisted by 
the limitations placed on the United Kingdom export trade by the conditions accepted under the 
Lend-Lease arrangements. Under the latter we agreed not to use Lend-Lease materials, or materials like 
them, in the manufacture of goods for export (Cmd 6311 of lOth September, 1941). 
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The proportionate importance of these two factors varied in each case: in India, for 
example, direct military expenditure was responsible for about two-thirds of the 
balances. The countries (with the exception of the United States and Canada) in 
which the United Kingdom had to incur this large expenditure and from which she 
had to draw these unrequited imports were, at the time, all members of the Sterling 
Area. This eased the immediate problem of financing, while, on the other hand, it 
piled up the immense liabilities which now confront the United Kingdom. The 
reasons why this was possible lie in the nature of the Sterling Area. 
5. The nature and working of the Sterling Area is described in Appendix N. It 
need only be said here that countries which are members of it conduct their foreign 
trade and payments in sterling-a considerable proportion generally through 
London-and therefore hold their external reserves in sterling. Sterling in their 
hands has always been and still is convertible into any currency, and it is clearly 
essential to the working of the system that it should be so. This, of course, must 
always be subject, as it is at present, to a due measure of restraint by all members of 
the Area and to any particular inter-governmental agreements. Members' currencies 
are therefore linked with sterling and several of them (e.g. India, Burma, Pakistan) 
hold sterling as currency backing. These customs have all developed for reasons of 
financial and commercial convenience, firstly, because the countries concerned did a 
great deal of their trade with the United Kingdom; secondly, because London could 
offer them the advantages of financial and commercial machinery which they 
themselves lacked; and, thirdly, because they normally raised in the London market 
the capital they needed for purposes of development. 
6. This system made for greater flexibility in the financing of the war effort of the 
United Kingdom and the Commonwealth than would otherwise have existed, since 
Sterling Area countries are naturally far more ready than others to hold large 
amounts of sterling. The outbreak of war and the imposition of exchange control (in 
order to safeguard the fore ign exchange resources of the Commonwealth for waging 
the war) involved the exclusion from the Area of certain neutral countries (e.g., the 
Scandinavian countries), but did not lead to any great change in Sterling Area 
practice. As previously, members of the Sterling Area sold their foreign exchange 
earnings in London and accepted in return sterling credits or balances. Each country 
of the Sterling Area continued to operate its own independent import and export 
control; and common policy (and in one or two cases control over intra-area capital 
transfers) kept to a minimum demands for foreign exchange or for gold. 
Although some Sterling Area countries used as much of their war-time income as 
possible to redeem outstanding indebtedness to the United Kingdom, all were left 
with more sterling than they could spend during the war. From a United Kingdom 
point of view these balances (totalling over 3,000) represented a claim to goods and 
services or to foreign exchange. In practice the exercise of this claim depends on 
three factors: the nature of the holdings, the urgency (or lack of it) of the holder's 
wish to spend them, and the traditions of Sterling Area practice. As regards the first, 
over £500 million consists of the funds of Currency Boards, Colonial Pensions Funds 
and various official holdings, and perhaps another £600 (at a rough guess) is held as 
currency backing by various Central Banks. Little of these types of holding should for 
present purposes be regarded as immediately expendable, though, e.g., currency 
backing can be run down if the country concerned is short of fore ign exchange. As 
regards the second, this is discussed fully in Section 11 of Appendix Ill ("Future 
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Prospects Regarding Sterling Balances") . The essential point is that although a 
country holds sterling it may not necessarily wish to spend it: this will depend on the 
state of its economy and its balance of payments position. As regards the third, 
members of the Sterling Area have a common interest in co-operating to conserve its 
resources, and if any member should show signs of wishing to run down its balances 
heavily, we should certainly wish to discuss the matter immediately. 
Control of balances 
7. Paragraphs 1 (a) and 1 (b) of Section 10 of the American Loan Agreement of 
December 1945 (Appendix VII) foresaw the need for the United Kingdom to obtain 
agreement of the sterling balance holders on-
(i) the amount of the balances to be made available immediately for current 
expenditure in any currency area; 
(ii) a programme of repayment of residual balances to commence in 1951. 
The question of partial cancellation, raised in paragraph 1 (c), has not hitherto, in 
fact, become practical politics.* It is refe~red to in paragraph 27 below. 
These intentions implied some restriction in the use of the uncancelled balances 
and the regulation by Sterling Area countries of their balances of payments in order 
to ensure that their net deficit did not exceed the agreed amount by which their 
accumulated sterling might be reduced. Early in 1947, therefore, a series of 
negotiations was undertaken which resulted in the segregation and blocking 
arrangements summarised in paragraph 1 of Appendix Ill, Section I. In accordance 
with our obligations under Article 7 of the Loan Agreement, No. 1 Account funds 
were made freely available for expenditure in any currency area, though this facility 
was temporary and had to be restricted as a result of the balance of payments crisis of 
August 194 7. 
With Australia and New Zealand informal discussions were taking place with a 
view to obtaining their agreement to maintain their balances at the current level 
when the balance of payments crisis in 194 7 underlined the necessity for common 
action to preserve the exchange holdings of the area and to protect the international 
position of sterling. Both Australia and New Zealand had already voluntarily agreed 
to make certain gifts to the United Kingdom Exchequer and, in view of the crisis, 
undertook that accumulated balances would not be drawn upon except for certain 
agreed purposes (e.g., repatriation of sterling debt). 
The sterling balances of the Colonies presented a special problem and it was not 
possible to take any action for partial immobilisation. In fact, the problem here was 
not so acute since, except in certain special cases, the balances tended, for a variety of 
reasons, to increase. In August-September 1947 the Colonies were requested by His 
Majesty's Government, as part of their contribution to the Sterling Area's efforts to 
regain a balance in overseas payments, not to run their balances down, and in this 
Colonial Governments have given wholehearted co-operation. 
• Australia and New Zealand have, however, made gifts of £28 million and £10 million respectively to the 
United Kingdom and a further £8 million is to come from Australia. 
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Movements of balances since the war 
8. Since 31st December, 1945, not only has the total of sterling balances fallen 
from £3,760 million to £3,150 million,* but very considerable movements have 
taken place in the composition of this total. These are shown in summarised form in 
Appendix 11, with brief comments on the reasons for them. They are discussed in 
greater detail in Section I of Appendix Ill . It will be seen that-
(a) on the one hand, certain balances (especially those of India and Pakistan, 
Egypt, Palestine and Jordan) have fallen sharply, mainly owing to their use by 
these countries to meet deficits on their current balances of payments, the causes 
of which include post-war reconstruction and unsettled political conditions; 
(b) on the other hand, there has developed a second category of sterling 
balances-those which have grown because the countries concerned have had 
favourable trading relations since the end of the war. Australia and some of the 
Colonies are the outstanding examples within the Sterling Area, and Italy outside 
it. 
Thus, whereas since 31st December, 1945, the balances of those countries which 
have consistently drawn them down have been reduced by £ 1,085 million, £466 
million of this has been offset by rises in other balances making the net reduction of 
over £600 million referred to above. 
9. The total figure for releases shown in paragraph 2 of Appendix Ill, Section I 
(£ 1,110 million), includes very large capital transactions (including the items 
referred to in Appendix 11). Even after excluding these, it can be said that, unless 
unforeseen contingencies should occur, the rate at which the balances will be drawn 
down should show a marked reduction, largely because of the expected dimi;mtion of 
the Indian drawing down. The total of releases still to be spent between now and 30th 
June, 1950, (including those under Agreements not yet concluded) should on 
present forecasts be under £100 million of which 70 is for India, small amounts for 
Ceylon, Egypt, Iraq and Israel, and perhaps something for Brazil for capital purposes. 
Nearly half of the 200 incurred in 1948-49 was in consequence of the Indian 
experiment of trying to combat inflation by importing on Open General Licence. On 
the other hand, the economies of all these countries are unstable, and unforeseeable 
emergencies may easily occur. Moreover, Pakistan has been running a large deficit 
on current account, and may experience special difficulties owing to her decision not 
to devalue. She has taken the full £ 17 million agreed upon for 1949-50t and a 
request for a supplementary release must be regarded as all too probable. 
Other factors increasing the supply of sterling in international trade and payments 
10. Apart from releases of, and drafts upon, the sterling balances, the supply of 
sterling internationally available has been increased in other ways which, in the 
aggregate, account for a very large sum to which it would be unrealistic to make no 
reference. First, gifts and loans have been made by the United Kingdom since the war 
for such purposes as UNRRA, Internat ional Refugees Office, Civil Affairs expenditures 
in conquered territories, maintenance of Armed Forces in Greece, and the like, all 
being made in contribution to the post-war rehabilitation of other countries. 
Secondly, new capital issues and conversion of maturing issues have been permitted, 
* See footnote to paragraph 2. t £12 million by 31st August and the rest subsequently. 
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in the main for borrowers within the Commonwealth, where the borrowing or 
conversion of a maturing issue has been deemed to serve a useful purpose. Thirdly, 
arising out of the fact that the Sterling Area operates as an area within which sterling 
payments are free of Exchange Control, there have been other capital movements, 
both into and out of the United Kingdom (cf., the column headed "Reasons" in 
Appendix 11); these appear, on balance, to have been outwards from the United 
Kingdom. 
11. Apart from the third category named in the last paragraph (i.e., capital 
movements, the net effect of which is difficult to measure) and apart from the 
running down of the sterling balances, the United Kingdom has, since the end of the 
war, provided to the rest of the world:-
Gifts 
Loans and Recoverable Aid 
Drawing rights under I.E.P.A. 
New capital including conversion and re-funding issues 
Total 
£million 
400 
485 
65 
300* 
1,250 
(Details of gifts, loans and recoverable aid, and drawing rights exercised to 30th 
June, 1949, are given in Appendix VI.) 
Whatever judgment may be passed in the light of after-knowledge on individual 
components in this total, the decision on each was taken after careful consideration 
in the light of policies which had general approval at the time, either in relation to 
rehabilitation, or in pursuit of the general obligations contained in the American 
Loan Agreement to avoid unnecessary restrictions on payments, or in the light of 
political and strategic considerations. 
The total of gifts, &c., provided by the United Kingdom as shown above (viz., 
£1,250 million) may be compared with the total of gifts, loans, credits, &c., received 
by the United Kingdom over the same period (viz., £1,931 million), as follows:-
American and Canadian credits 
E.R.P. (Loans and Grants) 
Australian and New Zealand gifts 
South African Gold Loan (outstanding, 30th June, 1949) 
South African gold gift and sundry gifts of food from Argentina, &c. 
Drawing rights under I.E.P.A. 
Capital repaid to United Kingdom less repayments of R.F.C. and 
Canadian Loans 
£million 
1,240 
405 
38 
30 
2 
16 
200 
1,931 
When allowance is made for the net sterling balance reductions (of about £600 
million) and other capital movements from the United Kingdom the total financial 
resources provided by the United Kingdom roughly corresponds to, or may even 
slightly exceed, those received by her. 
* Conversion and re-funding issues 190. 
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B. The effect of the running down of the balances on the economy 
of the United Kingdom 
[95] 
12. While the direct impact of the sterling balances on the economy of the United 
Kingdom is made only when the balances are reduced, the mere existence of the 
balances, whether reduced or not, presents in itself a major problem. Traders 
throughout the world are aware that great sums of sterling are available at need for 
Governments or commercial uses. Over against the world-wide shortage of dollars, of 
which traders and Governments are equally conscious, this abundance of sterling is a 
factor which would weigh on the sterling/dollar exchange rate even though there 
were little movement in the total of the sterling balances. This factor gained 
particular prominence in the growth of "cheap sterling" transactions. With such 
sterling balances available, a shortage of sterling was inconceivable, and both 
Governments and private traders were ready to see sterling spent with a freedom 
which contrasted sharply with their jealous eking-out of dollar supplies. Although 
the traffic in cheap sterling has diminished as a result of devaluation, this contrast 
between abundance and scarcity must remain a potential threat to any established 
dollar/sterling rate. 
13. It has been noted above (paragraph 8) that there has been a fall in certain of 
the balances amounting to £1,085 million. When allowance has been made for 
capital movements in both directions (but not for the loans, gifts and other items 
referred to in paragraph 11) the total financial resources placed by the United 
Kingdom at the disposal of the holders of balances who have run them down is of the 
order of £850 million. On the other hand, certain other balances have risen by £466 
million. When similar allowance is made for capital movements, the financial 
resources made available to the United Kingdom are of the order of £250 million. 
The net drain on our economy has therefore been about £600 million or rather 
under £200 million per annum, but this rate may, as has been mentioned, be 
reduced in future. It compares with the United Kingdom present production of about 
£10,000 million per annum and annual exports of about £1,600 million. The annual 
export trade of the whole Sterling Area is about £3,000 million. The drain is 
therefore small by comparison with these figures, but in the present extended state of 
the United Kingdom economy it may be of great significance. 
14. The running down of the balances is inflationary, both for the United 
Kingdom and in the countries holding them:-
(a) As regards the United Kingdom, so long as a sterling balance is held by 
another country, it remains, in effect, outside the domestic monetary system. But 
as soon as such a balance begins to be reduced, it passes into the hands of 
exporters and others within the United Kingdom itself, and flows back through the 
production process as income into the pockets of those who have produced the 
export goods. Their buying power within the United Kingdom is by that much 
increased, but the goods which they have produced are not available to satisfy the 
buying demand, nor have they earned any return flow of imports to take their 
place in the shops at home. A reduction in the sterling balances thus represents a 
direct widening of the inflationary gap at home by that amount, and tends to 
produce all the customary inflationary consequences, including a rise in export 
prices. 
(b) The balances enable the holder to run a deficit on external account and indeed 
[95] COLONIAL GENERAL 123 
are a direct encouragement to do so, but beyond that the existence of such large 
balances as a means of meeting an external deficit encourages the holders not to 
take steps to deal with the inflationary conditions which encourage an external 
deficit. 
This state of affairs in the countries holding the balances (which would follow 
equally from inflation not encouraged by the existence of the balances) has the effect 
on British exporters that there is no incentive to reduce export prices or to attempt 
to capture the more difficult markets as opposed to the easier inflationary markets. 
In addition the following effects on the United Kingdom economy ensue:-
(i) The countries concerned are traditional United Kingdom markets, with which 
we have well-established channels of trade, so that export business is easy to 
conduct and generally attractive as to the prices obtainable. It follows that where 
the total supplies available for export are less than the total potential market, a 
high proportion flows along these "normal" trade channels. In addition, quite 
apart from any favouring of old customers, the existence of longstanding orders 
inhibits early delivery to dollar markets. 
(ii) Apart from the direct diversion of exports from dollar to non-dollar markets, 
even exports of goods which are not potential dollar-earners absorb resources of 
man-power and materials which might otherwise be available for exports which 
could earn dollars . Moreover, to the extent that they contain material which could 
be exported in another form for dollars, or material which has to be imported, 
particularly for dollars (e.g., cotton textiles), the additional exports add to our 
balance of payments difficulties. 
(iii) The availability of sterling releases encourages a higher expenditure on dollar 
imports. If the sterling resources of the beneficiaries were less, they would have 
less sterling available for all purposes, including the purchase of dollars from the 
central pool. 
15. All the effects outlined in the previous paragraph have operated during the 
period of reduction in the sterling balances. But their effect has been largely masked 
by the contrary effects of E.R.P. and similar receipts from abroad. As and when 
assistance from E.R.P. aid is reduced, the inflationary and other pressures derived 
from the sterling balances will become more apparent. 
16. The preceding paragraphs are concerned principally with the effects felt 
within the United Kingdom economy. Substantial net drafts on accumulated sterling 
balances have, however, a further important effect on the trade and payments of the 
world as a whole. In the sum total of international payments, a deficit incurred by 
one country must of necessity be off-set by a surplus or surpluses in other countries. 
Hence the fact that a country which possesses a large available sterling balance can, 
by drawing on it, run into large deficit on international payments accounts, must 
indirectly be the cause of corresponding surpluses in other countries. But in the 
present straitened condition of most national economies, few countries other than 
the United States can afford an over-all surplus on their balance of payments. Any 
deficit, therefore, tends directly or indirectly to increase the surplus of the United 
States, and unless financed by additional dollar grants or loans, to aggravate the 
world dollar shortage, which is the greatest obstacle to a general restoration of 
convertibility in sterling and other non-dollar currencies . 
J 
124 ECONOMIC POLICY [95] 
17. By way of a postscript to these comments on the economic effect of the 
running down of the balances, we should notice what is liable to happen when the 
scale of running down has to be substantially reduced, either under pressure from 
the United Kingdom Government or for reasons originating in the country 
concerned. That country will then, by deflation and import restrictions, very likely 
cut down the demand for consumer goods (which are often of a type not saleable in 
dollar markets) and concentrate its demands on more essential products. It is likely 
to concentrate particularly on capital goods which are either themselves dollar-
earners or embody materials and skills which may be more or less readily diverted to 
the production of dollar-earning commodities. 
C. The relationship of the problem of the sterling balances to questions of politics, 
strategy and economic development 
General 
18. Before beginning to consider possible means of reducing the burden which 
the sterling balances represent, it is essential to stress that no approach is likely to be 
successful which takes into account merely balance of payments considerations. 
Indeed, if this had been so there would have been little excuse for not accepting 
much earlier the logic of the arguments in the preceding paragraphs and insisting on 
a drastic reduction of releases. But it has hitherto always been necessary, in dealing 
with the balances, to weigh very carefully the possible political and strategic 
consequences of what these countries would regard as an over-stringent policy on 
our part. The holders fall, of course, into very different categories (cf. paragraph 8 
above and paragraph 23 below), but it will be seen from Appendix 11 that the holders, 
who are mainly responsible for the drawing down of the balances, consist of a group 
of countries in the Middle East and round the Indian Ocean (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Iraq, India, Pakistan, Ceylon), which have in common both an exceptional import-
ance in the present international political and strategic situation, and an acute need 
of economic development. The former factor has had considerable influence on our 
treatment of the balances; the latter has been more important in determining the 
attitude of the holders towards them. Both force themselves on the attention when 
future policy is being considered. It is clearly important to emphasise to the United 
States Government the ways in which releases from the balances have contributed to 
our common political, strategic and economic objectives in the Middle East and 
Southern Asia. It is even more important to claim that the economic burden involved 
is one which we can reasonably ask them to share. 
Political and strategic factors 
19. The political considerations, internal and external, which are involved, are 
closely linked with the strategic. Thus internal policy, which is primarily a matter of 
political stability, concerns us because of the need to prevent any of these countries 
from falling into the Communist camp and to build them up as centres of 
anti-Communist influence. This in turn is directly allied with the strategic import-
ance of these countries in case of war. It is no function of this Report to go into the 
details of these questions, but the importance of, e.g., the Suez Canal Zone, the 
Indian Ocean and the oil of the Middle East in war-time hardly need emphasis. We 
have been forced in the past, for example to pay great attention to the first of these 
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(and the necessity of maintaining troops in the Zone) in our past arrangements over 
the Egyptian balances. 
The external considerations are the risks involved in creating grievances among 
these holders if they should feel that they had been unfairly treated in sterling 
balances settlements. Any such feeling would be intensified by their urgent desire to 
use the balances, not only to meet deficits on current account, but, in general, for 
their economic development. India, for example, has always proclaimed that she 
regards her balances as earmarked for the financing of development, though, no 
doubt for reasons which the Government of India regarded as imperative, they have 
not always been used for this purpose. This is, indeed, one of the main reasons for the 
Indian refusal to contemplate cancellation. 
Development 
20. This question is one of considerable complexity and difficulty. His Majesty's 
Government has already devoted a great deal of study to the application of the Fourth 
Point to the Middle and Far East, and the Papers on development in these regions 
produced by the Official Committee on Economic Development Overseas provide 
background material. The conclusions to be drawn from these studies are that, while 
our interests in these two regions would probably suffer from a refusal to share in the 
financing of such development, our share must in present circumstances be small, 
and that the main burden must be borne by the United States. This applies especially 
in the Far East (including India and Pakistan), whose capacity to absorb capital is 
practically inexhaustible. In so far as we link the future use of the sterling balances 
with the United States share of such development-under the Fourth Point or 
otherwise-that will assist in the finding of an agreed solution of the problem and 
help our case with Congress. Nevertheless, we have to make a careful choice of 
arguments here and, in particular, we should not base any scheme wholly on the idea 
of capital development, since political and strategic reasons are always likely to have 
primary importance. Moreover, we want to encourage the United States to relieve us 
of some of the existing burden of the sterling balances as well as to assume the major 
part of the cost of future development. United States assistance in financing India's 
capital development would be of no help in solving our problem if it left the Indians 
free to spend their sterling balances at any appreciable rate for other purposes. 
D. Factors determining the approach to the problem 
General 
21. We are very much in the dark as to the possible form or extent of United 
States help in dealing with this question, and, indeed, as to the whole attitude of the 
United States Government to it. Instead, therefore, of suggesting any concrete 
scheme, involving United States assistance of this or that type, form or amount, it 
seems to us that, at this stage at any rate, we could best assist our representatives in 
the forthcoming Washington discussions by setting out the various considerations 
which are likely to affect the drawing-up of any agreed scheme and leaving the 
general lines of possible schemes to emerge from the discussions. The present 
section of this brief therefore examines the general basis of approach which is most 
justified on merits and likely to make the best appeal to the United States 
Government (paragraphs 22-23); the objectives at which we should then aim 
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(paragraphs 25-27); the difficulties which are likely to be raised both by the United 
States Government (paragraph 28) and by the other Governments concerned with 
the sterling balances (paragraph 29); and, in the light of those various factors, some 
suggestions about the method of approach to the United States Government 
(paragraphs 30-31). Finally, we draw attention to the need, whatever the course of 
the Washington discussions, for a tougher policy on the part of His Majesty's 
Government on the release of the blocked balances and to the possibility, if the 
forthcoming discussions do not result in a satisfactory agreed settlement, that more 
radical action by His Majesty's Government will be required (paragraphs 32-36) . 
Impracticability of a comprehensive approach 
22. It seems very likely that there would be no prospect of success in any 
approach to the United States for help in the form of a vast contribution of gold or 
dollars to be exchanged for the whole of the balances or for any large proportion of 
them. The amounts needed would be so large, and the major questions of policy, 
which would be raised, so complex and untimely (e.g., the restoration of full 
convertibility) that we doubt whether such an approach should be contemplated at 
the moment. Moreover, the individual balances vary in size and in movement as 
greatly as do the particular needs and problems of their holders. We are therefore 
thrown back on a policy of individual approaches to the problems presented by the 
balances of single countries or groups of countries. If, contrary to our expectations, 
the United States Government press for a comprehensive settlement and are 
prepared to support it with adequate aid, we should consider it with ready sympathy 
in the light of the precise proposals made. 
Balances with the highest priority for treatment 
23. The first question to be settled, once a series of individual approaches has 
been decided upon, is that of the balances on which we should concentrate for the 
present. The considerations mentioned in Section C (paragraph 18) give an 
unmistakable lead to the answer. It will be noted, however, from the three categories 
listed in Section 11 of Appendix Ill that not all of the countries referred to in 
paragraph 18 are considered as among those most likely to exert a serious drain on 
the economy of the United Kingdom in the near future, but India, Pakistan and 
Egypt are all in this category, and Ceylon, Iraq, Israel and Jordan are all considered 
as falling into the second category of danger. On other grounds, too, the countries in 
this group seem to require priority of treatment. Their balances are war-time 
accumulations of the kind which the United States Administration clearly has 
pre-eminently in mind; they have been run down substantially; and the political, 
strategic and economic arguments all coincide in indicating them as the group with 
the first claim to consideration. These arguments apply with special force to India. 
She, perhaps together with Pakistan, is the most pressing case. She raises all the 
problems likely to be raised by other holders in the Middle East-Indian Ocean group, 
most of them in an acute or complex form. 
24. The balances of the remaining countries, notably Australia and the Colonies, 
involve such special factors (e.g., the post-1947 increase in the Australian balances 
and the unique relations between the Colonies and the United Kingdom) that very 
little purpose would probably be served by attempting to deal with them at this stage. 
Moreover, there are no obvious grounds (e.g., political strategy or development) for 
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attacking these cases as there are with the Middle East-Indian Ocean group. It is 
therefore preferable to postpone consideration of them until we have some evidence 
from the forthcoming discussions about the attitude of the United States Govern-
ment to the sterling balances generally. 
Our objectives 
25. Whatever kind of scheme may be worked out we should try to secure that it 
should embody as many of the following characteristics as possible:-
(a) It should provide immediate relief for our balance of payments through the 
acceptance and application by the United States of the principle of joint 
responsibility for economic assistance to the holder countries of the Middle 
East-Indian Ocean region. We have so far been bearing this burden practically 
alone by means of releases from the sterling balances. 
(b) This points to the provision of annual amounts of dollars to cover the whole or 
part of, e.g., the Indian deficit on current account (including current provision for 
development schemes). The most helpful scheme (subject to the Congressional 
t ime-table) would be one under which the annual amounts increase as E.R.P. aid 
tapers off, until it reaches a maximum when E.R.P. comes to an end. It might then 
diminish until it disappeared a few years later, when we might be ready once more 
to meet deficits of the present size by United Kingdom investment. 
(c) It would be greatly to our advantage if, in return for such assistance, the 
United States Government could secure, in some way or other, the outright 
cancellation of a proportion of the beneficiaries' existing sterling balances and 
some understanding about the use of the remainder. We deal separately in 
paragraph 27 below with the general question of cancellation. 
(d) The scheme should provide relief in a form which will avoid distorting world 
trade into new patterns which are unlikely to be permanent. There is a serious risk 
that our long-term commercial connexions and prospects and those of the other 
countries concerned might be seriously damaged by a purely temporary provision 
of dollars . 
26. The provision of dollars might take one of various forms, each of which has 
its advantages and disadvantages. There are likely to be two pairs of alternatives: aid 
might be in the form either of a grant or a loan; and it might consist of dollars freely 
expendable anywhere, or it might be "tied" either to purchases in the United States 
or to purchase of specific commodities, or to both. 
(a) Loan or grant. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the advantages which the 
sterling area would derive if United States assistance took the form of a grant 
particularly if, as the price of obtaining it, holders of sterling balances had to agree 
to the outright cancellation of a corresponding part of their balances. 
The pros and cons of accepting assistance by way of loan are much more evenly 
balanced. In favour of accepting such assistance it can be argued that the strain on 
our gold and dollar resources would be relieved, ·at a time when it threatens to 
prove intolerable, in return for an obligation to find dollars in the more distant 
(and one must hope more prosperous) future . This is undoubtedly a great 
advantage but in the case of members of the Sterling Area the disadvantages of 
assistance by loan are heavy-
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(i) It would be improvident to assume that within the foreseeable future our 
balance of payments with the dollar area will allow us to repay further heavy 
borrowing without an acute strain on the economy of the Sterling Area. 
(ii) If the holder countries are only to be offered a loan it is most unlikely that 
they will accept any measure of cancellation of their balances. They would be far 
more likely to regard their balances as assets set aside for repayment of the loan, 
their only liability being to find the sterling with which to buy the dollars from 
the central reserves. 
(iii) A loan of dollars to India would encourage her to use dollars with a freedom 
which the circumstances of the sterling area certainly do not warrant. For this 
reason the relief to our current dollar position might be nothing like equivalent 
to the burden of repayment (including any interest) which would eventually fall 
on the central reserves, of which the United Kingdom is the guardian. 
We do not wish to rule out of court the possibility of assistance by way of loan. It 
would indeed be premature to do so until discussions in Washington have shown 
much more clearly the sort of solution which the Americans may have in mind 
(and it is, of course, abundantly clear that a loan would be much more palatable to 
Congress than a free grant) . But we feel that the terms upon which any loan is 
offered must be examined with the utmost caution lest, by sponsoring its 
acceptance by the holders of sterling balances, we are merely putting off the evil 
day and are sowing dragon's teeth for ourselves when repayment falls due. 
(b) Tied or free. "Free" aid has everything to recommend it. It imposes no 
conditions which would hamper free, multilateral trade; it allows the beneficiary 
to buy in the cheapest market, which is the fundamental requirement of a 
"one-world" economy; and we ·may ourselves be able to earn some of the dollars. 
To establish the principle of "free" dollar grants or loans would be an outstanding 
achievement. 
Cancellation 
27. Before proceeding to discuss the difficulties which we are likely to encounter 
with the United States and the holders, it is useful to deal with this very considerable 
difficulty which will arise in our discussions with both parties. Although we agreed 
under Section 10 (1) (c) of the Loan Agreement (Appendix VII) to seek partial 
cancellation of the balances and have sought to achieve it, this has not hitherto been 
a practical proposition. There are certain technical difficulties in that the balances 
are not in all cases held by central banks or official bodies, but by private individuals. 
But the main difficulty is that public opinion in India, for example, has never 
accepted the argument that there should be some scaling-down of the balances, on 
the grounds that it was inequitable that such war-time liabilities incurred in the 
common cause should be regarded as the sole liability of the United Kingdom. India 
considers that she was brought into the war without being consulted; that, although 
a much poorer country than the United Kingdom, she contributed a more than 
proportionate share of the cost and, in fact, did all that could be expected or required 
of her; that she suffered privation by way of famine and inflation; and that the 
repayment of the sterling balances would not involve more than a relatively small 
sacrifice on the United Kingdom's part, having regard to the disparity in the standard 
of living of the two countries. Moreover, as has been mentioned, India regards the 
balances, which are almost her sole external reserves, as a fund to be used for her 
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essential economic development. It is possible that India and the other countries 
concerned may be ready to modify their attitude towards cancellation in return for 
adequate United States aid, but it is clearly impossible for us at this stage to say how 
far this may be so. 
We would add that it would be essential for us to secure that any sterling balances 
"cancelled" were in fact cancelled and that the Americans retained no hold over them 
in any shape or form. In effect sterling now held by, for example, India would have to 
be paid into the Exchequer (and used for the reduction of debt), no benefit remaining 
for any third party. 
Again, as regards the uncancelled balances, we should have to look closely at any 
conditions attached to their use. In particular, we should have to guard carefully 
against accepting convertibility obligations, so to speak, by a backdoor. We must not 
be led into this sort of bargain apart from a settlement of the convertibility problem 
as such. 
Difficulties with the United States 
28. To state the objectives set out above is to bring out, by implication, the kind 
(and magnitude) of difficulty which we are likely to encounter with the United States 
Administration. Briefly:-
(a) Indications as to whether the United States is prepared to come forward at all 
with any positive help in the solution of this problem can only emerge in 
Washington. A particular aspect of this is whether, if the United States is prepared 
to find money for the development of the Middle East and Far East, she will wish to 
link such provision with a settlement of the sterling balances. 
(b) There is a lack of comprehension in the United States of the significance of the 
sterling balances in the international political and economic situation. To regard 
these simply as war debts, analogous to those forgiven by the United States (a rich 
country) under Lend-Lease, is to overlook the complexity of the problem, the case 
on which the holder countries base their resistance to writing-down, the relation 
of the balances to the whole question of overseas investment by the Western 
countries, and the need of the holders for economic assistance. 
(c) There is also a lack of understanding of how the Sterling Area functions, of its 
importance in the promotion of free multilateral trade, and therefore of the 
importance of helping to cure the difficulties imposed on it by the existence of the 
sterling balances in such a way as is most likely to assist it to function normally. 
(d) Although the United States Administration is strongly in favour of free 
multilateral trading, and although it is only right to recognise past American 
generosity, neither the Administration nor Congress seems prepared at present to 
assist towards their objective by substituting the idea of free international 
circulation of dollars for that of closely supervised aid, which helps to meet 
immediate needs but makes more rigid the channels of trade. E.R.P. aid is, of 
course, subject to very close control by the United States Government (although 
the 1945 loan was free) and Congress would probably be reluctant to grant any 
future aid on less restrictive terms. Off-shore purchases are a long way from free 
multilateral trading. 
(e) Finally, there is the question of timing. Given the difficulties, discussion with 
the United States seems likely to be lengthy. But if some line of action is not 
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adopted before the end of April the mid-term congressional elections may well put 
a stop to the initiation of any congressional action until early 1951. 
Difficulties with the holder countries 
29. The major difficulty is that, whereas the United States would presumably be 
unwilling at present to consider any scheme which did not involve some contribu-
tion from the holder or holders in question, these countries would probably not 
consider it if it did not offer them some tangible advantage, and would certainly not 
do so if it involved them in any sacrifice, whether financial or political. 
(a) They consider their balances to be exactly the same as ordinary commercial 
obligations (though they have agreed, for the most part, to a lower rate of interest) 
and see no moral reason for writing them down (cf. paragraph 27). 
(b) They need current access to them in order to finance their current deficits, 
and would be unprepared to see them reduced unless they were offered some 
compensating advantage. The deficits do, of course, include some expenditure on 
development. 
(c) They all have hopes of receiving United States help under the Fourth Point 
without any sacrifice on their part, and will certainly be disappointed if they are 
offered nothing except in return for concessions in regard to their sterling 
balances. 
(d) At present, India and Pakistan secure a release of sterling with which they can 
buy hard currencies from the central pool for free expenditure and there might 
seem to be little advantage for them in securing instead a grant of dollars. It is 
possible that they might be persuaded to agree to a scheme on these lines on the 
grounds that it would help the Sterling Area as a whole and, therefore, their own 
prospects of advantage from its continuance; but, having regard to the strong 
feelings already aroused about the sterling balances, such agreement is at best 
doubtful. If the aid were in the form of a loan, or if there were restrictive 
conditions attached, they might well hesitate to waive any claim to sterling 
releases and would certainly refuse to agree to cancellation of an equivalent 
amount. The one factor which would probably influence their attitude most would 
be the prospect of much smaller releases over a substantial future period; and we 
deal with the possibility of restricting releases in paragraphs 31-35 below. 
(e) The holder countries would be reluctant to accept United States aid in loan 
form unless it were accompanied by an assurance that the Sterling Area would find 
the dollars to repay it, whether or not they were still members. The rate of interest 
would also be relevant. 
(f) Any kind of tied aid would involve them in more restrictive arrangements than 
at present, and might mean their being forced to buy in dollar markets at a higher 
price. 
(g) They would, of course, look narrowly at any scheme in order to see whether it 
put them at a disadvantage as against other holders (bearing in mind (a) and (b) 
above). 
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E. Suggested course of action 
General 
30. It was emphasised in paragraph 21 that we have not yet sufficient knowledge 
of the United States attitude to do more than state the general objectives at which we 
should aim and the difficulties we are likely to encounter, both with the United 
States and with the holders. When the discussions have got to the point of canvassing 
definite schemes we shall first have to decide whether the schemes are such that we 
can join in sponsoring them to the holder countries. Before we ourselves enter into 
any commitments we shall have to decide-
(a) what restrictions and conditions we shall be prepared to accept on any aid we 
may secure (paragraphs 25 to 27); 
(b) whether we shall be prepared to accept aid in the form of a loan rather than a 
grant, and, if so, on what terms (paragraph 26 (a)); 
(c) whether the amount and method of any cancellation and/or postponement of 
releases are satisfactory (paragraph 27); 
(d) whether we shall agree to any additional dollar expenditure by the holder 
country (e.g., on development), which will fall on the central reserves (paragraph 
20); 
(e) whether we shall agree, e.g., to the offsetting of aid against E.R.P. aid. 
The approach 
31. In all the circumstances the most promising line of approach seems to be as 
follows:-
(a) A series of preliminary discussions designed to enlighten the United States 
Administration and in due course public opinion, as to the nature of the sterling 
balances; their importance for the holder countries; the way in which they burden 
the United Kingdom; the way in which this has been a United Kingdom 
contribution to post-war reconstruction; the economic needs of the countries 
concerned; the political and strategic necessity of helping them either by releases 
or otherwise; the importance of the Sterling Area as a system of free multilateral 
trade; the value of "free" aid as a means of promoting such trade. The timing of 
this will need careful watching (see paragraph 28 (e)). 
(b) For the reasons noted in paragraph 22 there are likely to be insuperable 
difficulties in the way of a single, all-embracing solution and we should, therefore, 
suggest that we must deal with individual cases. 
(c) The discussion of the relative priority for treatment of individual holders 
(paragraph 23) and, possibly, the concentration on India and the Middle East and 
Indian Ocean group for the present. The older Dominions and Colonies would 
probably have to wait for some time. 
(d) It would be useless to formulate a detailed proposal at this stage, and tactically 
wiser to let the United States suggest such a proposal, but the essential thing is to 
hammer at the objectives outlined in paragraph 25. 
(e) As soon as a definite scheme is taking shape, to bring in the holder country or 
countries concerned. The form and venue of the talks with them can only be 
settled as the Washington talks proceed. 
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Restriction of releases in future 
32. The course of the discussions in Washington is very uncertain, and it will in 
any case be some time before agreement on any new policy can be reached with the 
United States Government and the other Governments concerned. Even when 
agreement is reached on policy, if it involves financial assistance by the United States 
there will inevitably be further delays before the necessary Congressional authority is 
obtained. 
On the other hand, it may be that we shall be completely unsuccessful in securing 
any tangible assistance from the United States in dealing with the problem. 
It is clear, therefore, in view of the urgency of our present economic problems, 
that we must adopt a tougher policy from now on about the release of blocked 
balances. This policy was, in fact, laid down by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
the House of Commons on 26th October, when he said:-
"When we come to the rest of the Sterling Area, the very nature of the system is 
that its members should be able to draw on the reserves which they keep with us in 
sterling when they are in need. It is a necessary consequence of their being willing 
to allow their balances at some times to rise that we should be willing to allow 
them at other times to draw on them. Special considerations arise in the case of 
the war-time sterling balances and the extent to which drawing is permitted upon 
those is and has been limited by the agreements which we have with the several 
countries. The reduction of those sterling liabilities, however, is, like the granting 
of new loans and credits, a matter of degree, and clearly in our present situation 
we cannot afford to employ so much of our resources for this purpose as has 
hitherto been desirable in our own long-term interests and in the interests of 
world development. 
In financial terms that means that in order to keep sterling strong we must not 
over-provide sterling to other countries, either in the form of new credits or in the 
form of releases of accumulated sterling balances. Our past policy has enabled us 
to give most essential help in the restoration of the economies of Europe and Asia. 
Had a different policy been adopted both we and the world would have been worse 
off. But we must now go slower whether we like it or not." 
33. As to the occasions for introducing this new policy, it is to be noted that the 
existing agreement governing the release of Indian balances run[s] to 30th June, 
1951, while Pakistan has been promised a minimum of £5 million for the year 
1950-51. Except as mentioned below, we do not suggest that any modification or 
breach of these agreements should be contemplated. There will, however, have to be 
negotiations with Egypt and Israel in the near future; negotiations with Iraq are now 
in progress. It is important that the new policy should be adopted in these cases, not 
only on their own merits, but also in order to show our determination to adopt it. 
Further, the period of any new agreements providing for releases should be as short 
as possible. 
34. Any settlement reached with the United States Government and the Govern-
ments of countries holding balances might well involve consequential modifications 
of existing agreements. 
35. If no such settlement appears likely we shall then have to consider whether, 
acting without the United States Government, we should not, as soon as possible, 
seek the agreement of the Governments concerned to a radical revision of our policy 
on releases. It might be desirable, for instance, notwithstanding the political and 
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strategic objections, to press for the funding of a large part of the balances, that is, 
for fixed schedules of annual releases (on less than the present scales) over a long 
period. This would inevitably raise the question of what rate of interest would be 
appropriate over that period. 
36. It is possible that we might have to go even further. If there is no agreement 
with the United States Government, or if agreement cannot be reached with the 
other Governments concerned, either on any Anglo-American scheme or on a more 
radical United Kingdom policy such as is suggested above, we may have to consider 
either unilateral funding or a unilateral breach of existing agreements, however 
recent. Either of these would obviously be a very serious step, with far-reaching 
consequences for ourselves and for the standing of sterling as well as for the 
Governments concerned. A breach of existing agreement could only be contemplated 
if our economic situation had seriously deteriorated below its present level. Any 
further examination of the possibility of such treatment of existing agreements must, 
therefore, depend on the course of future events in Washington and in this country. 
Canadian participation 
37. Throughout this report we have discussed the problem in terms of aid by the 
United States. We have no indication of what the Canadian attitude is likely to be and 
we must leave our representatives in the Washington talks to ascertain what part the 
Canadians are likely to play and the extent to which they may be able to take any 
initiative in the matter. 
European interest in the sterling balances 
38. Mention should perhaps be made of the fact that some attention is being paid 
to the sterling balances in connection with possible financial and economic 
developments in Europe. It is widely realised that no European currency union with 
United Kingdom participation is possible without a solution of the problem. Thus, in 
comments (from a private but influential Belgian source, confidentially given to us) 
on possible schemes for monetary union, it is hoped to encourage United Kingdom 
participation therein, and the convertibility of sterling, by suggesting way[s] of 
relieving us of the burden of the sterling balances. Such relief to us would also 
reassure European sponsors of schemes for monetary union who feel that the 
sterling balances represent a threat to the stability of sterling. 
The actual proposal referred to is that one-third of the balances should be 
cancelled by the owners, liability for another third taken over by the United States 
and liability for the remaining third shared between the countries forming the 
monetary union. How the last third would be dealt with in practice is not clear. 
Would the owners of the balances be expected to sell their sterling to the several 
European countries and receive in return the currencies of the latter? And would the 
new currency holdings be blocked and their rate of conversion into goods and 
services be subject to negotiations with the European Governments? And to which of 
the present sterling balances would the scheme apply: cf. Australia? Whatever the 
answers to these questions, it is difficult to believe that the holders of the sterling 
balances would be at all attracted by the substitution of other European debtors for 
His Majesty's Government. 
Since the above proposal has as yet received no sort of official sponsorship or 
recognition in any European quarter, it is premature to consider it further in this 
report. 
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Appendix Ill to 95 [Extract] 
I. Trends since the war 
B. Sterling Area 
. . . 2. Australia 
Since the end of the war the general trend of Australian sterling balances has been 
upwards, although in the immediate post-war years it was to some extent masked by 
large and non-recurrent capital payments. Early in 1947 discussions with Australia 
on overall financial policy took place in London, and the Australian Government 
were made aware of His Majesty's Government's desire that the balances would 
remain at or about their then level. In September 1947 Australia undertook that her 
sterling holdings would not during the then current financial year be depleted except 
for agreed debt repatriations. Since then, however, the Commonwealth has had a 
strongly favourable balance of trade, due to high production of, and high prices for, 
primary products and, in addition, a considerable capital inflow estimated at 140 
during 1947 and 1948. The drawing down of the pre-1947 balances has not therefore 
been in question and no formal blocking arrangements have been necessary. 
3. Burma 
No formal blocking of Burma's sterling holdings has been attempted, but, under the 
informal agreement of April 1947, she undertook to limit her drawings on her 
balances as at that time to 4 over the five years to April 1952. A balance of 34 was 
therefore not available for expenditure, but it was not segregated. Balances at the end 
of 1948 were relatively unchanged at 38, although there had been pronounced 
seasonal swings. Since then they have risen to 50 in August 1949, but this must be 
regarded as in some ways artificial, for most unexpectedly Burma has been enabled to 
maintain the current season's rice export programme following the recovery of heavy 
stocks from the rebel area, although her imports have fallen away substantially 
owing to internal disturbances. 
In practice, therefore, the rather loose blocking arrangement has not been put to 
the test since contrary to expectations Burma's sterling balances have risen. 
4. Ceylon 
Ceylon became a Dominion in February 1948. Until that date her balances were not 
subject to control, but the Government were advised, as were other Colonial 
Governments, of the policy His Majesty's Government wished to be applied. An 
adverse balance in the immediate post-war years, due in part to a worsening of her 
terms of trade and also to some capital outflow, reduced the balances from 81 in 1945 
to 45 in April 1948, at which date they were segregated in No. 2 Accounts following 
formal negotiations. From these balances have been released in successive negotia-
tions 16.25 up to the end of June 1950. Six are held in funded Government loans. 
Ceylon's Indian rupee assets at present are subject to the same control as are her 
sterling balances. Throughout the period of the Agreement Ceylon has lived within 
the agreed releases and has proved not unco-operative. 
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5. Eire 
Technically and politically Eire is a special case. Nearly 75 per cent. of the balances 
are with banks and private individuals and formal control, though technically 
possible, would have presented formidable political difficulties. The balances were 
depleted in the three post-war years by 28 (from a peak of 203) due to an adverse 
balance on current account. Since the middle of 1948 increased receipts under the 
Trade Agreement of July 1948, E.R.P. aid and some internal deflation have reversed 
the trend and the balances are tending to increase. 
6. India 
India with peak balances of some 1,300 presented the major sterling balance 
problem. Preliminary discussions in Delhi in February 1947 emphasised the political 
impossibility of securing cancellation by agreement but cleared the ground for more 
formal negotiations in July of that year as a result of which the remaining 1,160 
balances of the Reserve Bank of India were segregated in No. 2 Account and releases 
to No. 1 Account agreed to cover the remaining half-year. A table of releases agreed 
during this and subsequent agreement periods is opposite. The pre-blocking decline 
in the balances had been occasioned by some non-recurrent capital transactions and 
a combination of political and economic uncertainties which resulted in a capital 
outflow and serious adverse balance on current account. During the period from 
August 1947 to June 1948, the trend was reversed; some capital outflow financed 
through No. 2 Account continued though at a reduced rate and No. 1 Account 
balances rose to 80. This was achieved by severe import restrictions which were no 
doubt a contributory factor to the increased inflation which followed . In June 1948, 
partly at His Majesty's Government's request, import licensing was relaxed. The 
pent-up demand for consumer goods was underestimated and the effects of the 
liberalisation of import licensing became apparent towards the end of 1948 and early 
1949 when, although no releases had been envisaged prior to June 1949, His 
Majesty's Government agreed to ad hoc transfers from No. 2 Account to maintain No. 
1 Account balances at a minimum safety level. Releases of 81 were made up to end 
June 1949 to allow of a gradual tapering off of outstanding licences and similar 
provisions were embodied in the Agreement concluded in the following August. In 
July and August transfers from No. 2 Account totalled 33, the current increase in 
balances possibly reflecting seasonal movements. 
Even allowing for the fact that somewhat under half of the total releases is due to 
the non-recurrent pensions and war stores arrangements, the conclusion is that the 
blocking arrangements have been ineffective for, in the result, India has been 
allowed to withdraw from No. 2 Account as much as she needed for her current 
purposes. She has, however, become alarmed at the rate at which her balances are 
being consumed. 
India's treatment during these four years cannot be understood without reference 
to the political and constitutional developments during that period. India emerged 
from an exhausting war with her economy distorted by inflation and her administra-
tive machine weakened. Rehabilitation was delayed at first by political tension before 
her attainment of independence. Nationalism was rampant and contributed to a 
serious fall in business confidence. Partition threw further strains on, and further 
weakened, the administration. It provoked communal strife and resulted in the 
severance from the new Dominion of some of the richest agricultural lands thereby 
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increasing her dependence on imported food, and the separation from her basic 
industries of the bulk of their raw materials. It also aggravated the dollar drain. The 
existence of good relations between the two new Dominions would have eased their 
problems and ours, but this has unhappily not been possible. Mutual fear and 
distrust have aggravated the difficulties and created new ones in the shape of 
commercial friction and heavy defence expenditure. 
Undivided India 
Blocked at 14th August, 1947 
Date of 
Agreement 
14th Aug., 1947 
Dominion of India 
15th Feb., 1948 
9th July, 1948 
1st Aug., 1949 
(a) Conditional on need. 
Period 
Covered 
14th Aug., 1947-
31st Dec., 1947 
1st Jan., 1948---
30th June, 1948 
1st July, 1948---
30th June, 1949 
1st July, 1949-
30th June, 1950 
1st July, 1950-
30th June, 1951 
1,160 
Releases 
Working Balance 
and General 
65 
18 
81 
llO(a) 
SO(a) 
324 
605 
Special 
Purposes Net 
18 
15 
248(b) 
281 
(b) Purchase of sterling pensions annuity 168 plus purchase of war stores less Defence 
Expenditure Plan 54. 
7. Iraq 
Cancellation, or scaling down, of the Iraqi balances was not seriously considered, 
partly on account of their size and also because the bulk constituted cover for the 
note issue. His Majesty's Government reserved their position on this. A long-term 
agreement was concluded in August 1947 to operate until July 1952. Sterling 
balances (58) of banks and Currency Board in Iraq were blocked but provision was 
made for a general release of 15 over the five years on the basis of 4 for each of the 
first two years and 7 to cover the remaining three, together with a working balance of 
2 and a special release of 5. Provision was also made for a release of 4.3 in respect of 
repayment by the Iraq Government of sums due to the Iraq Petroleum Company and 
to His Majesty's Government on account of the Port of Basra. In addition a further 
9.5 has been released in respect of clauses of the Agreement in which no amounts 
were specified. 
Iraq has been progressively drawing on her sterling balances to finance the 
chronic deficit in her balance of payments and her No. 1 Account balances have run 
down to a relatively low level. A stricter control of imports has been introduced and 
requests have been made for further releases from blocked account. 
Blocking has, therefore, been successful to a certain degree in limiting Iraq's 
demands on United Kingdom resources. 
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8. New Zealand 
Since the end of the war New Zealand sterling balances have remained relatively 
stable apart from agreed debt redemptions and some relatively small net drawing 
down of which His Majesty's Government has had foreknowledge . The degree of 
co-operation shown by New Zealand in financial matters has been such as to make 
unnecessary any formal blocking. Current expenditure is closely related to current 
receipts. 
9. Pakistan 
Pakistan's share of the sterling assets of undivided India are determined by the 
Pakistan (Monetary and Reserve Bank) Order. Under this Order, 140 has so far been 
allocated to her by India and, since after partition the Financial Agreement of 14th 
August, 1947, became equally binding on both Dominions, the bulk of these assets 
have gone to No. 2 Account. After 1st January, 1948, the decision to operate separate 
foreign exchange accounts has necessitated separate negotiations with Pakistan for 
the renewal from time to time of the Financial Agreement. Cancellation, which had 
proved impossible before the balances were divided could hardly be raised with 
Pakistan without being raised simultaneously with India. A statement of releases 
agreed in this and subsequent negotiations is below. 
Until the end of 1948, licensing restrictions and better than average receipts for 
her primary produce combined to build up the No. 1 Account to the relatively high 
level of 40. Relaxation of import licensing in mid-1948 and relatively heavy 
expenditure on defence and development requirements was reflected early in 1949 in 
an adverse balance on current account and a rapid depletion of No. 1 Account 
balances which were reduced to 7 at the end of June. The trend has not yet been 
reversed. 
Pakistan 
Date of 
Agreement 
21st Feb., 1948 
14th July, 1948 
5th Aug., 1949 
Period 
Covered 
1st Jan., 1948---
30th June, 1948 
1st July, 1948---
30th June, 1949 
1st July, 1949-
30th June, 1950 
1st July, 1950-
30th June, 1951 
* Agreed minimum release. 
10. South Africa 
Releases 
Working Balance 
and General 
Special 
Purposes Net 
16 
5 
12 
5* 
38 
49 
1 
5 
5 
11 
South Africa has not since 1931 held sterling by statute or custom, preferring to keep 
her reserves in gold. Balances accumulated up to the end of the War had resulted 
from gold sales to the United Kingdom (under various agreements with the Bank of 
England) which made it impossible for His Majesty's Government to take any action 
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for formal control. During 1947 and 1948 there was a very large capital flow to South 
Africa which had been reversed by mid-1949 but now shows some signs of 
resumption. Under present arrangements both Governments have undertaken to 
consult together with a view to controlling undesirable capital movements if the 
need arises. 
11. The colonies (excluding Palestine and Ceylon) 
Sterling balances in the Colonies are the accumulated holdings of some 50 territories 
in varying degrees of economic and constitutional development, for whom His 
Majesty's Government is in the position of trustee. Total assets amounted to 563 at 
the end of the war (of which Hong Kong 36, dealt with under Far East) and increased 
to 620 in June 1947 and 675 at end August 1949, the main factors in the increase 
being high and rising prices for Colonial primary produce and restriction of current 
consumption. 
The assets can be divided into five broad categories:-
Currency Reserve 
Non-disposable (pension funds, &c.) 
Disposable 
Commercial bank 
Loans to His Majesty's Government 
Percentages 
in August 1949 
37 
25 
9 
26 
3 
How to deal with the Colonial balances poses a contradictory problem, for on the one 
hand there is the general need to restrict the calls on United Kingdom production by 
the expenditure of the wartime accumulations of sterling and, on the other, His 
Majesty's Government's undertakings and obligations, which in effect add to these 
accumulations by the operation of the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. After 
prolonged consideration, it was decided that any form of blocking was undesirable if 
indeed it were practicable. Various other ways of dealing with the balances were 
considered, inter alia:-
(a) Interest-free loans to His Majesty's Government. 
(b) Cancellation. 
(c) Fiduciary issues and utilisation of funds so released for development purposes. 
(d) Local loans. 
All these expedients are open to objection, the chief of which is that the funds are 
already very largely under control, i.e., committed to specific liabilities (currency 
reserves, pensions, sinking funds, &c.). Further, the application of any of these 
measures would involve negotiations with some fifty local Governments and 
whatever the outcome His Majesty's Government would be placed in the invidious 
position of "sitting on both sides of the table." Apart from this, as mentioned, 
Colonial Development and Welfare Acts commit His Majesty's Government to a large 
programme of social and economic development which could hardly fail to augment 
colonial balances .... 
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11. Future prospects regarding sterling balances 
40. General 
The future trend of sterling balances is difficult to forecast clearly and it may prove 
misleading to attempt to assess the degree of danger, if any, to the United Kingdom's 
economy that is inherent in any particular country's sterling balance. Every £ 
sterling held abroad is a United Kingdom liability and a potential call on United 
Kingdom resources: but the call will differ from country to country both in amount 
and speed. 
The following detailed analysis of the probable position in the future of the sterling 
balances of the whole world is therefore based on the degree of pressure on the 
United Kingdom economy which is likely to result from the accumulation and 
liquidation of large and small balances alike. The analysis is thus based on qualitative 
rather than quantitative considerations and the difficulties which are anticipated in 
negotiations with certain countries. The effects of devaluation have also been 
estimated as far as possible although these are not yet by any means clear. 
No distinction has been made between Sterling Area holdings of sterling and those 
held by other countries since all countries wish to be able to spend their sterling but 
the amount varies greatly from country to country. In order to emphasise the special 
danger in the case of certain countries these are placed in the first category. There 
follows a second category of cases in which it is thought that the future position is 
less serious-a probable gradual drain on United Kingdom resources, but changed 
circumstances, for example a bad season in Australia, or a cumulative exercise of 
purchasing power in the Colonies, would radically change the picture for these two 
areas. 
In a third category are those countries, the nature and size of whose balances are 
unlikely to give rise to difficulties. 
Category 1 
Argentina 
Belgium 
Egypt 
Germany 
India 
Iran 
Italy 
Japan 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Switzerland 
.. . 45. India 
Category 2 
Australia 
Bolivia 
Burma 
Ceylon 
China and Hong Kong 
Colonies 
Denmark 
Eire 
Iraq 
Israel 
Jordan 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
South Africa 
Sweden 
Thailand 
Category 3 
Austria 
Brazil 
Chile 
Ethiopia 
Finland 
France 
Greece 
Iceland 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Paraguay 
Spain 
Sudan 
Syria 
Turkey 
U.S.S.R. and Satellites 
Uruguay 
Indian sterling balances at 594 are now only 225 (four years' expenditure at the 
present rate) in excess of the statutory minimum, and during the recent negotiations 
there were indications that the Indians themselves were concerned at the over-rapid 
K 
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depletion of their reserves. Prior to devaluation it would have been reasonable to 
assume that Indian net expenditure would be limited to the Agreement rate of 50 a 
year (excluding tapering off) or even to a lower rate. But the fact that Pakistan has 
not devalued, with the many resultant economic difficulties between the two 
countries, has introduced an element of considerable uncertainty. Indian receipts 
from jute and cotton exports must suffer as a result of the deadlock between India 
and Pakistan over devaluation and the longer this position continues the greater will 
be the risk of India's deficit exceeding during the current year the worst estimate of 
110. 
In the longer term, assuming that some solution can be found to the present 
Indo-Pakistan deadlock, India is trying to cut expenditure by the Central and 
Provincial Governments on capital expenditure and is likely to strive to decrease the 
present net deficit on current account and, given reasonably favourable conditions 
(e.g., some success in the food production drive) she may achieve this. It is 
questionable, however, whether the degree of industrialisation and development 
envisaged by India could be achieved within a balance of payments, acceptable to us 
and indeed within their means, unless non-sterling sources can be heavily tapped for 
capital requirements. In the short run India will no doubt continue to make heavy 
imports of food grains .... 
49. Pakistan 
Having regard to the development problems with which Pakistan is faced and to the 
general attitude of the Pakistanis at the recent negotiations, we should have expected 
Pakistan prior to the devaluation of sterling to spend her releases up to the hilt and 
to press in each subsequent negotiation for increased releases, in any case not less 
favourable than those agreed upon with India. Pakistan's decision not to devalue may 
affect the position. To the extent that there is a capital outflow (and there is some 
indication of this) the pressure for further releases will be accelerated. Pakistan, like 
India though perhaps not to the same degree, will be adversely affected by the 
deadlock over devaluation. Since she is in a near-monopoly position as regards jute 
and as a major producer of another commodity, cotton, in short supply in the 
non-dollar area, Pakistan should have little difficulty in finding a market for her 
staple primary products at about the current level: she may, indeed, succeed in 
forcing the sterling price of jute to near the new dollar parity. Whatever her receipts 
(we should expect them to be at least at the current level whether or not India buys 
from her), itis clear that Pakistan will spend them to the full. Although the scale of 
Pakistan's spending from accumulated balances will be relatively low, in many 
respects she must be regarded as a more difficult problem than India for us to handle 
and potentially capable of greater disturbance to Sterling Area relationships 
generally. If India carries out her threat to suspend the Monetary Agreement the 
Pakistan rupee will fluctuate freely in the Bombay market. The Pakistan situation 
will undoubtedly be affected if the Bombay quotation reflects a substantial discount 
of the Pakistan rupee below the official rate .. .. 
57. The colonies 
The future of Colonial balances is at the moment obscure and is dependent on a 
number of unpredictable and conflicting factors. On the one hand, there are a 
number of reasons contributing to their rise: for example, the higher level of sterling 
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prices of primary commodities, the possibility of increased sales and the acceleration 
of capital investment, both United Kingdom and United States. On the other hand, 
there is still a strong demand for imports. 
It is more than probable that the first result of devaluation will be a net increase, 
subject to fluctuations, with possibly a downward tendency later. Although part of 
the balances are committed for specific liabilities, such as pension funds, there is a 
large amount that might be spent. The most important control of Colonial 
expenditure lies in the supervision of Colonial hard-currency expenditure, and this, 
in effect, acts as a brake on drawings on sterling balances. 
To the best of their ability the Colonies have co-operated in His Majesty's 
Government's overall financial policy. They were asked in 1947 to maintain sterling 
balances. That they have been rather more than successful is shown by the upward 
tendency of sterling holdings since then. It is never wise, however, to generalise 
about territories, the conditions of which are so different, and the fact remains that 
collectively they command large free sterling balances .... 
96 CAB 129/38, CP(50)18 22 Feb 1950 
'The Colombo Conference': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Bevin 
I circulate herewith, for the information of my colleagues, a summary of proceedings 
at the Commonwealth Meeting on Foreign Affairs at Colombo. The summary has 
been drawn up in consultation with the Commonwealth Relations Office. 
The purpose of the Colombo meeting was to enable the countries of the 
Commonwealth to exchange views on foreign affairs at the Ministerial level. This 
purpose was achieved; and, in addition, Ministers agreed to make certain recom-
mendations to governments on economic development in South and South-East 
Asia, and on preliminary work to be undertaken in regard to a peace treaty with 
Japan. The Meeting at Colombo had however an added significance by virtue of the 
fact that it was the first of its kind to be held in Asia, and there can be no doubt that it 
demonstrated to a heartening degree the extent of co-operation which can be 
developed between East and West through the agency of the Commonwealth. I 
consider that the results of the Meeting amply justified the decision to hold it, and 
that the way has been paved for further meetings as occasion requires. 
There was a general realisation amongst Commonwealth Ministers that world 
problems are indivisible and that the problems of South and South-East Asia are of 
particular urgency. There was also a remarkable unanimity of view as to the menace 
of Communism and as to the necessity of improving the standard of life and the 
social welfare of the peoples of South and South-East Asia in order to combat this 
menace. 
The arrangements made by the Government of Ceylon for the accommodation, 
welfare and entertainment of visiting Commonwealth Delegations were wholly 
admirable. The Government of Ceylon were generous in the extreme and throughout 
the Meeting were clearly anxious that Commonwealth Delegations should leave 
Ceylon with the best possible impression of their stay in the country. The amount of 
entertainment offered was perhaps excessive, but was evidence of the general 
goodwill towards visiting Delegations, which was heartily reciprocated. 
The Conference Secretariat, by arrangement, was provided jointly by the United 
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Kingdom and Ceylon. This was a novel and interesting experiment; and it was 
gratifying to find that such a Joint Secretariat could work so smoothly and 
efficiently. The United Kingdom High Commissioner and his staff were of the 
greatest assistance to the United Kingdom Delegation. 
Certain action remains to be taken on matters raised at Colombo, in particular 
with regard to economic development in South-East Asia, to the Working Party for a 
Japanese Peace Treaty and to assistance to Burma. Separate memoranda will be 
circulated in due course on these subjects. 
97 CAB 134/225, EPC(50)40 22 Mar 1950 
'Sterling balances and South-East Asia': joint memorandum for 
Cabinet Economic Policy Committee by the Working Parties on the 
Sterling Area and on Development in South and South-East Asia (18 
Mar 1950). Annexes: A and B 
1. This paper sets out for consideration an outline of policy for dealing with the 
two closely related problems of the sterling balances and development in South and 
South-East Asia. The factual background of these two problems was described in 
E.P.C. (49) 1371 and E.P.C. (49) 152 respectively; this paper suggests a line along 
which a solution may be found as a basis for preliminary discussion with the United 
States and with Commonwealth countries. 
2. Both aspects of this problem are urgent. While sterling balances of the present 
size remain outstanding throughout the world they represent a continuous threat to 
sterling and their repayment is a weighty burden on our economy which intensifies 
the inflationary pressure. Meanwhile, in South and South-East Asia the Communist 
threat is growing apace, and can be countered only by a constructive policy which 
will offer hope of economic advance for the peoples of this region; the Communist 
threat in this area is of vital importance to us, both politically and economically; 
Malaya is our largest single dollar earner and supplies from this whole area are of 
cardinal importance to our economy and those of Western Europe. As a result of the 
Colombo conference, arrangements are being made for Commonwealth discussions 
of South and South-East Asian development at Canberra in the second half of May. 
The Americans are pressing us urgently for our views both on sterling balances and 
on South and South-East Asian development, for they regard both of these problems 
as being of first-class importance. The sooner we act the better, for if we delay 
American thought will crystallize, perhaps along lines unsatisfactory to us. 
3. The problems are linked together for the following reason. Of the total sterling 
balances of £3,267 million, £1,185 million are in respect of India, Australia, 
Pakistan, Ceylon and New Zealand. The sterling balances represent not only the 
external reserves of these countries but also the funds upon which they rely for 
carrying out their programmes of development. If their drawings upon their sterling 
balances are reduced to a level which we can afford, India, Pakistan and Ceylon in 
particular will be unable to maintain, far less increase, their present rate of 
development; India has already had to cut back her development programme very 
1 See 95. 
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sharply. There is, therefore, no prospect of a satisfactory settlement of the sterling 
balance problem consistent with a continuous economic development in South and 
South East Asia unless new money can be found for development (or for settlement 
of the sterling balances) from the United States. On the other hand, if assistance can 
be found from the United States, it can serve a valuable dual purpose-it can both 
contribute to settlement of the sterling balances and enable development to proceed. 
4. At the same time the problems cannot be treated as identical. The sterling 
balance problem extends far beyond the boundaries of South and South-East Asia; 
the sterling holdings of Egypt and of certain European countries affect the position 
of sterling at least as much-though in a rather different way-as those of India or 
Australia. (The difference is, in fact, that between (i) and (ii) in paragraph 6 below). 
In the development of South and South-East Asia, Indonesia, Burma, Indo-China 
and Siam are as important as the Commonwealth countries-and indeed are nearer 
the front line in the Communist attack. 
5. The two problems cannot therefore be treated as one; but a self-consistent 
solution has to be found for both. Moreover, an American assistance scheme will 
have to deal with both problems in one scheme of assistance, for it is clearly out of 
the question for there to be two separate schemes for United States assistance with 
certain countries (e.g. India and Australia) receiving assistance under two different 
heads. 
I. Sterling balance settlement 
6. In seeking a settlement of the sterling balances, we are dealing with two major 
dangers to sterling and to our economy:-
(i) The existence of large sterling balances, available for spending outside our 
control, is an ever-present threat to sterling. The balances played a large part in 
the events of 1949 in that their existence contributed heavily-and still 
contributes-to the lack of confidence in sterling. While our affairs are going well, 
this is not directly damaging, but as soon as we suffer a set-back, our weakness is 
at once intensified. Our vulnerability to fluctuations in the world economy-
resulting from our wholly inadequate reserves-is our worst weakness, and the 
sterling balances greatly intensify it. 
(ii) The existence of large sterling balances represents a potential direct drain 
upon our economic resources-so-called "unrequited exports". If e.g. India is able 
to run a deficit on her balance of payments by drawing down her sterling balances, 
this is a charge on our economy, and contributes to our present inflationary 
difficulties. In 1948--49, the rest of the sterling area ran an overall deficit of £320 
millions, and in 1949- 50 the deficit will be well over £200 millions. It is only 
because we are receiving Marshall aid that we can support such a burden. 
7. The "sterling balances" are a wide range of overseas holdings of sterling and 
sterling securities-bank balances in London held by Central Banks, balances held 
by overseas commercial banks and private individuals, sundry war-time loans to His 
Majesty's Government, the funds of Colonial currency boards and Crown Agents, etc. 
Much of them-probably well over one-half-represent the monetary reserves of the 
Colonies and the normal world-wide working balances held in sterling which are a 
natural part of the sterling trading and financial system. The composition of balances 
differs from country to country; the present arrangements, by which some of the 
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balances are more or less "blocked", vary widely; some positions are more dangerous 
than others, and for different reasons. The "sterling balances" cannot be treated 
uniformly; but each holder attaches great importance to what happens to others. 
8. The distribution is shown in Annex A. Among Commonwealth countries, we 
consider that action requires to be taken with India, Australia, Pakistan, Ceylon; we 
do not recommend action in respect of the Colonies partly because their sterling 
funds are already under close control, and partly because we are already giving large 
financial assistance to the Colonies, and it would not make sense to take from them 
with one hand while giving with the other. (A fuller note on the position of the 
Colonies is given in Annex B.) New Zealand's balances do not create difficulty and 
South Africa's present a special problem. Outside the Commonwealth, the biggest 
problem is presented by Egypt; the Irish Republic is a source of danger, but 
technically we cannot yet see any means of dealing with it; other important holders 
are Italy, Sweden, France, Israel, Iraq, Brazil. The European balances involve special 
features. Their treatment will depend in the first instance on the outcome of present 
discussions about a European Payments Union. If the outcome of those discussions 
provides no solution of the problem of the balances, it will have to be considered in 
the light of the circumstances then arising, which we cannot now forecast. But, 
whatever the course of events in Europe, it will be advisable to deal first with the 
Commonwealth. 
9. Any settlement would be a combination of any or all of the following elements: 
(i) Cancellation of some balances outright (if possible). 
(ii) Funding of some (i.e. an arrangement by which part of the balances are paid 
off in equal annual instalments, over a specified number of years) . 
(iii) Release or partial blocking of the rest (i.e. agreeing how much of the rest the 
holder should be allowed to use freely now, and under what circumstances she 
should be allowed to ask for the release of any of the remainder). 
Possible settlements with the principal countries concerned are being worked out. 
They involve examination of their balance of payments, their needs for monetary 
reserves, working balances, etc. Provisional estimates of how a funding operation 
might be applied to certain individual countries are given in Annex C.2 
10. We presume that on general grounds of policy, the general imposition of an 
enforced settlement by us is ruled out. This does not rule out the possibility of an 
enforced settlement if individual countries refuse a voluntary one. But we must try a 
voluntary settlement, which will appear fair to world opinion. 
11. Without the injection of United States assistance, we can see no hope of 
securing the voluntary cancellation or funding of such a large part of the balances 
that the amount left free was a pure working balance, and that the demand upon our 
resources was thus limited to the annual instalments of repayment of the funded 
debt. It should, however, be possible to get some fundings; the amount would vary 
from country to country, and would partly depend upon the amount of interest we 
were prepared to offer. In order to get as much as possible of the most dangerous part 
of the balances funded, it would be worth-while to pay a reasonable rate of interest on 
the funded part; this element would become a defined liability which we could repay 
year by year and for the repayment of which we could plan; at the present time, even 
2 Not printed. 
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where balances are blocked by administrative agreement, they are a continuous 
source of anxiety because we shall always be under pressure from their holders to 
release them-and it is often politically impossible to refuse. The holders would 
husband their free resources more carefully- and thereby reduce the immediate 
burden on us-if they did not have at their disposal the possibility of pressing us to 
release blocked balances when the free balances are used up. Even a limited funding 
operation would be well worth-while, provided, of course, that we do not give them 
more free money now as a quid pro quo. 
12. With U.S. assistance for the countries concerned, we could go farther. If they 
received outright grants from U.S.A., for development or otherwise, it would not be 
unreasonable for the U.S. to make them cancel sterling balances in some fixed 
proportion to the grant; any form of United States assistance would help to meet 
their balance of payments deficits and should reduce their anxiety to draw upon their 
sterling balances now, and they would thus be able to afford to fund a larger part of 
their balances. 
That would mean that a balance-holding country would have available to 
spend-(a) the dollar aid; (b) the annual instalments of the funded portion of the 
balances; and (c) such part of the balances as we left completely free under paragraph 
9 (iii), although, in fact, it would not be able to spend all this amount because some 
would have to be retained as monetary reserves and working balances. 
13. But United States assistance is a long way ahead; it could not be voted until 
1951; we do not know what strings would be attached; it is most unlikely that the 
Americans would be willing to assist certain of the countries, (e.g. Egypt and 
probably Australia). If we make a sterling balance scheme wholly dependent upon 
United States aid for the recipients, we can do nothing effective in 1950 (laying 
ourselves open to loss of confidence and a repetition of 1949 if the United States 
economy lurches again); we create great uncertainty among sterling balance holders 
about our and the Americans' intentions- and we may lead them to fear that they 
will be subject to violent Anglo-American pressure, and thus to try to get rid of their 
sterling first, making the whole situation much worse. 
14. We therefore recommend that we should tackle the problem in two stages: 
(i) A limited funding scheme as quickly as possible independently of United States 
assistance, starting with the Commonwealth countries and then working outwards 
to others. 
(ii) If United States assistance becomes available, for development or otherwise, 
linking it with the sterling balance scheme, so that a recipient of United States aid 
would have to cancel part of the funded debt and/or fund a larger proportion of its 
balances. 
11. South and South East Asia development 
15. From what has gone before, it is apparent that (except in the Colonial 
territories) we cannot afford to play any significant part in the financing of 
accelerated development in South and South-East Asia. The assistance which we 
have given to India, Pakistan and Ceylon by permitting them to use their sterling 
balances has contributed greatly to their economies since they became independent, 
but at a greater cost to ourselves than we can afford to continue to pay. Thus, far 
from being able to do more to assist development in this region, we cannot do as 
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much as we have done in the recent past. The other Commonwealth countries in the 
region are likewise unable to contribute financial help; Australia, indeed, has large 
ideas of development herself and relies upon substantial private investment from the 
United Kingdom in order to carry it out, and is looking for United States help too. 
Incidentally, we must beware of Australia (or any other Sterling Area country) 
offering a sterling contribution to investment in development; in terms of the 
economic burden involved, she can only turn her sterling into goods and services at 
our expense. (For instance, if Australia gives or lends £1,000,000 to Indonesia to buy 
U.K. plant for electrical generating stations, the supply of that plant involves 
demands for labour and materials in the U.K. in precisely the same way as if India 
were buying it and paying for it, not by exports to us, but by drawing down her 
sterling balances.) 
16. The course of economic development in this region therefore depends upon 
United States assistance. Without it, there is no hope for the non-Commonwealth 
countries-Burma, Indonesia, Indo-China and Siam- and the Commonwealth 
countries would probably have to do less economic development than they are doing 
now, rather than more. 
17. As explained above, both from the political point of view and from the 
economic point of view, it is highly necessary- and indeed urgent-that economic 
development throughout this region should proceed as fast as possible. There is no 
other way to provide hope for these peoples. 
18. In the middle of May, the Consultative Committee which was set up at 
Colombo will meet at Canberra. It is important that the meeting should be 
successful, not only on the merits of the problem before it, but also to show the 
reality and strength of the Commonwealth in that part of the world, and its ability to 
take the initiative and play a positive part in the solution of major problems. 
19. There is much to be gained from an imaginative approach to the problem, 
provided that we set about it in a practical and realistic way. The condition of success 
must be United States assistance, for the scale of the problem is so great that 
economic aid given piecemeal in the sort of quantities which we can offer does not 
scratch the surface of the task of raising the productivity-and thus the standard of 
living-of 500 million people. 
20. This suggests that the right line of approach is to concentrate upon the major 
task, which is to present a realistic development programme, showing the extent of 
U.S. assistance which is needed to supplement the resources otherwise available to 
carry it out, and the positive benefits which would be derived from such assistance. 
In addition to the long-term development, it is necessary also to consider the money 
and supplies which are needed to maintain political and economic stability, but we 
consider that the latter should be included in a very wide concept of "development", 
both because of the greater political appeal of development, and also to avoid the 
danger of having the idea of development associated exclusively with spectacular 
"projects"-a danger which would greatly reduce the amount of United States 
assistance, for such "projects" are not large in terms of United States finance, and are 
very slow to set in motion. This approach may well make it difficult to cover under 
the programme the immediate quasi-military needs of territories such as Indo-China 
where governments at present exercise no effective control over their territories. 
Their development needs would be covered by the programme, if and when their 
governments required control of their economies. Meanwhile, their immediate needs 
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are in any case so urgent that the only way of meeting them in time would be by 
some emergency aid such as was rendered by the U.S. to Greece, Turkey and France 
before the E.R.P. programme was launched. 
21. If the other Commonwealth countries agree, the preparation of the program-
me will start at Canberra on a Commonwealth basis; we should hope to keep it 
centred in the Commonwealth, while associating other countries in the area with it. 
We consider that it would be wrong to set up an "Asiatic O.E.E.C."-in which, 
indeed, the United Kingdom as such would have no locus standi at all. We consider 
that it would also be inexpedient to run a development programme on an 
"Anglo-American" basis, for this would lead to a division of interest between "West" 
and "East", which it is our purpose to avoid. If we can start with a Commonwealth 
organisation and initiative, and then associate others with it, we can hope both to 
secure an effective position for ourselves, helping both the Americans and the Asians 
and to build up an effective working system. 
22. We recommend, therefore, that our general policy on the problem of South 
and South-East Asia development should be:-
(i) That, at Canberra (following the Colombo resolution-see Annex A C.P.(50)18) 
we seek to begin the preparation of a development programme for the Common-
wealth countries in the region, to prepare the way for-
(ii) A submission to the United States for assistance in carrying out this 
programme, and 
(iii) That, at Canberra, a decision should be sought to invite other countries in the 
region, i.e. Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia and Siam to co-operate with the 
Commonwealth in making a submission to the United States. 
(iv) That any scheme agreed at Canberra should be coordinated with the 
Technical Assistance Programme being prepared by the United Nations Organisa-
tion and its specialised agencies; 
(v) That we should go ahead with the work on the Commonwealth programme 
irrespective of whether the other countries join in. 
(vi) That we should seek to keep the initiative in the Commonwealth, and should 
not set up a new Asiatic organisation on the one hand or seek an Anglo-American 
organisation on the other. 
23. The question whether the Colonial territories in the area should be included 
in the scheme or treated separately requires further consideration. As regards other 
Colonial territories (and those in the South-East Asia area if it is decided to treat 
them separately) it must be remembered that if we embark upon this Common-
wealth enterprise in South and South-East Asia, leading possibly to United States 
assistance, the Colonies will require to be assured that the United Kingdom will 
continue to provide any necessary assistance to their development. 
Ill. The role of United States assistance 
24. United States assistance is essential for development and it is also essential 
for a settlement of the sterling balances. We would envisage United States assistance 
being granted primarily for development, with an associated condition requiring 
sterling balance holders to make adjustments related to the amount of United States 
assistance they receive. 
25. Although United States assistance is crucial, the quantities involved are not 
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large compared with the amounts of foreign aid voted by the United States Congress 
in recent years. Since the end of the war, the United States has given foreign aid to a 
total of about $25,000 million; for 1950/51, the Administration has asked for an 
E.C.A. appropriation of $2,950 million. Without a good deal of examination it is 
difficult to estimate the cost of U.S. assistance to a development programme in S. 
and S.E. Asia, but in the earlier stages it might not exceed $500 million a year, 
although the cost would grow as economic development got under way. In their 
difficult budgetary situation, even $500 million-the equivalent in their Budget to 
about £35 million a year in ours-looms large. We have been warned by State 
Department officials not to expect that large amounts of money will be available for 
this region. On the other hand, as the burden of E.R.P. falls, there will be room for 
new items in their foreign aid budget. There are signs of a growing expectation in 
U.S.A.-shared by Senator Taft-that the U.S.A. will have to give substantial 
post-E.R.P. aid, and if a convincing case can be made in United States interests, there 
is no prima facie reason for ruling out even a substantial programme. 
26. A programme of assistance could readily be justified in the U.S. on three 
heads:-
(i) Resistance to Communism by constructive means; 
(ii) Constructive action to relieve the world dollar shortage, particularly by 
strengthening the dollar-earning economies of South East Asia; 
(iii) As a step towards the strengthening of sterling, and thus of the whole world 
economy. 
27. It may be suggested that the aid should be given to the United Kingdom, thus 
enabling us to make attractive terms for sterling balance settlement and to take the 
lead in South East Asia development (where we are regarded as having more 
know-how). This would be undesirable. If the aid was given to the United Kingdom, it 
would be regarded by public opinion, both in U.S.A. and elsewhere, as yet another 
scheme of help for a bankrupt Britain; we should move farther and farther away from 
independence, and we should probably be subjected to a new series of conditions 
which would be unacceptable. This would be damaging to Anglo-American relations 
and we consider that the aid must be given, if it is given at all, direct to the recipient 
countries. 
28. Strings will be attached to United States assistance to any of these countries. 
United States assistance inevitably means United States administrative and commer-
cial penetration; there is no escape from this, for even the most reasonable measures, 
designed simply to ensure that the United States taxpayers' money is not wasted, 
involve an intimate supervision of the recipients' affairs. We have seen this in 
Europe, and it is inevitable in Asia. In addition to this, there are dangerous 
potentialities which could do our commercial and financial interests much damage. 
This aspect of United States assistance should not be overlooked; but the risks have 
to be faced if these countries are to receive U.S. assistance for their development. 
29. The experience of E.R.P. has shown how the concepts and mechanics of aid 
govern the entire course of events. We are considering the possible ways in which a 
U.S. assistance scheme could be initiated and worked, and we shall report upon this 
later. 
30. On the Congressional time-table, it would be impossible for United States 
assistance to be voted before March 1951. It is therefore appropriate to aim at 
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presenting a report on the Canberra programme to the Americans, making public 
the need for assistance, not later than November 1950 (immediately after the 
Congressional elections). 
IV. Procedure 
31. Both on the sterling balances and on development, we are in a delicate 
position between U.S.A. and the Commonwealth. Before we talk to the sterling 
balance holders about a settlement, we clearly need to know whether our proposals 
make sense to the Americans, but the Indians (and others) made it very plain at 
Colombo that they were highly suspicious of our discussing with the Americans a 
matter which they regard as one for the sterling area and the Commonwealth. We do 
not want to canvass at Canberra the idea of United States assistance for development 
without having some idea of what the Americans are thinking. If we talk to the 
Americans first, we risk creating mistrust in the Commonwealth; if we talk to the 
Commonwealth first, we cannot say anything sensible because it may run completely 
counter to what the United States would be ready to assist. Meanwhile, the 
Americans are pressing us to talk to them both about sterling balances and about 
development. 
32. We consider that the right plan is first to approach the Americans informally 
through the tripartite Talks machinery, but to seek to elucidate their views rather 
than to ask their attitude to a specific plan. We should not attempt to agree upon a 
plan with the Americans either for the sterling balances or for development 
assistance. But we do want to form an idea of how they are thinking. We recommend 
that such exploratory conversations should be held in Washington in the second half 
of April. We shall inform the Commonwealth of our intention. 
33. On sterling balances, the next formal step would be a meeting of Common-
wealth Finance Ministers in London, as early as possible-say late in June. We 
should then outline a plan for the strengthening of sterling, including the partial 
funding of sterling balances as recommended in paragraph 14 (i). If this was 
successful, we could start on other non-Commonwealth countries as necessary 
immediately afterwards. (A question may shortly arise of dealing with Egypt 
separately at an early date). We should of course emphasise that if United States aid 
came, we should try to arrange for the plan to be carried out in a manner which 
would involve further adjustment of sterling balances-but no "sacrifice" to the 
holders, for they would be getting dollar aid-and thus lead to a general strengthen-
ing of sterling. 
34. Meanwhile, on development, the Consultative Committee would meet in 
Canberra in the second half of May, where we should seek to secure decisions as 
recommended in paragraph 22 above. After Canberra, the preparation of program-
mes would proceed in the capitals, and the approach would be made to other South 
East Asia countries. Later in the year-say September-a further conference would 
be held, which would first thrash out the Commonwealth part of the submissions to 
the Americans; when a groundwork had been established, we should hope that the 
Indonesians etc., would be ready to contribute their part to the report. A Ministerial 
meeting would be necessary, say in the second half of October, to approve the report 
for submission to U.S.A. 
35. This is a formidable programme of Commonwealth activity-parallel to 
which would be taking place informal meetings with U.S.A. , possibly with other 
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Commonwealth members present. But it is inevitable if we are going to deal with the 
sterling balances and if we are to make a serious attempt to set South-East Asia 
development moving. 
36. This paper discusses its problems in terms of dollar aid from the United States 
only. The possibility of aid from Canada also should clearly be canvassed. Since the 
important discussions of the prospect of aid will be held through the Tripartite 
consultative machinery in Washington, to which Canada is a party, advantage should 
be taken of that machinery at all stages to encourage Canada to give what aid she 
can. 
V. Conclusion 
37. We accordingly recommend as follows that:-
(i) We seek a two-stage settlement of the sterling balance problem, the first, 
independent of United States aid, by a limited measure of funding, and the second 
involving cancellation as a condition for United States assistance for Development. 
(Paragraph 14). 
(ii) We seek a South and South East Asia development programme on the policy 
indicated in paragraph 22. 
(iii) We do not seek direct United States aid to United Kingdom in connection 
with sterling balances or development (paragraph 27) . 
(iv) Exploratory discussions with the Americans and Canadians be started as soon 
as possible on the lines of paragraph 32 and 36. 
(v) The procedure in paragraphs 33 and 34 be accepted for the time being as a 
general basis of planning. 
Annex A to 97: Distribution of the sterling balances 
31 Dec. 31 Dec. 31 Dec. Change Dec. 1945 
£millions 1945 1947 1949 to Dec. 1949 
I. Sterling Area 
Australia 134 128 358* +224 
New Zealand 86 55 45 -41 
India } 1,311 1,189 { 637* } -580 Pakistan 94* 
Ceylon 81 50 51 -30 
South Africa 72 43 56 -16 
Total-Dominions 1,684 1,465 1,241 * -443 
Colonies (about 90% 
in seven colonies) 563 638 675 +112 
Irish Republic 193 186 208 +15 
Rest 110 96 97 - 13 
Total-Sterling Area 2,548 2,385 2,219* -329 
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Il. Non-Sterling Area 
Egypt 405 358 320 
Palestine 119 100 56 
Argentine 108 158 22 
Europe and Possessions 
(about 20 countries) 423 516 462 
Rest 157 154 187 
Total-Non-Sterling Area 1,212 1,286 1,047 
Ill. Grand Total 3,760 3,671 3,267* 
* Excluding capital value of pensions annuities (India 171; Pakistan 8) 
Annex B to 97: The sterling balances of the colonies 
-85 
-63 
-86 
+39 
+30 
-165 
-493 
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It is recommended, in paragraph 8 of the Paper, that no action should be taken 
regarding the sterling balances of the Colonies on the grounds that their sterling 
funds are already under close control and because we are already committed to 
providing large financial assistance to the Colonies for their development. The latter 
point needs no elaboration except to note that a substantial part of the expendable 
sterling balances of the Colonies are themselves largely committed to the same 
purpose. The question of the control of Colonial sterling balances is, however, 
further examined below. 
2. The structure of Colonial sterling balances is approximately as follows. 
(a) Government budgetary reserves 10% 
(b) Government statutory obligations, e.g. savings 
bank funds, sinking funds, pension funds 26% 
(c) Loans to H.M.G. 3% 
(d) Currency funds 37% 
(e) Commercial banking funds 24% 
Total 100% 
Of the above funds-
(a) together with that part of (c) which is not owed to private investors, is in 
theory freely expendable: in practice it is largely committed to Colonial economic 
and social development in accordance with H.M.G's policy; 
(b) being held against statutory obligations, are not available for any other 
purposes; 
(d) provide that backing for Colonial currencies and thus support the inter-
changeability with sterling of Colonial currencies, on which public confidence in the 
latter rests; 
(b) and (d) which together comprise nearly two-thirds of Colonial sterling balances 
are in fact "tied" and are in no sense expendable by Colonial Governments; 
(e) comprise the assets held in the U.K. of the commercial banks operating in the 
Colonies. The Colonies have, of course, no central banks and the commercial banks 
operating there are, for the most part, branches of the big British banks. Banking in 
the Colonies is therefore almost an integral part of the U.K. banking system and the 
commercial banking funds at (e) are necessary for the full operation of Colonial 
economies which are so closely integrated with that of the U.K. 
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3. It is clear from the above that the "free" balances of the Colonies are an almost 
negligible element in the total and the existence of these balances is not even a 
potential threat to the economic or financial stability of the U.K. It is also apparent 
from the gradual increase in Colonial sterling balances that the Colonies as a whole 
are very far from contributing to the strain on the U.K.'s balance of payments 
position. It may also be noted that owing to the absence of local stock markets in 
Colonies, almost all their investments must be held in the U.K. 
98 CAB 134/224, EPC 11(50)1 28 Mar 1950 
'Sterling balances': Cabinet Economic Policy Committee minutes 
The Committee considered a memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(E. P.C. (50)40) 1 covering a memorandum by officials on the related problems of the 
sterling balances and the economic development of South-East Asia. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that one of the underlying difficulties in 
solving the problem of the sterling balances was their varied nature and origin, since 
they included not only large sums resulting from our wartime expenditure but also a 
considerable volume of funds which other countries needed for their current sterling 
operations. It was doubtful whether, if we aimed solely at restricting the use of the 
balances, a better way could be devised than the present system which had operated 
since 1947 and by which the United Kingdom limited the amounts released to 
different countries in accordance with the economic and political circumstances of 
the time. On the other hand, the general knowledge that such balances existed could 
not fail to affect the strength of sterling as an international currency, and a more 
rapid reduction of the sterling balances would in the long run have a stabilising effect 
which would be of benefit to us. Though the balances had been reduced considerably 
in recent years a large volume of funds was still outstanding, and there had in fact 
been in the case of Australia a considerable new accumulation in recent years as a 
result of the high prices for wool and meat. He recommended, therefore, that a 
systematic attempt should be made to reduce the amount of drawings on these 
balances, and his main proposal was that an approach should be made to the 
Governments concerned to explore the possibility of negotiating a funding operation 
in respect of certain sections of the balances. He suggested that this should cover in 
each case that portion of the balances which was not required for current operations 
or as a currency reserve. He thought that the first step ought to be to hold informal 
discussions with the United States authorities, who were indeed already pressing us 
for the further statement of our views which we had promised in the tripartite 
financial discussions in Washington last September. If the exploratory talks with the 
United States authorities showed that they would favour the lines of policy proposed, 
we should begin bilateral negotiations with the various countries concerned, perhaps 
on a tentative basis with the major creditors in the first place, to see whether they 
were willing to enter into funding arrangements over a reasonable period and at a 
reasonable rate of interest. At a later stage, after the Commonwealth talks on the 
Spender Plan2 for economic assistance to South-East Asia, we might bring the two 
lines of policy into conjunction by proceeding to discussions with the United States 
1 See 97. 2 Mr P C Spender was Australian minister for external affairs since 1949. 
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Government on the question whether they would be prepared, when advancing 
dollar aid to South-East Asia, to link such advances with the gradual cancellation of 
the funded balances of the recipient countries. 
In discussion, the following points were made:-
(a) The proposal to fund part of the sterling balances involved two major 
disadvantages; firstly, it would mean that we should have to pay interest on the 
funded balances at a rate substantially higher than that which we paid at present, and 
our total payments wbuld to that extent be increased. Secondly, if only part of the 
sterling balances were funded, we should be subjected to constant pressure to make 
liberal releases from the unfunded proportion. Unless we could adopt an extremely 
firm attitude towards such claims, we might ultimately find that the funding 
operation had been disadvantageous rather than beneficial. In these circumstances, 
the negotiations should be handled with great caution and, if the response of the 
United States authorities to our preliminary informal approach should be negative or 
discouraging, it would be advisable to review the whole matter before entering into 
discussions with Commonwealth Governments. In any event, it might be preferable 
to aim, not so much at a normal funding operation, as an arrangement for controlled 
releases covering a period of say, twenty years under which the rate of interest might 
be kept down to about 1%. 
(b) It would not be advisable to accept United States aid in the form of loans. It 
would be no advantage to the sterling area generally to replace sterling by dollar 
liabilities. It would also be important to try to avoid the acceptance of conditions 
which might limit the use of any funds provided by the United States Government. 
(c) It was suggested that the memorandum annexed to E.P.C.(50)40 had laid too 
much emphasis on the adverse effects on sterling resulting from the existence of 
large sterling balances, and had over-estimated the advantages of a limited funding 
operation from this point of view. Against this, it was argued that, whatever direct 
advantages might accrue from funding part of the sterling balances, the principal 
gain was likely to be psychological in that this might be expected to have far-reaching 
effects on public opinion in the United States. In any event, it was clear that there 
was no prospect of securing United States aid unless we had first made a constructive 
attempt to lighten the burden of these balances. This could not be ach ieved by 
cancellation, since it was politically impossible for any Commonwealth Government 
to consider such a proposal at this stage. We were therefore compelled to 
contemplate the possibility of funding a proportion of the balances as a preliminary 
to the negotiation of an arrangement under which a measure of cancellation might 
be secured in return for United States aid. 
(d) It might well be found that some Commonwealth Governments would 
welcome a proposal for a limited funding operat ion on the ground that it was not in 
their countries' long-term interests to continue to draw down these balances at the 
present rate. 
(e) A further argument for caution in negotiating funding arrangements for the 
sterling balances was that, if the world economic situation should seriously 
deteriorate during the next few years, the existence of these balances might prove a 
valuable asset in preserving markets for our exports, particularly of engineering 
goods. 
(0 It was argued that, so long as the sterling balances maintained their present 
character, they retained, for the creditor countries, some suggestion of guilt on 
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account of the fact that they had been largely built up during the war. Once they 
were funded, this feeling would no longer persist. 
(g) It was suggested that an attempt should be made to persuade Commonwealth 
Governments to regard part at least of the sterling balances as a form of 
Commonwealth pool which could be used for the development of the under-
developed areas of the Commonwealth. It was not in the general interest that any 
part of the Indian or Pakistan balances should be cancelled, since comparable 
resources would have to be made available to them in any event; but it should be 
possible, for instance, to persuade the Australian Government to write off a 
proportion of their balances by transferring them to a general pool on which India 
and Pakistan could draw. The creation of a Commonwealth pool on these lines would 
provide convincing proof of our determination to find a solution of this problem in a 
form likely to be most acceptable to American opinion and would provide a channel 
by which, at a later stage, United States aid could most easily be made available. 
Against this, it was argued that, whatever effect such a scheme might have on the 
ultimate total of the sterling balances, it would offer no immediate relief to the 
United Kingdom; on the contrary it might well lead to increased claims on United 
Kingdom resources by the beneficiary countries. 
(h) Some doubt was expressed whether it was expedient to approach the United 
States Government, however informally, until further progress had been made in 
working out a solution of the sterling balance problem. The predominant view of 
Ministers was, however, that it would be best to adhere to the procedure suggested in 
the memorandum annexed to E.P.C.(50)40. 
(i) Paragraph 6 of Annex C to the memorandum might create the impression that 
3% would be regarded by Ministers as a reasonable and acceptable rate of interest on 
funded sterling balances. This could not be assumed, and it would be preferable to 
avoid the use of a misleading figure, even for purposes of example. 
The Committee:-
Approved the recommendations set out in paragraph 37 of the memorandum 
annexed to E.P.C.(50)40. 
99 CAB 124/122, no 16 5 Apr 1950 
[Colonial development]: letter from SirS Cripps to Mr Griffiths about 
extending the CDW Act 
[The process of extending the provision for Colo,,ial Developmept and Welfare was begun 
by Creech Jones towards the end of 1949. In the letter which Criffiths refers to, his 
predecessor had sought an assurance that at the very least, if the government won the 
next election they would make immediate provision for a one-year stop-gap extension of 
the 1945 COW Act. Without such a provision, Creech Jones argued, 'some of the most 
essential economic development in the Colonial Empire will be brought to a standstill in 
the almost immediate future'. A breakdown in the central services-research and survey 
work-was the main worry. Under the 1945 Act, £85.5 million was allocated to colonies 
individually to finance ten-year programmes; £23.5 million was allocated for the 
centrally-controlled services; and £11 million was put into a general reserve. Most of the 
latter had been spent on the special needs of Sarawak and British Honduras, together 
with the promotion of broadcasting. Although much of the £85.5 million territorial 
allocation in fact remained unspent (owing to the shortage of supplies and technicians), 
provision for research-very important in the long run-was nearly exhausted. For the 
future, Creech Jones hoped they would make an extra £100 million available for the 
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period 1951-1961: 'I am quite sure that no amount of talk about American investment in 
the Colonies can ever lead to anything unless we ourselves are prepared to do more than 
we have yet done in the provision of basic services, such as roads, communications and 
water supplies, without which the Colonial field is bound to remain unattractive for 
external investment of any kind' (CAB 124/122, no 11, to SirS Cripps, 19 Nov 1949). An 
amending CDW Act in 1950 provided £20 million, of which £2.5 million was devoted to 
research. See part 4 of this volume, 379.) 
My dear Jim 
I have considered very carefully and sympathetically your letter of the 3rd April 
proposing the introduction of a new Act providing for the expenditure of a further 
£100 m. on Colonial Development and Welfare during the period 1951- 1961. 
While, as you know, I am fully seized of the need for continuing our policy of 
assisting the Colonies in their development, I feel bound to question whether it 
would be right at the present stage to commit ourselves to such a far reaching 
extension of our overseas investment programme as you propose. I realise, of course, 
the difficulty of the present situation in regard to the provision of finance for 
Colonial Development in that your central reserve is practically used up, and I have 
already agreed to the introduction of a limited measure to relieve this situation. I 
recognise too the necessity for forward planning of Colonial Development. But I am 
not sure that this really obliges us to take decisions in 1950 as to the duration and 
scale of continued assistance beyond 1956. There are a number of factors which may 
arise in the course of the next few years of which account will need to be taken in 
determining our policy beyond 1956. 
For one thing we are by no means clear what will be our own position when 
Marshall Aid comes to an end in 1952. Further, I understand that the Americans are 
framing plans for the large-scale development in the near future of the Colonial 
Territories. We are pretty certain to be strongly pressed to provide new funds to 
match any Colonial Development expenditure they undertake, and we ought to be 
cautious not to extend our commitments too far at this stage. 
What I would prefer in the circumstances, therefore , is that we should at this stage 
go for a more limited objective, namely to provide what additional funds are 
necessary to give you some easement with your central reserves to enable you to 
cover satisfactorily the rest of the period till 1956. I understand that your minimum 
assessed requirements for this period have been calculated at £4.75 millions, but to 
provide you with a certain amount of elbow room I would be willing to ask 
Parliament for a total of £10 millions. We might then consider as a separate issue 
what further provision would be justified after 1956, though I should not object to 
some reasonable overlap between the new provision and the existing Act, if this is 
found on further examination to be desirable. In the meantime I think the right 
course would be to remit the question of what may be appropriately provided to meet 
long-term needs up to, say, 1961, to the Committee on Colonial Development who 
would, of course, relate this particular problem to the wider question of home and 
overseas investment. 
In view of the various uncertain factors over the next few years, I hope you will be 
able to agree to the course I have suggested. 
I am sending copies of this letter to the Lord President and to the Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations. 
L 
Yours 
(s'd) Stafford 
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100 CAB 124/122, no 19 19 Apr 1950 
[Colonial development]: letter (reply) from Mr Griffiths to SirS Cripps 
about extending the COW Act 
Thank you very much for your letter of the 5th April about my proposal for a new 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act. I am most grateful to you for your prompt 
response, and for the sympathy with which you have considered the matter. 
I could not myself subscribe unreservedly to the view that it is our right course to 
wait until we know what the Americans are going to do in the field of Colonial 
development before we decide on our own long term plans in that field . It seems to 
me that this attitude, if pressed at all far, might lead us perilously near to a 
renunciation of our responsibilities towards the Colonial peoples. I still feel that a 
measure on the lines outlined in my letter of the 3rd April would have afforded 
welcome proof that we maintain those responsibilities, and would have been of 
lasting benefit to the Colonies, the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth as a 
whole. I do appreciate, however, that His Majesty's Government are in difficulties as 
regard forward planning until they know what the position of this country will be on 
the termination of Marsh all Aid in 1952, and I am glad to see that you are prepared to 
envisage an overlap between the period covered by the present Act and such further 
provision as may be necessary for the years after 1956. 
In the circumstances I am willing to agree that we should limit our present 
consideration to the period up to 1956, though I must reiterate my view that 
considerable provision for the subsequent years will certainly be necessary and that a 
substantial overlap will be required. I must press you very strongly, however, to 
agree that I should ask Parliament for a supplementary provision of more than £10 
million to cover this limited period. I am grateful for your suggestion, and I know 
that it was put forward in a constructive and helpful spirit, but I should be less than 
honest if I held out any hope that this sum will meet the minimum requirements 
over the next six years. I should emphasise that the figure of £4.75 million which you 
mention as my minimum assessed requirements for this period in fact covers only 
the minimum foreseen requirement in specific fields of research and survey. These 
are largely centralised services, and are thus perhaps more susceptible of assessment 
than other types of development, but they only represent a fraction of the whole field . 
The appendix to the draft paper enclosed in my previous letter attempted to give 
some picture of the future requirements of Colonial development (in the economic 
sphere) as a whole. The appendix was not reduced to exact financial terms because 
the result would have been misleading, but I am quite certain that the minimum 
requirement over the whole field, even if we were to include nothing more than 
economic development in the strict sense, would come to much more than £10 
million. I must ask you to bear in mind that the purchasing power of sterling has 
fallen considerably since many of the ten-year development plans were drawn up and 
approved. The total estimated cost of some of the plans has doubled, and a number of 
projects which originally found a place in the approved plans have had to be 
jettisoned or remitted to the indefinite future. In order to maintain the impetus of 
essential development I have already been forced, as you know, to allocate £81Jz 
million from the original U!1-allocated reserve of £11 million, and this figure 
excluded the sum of £4.75 million representing the assessed minimum sup-
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plementary needs of research and survey. In other words I have already found it 
necessary, in less than four years out of the 10 year period covered by the 1945 Act, to 
make supplementary allocations of over £13 millions. Out of the £10 million 
mentioned in your letter only a little over £5 million would be available for 
commitments not already in sight. If to this figure is added the remainder of the 
existing reserve (something under £2ljz million), we have a supplementary provision 
of about £7lfz million with which I must do for the last six years of the present Act, 
though I have already been obliged to make provision for over £13 million during the 
four years since the Act began. I do not see how this can be regarded as adequate. 
You say in your third paragraph that the Americans are framing plans for the large 
scale development in the near future of the Colonial territories, and you go on to say 
that we are pretty certain to be strongly pressed to provide new funds to match any 
Colonial development expenditure they undertake. This is one of my many reasons 
for contending that £10 million is not enough. It has hitherto been agreed that 
sterling expenditure to match dollar expenditure incurred by the Americans under 
E.C.A. schemes should be counted as a final charge against the Colonial Develop-
ment and Welfare Vote, and I assume that the Treasury will take the same attitude as 
regards American assistance in the future. The necessity to make provision for this 
purpose has been one , of the contributory causes of the depletion of the existing 
reserve. Incidentally, it has been our experience that the sterling expenditure on 
E.C.A. technical assistance schemes in the Colonies-useful though those schemes 
have been-has fallen little if at all short of the total sterling expenditure which 
would have been required on the same schemes if the Americans had never entered 
the field. 
In putting forward the proposals contained in my previous letter, I said that it 
would be my intention to keep £20 million out of the total of £100 million as a 
reserve for use, as and when required, up to the 31st March, 1956. The remainder of 
the total sum would, of course, have been retained for the subsequent years. If we are 
now to proceed on the basis that we can look no further ahead than 1956, I see no 
reason to alter my view that a supplementary provision of £20 million represents the 
essential requirement for that period. Assuming the provision were to be made as 
from the 1st April, 1951, the average annual additional burden to the United 
Kingdom taxpayer would be only £4 million a year. In view of the increases in costs 
which have taken place and having regard to the purposes to which the money will be 
put I regard this as a very moderate request, and I am sure that Parliament would be 
willing to provide the money. I must re-emphasise that the development work made 
possible by such a provision would for the most part be productive work likely to 
prove of benefit to the United Kingdom as well as to the Colonies. 
I would mention again the possibilities that exist for the development of dollar 
earning and dollar saving production in the Colonies. I am anxious, for instance, to 
encourage the production of cotton, tobacco and timber, and I believe that output of 
these can be considerably stimulated. This will require pilot schemes for testing out 
the economics of particular projects, experiments in developing new techniques for 
injecting modern methods into peasant agriculture (e.g. by "group farming") as well 
as the provision of training facilities and roads and other basic services in promising 
areas. £10 million will not cover this work. But if I am given the £20 million for 
which I ask, I intend to enst1re that so far as possible, bearing in mind that the 
fundamental object of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act is the development 
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and welfare of the Colonies for its own sake, the money should be used for projects 
which will contribute directly or indirectly to the expansion of dollar saving or dollar 
earning production. If I received an application for assistance in respect of a scheme 
which was not demonstrably of this category, I should require it to be backed by a 
very strong case made out on other grounds. Much of the money thus spent by the 
United Kingdom on dollar earning and dollar saving purposes would of course be 
matched by similar expenditure provided by the colonies themselves. 
I greatly hope that you will be able to let me have an early and favourable reply to 
this letter. If you require a discussion either between ourselves or between our 
officials before you finally make up your mind, I am of course entirely at your 
disposal. 
I am sending copies of this letter to the Lord President and the Secretary of State 
for Commonwealth Relations. 
101 CAB 134/227, EPC(50)111 27 Oct 1950 
'Economic development in South and South-East Asia: report on the 
meeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee': memo-
randum for Cabinet Economic Policy Committee by Mr Gaitskell 
(Exchequer). Annex: description of the proceedings of the conference. 
The meeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee on South and South-
East Asia began on 25th September and ended on 4th October. The proceedings are 
described in the Annex, and I now seek my colleagues' approval for the recommenda-
tions which were made and for the course of action which is contemplated. The 
meeting of the Committee was, in my view, and I think in the view of all those who 
attended it, a most fruitful one. There was a striking sense of common purpose and a 
determination to press forward action along strictly practical but imaginative lines. 
Particularly encouraging was the relationship between the Asian members of the 
Commonwealth and ourselves and the older Dominions; one has the impression that 
this work on the development of South and South-East Asia is creating links of 
common interest and common understanding which will be of value far beyond the 
immediate task upon which the Commonwealth Governments are engaged. 
Report on economic development 
2. The main business of the meeting was the preparation of a draft report entitled 
"The Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-
East Asia." This draft, in its final form as adopted by the Consultative Committee, has 
been circulated to my colleagues (E.P.C.(50)105), 1 and I now recommend its approval. 
The other delegates are similarly recommending their Governments to approve it, 
and I hope that we shall know before the end of the month that the report has been 
approved by all Governments. 
3. The Consultative Committee recommended that the report should be pub-
lished as soon as possible after it had been approved by Governments, but that timing 
should be arranged in a manner which would avoid embarrassment to the 
1 See 102. 
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Americans. We have been advised by the United States Administration that publica-
tion as soon as possible after the Congressional elections on 7th November would be 
convenient to them, and the other Commonwealth Governments have been advised 
accordingly that we should try to have the report ready for publication by lOth 
November. I recommend that, subject to any further views expressed by our 
Commonwealth colleagues, and subject of course to their approval of the report, we 
should publish as soon after lOth November as convenient. 
Technical co-operation 
4. The Consultative Committee agreed the draft constitution for the Council of 
Technical Co-operation to be established in Colombo, and operations can begin as 
soon as the Commonwealth Governments have given their approval. We hope to 
receive this by the end of the month. My colleagues have already approved this 
constitution (E.P.C.(50)88) and only formal approval is now required. I would, 
however, emphasise the great importance of this work; it is essential that the new 
organisation at Colombo should get quickly under way and I hope that my colleagues 
will do all they can to impress upon their departments the urgency of meeting the 
demands for trained men and training facilities. It is [has] not yet been possible to 
designate a Director for the Bureau but it is still hoped to get a Canadian for this 
important post. 
Position of non-Commonwealth countries in the area 
5. It was originally intended that the report should cover the development of the 
whole of South and South-East Asia and invitations had been given to Burma, 
Indonesia, Siam and the three Associate States of Indo-China to draw up develop-
ment programmes and to participate in the preparation of the report. The report 
incorporates as much material as was available about the situation of. the non-
Commonwealth countries in the area but their slowness in responding to our 
invitation has meant that it is a report by Commonwealth Governments alone. We 
were able, however, to arrange some useful meetings between the Consultative 
Committee and delegates from Siam and the three Associate States of Indo-China, 
which the Ambassadors of Burma and Indonesia attended as observers. These 
meetings gave the Commonwealth Ministers the opportunity of explaining the 
Colombo Plan and the delegates and observers are reporting back to their Govern-
ments accordingly. 
6. The Delegates of Siam and of the Associate States of Indo-China confirmed 
that their Governments intend to take part in the Plan, but there was clearly great 
nervousness both in Burma and in Indonesia about associating with the Common-
wealth in this work. There is some reason to hope, however, that these countries too 
will in the end associate themselves with the plan, particularly as the Americans have 
been advising them to do so. They have been invited to join the Council of Technical 
Co-operation and to prepare development programmes on similar lines to those of 
the Commonwealth countries for consideration at a later joint meeting of the 
Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries. 
7. The question of extending the area to cover the Philippines was discussed and 
many members wished this to be done. We decided that it would be most prudent to 
consult the United States befor~ taking a decision on whether the Philippines should 
be invited to participate. While their official reply was to the effect that the United 
160 ECONOMIC POLICY [101) 
States Government would be happy to leave it to the Commonwealth to decide 
whether or not to invite the Philippine Republic, we gathered unofficially that they 
would prefer to see the Philippines invited to participate provided the invitation is 
delayed until after the report of the recent United States Economic Mission to the 
Philippines has been considered in Washington. It was agreed, therefore, to await the 
replies of the other non-Commonwealth Governments in the Area before taking a 
final decision to invite the Philippines to participate, and it is proposed also to 
maintain consultation with the United States Government on this point. 
Commonwealth contributions 
8. It was decided not to make any specific reference to Commonwealth contribu-
tions in the report, partly because Canada, Australia and New Zealand were not in a 
position to state the contributions which they would be prepared to make, and partly 
because the inclusion of figures for the Commonwealth countries would imply 
making a "bid" for United States assistance. The total external finance required for 
the Commonwealth countries is now put at £1,085 million over a six-year period. 
9. I was authorised to offer a United Kingdom contribution to Commonwealth 
countries, by release of sterling balances, Colonial Development and Welfare funds, 
&c., of the order of £330 million in the six years (as well as £30 million in six years 
for non-Commonwealth countries in the area). Although no figures were given 
during the conference itself, I informed the other delegates privately of what we had 
in mind. It seemed to be generally accepted that we could not do much more. The 
Commonwealth Governments who might be contributors-Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand-were not prepared to commit themselves to any specific figure, but I 
should say that it was reasonable to expect that the total Commonwealth contribu-
tion including that of the United Kingdom might in the end be at least 40 per cent., 
and possibly more, of the total external finance required by the Commonwealth 
countries. If the United States provides external finance itself, then Canada is very 
likely to make a corresponding contribution; Australia is likely to contribute in any 
event, and New Zealand may give a token amount of assistance. We may hope, 
therefore, that a substantial part of the external finance will be provided within the 
Commonwealth, though this would, of course, leave the external finance required by 
the non-Commonwealth countries in the area to be drawn almost entirely from the 
United States. 
10. The Commonwealth Governments are now considering what contribution 
they will be prepared to make, but it will be impossible to reach finality on this except 
in relation to what the Americans ultimately decide to do. Ideally, one would 
envisage a statement of intention by the United States Administration stating the 
amount of funds which they would seek from Congress for the Commonwealth and 
non-Commonwealth Governments in the area, this to be followed simultaneously by 
statements in London, Ottawa, Canberra and Wellington of the resources which the 
Commonwealth countries would be prepared to make available. 
11. Negotiations have been proceeding in parallel for a long-term settlement of 
sterling releases with the Commonwealth countries in the area, and the effect of the 
programme is likely to be that by the middle of 1957 the sterling balances of India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon will, broadly speaking, be reduced to the minimum level which 
they require to hold as a currency and foreign exchange reserve. One of the more 
valuable by-products of the Colombo Plan, though not a primary objective, 
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particularly vis-a-vis the United States, is thus likely to be that, as far as India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon are concerned, this problem of war-time accumulations of 
sterling balances will have been virtually solved. 
12. It is stated in the report that the United Kingdom will not seek finance from 
other Governments in respect of the Colonial territories in this area, apart from 
assistance which is available under present arrangements (e.g., E.C.A., Colonial 
development pool). 
13. There is now good reason to hope that the International Bank will play a 
considerable part. I saw Mr. Black2 in Washington; he had seen an early draft of the 
report, thought it a workmanlike document, and expressed great interest in the 
programme. When the report is published, he may be able to make a helpful 
statement about it, although any actual negotiations for International Bank loans 
would have to be conducted on a bilateral basis with the countries concerned. The 
question of the use of our and other Commonwealth countries' subscriptions to the 
International Bank will probably arise at an early stage. 
United States attitude 
14. The United States Government had appointed a Liaison Officer to the 
meetings, who had been kept fully informed and had received the successive drafts of 
the report. In my visit to Washington, I was able to discuss the Plan with Mr. Webb3 
and State Department officials. They stated that they regarded the initiative which 
had produced the report as a most constructive one; they had been impressed by the 
practical and realistic character of the report; they appeared to regard the general 
scale of finance indicated as being required from the United States as being broadly 
in line with their own thinking. Mr. Webb stated they would not be able to give an 
immediate reaction, because they would have to study the report in the light of all 
their other commitments, and they would not be able to take final decisions quickly. 
15. It seemed to me that their attitude was definitely encouraging, but that we 
cannot expect a definite decision one way or the other at least until after the 
Congressional Election and probably not until they are in a position to put their 
whole programme for foreign assistance, military and economic, before Congress 
early in the New Year. 
Continuing organisation 
16. The Consultative Committee discussed the question of continuing organisa-
tion on the assumption that the United States would provide some external finance 
for the Commonwealth countries, and a general consensus of opinion was reached. It 
was recognised that there would have to be bilateral arrangements for the provision 
of finance and management of the assistance programme; no one was in favour of the 
creation of a purely "regional" organisation which would divide the aid, "screen" 
programmes and generally act as an Asiatic O.E.E.C. It was thought, however, that a 
useful purpose would be served in having a Council for South and South-East Asian 
development on which the United States would be represented as well as the 
2 Eugene R Black, US executive director, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
1947-1949; president, 1949-1953. 
3 James E Webb, US Treasury official; director, Bureau of Budget, 1946-1949; under-secretary of state 
from 1949. 
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Commonwealth countries and the non-Commonwealth countries in the area (if they 
participate). 
17. In Washington I explained these preliminary views which the Consultative 
Committee had reached. The United States reaction was that they would wish to 
consider this further; they did not press the idea of an Asiatic O.E.E.C. but were 
doubtful about the desirability of having a very close formal relationship between the 
United States and the other countries concerned. This will be a matter for further 
discussion, and, if my colleagues agree, I propose that we should continue to 
advocate the loose type of organisation, containing the interested countries, which is 
the most acceptable form of organisation to all the Commonwealth countries. 
Follow-up action 
18. Arrangements were made by the Consultative Committee for the necessary 
liaison to be maintained to enable the Commonwealth to deal effectively with the 
next stage:-
(i) A definite reaction by the United States Administration. 
(ii) Response of the non-Commonwealth countries in the area to the renewed 
invitation to join the scheme. 
(iii) Decisions by Commonwealth Governments on the size of their contributions. 
In accordance with these arrangements, we should inform the other Common-
wealth Governments of my discussions in Washington. 
19. In my view-and I am sure my colleagues will concur in this-the Colombo 
Plan is of major political and economic importance, and we must continue to put our 
full weight behind it. In consultation with the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations, I will keep my colleagues very fully informed of 
progress. 
Conclusion 
20. I therefore recommend that:-
(i) The draft report be approved for publication as soon as practicable after l Oth 
November (paragraphs 2 and 3) . 
(ii) The constitution of the Council for Technical Co-operation be approved 
(paragraph 4). 
(iii) We should continue to take all action necessary to promote the Plan 
(paragraph 19). 
Annex to 101 
Report on economic development 
1. The main business of the Committee was the consideration of a draft report on 
the economic development of South and South-East Asia, which had been prepared 
by a preliminary meeting of officials, under United Kingdom chairmanship, mainly 
on the basis of the replies of Commonwealth Governments to the questionnaire 
issued after the Sydney Conference. 
2. The report is an attempt to set out the problem of the area, to describe what 
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the Commonwealth Governments in the area intend to do to tackle this problem, and 
to show the extent to which they will need support from overseas both by the supply 
of trained men and by the supply of capital in order to make an effective attack upon 
their problem of poverty and under-development. 
3. The report consists of three parts. The first three chapters are of an 
introductory character and describe the importance of South and South-East Asia, 
the effect of the war and its aftermath, and the need for development. In these 
chapters the general case is made for economic development as the only effective 
means of tackling the problems of the area. They reveal the poverty of the peoples of 
the area, the gruelling to which these peoples have been subjected during the last ten 
years, the lamentably low state of economic development in comparison with 
countries in the Western World, and the resources which could be mobilised. 
4. In the next part of the report- Chapters IV to VII-are described six-year 
development programmes for each of the Commonwealth countries in the area-
India, Pakistan, Ceylon and the Colonial territories, the Federation of Malaya, 
Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak. In each case the development programme is 
examined in detail; the major projects are described and an attempt is made to 
express the type of economy which the Government is seeking to establish over a 
period. Considerable attention is directed to the administrative machinery by which 
the Plan will be carried out. An examination is then made of the financial 
implications of the Plan-the extent to which external finance is needed in order to 
carry out the Plan. These chapters are themselves distilled from a substantially larger 
amount of material provided by the countries and a considerable amount of 
additional information is given in appendices. 
5. The concluding section of the report-Chapters VIII, IX and X-draws the 
conclusions from the individual country programmes. The analysis shows that the 
main weight of the programmes is upon agriculture, transport and communications, 
and power, which in fact account for over 70 per cent. of the total of the development 
programmes. This is because the central problem in the area is a problem of food. In 
the six years of the programme there will be an increase of 31/2 per cent. in the 
amount of land under cultivation, an increase of 7 per cent. in the land under 
irrigation, and an increase of 10 per cent. in the production of food grains. Even this 
substantial increase in production will do little more than keep pace with the 
growing population, and imports will still be required on much the same scale as at 
present. Very little weight is placed on industry, which accounts for only 10 per cent. 
of the development programmes, and the provision of social capital, particularly in 
India and Pakistan, is on a very cautious scale. The analysis shows, indeed, that these 
programmes are moderate and within the sphere of practicability and that they are 
directed to deal with the most urgent problems first in a practical way, rather than to 
make a drive towards self-sufficiency by grandiose plans for industrialisation. It 
appears on analysis, however, that even these moderate programmes are far beyond 
the capacity of the countries concerned to achieve by their own efforts. They are 
limited predominantly by the shortage of trained men and by the shortage of capital. 
6. The report analyses the need for trained men in a more comprehensive way 
than has been possible hitherto, showing how the supply of trained men can be 
expanded by expanding training facilities in the area, by securing training overseas, 
and by obtaining men from abroad. This leads to a description of the Council for 
Technical Co-operation, the constitution of which was agreed by the Consultative 
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Committee. The setting-up of this Council, which will be assisted by a Bureau at 
Colombo, is the special contribution of the Commonwealth Governments to this 
problem, and the emphasis is laid on the necessity to co-operate with United Nations 
agencies and with the United States (Point Four) organisation. Arrangements are 
already being made to make this co-operat ion effective. 
7. The report concludes with a description of the need for capital and an analysis 
of the possible sources from which external finance can be drawn. The total amount 
of external finance needed over the six-year period 1951-57 is put at £1,085 million 
and it must be noted that this is substantially larger than the actual cost of capital 
goods which will be required to be imported for the programme, which is put at £411 
million in the six years. In order to be able to devote sufficient resources internally to 
the execution of the development programme, it will be necessary for the countries 
to import consumer goods as well as capital goods. The possible channels of external 
finance are analysed in some detail in this chapter but, for the reasons set out in the 
following paragraph, no quantitative assessment is made of the possible contribution 
of each of them. The problem is stated as a world problem, for the solution of which 
every possible source of external finance should be fully exploited. 
8. There are three general characteristics of the style and presentation of the 
report to which particular attention should be drawn:-
(i) The development programmes have been presented on strictly practical and 
realistic lines and special care has been taken to show that the Governments of the 
Commonwealth countries in the area are masters in their own house and have 
their feet firmly on the ground. The nature of the programmes submitted by India 
and Pakistan fully supports this line of approach-the excessive hopes of two or 
three years ago about the rate at which development would proceed have now 
vanished and the problem is recognised as being one which calls for a long and 
painful effort. The Consultative Committee thought it wise to emphasise the 
practical and realistic character of the programmes in order to be able to resist any 
argument that external finance provided for these territories would be wasted 
through inefficiency, corruption and the lack of a well-thought-out plan. 
(ii) Much attention is paid to the steps which the Commonwealth countries in the 
area are already taking to help themselves and to the further measures they are 
taking to mobilise their resources, financial and other, to carry through their 
development programmes. 
(iii) Particular care has been taken to avoid having this report appear as a bid for 
United States assistance. The report is presented as a statement to the world and 
not as an appeal to the United States Congress. This was considered desirable both 
on merits, for neither India nor Pakistan was willing to show itself as appealing to 
the charity of the Americans, and also because the United States Liaison Officer to 
the Conference had expressed the view that this was most appropriate from the 
American standpoint. 
Follow-up action 
9. The Consultative Committee made the necessary arrangements for dealing 
with any response which the United States may make. It has been agreed that all the 
Commonwealth Governments should keep continuous liaison through the normal 
channels, including the Commonwealth Liaison Committee in London, and that 
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Governments should hold themselves in readiness to call together a standing 
Committee on the official level in whatever capital is most appropriate as and when 
this may be necessary. It is impossible to make very firm arrangements at this stage 
because we do not yet know how the Americans will wish to handle the problem if 
they decide to provide the finance. The only possible organisational arrangement, 
therefore, is to provide fully for an exchange of information and to provide for a 
meeting to be called with the minimum amount of delay should the need arise. 
10. The question of France and Holland was not discussed in the Consultative 
Committee. There is great hostility on the part of India, Pakistan and Ceylon to the 
association of France and Holland with the Colombo Plan. The United Kingdom will 
continue informally to keep the French and Dutch Governments informed of the 
proceedings. But it is clear that for the time being it will be impossible to associate 
them formally with the plan. 
Continuing organisation 
11. The Consultative Committee considered what would be the most effective 
continuing organisation and agreed that the arrangements set out in paragraph 16 of 
the covering paper to this Annex would be the most appropriate. 
Attitude of delegations 
12. On this occasion, as the Conference was held in London, we were in the chair, 
and the present Chancellor of the Exchequer was supported throughout by the 
Paymaster-General and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, and the team of officials who have worked on these problems from the 
Colombo Conference onwards. Mr. Malcolm MacDonald was in the lead for the 
Colonial territories in the area and we broke new constitutional ground in that for 
the first time non-official representatives from the Colonies and Protected Territories 
attended a Commonwealth Ministerial , Conference as advisers and took part in the 
discussions. Dato Onn bin Jaafar,4 for the Federation of Malaya, and C.C. Tan5 for 
Singapore, made a good impression in the Conference, and this particular new 
constitutional departure seemed to have been a very useful one. 
13. The Commonwealth Delegations were, as usual, very strong; Australia and 
New Zealand were represented by their Foreign Ministers, Mr. Spender and Mr. 
Doidge; Canada by Mr. Mayhew, the Minister of Fisheries; India, Pakistan and Ceylon 
by their Finance Ministers, Mr. Deshmukh, Mr. Ghulam Mohammed, and Mr. 
Jayawardene. The teams of officials were broadly speaking the same as those which 
attended the Sydney Conference, with some strengthening in the case of Canada and 
Pakistan. The officials in all the Commonwealth countries who are engaged on this 
international work are now working very smoothly together as a team, and this fact 
was of decisive importance in getting the report prepared so quickly. 
14. Australia. Mr. Spender was in much more constructive mood than at Sydney, 
and made an effective contribution to the discussions. No specific Australian point of 
view emerged from the discussions either at the Ministerial or at the official level; 
their interventions were primarily designed to bring out more strongly the efforts 
4 Dato Onn bin Jaafar, president, United Malays National Organisation, 194&-1951. 
5 C C Tan, non-official member of Singapore Advisory Council, 1946; first chairman of Singapore 
Progressive Party, 194 7. 
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which the countries themselves were making, and to make it easier to bring in the 
non-Commonwealth countries in the area. Mr. Spender had to leave for the United 
Nations meeting in New York before the end of the meetings, but seemed well 
satisfied with what had been done. 
15. Canada. The Canadian Delegation played a very important part, particularly 
in the discussions at the official level and in the work of drafting and editing the 
report. The Canadian Government had expressed some misgivings about our earlier 
ideas on the structure of the report, but in the end the form of presentation which 
was chosen was entirely acceptable to their Delegation. Canada's main preoccupation 
in the scheme is to avoid becoming committed to any purely Commonwealth plan 
which does not include the United States; the Canadians will almost certainly 
contribute if the United States does, but they do not want to associate themselves 
with a purely Commonwealth plan, particularly as they have little direct interest in 
South and South-East Asia. 
16. Ceylon . The Ceylon development programme is much the weakest of the 
Commonwealth programmes; from their programme as it stands, indeed, it could be 
argued that they are not prepared to finance as much development from their own 
resources as they are doing now. It can fairly be said, indeed, that Ceylon is looking 
for a much higher proportion of external help than should actually be necessary. It 
seemed clear from the discussions that the Ceylon Government had considered their 
plans much less thoroughly than India or Pakistan, and their presentation was 
consequently less convincing. Mr. Jayawardene took a prominent part in the 
discussion, but the weakness of the Ceylon programme reduced the effectiveness of 
his contributions. 
17. India. As at Sydney, the Indian Delegation made a great impression, and their 
development programme, which was brilliantly expounded and defended, set the 
tone for much of the report. Their eagerness to be on friendly terms with the United 
Kingdom, and to derive the fullest possible advantage from the contact with the West 
which the Commonwealth provides, was very clear. Both Ministers and officials 
appear to have drawn very rational conclusions from their experience in the last 
three years, and the size of their programme was therefore very modest and fully 
within the range of practical possibilities. Both in content and in presentation, their 
programme compares very favourably with, for example, those presented by O.E.E.C. 
countries. In almost every question which arose, Mr. Deshmukh could be relied upon 
to take the commonsense line. 
18. New Zealand. Mr. Doidge made a robust and practical contribution, particu-
larly on questions bearing upon the public reception of the report. 
19. Pakistan. The Pakistan Delegation was much stronger than before, and, while 
it lacked the great technical ability of the Indians, it was able in the end, with a good 
deal of prompting, to present its programme convincingly. Here too, experience has 
had a moderating effect. It is worth recording that it proved possible to have 
reasonably frank discussion and to deal in the report with a number of questions, 
such as defence and jute, which are of burning controversy between India and 
Pakistan. The officials of the two countries appeared to be on very good terms with 
each other, and Mr. Ghulam Mohammed invariably supported Mr. Deshmukh in 
debate. Whilst these meetings contribute nothing to a direct settlement of the 
matters under dispute between India and Pakistan, they help to maintain an 
atmosphere in which a settlement is not ruled out. 
[102) COLONIAL GENERAL 167 
102 CAB 134/226, EPC(50)105 Oct 1950 
[Colombo Plan1: final report of the Commonwealth Consultative 
Committee on South and South-East Asia about co-operative econ-
omic development [Extract] 
[This report was prepared at a meeting of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee on 
South and South-East Asia, which took place in London in September 1950. The 
governments represented at the meeting were Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New 
Zealand, Pakistan and the UK. At the first meeting of the committee in Sydney in May 
1950 the decision was taken to draw up a six-year programme of economic development 
for countries in the region, and to invite other countries in the area to join in this 
co-operative enterprise to make a comprehensive attack upon the problem of poverty and 
under-development in the region as a whole. The governments of Cambodia, Laos, 
Vietnam and Thailand accordingly sent delegates to a joint meeting with the members of 
the Consultative Committee early in October 1950; the ambassadors in London of Burma 
and Indonesia attended as observers. Thus, whilst this report was prepared by govern-
ments represented on the committee, and consequently dealt in detail primarily with the 
problems and programmes of the Commonwealth governments in the area, it was hoped 
that at a later stage other countries would prepare similar programmes which would 
enable a complete conspectus to be made of the region's d~velopmental problem. The 
following chapters are omitted: (iv) the development programtne of India, (v) of Pakistan, 
(vi) of Ceylon, (vii) of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo & Sarawak, (ix) 
the need for trained men, (x) the need for capital-except for the conclusion; and 
appendixes 1-7.) 
' \ 
Chapter I. The importance of South and South-East Asia 
1. The peoples of Asia have long felt the pressure of poverty and hunger. While 
the realisation of self-governm'ent could not of itself relieve this situation, it has 
made possible a new approach to th'e problem of raising living standards through the 
vigorous development of national res~es. Among the peoples of Asia hopes and 
aspiratiops have been raised by the plans ohtreir Governments to secure a fuller life 
for them, 
2. The region with which this Report is concerned comprises the countries of 
India, Pakistan, Ceylon, the Federation of, Ma~aya, Singapore, North Borneo, 
Sarawak, Brunei, Burma, Thailand, I ndo-China and Indonesia. Its 570 million people 
make up one-quarter of the population of the world. Despite the abundance of 
human resources, the considerable natural wealth of the area has not in the past 
been developed rapidly enough to ease the increasing pressure of population upon 
the land. There is, therefore, a great poverty among millions and an unceasing 
struggle for existence. In India at present the people's diet consists almost entirely of 
cereals, and in the rationed urban areas they consume only about 12 ounces of food 
grains a day. In Pakistan, with its wide range of temperature, 9 yards of cotton cloth 
have to suffice for one man during the year. The low level of consumption illustrated 
by these meagre quantities is clearly inadequate by any standard; moreover the level 
of food consumption in the whole sub-continent of India is appreciably below what it 
was ten years ago. The same general picture, with local variations is presented by 
every country in South and South-East Asia. In these circumstances the urgent need 
of these countries is to develop their economies in order to increase food production 
and· consumption and raise the real income of their peoples. 
3. During the past five years political events have moved fast in South and 
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South-East Asia. Changes have taken place on a scale hardly precedented in world 
history. Independent Governments have come into being, supported by democratic 
institutions and imbued with enthusiasm for the future welfare of their countries. 
The horizon of thought and action in the economic as well as the political field has 
been greatly extended, and Governments are grappling with the problem of 
promoting the economic improvement which is indispensable to social stability, and 
necessary to strengthen their free institutions. It is of the greatest importance that 
the countries of South and South-East Asia should succeed in this undertaking. The 
political stability of the area, and indeed of the world, depends upon it, and nothing 
could do more to strengthen the cause of freedom. 
4. The countries of the region play an important part in the world economy. The 
area is a major source of the food and raw materials consumed throughout the 
industrialised world. Before the war it provided almost all the world's exports of jute 
and rubber, more than three-quarters of the tea, almost half the tin and one-third of 
the oils and fats. These key products have for generations flowed into the great trade 
routes of the world. Rubber, tin and jute products earn dollars in the Western 
Hemisphere. Tea and oils are shipped to Europe. In return, the industrial products of 
the West-textiles, machinery, iron and steel-flow back into the area. 
5. Two features of this world-wide trade are especially significant in relation to 
present-day difficulties. The first is that the area has traditionally had a large trading 
surplus with North America, and a deficit with the United Kingdom and Western 
Europe. The earning of this dollar surplus in trade with South and South-East Asia 
was an important factor in enabling the United Kingdom and Western Europe to 
finance their own dollar deficits before the war. Thus the dollar earnings of South 
and South-East Asia were a significant element in the world's multilateral system of 
trade. 
6. Secondly, the main impetus to the development of South and South-East Asia, 
which helped to make possible a world-wide pattern of trade, came from a steady flow 
of capital from the countries of Western Europe and more especially from the United 
Kingdom. While this flow of investment may not have been adequate to permit as 
rapid social and economic progress as might have been desirable, it nevertheless 
provided the basis for the development which has taken place in the area over the 
past hundred years. There can be no question that external finance must continue to 
be made available if the constant pressure of population is not to depress living 
standards still further. 
7. Since the end of the war both these features in the economy of South and 
South-East Asia have been transformed. Dollar surpluses have in many countries 
been replaced by dollar deficits; and the flow of new capital into the area has itself 
dwindled away as a result of the disturbance caused by the war and the reluctance of 
private investors to risk their savings in the face of new uncertainties. 
8. In these circumstances it is clear that the vital interests of the countries of 
South and South-East Asia, as of the rest of the world, require the restoration of the 
area to its key position in world trade. The strengthening of their economies through 
the resumption of a large-scale flow of capital is essential to any permanent increase 
in productivity and living standards, and at the same time it is a condition of the 
higher level of trade on which a stable world system could be based. 
9. At their meeting in Colombo in January 1950, the Foreign Ministers of the 
Commonwealth countries agreed upon the vital importance of the economic 
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development of South and South-East Asia in the maintenance of the political 
stability of the countries in that area, and in the growth of an expanding world 
economy based upon multilateral trade. 
10. The Commonwealth Governments took the initiative in considering interna-
tional action to deal with the problem because three quarters of the people of South 
and South-East Asia live in countries which are members of the Commonwealth, and 
the whole area is one with which the Commonwealth Governments have close 
political and economic ties. But the initiative has been taken in no exclusive spirit. It 
was contemplated from the beginning that all countries in the area which were not 
members of the Commonwealth should be invited to participate on equal terms in 
whatever plan could be devised to lead to international action. It was moreover 
recognised that the resources required for the effective development of South and 
South-East Asia were considerably more than the Commonwealth itself could 
provide, and that it would therefore be necessary to seek the co-operation of other 
countries. The scale of the problem is indeed such that a new and more comprehen-
sive approach was from the first regarded as essential. 
11. Accordingly, after the Colombo Conference, a process of Commonwealth 
consultation was begun with the purpose of making the most effective possible attack 
upon the problem, and of focussing world attention on the needs and difficulties of 
the area. The Commonwealth Consultative Committee, which was brought into 
being at Colombo, met at Sydney in May and took the process a long step further. 
The Governments of the Commonwealth countries in the area agreed to draw up a 
practical and realistic plan of development for a six-year period to run from the 
middle of 1951, and they put the preparatory work in hand at once. They also decided 
to provide funds for a technical assistance scheme for the area. This scheme, the 
detailed organisation of which was worked out at a meeting at Colombo in July, is 
outlined in Chapter IX of this Report. 
12. In the meantime, in accordance with the decisions taken at Sydney, 
invitations were issued to the non-Commonwealth Governments in the area to join 
in the work of the Consultative Committee and to draw up six-year plans of economic 
development. In the event, however, it has not proved possible to secure the full 
participation of the non-Commonwealth Governments within the time originally 
envisaged, nor have they been able to prepare programmes of the kind presented to 
the Committee by the Commonwealth Governments. This Report has therefore 
confined itself in the main to the development programmes of the Commonwealth 
countries. It is however, hoped that it will be possible for the non-Commonwealth 
countries to co-operate fully in the plan in the very near future and to prepare 
development programmes of their own which, when brought together with those of 
the Commonwealth countries, would provide the comprehensive survey of the needs 
of the area as a whole that was originally considered desirable. 
13. The preparation of this Report is thus a further step in the process set on foot 
in Colombo. The idea conceived there has been given shape and content in the last 
eight months. The scale of the problem has been assessed, knowledge has been 
gained of the difficulties to be overcome, and the way has been prepared for further 
advance. 
14. The purpose of the Commonwealth Governments in initiating the program-
me described in this Report is fully in accord with the principles of the United 
Nations. They intend that it should develop in harmony with the valuable work done 
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in the area by the United Nations and its Specialised Agencies, who have recognised 
the need for outside assistance for the development of under-developed territories. 
15. These considerations form the background of this Report. The improvement 
in the welfare of the South and South-East Asian peoples is a vast human endeavour, 
and the community of free nations stands to gain immensely by it. The political 
stability of the countries of the area is possible only in conditions of economic 
progress, and a steady flow of capital from more highly developed countries is 
essential for this purpose. The conception of the Commonwealth countries' approach 
to the problem is that a fresh impetus should be given to economic development in 
South and South-East Asia in order to increase production, raise standards of living, 
and thus enlarge the volume of trade around the world from which all countries may 
benefit. It is because this is a world problem of the first magnitude, and not a purely 
national or regional one, that the Commonwealth Governments have framed this 
Report for the world's consideration. 
Chapter II. The war and its aftermath 
1. The second world war inflicted heavy losses on South and South-East Asia. In 
the fields of battle physical damage caused by the fighting itself was aggravated by 
'scorched earth' and 'denial' policies which followed the outbreak of war. Under the 
Japanese occupation many territories were despoiled and neglected, and economic 
assets built up over generations were allowed to waste away. Railway tracks and 
locomotives were removed; rubber plantations and tea estates reverted to the jungle; 
power stations were driven without care or maintenance. After the war these 
disasters, combined with a world shortage of shipping, radically disorganised the 
production and transport of foodstuffs and raw materials within South and 
South-East Asia, with calamitous results for the economies of the area. 
2. Economic dislocation and inflation in many parts of the area were added to the 
physical ravages of war. The Indian sub-continent, as the great Eastern base of the 
Allied armies, supplied the forces East of Suez with clothing from mills worked to 
capacity without normal renewals; at the end of the war machinery was overstrained 
and in need of replacement. The railways, too, had carried an unusually heavy 
volume of war traffic and by 1945 were in urgent need of repair. Every effort was 
made to increase food production at the expense of crops such as cotton, jute and 
oil-seeds. Home consumption of such goods as cotton textiles had to be restricted in 
order to maintain exports in the interests of the war effort. These measures, together 
with the great increase in the money supply arising from war finance, created an 
inflationary situation which remained a source of serious weakness when the war 
came to an end. 
3. If the state of insecurity had ended with the war, much more might have been 
done in South and South-East Asia during the ensuing five years to restore a healthy 
pattern of production and exchange. Unhappily political and social disturbances 
occurred in large areas with varying intensity at different times. Some Governments 
have been largely preoccupied with these disturbances and others, although well 
established, have been compelled to devote a large part of their resources to defence 
and the maintenance of law and order. In the Indian sub-continent the transfer of 
political power to the new Governments of India and Pakistan was carried out 
smoothly, but the partition of the country itself caused considerable economic 
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dislocation. Attempts are still being made to resolve certain matters which are costly 
to both India and Pakistan and a serious obstacle to economic advance. In Malaya 
economic rehabilitation has proceeded a long way, but the measures required to 
maintain law and order are a heavy drain upon the resources of the Government of 
the Federation of Malaya and upon the United Kingdom. In Thailand the economic 
situation has steadily improved. In Burma, Indo-China, and Indonesia grave 
dislocation has retarded the process of post-war recovery. 
4. The central problem has been, and still is, the supply of food. It is here that the 
impact of the war and of post-war unrest has been most serious, for the effects of the 
disruption of major sources of supply have been accentuated by large population 
increases. Rice is the staple food of the hundreds of millions living in the area, and in 
1938 over 5,500,000 tons were exported from Burma, Thailand and Indo-China, 
while imports into India, Ceylon, Malaya and Indonesia were 3,300,000 tons. 
Immediately after the war there were 15 million acres of abandoned rice fields in 
South-East Asia and exports from the sources mentioned above were reduced to 
under 1,000,000 tons in 1946; these were wholly absorbed by the importing 
countries of the area. In 1950 exports are not expected to exceed 2,500,000 tons. So 
radical an interruption in the supply of rice naturally held grave dangers for the 
inhabitants of all rice importing countries of the area. It undoubtedly aggravated the 
catastrophic famine in Bengal in 1943, although this was also in part a result of the 
internal strains occasioned by the war. 
5. To meet this situation and to prevent the recurrence of famine, was one of the 
first and most urgent tasks of the post-war years. The International Emergency Food 
Council was created in 1946 to allocate scarce foodstuffs on the basis of need and to 
prevent ruinous competition in world markets. It continued in operation until1949. 
This was an act of international co-operation of major significance to South and 
South-East Asia. The meagre rice allocations were also supplemented by large 
shipments of wheat from the United States, Australia and Canada. In addition, the 
importing countries themselves took measures to increase still further their own 
output of food by speeding up irrigation projects and by providing special assistance 
to farmers. 
6. Thanks to these measures and to the gradual recovery of rice production 
within the area, a sufficient flow of essential foodstuffs was maintained to avert 
widespread starvation. It must be acknowledged, however, that over the greater part 
of the area little progress has been made towards raising food consumption. 
Calculations made by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East, in its recent Economic Survey of the area, show that the output of food in 
South and South-East Asia is still below its pre-war level, while the population has 
increased by some 10 per cent. Consumption per head is, therefore, lower than it was 
ten years ago. 
7. Related to the problem of food is that of transport. Reference has already been 
made to the serious deterioration which took place in the railway system during the 
war as the result of a great increase in the volume of through traffic, some of which 
would normally have been routed by sea. There was also loss of rolling stock and 
locomotives exported directly to war areas. In South-East Asia it was found at the end 
of the war that more than a third of the pre-war track had been torn up or rendered 
useless. Road and water transport had also suffered heavily. Large numbers of water 
craft and working animals-perhaps as many as one-half-were destroyed by 
M 
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Japanese troops retreating before the Allies or through the looting of farms and 
plantations by starving refugees during the ensuing chaos. All this had the most 
serious effects upon the production and movement of crops. Since the war some of 
the deficiencies in transport equipment have been made good, but not all the 
railways of South-East Asia have yet been rebuilt. 
8. The effects of the war on industry are to be seen mainly in India. Although 
there is little industry in other parts of South and South-East Asia, the whole area 
was affected by what happened in that country. The production of war material in 
India led to a large temporary expansion in the output of steel, electric power, 
cement and cotton textiles, all devoted to war purposes. The industrial machine, 
however, especially in the jute processing and textile trades, did not receive adequate 
maintenance. As a result of this prolonged wear and tear, the accumulated 
deficiencies in the supply of many essential consumer goods could be overtaken only 
gradually during the post-war years, and at the cost of a heavy charge on external 
resources which might otherwise have been applied to new development. 
9. In view of these difficulties, it is hardly surprising that there is still a major 
task of reconstruction in South and South-East Asia. The outstanding fact is the 
amount of work which has already been done and and the levels of production which 
are being achieved. The course of the various economies is described in a wealth of 
detail in the United Nations Annual Economic Surveys of Asia and the Far East, and 
it is necessary here to relate only the essential facts. In the following table the more 
significant figures of pre-war and post-war production and exports are presented:-
Table 1 Production and exports of selected commodities 
from South and South-East Asia 
Production- Pre-war 1946 1949 
Rice (paddy) 70,990 64,987 70,117 
Wheat 10,160 9,180 9,517 
Oils and fats 3,596 2,844* 3,174 
Sugar 6,223 5,789 6,200 
Jute 1,831 1,427 1,340 
Cotton 1,132 759 606 
Tin 116 15 94 
Petroleum (crude) 7,960 444 9,034 
Exports-
Rice (paddy) 5,676 956 2,460 
Oils and fats 1,319 174 630 
Sugar 1,029 2* 36 
Tea 315 268 362 
Jute 757 391 271 
Jute manufactures 894 711 846 
Cotton 573 171 177 
Rubber 830 891 1,393 
* 1947 
Note: For the definition and sources of these figures, and for details by countries 
and years throughout the period, reference should be made to Appendix 1 [not 
printed] . 
'000 tons 
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10. It will be seen that, although production has in general been restored, exports 
have revived unevenly and exports of foodstuffs are still much lower than pre-war. 
Rice. The drastic effects of the war have already been described. Since 1946 the work 
of rehabilitation has partially restored the flow of supplies. There has been a full 
recovery in Thailand, but not in Burma or Indo-China. 
Rubber. The level of exports recovered rapidly after the war and is now far higher 
than at any previous time. Orders were placed for the necessary equipment long 
before Malaya was liberated. But the real effects of the years of neglect under 
Japanese occupation have yet to show themselves. The long period in which there 
was no replanting will react upon the productivity of the industry in future years, 
unless a large programme can be got rapidly under way. 
Oils and fats. The main producers of oils and fats in the area are India, Indonesia and 
Malaya. Immediately after the war the attempts made in India to increase the 
production of other foods reduced the output of oils and fats. Since that time 
competing demands for cultivable land have limited production. The level of India's 
exports of oils has also been affected by the cessation of its imports of copra and by a 
general increase in home consumption. In spite of internal difficulties, the 
production of oils and fats in Malaya, which suffered considerably as a result of the 
war, is now almost back to its pre-war level. 
Sugar. Production in the Indian sub-continent has been increased, but in Indonesia, 
where wartime disruption brought exports to a complete standstill, it still remains 
far below the pre-war level and is barely sufficient to meet domestic consumption. 
Over the whole area the output of sugar had just about recovered in 1949 to its 
pre-war level. 
Tea. Although Ceylon and India have substantially increased their production, this 
has been partially offset by the slowness of recovery in Indonesia. As late as 1949 
Indonesian production was only one-third of pre-war. 
Jute and cotton . India and Pakistan, the main producers of these commodities in the 
area, have found it impossible to restore pre-war levels of output because of 
continuing demands on cultivable land for other purposes. Present plans provide for 
increased production of both materials. 
Tin. The tin mines of Malaya and Indonesia suffered heavily from the 'scorched earth' 
policy during hostilities and from neglect during enemy occupation; in Thailand the 
mines were kept short of fuel. Since the war new dredges and pumps have been put 
into operation and the supply of engineering materials, coal and electric power 
improved. By 1949 the production of tin had been almost restored to the pre-war 
level, from the very low level of 1946. This was mainly due to rapid improvements in 
Malaya and Indonesia. Production of tin in Burma and Thailand remains low. 
Crude petroleum. Production in Indonesia, which ceased almost entirely after the 
war, was restored by 1949 to 80 per cent. of the 1938 level. In Brunei, however, 
production has greatly expanded since the war and is now nearly five times as great 
as in 1938. 
Electric power. Industrial expansion during the war led to an increase in the output 
of electric power in the sub-continent of India and this has been continued in 
post-war years. It is now almost twice the pre-war level, although still insufficient to 
meet demand. 
11. Against this background of dislocation and uneven recovery in South and 
South-East Asia it is possible to distinguish certain broad financial effects. First 
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among these was the inflation of prices and costs caused by the shortage of supplies 
and unbalanced Budgets. In the Indian sub-continent the increase in the supply of 
money to finance war production and the accumulation of sterling credits against 
wartime exports led to an increase of 150 per cent. in wholesale prices between 1939 
and 1946. In the occupied territories of South-East Asia the enemy financed himself 
by unrestricted creation of paper money. Over the whole of the area the increase of 
wholesale prices between 1939 and 194 7 was nowhere less than 150 per cent. and was 
as great as 1,000 per cent. in Indo-China. During the five years since the war the 
inflationary pressure has slackened, but the upward movement of prices did not show 
signs of halting until 1949. At the present time, however, account must be taken of 
the probable long-term effects of the devaluation of sterling and of the rearmament 
policies recently decided upon. 
12. The effects of inflation in South and South-East Asia have been mitigated by 
the provision of external finance and by using up external assets. The process of 
rehabilitation has been assisted by import surpluses financed by these means. The 
attempts by some countries to increase production in various sectors of the economy 
have, during the past five years, involved increased imports of machinery, vehicles 
and constructional materials, which domestic industry was unable to provide. 
Moreover, emergency imports of grain and textiles in the period immediately after 
the war made possible only by incurring substantial trading deficits which were 
financed by drawings upon accumulated reserves of sterling. In addition, import 
licensing controls have been relaxed for certain periods since the war, and this has 
had the same effect of giving an outlet to inflationary pressures dammed up within 
the economy. 
13. For some or all of the above reasons, India, Pakistan and Ceylon drew upon 
their sterling balances in the years 1946-49 to the extent of about £340 million to 
finance their deficits on current account. This external finance could scarcely be 
regarded as adequate considering the extent of the losses incurred during the war 
and the post-war needs of the countries. It was nevertheless equal to more than 
one-fifth of their combined imports from the rest of the world during the period. To 
this extent the United Kingdom bore the immediate burden of rehabilitation in India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon, and it was in fact enabled to do this by generous support from 
the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in the form of gifts and loans 
(including Marshall Aid) and by the accumulation of sterling balances by various 
countries. In the Colonial territories in the area the United Kingdom Government 
have also sanctioned assistance to a total of £95 million in the form of grants in aid of 
administration, loans and grants for war damage and development purposes, and 
security expenditure. Of this amount about £4 7 million will have been spent by 31st 
March, 1951. The direct burden of rehabilitating the Commonwealth countries in 
South and South-East Asia has thus been borne to a large extent within the 
Commonwealth, apart from drawings by India on the International Monetary Fund 
and on loans from the International Bank. 
14. Less progress has been made with rehabilitation in most of the non-
Commonwealth countries of South-East Asia. The United Kingdom, Canada and 
Australia provided some financial support to these countries during the period of 
rehabilitation. A joint Commonwealth loan to Burma of £6 million was shared 
between the United Kingdom, Australia, India, Pakistan and Ceylon. India made a 
loan to Thailand. Nevertheless, the assistance given by the Commonwealth to the 
[102) COLONIAL GENERAL 175 
non-Commonwealth countries, as also the substantial aid provided by the United 
States and other countries, has done no more than meet a part of their needs. 
15. A realistic view of the last five years shows that much has been done to restore 
the disrupted economies of South and South-East Asia. Those countries which have 
succeeded in maintaining political stability through the turmoil of the period have 
made headway with rehabilitation, although this has in some cases involved large 
balance of payments deficits. A stage has now been reached at which it is possible to 
plan ahead and to move from policies based upon the need to deal with immediate 
emergencies to the execution of sound and realistic long-term plans for economic 
development. 
Chapter Ill. The need for development 
1. Throughout South and South-East Asia the standard of living is lamentably 
low, and the economies are gravely underdeveloped. Poverty and hardship are the 
rule rather than the exception. The meagre diet of most of the peoples of these 
countries lacks variety; it is composed mainly of cereals, pulses and starchy foods, 
which do not supply the amount of proteins and fats necessary to proper nutrition. 
The average daily consumption of food per head is below 2,000 calories, which 
contrasts with about 3,000 in the United Kingdom. The absence of adequate medical 
facilities results in a high mortality rate. Illiteracy is very high. There are many ways 
in which the lot of the peoples in the area might be compared with that of those in 
more advanced countries, and all would emphasise the need for urgent measures to 
improve their position. This can be done most economically and effectively by the 
development of the natural resources of the area. The longer the initiation of the 
necessary action is postponed, the greater will the problem become. It brooks no 
delay. 
2. Everywhere in the area populations are growing quickly, as is indicated by the 
following table:-
Table 2. Rates of population increase in South and South-East Asia 
India 
Pakistan 
Ceylon 
Malaya 
Burma (1931-41) 
Thailand (1937-47) 
Indo-China (1931-36) 
Indonesia (Java, 1920-30) 
···} 
... 
Annual rate 
of increase 
per cent 
1-1.5 
2.2 
2.4 
1.3 
1.8 
1.4 
1.8 
If these rates of increase are maintained, the present population of some 570 million 
will, before 1970, have grown to 720 million, an increase in less than twenty years 
roughly equivalent to the total population of the United States. To some extent this 
increase will reflect the lower death rate resulting from improvements in public 
health-for example, the eradication of malaria from Ceylon. The inevitable 
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short-term trend towards larger populations only emphasises the need for rapid 
development. The additional problem which this increase in population involves 
may, however, be counterbalanced to some extent by the increased vigour and 
productivity of the people which might be expected to flow from any advance in their 
standard of living. In the longer run experience suggests that a general improvement 
in standards of living eventually exercises a steadying influence on the growth of 
population. In some countries in the area this influence is already apparent from the 
declining birth rate of the middle classes. In East Bengal, for instance, it has been 
found that the average size of families tends to be smaller on holdings of ten acres 
than on those of five. 
3. It is clear that agricultural and industrial production will have to rise to 
provide for the additional population-even at the existing standard of living. A very 
substantial programme of development is needed to secure any improvement. The 
necessary statistical data do not exist for a reliable estimate of the extent to which 
production is keeping pace with population growth in South and South-East Asia, 
but it is highly probable that the events of the last ten years have caused production 
per head to deteriorate. As far as the land is concerned, this is not a new process, for 
in undivided India agricultural yields per acre had been falling before 1939. While the 
area under rice rose slightly from an average of 66 million acres in 1914-19 to an 
average of 69 million acres in 1934-35, the average yearly production of rice actually 
fell from 27 to 25 million tons. This decrease in agricultural yields must be checked 
and some improvement must be achieved. In essence, however, the problem is one of 
original development of potential resources rather than mere rehabilitation and the 
restoration of economic activity to a previous level. The problem may be described as 
one of increasing the capital equipment of the countries in order not only to keep 
pace with the growth of populations, but also through increased production per head 
to permit some rise in the level of consumption. This is a formidable task. 
4. The present state of development in South and South-East Asia is probably as 
low as anywhere in the world. International comparisons are difficult and preclude 
precise conclusions, but it is possible to give a broad picture of the disparity between 
the national incomes of countries in the area and those of more advanced countries. 
From such information as is available, it appears that average national income per 
head in most of South and South-East Asia ranges around £20, whereas in the United 
Kingdom it is over ten times as large, and in the United States it approaches £400. 
5. By far the largest element of national income in South and South-East Asia is 
derived from agriculture, which in all the countries provides the livelihood for more 
than half, and in some for as much as 80 per cent., of the population. The heart of the 
problem is the under-employment which results from the pressure of population on 
the land. In Ceylon, for example there are nearly 1,200 people who depend upon 
agriculture for every 1,000 acres of cultivated land. This contrasts with about 60 in 
Great Britain. 
6. What this difference means in terms of output can be illustrated by a 
comparison between India, with 306 million acres under cultivation, and the United 
States with 360 million. In India there are 73 million agricultural workers of all 
kinds, while in the United States only 8 million are actively occupied on the land. In 
spite of the much more intense application of manpower, agricultural yields per acre 
are far below those in the United States; for instance, the yield of wheat is less than 
600 lb. compared with over 1,000 lb., and the yield of cotton is only 66lb. compared 
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with 313 lb. This disparity cannot be explained simply by natural differences of soil 
fertility; it is the application of capital which enables the farm worker in the United 
States to produce so much more than the peasant of South and South-East Asia. For 
example, in the United States there are over 2,400,000 tractors, whereas in India 
there are only 10,000. Again, the United States uses, on an area only one-sixth 
greater, over 13 million tons of fertiliser a year against some 200,000 tons used by 
India. 
7. In communications, fuel and power, and industry the scope for development is 
illustrated by the comparative examples given in the following table:-
Table 3. Levels of economic development in 1949: comparative indicators 
Unit 
Per'OOO United United 
population India Pakistan Ceylon Malaya Kingdom States (a) 
Electricity 
production '000 kWh 13 1.9 9.6 117 1,033 2,296 
Coal 
consumption tons 80 18 28 85 3,884 3,473 
Petroleum 
consumption tons 7.8 11 23 99(b) 327 1,638 
Steel 
consumption tons 3.8 1.3 6 16 194 364 
Cement 
consumption tons 7.2 3.6 19 25 148 229 
Locomotives Nos.(c) 22 16 32 31 410 309 
Carrying capacity 
of railway wagons tons 10(d) 8.8 4.5 13 276 556 
Rail freight '000 65 32 446 4,568 
ton miles 
Load-carrying road 
vehicles Nos. 0.18 0.07 1.41 3 16 43 
All-weather roads miles 0.32 0.1 0.87 0.93 3.7 2.2 
Telephones Nos. 0.37 0.21 2.2 7.7 98 261 
(a) In most cases, figures refer to 1948. 
(b) Excluding Service supplies and bunkers. 
(c) Per million population. 
(d) Excludes 16,516 wagons for which no carrying capacity is recorded. 
8. The scope and the need for development are great, but so also are the 
potentialities of the region's underdeveloped natural resources. In India it is 
estimated that improvements in agricultural practices and technique alone, through 
the use of better seeds and fertilisers and through irrigation works, existing steel 
plants and the construction of additional capacity for an annual output of 500,000 
tons, could by 1956-57 secure increases over the current estimated levels of 
production of 8 per cent. (3,000,000 tons) in foodgrains, 30 per cent. (195,000 tons) 
in cotton, 50 per cent. (375,000 tons) in jute and 30 per cent. (1,500,000 tons) in 
oil-seeds. In Ceylon it would be possible in the long run to bring another 3 million 
acres of land under the plough, thus doubling the cultivated area. In Pakistan two 
irrigation projects at present in hand, at Thai and Kotri, will make an additional 
4,800,000 acres available for cultivation, and a further 2,300,000 acres at present 
lying waterlogged in West Pakistan could be recovered by the construction of 
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tube-wells to lower the water-table in the area. Similarly, in nearly all the other 
countries of the area the application of capital would enable large tracts to be 
brought under cultivation. This work, much of which will be accompanied by the 
development of hydro-electric power, is the first step towards that growth in 
productivity without which many of the ills which afflict South and South-East 
Asia-poverty, under-feeding, disease, illiteracy-cannot be relieved. The hydro-
electric power resources of the area have hardly yet been tapped. Pakistan's potential, 
for instance, is estimated at over 5,000,000 kilowatts; the actual installed hydro-
electric capacity is now 9,600 kilowatts, and in the next six years it is to be increased 
by 200,000 kilowatts. What is true of hydro-electric power is true also of the mineral 
resources of the area; in many of the countries the extent of these resources has not 
yet even been ascertained. 
9. The human and material resources of the area are large enough to solve its 
problems. But if they are not brought into effective use, the position will become 
worse. Even the present inadequate standards of nutrition will not be maintained, for 
the pressure of increasing populations will bring them still lower, and this will make 
it all the more difficult to create the social services which are required to combat 
disease and to educate the millions who are still unable to read. The growth of 
productive power is a gradual process which must be spread over generations. The 
levels now reached in the advanced countries, which are themselves insufficient to 
satisfy their peoples' aspirations, are the result of 150 years of economic develop-
ment. It is the early stages which are the most costly and difficult. Basic 
services-railways, roads, ports and harbours, electricity and irrigation-require a 
vast capital investment and must be undertaken before production can be increased 
significantly. In democratic countries a certain minimum of social services must be 
provided concurrently with programmes for economic development if these are to 
command the popular support without which they would be frustrated. 
10. The countries in South and South-East Asia are at very different stages of 
development, but none has passed the period at which heavy expenditure on basic 
services is required. Once the process of development gets under way its effects are 
cumulative and the difficulties become less. This is illustrated by the experience of 
these countries so far. In India the production of iron and steel increased from an 
almost negligible amount in 1914 to 400,000 tons in 1925, and to 800,000 tons in 
1939; in the next ten years there was a further increase to 1,100,000 tons. In the 
same way it was possible to expand the production of cement, already doubled in the 
five years before the war, by another 47 per cent. between 1939 and 1949. 
11. The most effective and efficient pattern of development is different for each 
country. There is no standard formula which can be universally applied. There are, 
however, no grounds in experience for the view that development implies unecono-
mic national self-sufficiency. In fact, the countries in South and South-East Asia 
with specialised economies heavily dependent upon international trade have the 
largest national incomes per head. In the ordinary way the growth of national 
income brings with it automatically an increase in trade. The United States, which 
has the widest and most complete natural resources of any advanced country, and 
which could be virtually self-sufficient if it wished, has a foreign trade per head some 
twenty times as great as that of India. 
12. Ever since the end of the war, and indeed during the war itself, considerable 
thought has been given in South and South-East Asia to the need for development. 
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Much useful experience has been gained without which it would have been 
impossible to proceed with the formulation and execution of realistic programmes. 
The problems of the whole area have been in the forefront of discussions in the 
United Nations and its Specialised Agencies, and valuable expert investigations have 
been made, particularly by the Economic and Social Council and the Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East. Now, for the first time, it is possible, as is 
shown by such detailed programmes as have been submitted, to proceed with the 
comprehensive attack on the problem which the situation demands. The different 
countries have of course approached their problems differently, but there is a 
common strand which runs through the whole. In Chapters IV-VII there is a brief 
description of each of the Commonwealth countries' Development Programmes, as 
prepared for discussion and analysis in this report; additional statistical material will 
be found in the Appendices .... 
Chapter VIII. The sum of the programmes of the Commonwealth countries 
1. The programmes described in the previous four chapters demonstrate the 
opportunities which exist in the area for raising the standard of living of the peoples 
through development. They also show that the countries' resources of capital and 
trained men are insufficient to make full use of these opportunities. All the 
Commonwealth countries in the area-and indeed the non-Commonwealth coun-
tries too-face the same problem, but their needs and circumstances differ widely. 
For this reason the course of development charted in the programmes, and the 
problems which will be encountered, are necessarily different. 
2. In India, the problem is one of food and raw material shortage, and the need to 
overcome inflation; so the programme is directed to the expansion of food and raw 
material production, and the scale of development which can be undertaken is 
governed by the need to prevent inflation. Pakistan's problem is one of low 
productivity and of the need to provide some diversification in an almost completely 
agricultural economy; so its programme provides for more industry and a general 
advance in power, transport and agricultural efficiency. In Ceylon, and also in 
Malaya, the economies are at present highly specialised in the production of export 
crops; it is therefore necessary, without abandoning specialisation in traditional lines 
of production, to concentrate on opening up new areas for food production in order 
to give more stability to the economies. 
3. All the countries need to undertake basic economic development on a large 
scale-irrigation, power, communications, railways, roads, ports and harbour 
installations. Most of this work is normally the responsibility of Governments, and 
the programmes presented are those of public authorities and are to be financed 
almost entirely by public authorities, directly or indirectly. Private investment does 
not normally undertake work in the field of basic economic development. For 
however much this development contributes to the prosperity of the countries 
themselves and to the world as a whole, it is not of a character likely to appeal to the 
private investor. Moreover, the scale of investment required is far beyond the scope 
of the domestic capital market in an under-developed country. 
4. This is why the programmes mainly relate to public investment. But the fact 
that the work of basic development is for the most part undertaken by public 
authorities in no way lessens the importance which is attached to private investment. 
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In general, public investment in these countries is confined to basic services and to 
industries of strategic importance, such as the production of munitions; the 
establishment of new basic industries also tends to require Government finance. 
Both in India and in Pakistan there are a number of undertakings in which 
Government and private enterprise work in partnership. In the case of Pakistan, the 
Government found itself compelled to take the initiative in this way, in order to 
inspire public confidence in the undertakings and to attract private capital to them. 
It is the intention of the Government to withdraw its participation in these 
enterprises as soon as private capital is able to provide all the necessary funds. In the 
general field of industry and commerce, however, the dominant role in all the 
countries is played by private enterprise. 
5. As the development programmes proceed and the national incomes and 
savings of the countries grow, the scope for private investment will increase. It is 
expected, for example, that in India private investment will rise by about 60 per cent. 
in the course of the six-year period. In the Federation of Malaya, where the major 
export industries are entirely privately owned, private investment in agriculture, 
mining and industry will be substantially greater than the public investment in these 
fields. Throughout these countries, public development paves the way for private 
investment. 
6. All the Governments welcome the inflow of foreign private capital, and whilst 
some regulation is necessary to ensure that the investment is not inconsistent with 
the wider economic interests of the countries, these regulations are in practice 
administered in a manner which takes fully into account the countries' need for 
foreign capital. In the long run, when the emphasis of the investment programmes 
changes from basic development to investment in industry and commerce, the need 
will best be satisfied by private capital. Indeed the progress of these countries in later 
years will depend largely upon the existence of a favourable atmosphere for private 
foreign investment. Whilst at present the scale of private foreign investment is small 
in relation to capital needs, all the countries are conducting their policies towards 
foreign investment in a manner which seeks to build up this favourable atmosphere. 
Nature of the programmes 
7. The rate of expenditure under the development programmes is as follows:-
Table 18. Public authorities' expenditure on development programmes 
India 
Pakistan(a) 
Ceylon 
Malaya and British Borneo 
1950-51 
£m . 
169 
32 
10 
6 
Average annual 
rate 
1951-57 
£m. 
230 
47 
17 
18 
Per cent. of 
national income 
3 
2% 
10(b) 
4 
Total 
1951-57 
£m. 
1,379 
280 
102 
107 
(a) The Pakistan programme includes £43 million of private investment in 1951-57. 
(b) Based on a probable under-estimate of Ceylon's national income. 
8. In framing these programmes, the Governments have been guided by their 
experience of development work so far. They have included only as much as they 
could be reasonably confident of completing within the period, given a supply of 
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capital and trained men from overseas on the scale indicated. Previous plans have 
been ruthlessly curtailed in order to arrive at programmes which are both feasible 
and balanced within themselves. India, for example, has projects worked out which 
would cost Rs.32,000 million; but the programme is limited to Rs.18,000 million. 
Pakistan's programme is about 60 per cent. of what it was previously hoped could be 
accomplished. Post-war experience in most countries, not only in South and 
South-East Asia, has shown the danger of starting on an over-ambitious investment 
programme, and consequently of failing to carry it out. 
9. The size of the programmes is limited by the shortage of both capital and 
trained men of all kinds. Even programmes of the size now contemplated could not 
be accomplished without capital and trained men from overseas. It will be noted that 
the programmes for Ceylon and Malaya are larger, in relation both to national 
income and to population, than those of India and Pakistan. This is possibly 
primarily because of their higher national income per head. 
10. In all the countries the programmes represent a considerable acceleration in 
the present rate of development. With the assistance of substantial economic support 
from overseas and by drawing down their sterling balances, the countries have been 
able to do a great deal, although in some cases much of the work has been more in 
the nature of reconstruction than new development. Organisations are therefore in 
being to carry out development, and a large number of projects are already under 
way. A total of ninety-four identifiable projects of £1,000,000 or more, costing in all 
£569 million, are included in the programmes, and significant expenditure will have 
taken place on seventy-one of these by June 1951. These development programmes 
are not a leap in the dark; in great part they involve a speeding up and broadening of 
work which is already in progress. 
11. As far as future development is concerned, the experience already gained is of 
particular importance. Procedures which have been evolved over the years exist in all 
the countries for the stringent control of public expenditure. More recently, the 
problem has been to establish machinery for the co-ordination of large-scale 
development planning. There are many difficulties in the way of building a 
sufficiently strong organisation of this nature, but the Governments are fully seized 
of its importance. Moreover they recognise that the administration of development 
programmes cannot follow a rigid pattern; rather it must be kept under constant 
review as the development work gathers momentum. 
12. The distribution and the cost of the programmes is described in the following 
table:-
Table 19. Analysis of development programmes 
Malaya and 
India Pakistan Ceylon British Borneo Total 
£m. £m. £m. £m. £m. Percentage 
Agriculture(a) 456 88 38 13 595 32 
Transport and 
communications 527 57 22 21 627 34 
Fuel and power 43 51 8 20 122 6 
Industry and mining(b) 135 53 6 194 10 
Social capital 218 31 28 53 330 18 
-
1,379 280 102 107 1,868 100 
(a) Including multi-purpose projects. (b) Excluding coal. 
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13. In all the countries (except Singapore, where the problems are entirely 
different) the programmes concentrate upon agriculture, transport and communica-
tions, and electric power. These are the basic development requirements, related to 
the overriding need to increase production of food and agricultural raw materials. 
They account for over 70 per cent. of the total of the programmes. They include 
bringing new land into cultivation in all countries. For example, the Ceylon 
programme envisages an increase of some 20 per cent. in the land under food 
production, without interfering with the production of export crops. In India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon, the basic development will be achieved by big multi-purpose 
projects which combine irrigation, flood control and the production of hydro-electric 
power. In India and Pakistan much of the newly irrigated land will be cultivated by 
modern techniques. This work will demonstrate throughout the area the possibilities 
and advantages of new systems of agriculture. The productivity of the land already 
under cultivation is also to be increased by greater use of fertiliser, double cropping, 
seed-farms, improved transport and provision of electric power. 
14. Industry accounts for about 10 per cent. of the expenditure envisaged in the 
programmes. In Pakistan the proportion is nearly 20 per cent, but Pakistan is a 
country with hardly any industry at all, since the parts of undivided India which 
subsequently formed Pakistan were the agricultural areas serving the towns; the 
scale of industrialisation envisaged in the next six years is the minimum necessary to 
introduce a better balance into the economy. In India relatively little industrialisa-
tion is contemplated; the main effort is directed to food and raw material production, 
and to the provision of power and transport for the countryside, so that rural 
industries can develop naturally and along economic lines. The general tendency of 
policy in all the countries is away from the concept of intensive urban development 
and towards a more balanced economy in the villages. 
15. The rest of the programmes is devoted to the provision of social capital-
housing, health and education. The need for these services is, of course, very 
pressing, and it is necessary for them to march in step with the development of 
productive power. They can moreover have a considerable effect on productivity by 
enhancing the mobility, physical fitness and efficiency of labour. The expenditure of 
capital on social services involves a running cost when the services are established, 
and this becomes a fixed charge on budget revenue. The Governments have therefore 
had to weigh the relative advantages of the development of production against the 
extension of social services. In so doing they have had to take into account the fact 
that the former directly increases the future national income and taxable capacity, 
whereas the latter represents a call upon future revenue. The countries have struck 
this balance differently in their programmes. India and Pakistan have allocated only 
modest funds to social capital; Ceylon and the Federation of Malaya have allocated 
rather more; while over half of the Singapore programme consists of expenditure on 
social capital. This is inevitable in a city with the special characteristics of Singapore, 
with its rapidly rising population. 
16. The programmes consist of a large number of specified schemes, which are 
listed in Appendices 3 to 6. Apart from the large multi-purpose projects, a relatively 
small part of the total consists of big projects, and most of the remainder is made up 
of a series of expenditures which could perhaps be grouped together under broad 
headings, as in Table 19. They cannot, however, be said to represent self-contained 
operations which can be treated individually without regard to the programme as a 
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whole. Indeed, even the major projects depend to some extent for their full effect on 
the carrying through of these other expenditures. In fact, of the total cost of the 
programmes, only about one-third can be attributed to readily identifiable individual 
projects. This is shown by the following table:-
Table 20. Range of identifiable projects in development programmes 
Projects begun Projects begun 
before June 1951 after June 1951 Total 
No. Value No. Value No. Value 
£m. £m. £m. 
Over £10,000,000 12 223 6 116 18 339 
Between £1,000,000 
and £10,000,000 59 165 17 65 76 230 
- -
71 388 23 181 94 569 
17. All the programmes involve the expenditure of foreign exchange. But the 
proportion of this expenditure varies widely from programme to programme. This is 
illustrated by the following table, which shows the division between expenditure on 
domestic goods and services and expenditure of foreign exchange on imported 
developmental commodities:-
Table 21. Domestic and foreign exchange expenditure for programmes, 1951-57 
India 
Pakistan 
Ceylon 
Malaya and British Borneo 
Total 
£m. 
1,379 
280 
102 
107 
Expenditure on 
domestic goods 
and services* 
£m. 
1,142 
165 
63 
87 
Expenditure of 
foreign 
exchange 
£m. 
237 
115 
39 
20 
Percentage of 
foreign exchange 
expenditure 
17 
41 
38 
19 
• Part of the domestic expenditure will call for external finance. See Table 27 I not printed]. 
As will be seen, the proportion of the foreign exchange expenditure to the total cost 
of development is much smaller for India and Malaya than for the other two 
countries. In the case of India this is because a high proportion of the materials and 
equipment required is available within the country, and the need for imports is 
therefore relatively small. This is also true to some extent of Malaya, with the 
additional factor that the programmes have a large local labour content. 
Results of the programmes 
18. When the programmes are completed, results like the following can be 
anticipated:-
More land under cultivation:-
13 million acres (increase of 31/2 per cent.). 
More foodgrains produced:-
6 million tons (increase of 10 per cent.). 
More land under irrigation:-
13 million acres (increase of 17 per cent.). 
184 ECONOMIC POLICY [102) 
More electric generating capacity:-
1.1 million kilowatts (increase of 67 per cent.). 
19. In terms of the standard of living of the people, the growth of productive 
power is not likely to show spectacular results by 1957. But the danger at present 
throughout the area, and in particular in the Indian sub-continent, is that the 
standard of living will fall, as a result of population growth and the inadequacy of 
savings and capital investment. The programmes will do little more than hold the 
present position, but it will be apparent to everyone in South and South-East Asia 
that progress is being made. The strength of these programmes is that they are 
designed to lay sound foundations for further development: they aim to provide, in a 
six-year period, the indispensable preliminary basic development which will pave the 
way for improvement in the future. 
20. The execution of the programmes is expected to strengthen the financial 
position of the countries, both internally and externally. The growth of productive 
power will increase national income and therefore the yield from taxation and the 
amount of savings. The Indian programme, for example, envisages that the net 
home-financed investment programme, both private and public, would increase 
from its current annual rate of Rs.2,450 million (£184 million) to an annual rate of 
Rs.4,360 million (£327 million) by 1957. The increased production, particularly of 
food, will curb the inflationary forces, and the result will be a healthier internal 
economy, better able to sustain its own investment programme. 
21. On the external side, it is impossible to forecast balances of payments several 
years ahead, especially for countries whose export earnings are subject to wide 
fluctuations . It is clear, however, that the export potential of the various countries is 
likely to rise as the programmes take effect, and this will enable them to increase 
their total imports. At the same time the tendency will certainly be for the 
composition of these imports to change. In particular, the increased food production 
envisaged in all the programmes is likely to reduce the proportion of food imports in 
favour of imports of capital and consumer goods, even though there is ample room 
for an increase in food consumption. This somewhat lowered dependence on 
imported food will in turn strengthen the economies of the countries and enable 
them the better to meet any crises which might endanger food supplies from abroad. 
In the result, therefore, there is a reasonable expectation that the development will 
strengthen the external financial position of the countries. While this is true of all 
the countries, it applies with special force in the case of Pakistan. 
Effect on world trade 
22. The increase in incomes is likely, other things being equal, to contribute to 
the expansion of world trade. The opposite would be true only if the development 
were consciously planned to lead towards self-sufficiency. While the programmes 
provide for some diversification of the economies, this is not with autarky in mind. 
There is such a dangerous dependence on two or three export crops in Ceylon and 
Malaya that diversification is no more than ordinary prudence, while in Pakistan the 
economy is concentrated unduly upon agriculture. 
23. All the countries are expanding rice production, and the total increase may be 
of the order of 2,500,000 tons. India expects to increase production by 7 per cent. 
Pakistan by 6 per cent., Ceylon by 32 per cent. and Malaya by 77 per cent. This 
expansion will not, however, lead to uneconomic duplication. The total population of 
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the area at the end of the six years is likely to be some 10 per cent. higher, and the 
increase in production envisaged in the programmes will to a large extent be taken 
up by the restoration of pre-war levels of consumption. On balance, it is estimated 
that the aggregate dependence of all the countries in the area on rice imports will be 
lessened by not more than 10 per cent., and that they will still have to import a total 
of 1,700,000 tons. 
24. Both the Indian and the Pakistan programmes provide for an increase in 
cotton production; here too there is such a large potential demand for cloth in the 
sub-continent that the extra cotton, and the extra cloth, will be easily absorbed. The 
increased production of jute is likewise directed towards a sound economic purpose. 
Exports from the Indian sub-continent have fallen since the end of the war. The 
commodity has been so scarce and expensive that other countries have been 
stimulated to search for substitutes to an extent which may threaten the future 
market for the natural product. This danger will clearly be lessened if production is 
expanded to a level which will enable it to be sold more cheaply. It should, moreover, 
be noted that even these plans for expansion both in India and Pakistan will not 
restore production to pre-war levels. In these circumstances the attention to be paid 
to jute and jute goods is clearly necessary for both countries. 
25. The programmes are of a constructive character in relation to world trade 
and the world economy. The corollary is that a healthy world economy is vital for the 
fulfilment of the programmes. The demand for the main exports of the area is subject 
to extreme fluctuations, as is illustrated by the following table:-
Table 22. London prices of South and South-East Asia export commodities 
Basis 1920-29 1930-39 1940-49(a) 
Commodity of prices High Low High Low High 
Tea 
Rubber 
Tin 
Copra 
Jute 
pence/lb. 20%(b) 15%(b) 181fz lllf4 361f4(C) 
pence/lb. 35 91f4 91fz 21f4 18 
£per ton 419(b) 139(b) 311 100 757 
£per ton 30 21 23 9 47(c) 
£per ton 78 15 56 14 115 
(a) The period 1940-49 was marked by a general upward trend in prices. 
(b) 1922-29 only. 
Low 
14lf4(c) 
11% 
209 
19(c) 
21 
(c) Average f.o.b. contract prices; the free market price for copra was substantially higher. 
The national incomes of these countries, their balance of payments and, in 
particular, their dollar earnings are thus at all times vulnerable even to relatively 
minor fluctuations in world business activity. In working out their programmes 
Commonwealth countries have assumed a relatively high level of world demand for 
their basic exports. If this assumption were not fulfilled, their ability to carry out 
these development programmes would be gravely impaired. 
Conclusion 
26. The conclusion is reached that the development programmes have been 
framed on a realistic basis. They are designed to provide the foundations for future 
progress rather than early dramatic results. They are consistent with the concept of 
an expanding world economy, but are very vulnerable to changes in the level of 
business activity throughout the world. There are two limitations upon the size of 
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the programmes-the shortage of trained men, and the shortage of capital, both 
internal and external. The latter shortage is the more serious. Even these program-
mes, though limited in the results which they will achieve immediately, are more 
than the countries can sustain from their own resources. Their economies need 
support to carry the programmes through. The next two chapters describe the size 
and nature of the support which they require .... 
Chapter X. The need for capital 
Conclusion 
35. This Report has described in detail the economic problems and programmes 
only of the Commonwealth countries within the area. Much that it contains, 
however, would apply with substantial accuracy to those other countries of South 
and South-East Asia which are not members of the Commonwealth. They all are 
afflicted by deep and widespread poverty. They all suffer from an acute shortage of 
capital. It has not yet proved possible for these countries to discuss their economic 
programmes alongside those of Commonwealth countries, but it is hoped that this 
may be done at a later stage. When their data and programmes become available, it 
will almost certainly prove that they require external finance for comparable 
purposes and on a comparable scale. 
36. At such time as these additional countries in the area become fully associated 
with the work of the Consultative Committee and are in a position to make their 
programmes available, it will be necessary to make some adjustment in the name and 
structure of the Committee in order to permit it to operate effectively on a wider 
basis. If other countries find themselves able to help in the work of economic 
development in South and South-East Asia, further and probably more radical 
alterations in the organisation will be required. It may be the wish both of countries 
providing external finance and of those receiving it that it should be made available 
on a bilateral basis. It may be, however, that there would also be need for an 
organisation of participating Governments which could review progress, which could 
draw up periodic reports, and which could serve as a forum for the discussion of 
development problems in South and South-East Asia. The form of such an 
organisation cannot be determined until it is clear what the sources of external 
finance will be. But it would seem preferable if the organisation could include both 
countries supplying capital and countries receiving it, who would all meet to 
consider the problem of development as a matter of common interest. 
37. Stress has been laid throughout this Report on the poverty of the peoples in 
the area. In economic terms that is the cardinal fact which must be held in mind. In 
another sense, however, these countries are rich. They are rich in the dignity of 
peasants tilling the soil, and in the wisdom of teachers and scholars. They also 
possess incalculable capital in the form of the traditions of civilisations which are 
older than history itself-traditions which have produced treasures of art and 
learning and which still mould the minds and spirits of their peoples. The worst 
effect of poverty has been to cloud and circumscribe these human assets. They must 
be liberated so that they can contribute towards the self-realisation of individuals, 
towards the fulfilment of national aspirations, and towards the enhancement of the 
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lives of other peoples throughout the world. The progress of science and technology 
has suggested ways in which this may be done; and in an age when other countries 
are increasingly reaping the advantages of scientific and industrial advance, the 
hastening of a similar process in Asia cannot safely be delayed. 
38. Commonwealth countries in the area have shown their determination to do 
their full share in furthering the economic development of their own countries. It is 
realised that this burden must be borne chiefly by the countries themselves. The 
careful preparation of these programmes by the Governments of the under-developed 
countries and the scrutiny which they have given to all the projects which they have 
under contemplation in order to reduce them to a consistent and practical 
programme, is an index of their self-disciplined resolve to move forward energetical-
ly. Without external financial assistance something will be done. But it will be done 
at a much slower rate than would be possible if external finance were provided. 
39. And speed is necessary. In a world racked by schism and confusion it is 
doubtful whether free men can long afford to leave undeveloped and imprisoned in 
poverty the human resources of the countries of South and South-East Asia which 
could help so greatly, not only to restore the world's prosperity, but also to redress its 
confusion and enrich the lives of all men everywhere. 
103 CAB 134/228, EPC 5(51)3 9 Mar 1951 
'Production of raw materials in the colonial empire': Cabinet 
Economic Policy Committee minutes 
The Committee considered a memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
(E.P.C.(51) 18) describing the production of raw materials in the Colonies and 
discussing the possibility of its further development. 
The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs said that the general conclusions to be 
drawn from the paper were that there was not a great prospect of a large-scale 
immediate increase in production, but that a good deal could be done in the course 
of the next few years if firm arrangements were made and the needs of the Colonial 
territories were met. As the paper pointed out, the level of production could be raised 
only if capital goods were made available for Colonial industries and transport 
systems and if Colonial requirements of consumer goods were met as fully as 
possible. In the near future increased quantities of raw cotton might be obtainable 
from Nigeria, and possibly also from Uganda. Discussions about using iron pyrites 
from Cyprus for the production of sulphuric acid were now going on between his 
Department and the Board of Trade, and a further examination was being made of 
the possibility of using the sulphur deposits in the New Hebrides. More copper could 
be obtained from Northern Rhodesia if the Southern Rhodesian authorities would 
co-operate by making coal available from the Wankie mine, and the Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations was examining this question. 
In discussion the following points were made:-
(a) Repeated attempts had been made to obtain the help of the Government of 
Southern Rhodesia in making Wankie coal available for the Northern Rhodesian 
copper mines. It was not entirely clear whether coal or transport was now the 
bottleneck, but political considerations in Southern Rhodesia continued to hinder 
N 
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effective co-operation. When the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations had 
obtained a report on the present situation further action should if possible be taken, 
since our need for copper was urgent and the Northern Rhodesian mines provided a 
valuable supplementary source within the Commonwealth. 
(b) The implication in the paper that shortages of raw materials might in general 
be temporary was incorrect. Even if no stockpiling had been taking place, the 
demand for non-ferrous metals would have exceeded the supply, and in the long term 
it would be necessary to arrive at a policy for limiting consumption as well as 
increasing production. 
(c) The Colonies would undoubtedly need increased supplies of capital goods and 
consumer goods, and Colonial authorities should be urged to place orders for the 
former without delay. They might also be encouraged to buy consumer goods in 
Europe. 
(d) Orders from the Colonies for steel bars from the United Kingdom should be 
confined to essential needs, since steel bars were becoming a bottleneck in the 
United Kingdom building programme. 
(e) The statement, in section (v) of Appendix A, that the present world output of 
tin exceeded consumption by about 30 per cent was incorrect: 10 per cent was the 
correct figure. Although recent attempts to revive the tinmining industry in 
Cornwall had been unsuccessful this might be due in part to deliberate obstruction 
by financial interests which controlled both Straits and Cornish mines, and it should 
not be taken for granted that Cornish mining would be uneconomical. 
The Committee:-
Took note of E.P.C.(51)18 and of the points made in discussion. 
104 DO 35/2380, no 1 19 Dec 1947 
[Development of Africa]: memorandum by Field-Marshal Lord 
Montgomery, 'Tour in Africa, Nov-Dec 1947' [Extract] 
[Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery, chief of the imperial general staff, decided to make a 
tour of Africa at the end of 1947. ('It is terribly important to check up on Africa': FO 
800/435, letter to Mr Bevin, 10 Sept). He visited French Morocco, Gambia, Gold Coast, 
Nigeria, Belgian Congo, Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Sudan and Egypt. Afterwards he wrote a 76-page report, most of which was concerned 
with military analysis, region by region. There was, however, a provocative general 
introduction, reproduced here. Senior ministers took this report seriously. Attlee was 
'much interested', and Bevin called for its 'serious and urgent study' (PREM 8/923, Mr 
Attlee to F-M Montgomery, 21 Dec 1947; Bevin to Attlee, minute, 22 Dec). Creech Jones 
produced a comprehensive reply (see 106). The CRO generally agreed with the 
conclusions of the secretary of state for the colonies, believing that Lord Montgomery 
(especially in relation to the High Commission Territories) had ignored the political 
realities; Gordon Walker minuted, 'Mr Creech Jones's paper seems very sensible' (8 Jan 
1948). On 9 Jan 1948 the report was considered by a special committee of Cabinet 
ministers (107), chaired by Attlee and attended by Morrison, Sir Stafford Cripps, Lord 
Addison, Bevin, Alexander and Creech Jones.] 
... 3. It is impossible to tour Africa withoutbeing impressed with the following 
points: 
(a) the immense possibilities that exist in British Africa for development. 
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(b) the use to which such development could be put to enable Great Britain to 
maintain her standard of living, and to survive. 
(c) the lack of any "grand design" for the development of British Africa and 
consequently the lack of a master plan in any Colony. There are too many 
authorities involved; the thing is patchy and disjointed; there are too many 
Conferences and Committees and not enough policy laid down by a central 
authority; there is in fact no "grand design" and no master plan. 
(d) because of the lack of a grand design, and master plans, no real progress in 
development is being made. 
4. These lands contain everything we need. 
Minerals } 
Raw Materials These exist in almost unlimited quantities. 
Labour 
Food: 
Power: 
can be grown to any extent desired. 
can be developed economically' since coal is unlimited and can 
be obtained very cheaply. 
Communications: given raw materials, power, labour, and food, it is then essential 
to have good communications. These require to be developed so 
as to be suitable for economic and strategical requirements. 
5. The market is in the Commonwealth and Empire. And the market exists 
especially in the United Kingdom: which is a small country, with a large population, 
with no raw materials, and with no natural resources except coal. 
6. The two primary essentials would seem to be: 
(a) to develop the resources with the necessary capital, capital goods, brains, and 
manpower, as rapidly as possible. 
(b) to effect such a grouping of British (or Commonwealth) Africa as will break 
down the many existing barriers. Economic necessity and sound common sense 
should be the yardstick; these factors should take priority over all political 
viewpoints . 
7. It must be remembered that Africa is a sphere of influence of the Western 
Powers; no potentially hostile foreign power has a footing in that continent. If ever 
there should be a "show down" between the East and the West, then Africa goes with 
the West. Its development is therefore an urgent matter. 
8. The following points will be essential to success in the development of British 
and Commonwealth Africa. 
The grand design 
There must be a grand design for African development as a whole, with a master plan 
for each Colony or nation. In this, there must be vision; we must think big, and go 
for big worth-while projects. The "great opportunity" is there; the "grand design" is 
lacking. 
Long term planning 
This is very necessary: based on the grand design and the master plans. It will be 
useless to adopt a short sighted policy of expanding and developing only where an 
immediate dividend is likely. We must think big and have vision. 
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Isolation 
This is a very dangerous plaything in the days in which we now live. No nation, no 
Colony, can stand alone. For full and proper development we need co-operation and 
mutual support, so as to avoid waste of effort and get the maximum benefit. 
Unity 
This is vital: if we are to get on with the matter quickly and save Britain from her 
present troubles. There is no place today for party politics, parochialism, local 
mindedness, or any policy of laissez faire. 
Grouping (see para 6(b )) 
The present system of more or less water-tight compartments is highly wasteful, is 
illogical, and can do no good to mankind in general or to Britain in particular. A 
proper grouping of British (or Commonwealth) Africa should take place as rapidly as 
possible. This would have to be fairly gradual so that the peoples can be educated to 
what is required. 
The first stage should be a gradual development of a Federal System in the Cent ral 
African Group, the East African Group, and the West African Group. 
The organisation of the "High Commission", with a Central Assembly, which is to 
come into force in the East African Group on 1 Jan 1948 is a step in the right 
direction. 
A suitable grouping would be: 
Central African Federation: 
East African Federation: 
West African Federation: 
S. Rhodesia 
N. Rhodesia 
Nyasaland 
Bechuanaland (or part of it) 
Kenya 
Uganda 
Tanganyika 
Mauritius 
Seychelles 
Zanzibar 
Somalia (see para 9) 
Nigeria 
Gold Coast 
Sierra Leone 
Gambia. 
We should have no nonsense with UNO about Tanganyika; it should be absorbed into 
the British bosom. The High Commission Territories are an amazing "set up" and 
should be abolished. Bechuanaland should be divided between the Union and the 
Central African Federation. Swaziland and Basutoland should be incorporated in the 
Union. 
The second stage might well be a link-up between the Union and the British 
Central African Federation. Here again the aim should be a form of Federation, 
starting slowly, e.g. Defence, Communications, Currency, etc. 
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The third stage should be a much closer co-operation between the British 
territories and those owned by the other Western powers. 
And generally we should welcome U.S.A. assistance, capital, and capital goods. 
9. Somalia 
(a) This territory can be taken to include the following: 
British Somaliland 
The Ogaden 
Ex-Italian Somaliland. 
The territory is a financial liability to any nation that takes it on. It is quite 
impossible to develop the territory so as to make it a paying proposition. The 
Somali people are virile and nomadic, and are well armed. 
(b) British Somaliland is required by Britain; it can provide air bases and, together 
with the Aden Protectorate, commands the sea approaches to the Red Sea. 
(c) The Ogaden cannot go back to the Ethiopians, who have never done anything 
for it since they seized it towards the end of the 19th Century. The inhabitants are 
fanatical Moslems; they hate the Ethiopians who are mostly Christians; they are 
well armed and would fight if their country was returned to Ethiopia. 
(d) Ex-Italian Somaliland cannot go back to the Italians, who are potentially 
hostile to Ethiopia. 
(e) The whole British future in eastern Africa depends on stable conditions in 
Ethiopia and in the Somali lands in the Horn of Africa. The future of Ethiopia is 
uncertain; the future of Somalia must not be uncertain .1 
(0 I consider that Somalia, constituted as in (a) above, should be taken on by 
Britain. It should be placed under one Governor and the territory included in the 
East African Federation. This will enable the finances of the Federation as a whole 
to be used to support Somalia, without the territory becoming too great a burden 
on the British taxpayer. As it is quite impossible to develop the country, no 
attempt should be made to do so on any luxurious scale; we should administer the 
territory on some form of loose political control through tribal authorities, except 
in a few urban or otherwise special areas. The normal form of Colonial 
Administration leads nowhere in such territories, and economic development as 
commonly understood is not possible. 
10. Difficulties 
These will be immense; so they were when we went to Normandy in 1944. Many 
people will say that what I advocate above is not possible yet; I could have written a 
paper proving the theoretical impossibility of a landing in Normandy in 1944. There 
will be many people in the U.K. who will oppose such a plan on the grounds that the 
African will suffer in the process; there is no reason whatever why he should suffer; 
and in any case he is a complete savage and is quite incapable of developing the 
country himself. 
The analogy of India would seem to apply; we developed India because the Indians 
were quite incapable of doing so; we benefitted ourselves greatly thereby; we finally 
1 Emphasis throughout in original. 
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handed it over to the Indians themselves. The difficulties must be faced; they must be 
overcome with courage, and before it is too late. In the development of Africa we 
must adventure courageously, as did Cecil Rhodes. We must face up to the problems 
now; they will be far more difficult if left for our children. The plain truth is that 
these lands must be developed in order that Britain may survive. 
11. Brains and "go-getters" needed 
(a) We shall make no substantial progress in the development of Africa unless we 
import brains and "go-getters". 
(b) As regards brains. There is a marked lack of men of real ability in our African 
colonies; we require men of vision, who will think big, will take risks, and who are 
good judges of men. 
(c) As regards "go-getters". Life flows at a very even tempo; conditions are easy, 
with no restrictions on food or other necessities of life; income tax is very small. 
There are masses of servants and no one does anything for him or her self; this is 
bad for character and is particularly harmful to young people and children. Such 
conditions, combined with a hot climate, do not make for energetic action. There 
are too many people in responsible positions who have been living in such 
conditions for too long; they have become small-minded, they have little "drive", 
and they take easily to the line of least resistance. What is needed is some fresh 
blood in each Colony; we need men who will not be put off by difficulties; but who 
have the drive and determination to get things done: whatever may be the 
difficulties. We need in fact a really good importation of "go-getters" into Africa. If 
we do not import them, we will fail: with all the resultant and ghastly 
repercussions. 
12. The danger in Africa 
The population of Africa is probably some 150 million. Of this total only some 3 
million are white (Europeans); of this 3 million, 2V2 million are in the Union of 
South Africa. There is an increasing social and political consciousness developing in 
the African peoples; this is a very great potential danger and must be watched; a well 
organised Communist movement amongst the Africans could make our position very 
unpleasant. For this reason we cannot afford to be weak, or to have isolated areas; we 
must link up our territories into strong combinations, which will have economic, 
financial, and political strength, and will thus contain contented populations; this is 
the best way to keep out Communism. Already Communist agents are active in all 
parts of Africa and they are exploiting to the full the lack of any uniform native policy 
throughout the British territories. Every Colony, as well as the Union of South 
Africa, has different native laws. This situation is a menace; the sooner it is righted 
the better. A good first step would seem to be a meeting of all the Native 
Commissioners. The real and final answer is Federation into strong groups, as 
advocated in para 8. 
13. Conclusion re development in Africa 
(a) We have no time to lose. 
(b) The first and immediate requirement is a Grand Design for British Africa as a 
whole; this can only be drawn up in London. Next must come a Master Plan, or 
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blue print, for each Federation (or Group of Colonies). 
(c) Immense "drive" will be required to formulate the Grand Design, and in fact to 
get a move on at all. Many people will say it can't be done; such people should be 
eliminated ruthlessly. Belly-aching will assume colossal proportions; it must be 
stamped on. 
(d) "Go-getters" will be required in Africa in large numbers. We will do no good so 
long as we keep Government servants for 20 to 25 years in the same place in a hot 
climate, and then make them Governors of Colonies in the same part of the world. 
A man is burnt-out by the time he becomes a Governor; he requires a good 
"re-bushing" after say 10 years and should then be sent somewhere else and to a 
better climate. 
(e) British and other European settlers in African colonies live their lives under 
very easy conditions and dislike anything which upsets the even tempo of their 
existence: such as schemes for progress and development. Many of them require a 
good jolt which will make them face-up to their Empire responsibilities in these 
respects .... 
105 FO 800/435, ff90-96 1 Jan 1948 
[Development of Africa]: minute from Sir 0 Sargent (FO) to Mr 
Bevin, commenting on Field-Marshal Montgomery's memorandum 
With reference to the attached paper by the C.I.G.S. on his African tour, the 
following points seem to call for comment by the Foreign Office. 
Tanganyika 
... Field Marshal Montgomery deals with the desirability of forming an East African 
Federation, to include Tanganyika, and adds that "we should have no nonsense with 
UNO about Tanganyika; it should be absorbed into the British bosom". Tanganyika is 
of course now under U.K. trusteeship. If the Field Marshal implies that the 
trusteeship should be abolished and that Tanganyika (which was formerly under 
mandate) should be relegated to the status of a colony, the short answer is: 
(a) that the trusteeship could only be surrendered to, and by agreement with, the 
General Assembly which authorised it; 
(b) that the Assembly would never authorise so retrograde a step as the relegation 
of Tanganyika to pure colonial status; 
(c) that, therefore, if we were not trustees, someone else would be appointed in 
our place-which would not suit our book. Therefore the idea is an impossible 
one. 
The question of a federation to include Tanganyika may not be legally impossible, 
though the technical difficulties would no doubt be formidable to say the least. As an 
illustration, Article 76(d) of the Charter prescribes as one of the basic objectives of 
the trusteeship system the obligation to ensure equal treatment in social, economic 
and commercial matters for all members of the United Nations and their nationals. 
Thus, if it were desired to introduce some uniform economic system within a 
federation which included Tanganyika, it would have to be governed by the 
obligations imposed on us as trustee for Tanganyika, and exclusive commercial and 
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economic advantages enjoyed by the U.K. in e.g. Kenya, could not be extended to 
Tanganyika. 
The Colonial Office may be expected to make these points even more forcibly and 
at greater length. Moreover, the Field Marshal perhaps forgets that the Trusteeship 
Council has the right to send missions of investigation periodically to trust 
territories and, subject to confirmation, it is believed that the East African 
trusteeship territories, including Tanganyika, are billed for a visit during the coming 
year. 
It is all the more necessary to avoid any action or policy which might be construed 
as a flouting of the authority of the U.N. in regard to Tanganyika, so long as we need 
a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly for obtaining trusteeship of Cyrenaica 
or Libya as a whole. Even without such complications, there is little hope of getting 
more than the bare majority required. 
Cooperation with other Western powers 
Field Marshal Montgomery gives this as the third stage. In fact we are getting on with 
it now. As a result of the Secretary of State's conversations with M. Ramadier1 and 
M. Bidaultz the first meeting is to be held at the end of January of a special 
Anglo-French Colonial Committee, which will deal in the first instance with West 
African questions. It has been agreed that, besides the business of organizing its work 
and discussing how Belgium and Portugal can be brought in, the Committee shall 
tackle the problems of (a) communications (b) development plans (c) price policy 
and (d) intercolonial trade. The Foreign Office will be represented on the Committee. 
In view of the shortage of facilities in Western Europe for providing capital 
equipment, one of the subjects which is certain to come up will be the possibility of 
enlisting American help for development plans, possibly for the International Bank 
in connexion with the Marshall Plan. 
Ethiopia, the Ogaden, and the ex-Italian colonies of East Africa 
The gist of the C.I .G.S's recommendations regarding these territories is as follows:-
An all-British, united Somalia must be created, incorporating Italian Somaliland 
and the Ogaden with British Somaliland in the proposed East African Federation. 
N.B. The reference to "the Ogaden" is presumably intended to embrace also the 
adjacent Reserved Area, since elsewhere the Field Marshal urges that Ethiopia should 
be given nothing which she does not at present control save possibly a corridor to the 
sea at Zeila. 
The C.I.G.S. advocates this, roughly speaking, on the grounds that Ethiopia is a 
hopelessly corrupt feudal State; that the Somalis of the Ogaden and the Reserved 
Area hate the Ethiopians and would fight rather than be handed back to them; that 
Italian Somaliland cannot be handed back to Italy because Italy is potentially hostile 
to Ethiopia; and that as Ethiopia's future, through her . own backwardness and 
corruption, is uncertain, that of the "Horn of Africa" must not be uncertain. 
The C.I.G.S. further prescribes that a new Anglo-Ethiopian treaty on the above 
basis should be concluded without further delay. To make such a treaty acceptable to 
the Ethiopians, we should promise them (while cutting down the British Military 
1 P. Ramadier, French premier Jan-Nov 1947. 
2 G Bidault, French foreign minister for most of the period 1946-1950; premier 1946 and 1949-1950. 
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Mission immediately to a total of about 60 all ranks) the fullest measure of help in 
"getting a good show going in Ethiopia", and undertake to come to their assistance 
in the event of their being attacked. 
As regards Eritrea, to which the Ethiopians have a strong claim, the Field Marshal 
implies that they must not get it. He does not say who should get it. His argument 
(see above) that Italian Somaliland should not go back to Italy because Italy is 
potentially hostile to Ethiopia, implies that Eritrea should not go back to Italy either. 
2. These recommendations are not realisable. The Ogaden and the Reserved Area 
belong to Ethiopia. We are still in military occupation of them, our excuse for this 
being that we need the lines of communication which pass through them between 
British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. Once the fate of Italian Somaliland is 
decided, that excuse will cease to have any validity, whoever gets trusteeship. The 
Ethiopians attach very great importance to regaining control over these two 
territories of theirs, and the inducements suggested by the Field Marshal above are 
quite inadequate to enable us to negotiate a treaty with them which would provide 
for the cession of the two territories to us. The most that we can hope for is 
agreement on an exchange arrangement which we have been attempting to negotiate 
with them for some time past, under which they would get a corridor to the sea at 
Zeila and we would get a part of the Ogaden and the Reserved Area. The Ethiopians 
have not so far shown much enthusiasm about this proposal. 3 
3. It is true that the Somali inhabitants of the Ogaden and the Reserved Area do 
not wish to go back to Ethiopian control and may try to fight to prevent it. But as 
they are Ethiopian nationals we are not entitled to take their wishes into account to 
the extent of denying the Ethiopians' claim to get their two provinces back. 
4. As regards Italian Somaliland, the most that we could do would be to ask for a 
trusteeship. It will be remembered that we proposed this at an earlier stage, when the 
idea of a united Somalia was mooted, and that we had to drop the idea. Even if we 
obtained trusteeship of Italian Somaliland, the period of our tenure would probably 
not be allowed to extend beyond ten years, whereas the Field Marshal is evidently 
thinking in longer strategic terms. Moreover, we feel that to ask for it would be liable 
to prejudice our chances of obtaining the trusteeship of Cyrenaica (or Libya as a 
whole), which from the strategic point of view is far more important to us . Finally we 
have always felt that, if we are to get a trusteeship of the ex-ltalian colonies of North 
Africa, and if Italy, owing to the merits of the Ethiopian claim, is not to get Eritrea, 
the return to her on a trusteeship basis of Italian Somaliland, represents the smallest 
sop likely to prevent a revulsion of feeling in Italy against the Western Powers and a 
consequent danger of her turning more towards the East. Th9ugh the inhabitants of 
Italian Somaliland would prefer us to the Italians, the latter made a good job of this 
colony before the war. 
Sudan 
It will be seen that the Field Marshal is against any expansion of the Sudan Defence 
Force, and says that this idea should be dropped. He does not say why he comes to 
this conclusion. The idea was first put forward by the Foreign Office, with an eye not 
to the defence needs of the Sudan, but to the need for creating reserves of manpower 
for the defence of the Middle East and East Africa as a whole. At present we are 
awaiting Sir R. Howe's4 comments on the proposal. 
3 See part 3 of this volume, p 282 (map). 4 Gov-gen of the Sudan, 1947-1955. 
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Egypt 
The C.I.G.S. has already re-assured you as regards the references in his paper to the 
location of the Combined Headquarters in Egypt and the need for peacetime as well 
as wartime facilities in that country. 
106 DO 35/2380, no 3 6 Jan 1948 
[Development of Africa]: memorandum by Mr Creech Jones, com-
menting on Field-Marshal Montgomery's memorandum 
I have read the Chief of the Imperial General Staffs memorandum on his tour in 
Africa with the greatest interest. I have little to say at this stage on its military 
section, but I feel bound to comment at some length on the introduction which deals 
with political and economic problems. I will take this first and conclude with a brief 
comment on the military side. 
2. The following is a summary of the views which I shall express:-
I. The development of Africa 
While I agree with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff as to the importance of a 
quick and vigorous development of Africa as part of the Western world, I have the 
following comments on what he says:-
(a) The imposition on the African Territories of a grand design or master plan by 
central control and direction from London would not be practical politics and 
would conflict with our declared policy of devolution in the process of building up 
self-government, which is based on the experience of the history of the British 
Commonwealth. Such a course would not secure the co-operation of the local 
people, without which effective development cannot take place. (Paragraphs 3 to 
5). 
(b) We have a clear and well-understood general policy for political and economic 
development in Africa; in addition, all the African Territories have comprehensive 
ten-year development programmes, and there are regional plans as well. These will 
be supplemented by the plans to be made under the Overseas Development Bill. 
The present problem is one of execution, not planning. (Paragraphs 6 and 7). 
(c) In my view, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff over-estimates the material 
resources of Africa. To secure development on the scale which he envisages we 
must be prepared to invest very large sums of money and to provide capital and 
consumer goods on a much larger scale than at present. (Paragraph 8). 
(d) The reason why progress has been retarded in the past is not lack of brains or 
vigour on the part of the Colonial Service, which on the whole is a first-rate body 
of men, but lack of appreciation by past Governments in this country of the needs 
of African development and lack of money through the old policy of making 
Colonies pay their way. This is now being rectified by many new acts of policy 
including the operation of the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts and the 
Overseas Development Bill. (Paragraphs 9 and 10). 
(e) The present bottle-neck is lack of capital goods, and particularly steel, and 
shortage of consumer goods and technical staff. Our pronouncements about 
Colonial development can only be made a reality in so far as we give the Colonies a 
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much greater priority than hitherto in the supply of these necessities. (Paragraph 
12). 
11. Political questions 
(a) The right means of countering possible anti-British movements in Africa is by 
developing our existing friendly relations with the African peoples through the 
existing policy of building up responsible native institutions (Paragraphs 13 and 
14). 
(b) While I entirely agree with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff as to the 
importance of regional co-ordination-and this represents existing policy-! am 
not in favour of the political federation of Mauritius and Seychelles with East 
Africa, nor of political federation, as opposed to co-ordination, either in Central or 
West Africa. (Paragraphs 15 and 16). 
(c) There can be no question of going back on the Trusteeship Agreement for 
Tanganyika. (Paragraph 17). 
(d) I should be opposed to any form of political link-up between the African 
Colonial Territories and the Union of South Africa. (Paragraph 18). 
(e) I have always been in favour of a United Somalia under British trusteeship, but 
I understand the present Foreign Office vifw to be that this policy cannot be put 
across internationally. It would be difficult to justify the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff's proposal that any part of the cost of administering a United Somalia 
should be imposed on the East African territories. (Paragraph 19). 
Ill. Military questions 
(a) I warmly welcome, and have always favoured, the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff's proposal that the African forces should come under the control of 
the War Office, but I do not agree that their whole cost can be borne by the African 
Governments. (Paragraph 20). 
(b) The early execution of a plan to link East Africa and the Rhodesias by rail 
would require a decision on strategic as well as economic grounds. (Paragraph 21). 
I. The development of Africa 
3. Need for vigorous development. I wholeheartedly agree with the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff in his main contention regarding the importance of a quick 
and vigorous development of our African Territories. This is essential not only to this 
country but to Western Europe as a whole; it is necessary not only on strategic, but 
also on economic and political grounds. The effective economic development of the 
African Territories is needed both to secure their smooth progress in the social and 
political fields, and also to help in the supply to this country and the rest of the world 
of food and raw materials. Our departure from India and the reduction in our 
overseas investments generally still further increase the economic importance of the 
African Territories. Politically, our long term aim must be to secure that when the 
African Territories attain self-government they do so as part of the Western world. 
Meanwhile we can strengthen the position of Western Europe internationally by 
building up the economy of Africa and linking Africa more closely with this country 
and the other countries of Western Europe. At the same time our policy of 
co-operation with the other Western European countries will be materially assisted 
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by friendly and fruitful collaboration in Africa. For these reasons I fully accept the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff's main theme. I am in favour of actively pursuing 
the collaboration with the other colonial powers in Africa which we have already 
started successfully. I agree, that with suitable safeguards, we should welcome 
American assistance in capital and capital goods . 
4. At the same time, I do not agree with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff's 
diagnosis of the reasons why development has not been more rapid hitherto. I think 
that he is over-optimistic about the material resources of the African Territories and 
that he under-estimates the limitations on direction from London. 
5. Importance of devolution. In support of his plan for a grand design and master 
plan the Chief of the Imperial General Staff uses a military operation as an 
illustration. But we are not here concerned with a military operation; we are 
concerned with the developing relations between peoples over a period of years. The 
conception of a master plan or blueprint involves central direction from London by 
means of the issue of orders through a chain of responsibility, as in a military 
command. But that is not the situation with which we have to deal. We have to deal 
with countries having legislatures of their own with considerable powers and 
responsibilities. Whether these countries are treated singly or in groups these powers 
and responsibilities will progressively increase. In our policies we must be able to 
carry the local people with us, whether they are Africans or Europeans. The whole 
experience of the British Commonwealth shows that the best results are obtained not 
by direction from the centre but by the devolution of responsibility to the component 
parts. The Dominions were built up in this way. The same procedure was followed in 
India, which the Chief of the Imperial General Staff mentions. More recently this has 
been done in Ceylon. In Africa itself the Sudan is a good example of successful 
devolution. We have always followed a policy of devolution in our Colonial 
Territories, and at the recent conference of African Governors in London it was 
generally felt that there should be greater devolution in our relations with the 
African Governments. Any attempt to secure our objectives by dictation from the 
centre would not only be contrary to all our pronouncements regarding political 
devolution and to all the experience of our history; above all it would not work. We 
should not secure the co-operation of the local people, without which no effective 
development can take place. 
6. Policy already laid down. When I say that we must avoid central dictation I do 
not, of course, mean that we should not have a general policy. The function of the 
Secretary of State in formulating general policy is well recognised and accepted in 
Colonial Territories. We have a clear policy for Africa in political development, the 
important field of loc4l government, education and social services, and economic 
development. In order to ensure that this policy was fitted to present requirements I 
held a conference of all the African Governors and Governors Designate in London 
during November. Broad agreement was reached and the whole field of political, 
economic and social development was covered. 
7. Development plans of African territories. The Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff's memorandum implies that there are no plans for development in each of the 
African Territories. That is quite incorrect. My predecessor, Lord Hall, asked all 
Colonial Governments about two years ago to draw up comprehensive ten-year 
development plans. All the African Governments have done this and with one 
exception all the plans have been approved both by the local legislatures and in 
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London; Between them they provide for expenditure on new capital works and the 
expansion of social and economic services amounting to some £170 million over a 
ten-year period. Of this some £60 million is to come from the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Vote and the remaining £110 million from local resources and loans to 
be raised by the African Governments. This is over and above the expenditure on 
existing services. The plans include some £30 million for the improvement of 
communications, to which the Chief of the Imperial General Staff rightly attaches so 
much importance. In addition all the Colonial Governments have now been asked to 
suggest schemes of constructive economic development which may be undertaken 
by the Colonial Development Corporation. The amounts of money involved in these 
plans may seem relatively small when compared with expenditure in this country; 
they are large when compared with anything done in the past in our African 
Territories. The ten-year development programmes provide all Governments with a 
large field of activity over the next few years which will fully occupy their staffs. The 
problem, in other words, is now not so much one of planning (except in the field to 
be covered by the Colonial Development Corporation); it is rather one of carrying the 
plans into execution. That is the real task before us now and I will deal with it below. 
But first I should like to say something about the material resources of Africa and the 
quality of our Colonial Service, on both of which I do not agree with the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff. 
8. Material resources of Africa. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff says in 
paragraph 4 of his memorandum that minerals, raw materials, and labour exist in 
almost unlimited quantities; that food can be grown to any extent desired; and that 
coal is unlimited and can be obtained very cheaply. I think that these statements are 
greatly exaggerated. Undoubtedly there are large untapped mineral resources, much 
coal and many people not pulling their weight economically. But Africa is not an 
undiscovered Eldorado .. It is a poor continent which can only be developed at great 
expense of money and effort. At present vast areas of Africa are barely self-supporting 
in food. They can be made to produce more food only as a result of heavy capital 
expenditure on water supplies, bush clearance and fertilisers, etc. and by the use of 
very considerable supervisory manpower. To develop minerals, including coal, we 
require large railway construction, for which big supplies of steel and other capital 
goods will be needed. In most of the East African Territories there is at present an 
acute shortage of African labour. In some areas it is a real shortage; in others 
Africans are available, but are unable or unwilling to work because of bad health or 
lack of inducement through shortage of consumer goods. To develop Africa on the 
scale which the Chief of the Imperial General Staff envisages we must be prepared to 
invest very large sums of money; we must supply capital goods, and above all steel; 
we require much larger supplies of consumer goods; and we need to expand all our 
government services, which in itself involves the increased provision of supervisory 
personnel from this country and increased supplies of capital goods for building, etc. 
I mention these matters not for the purpose of enlarging on the difficulties, but to 
show that the policy cannot be carried into effect merely by the drawing up of plans. 
What is required is the supply of material and personnel. I shall revert to this point 
later. 
9. The Colonial Service. In paragraph 11 of his memorandum the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff says that we are suffering in Africa from lack of brains and lack 
of vigour. While I am not unaware of certain defects in the Service (defects which 
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have been receiving my attention), I emphatically disagree with this assessment of 
Colonial Service. The men whom the Director of Recruitment at the Colonial Office 
has sent to Africa both for administrative and technical work during the last twenty 
years have been men of very high quality. We are constantly aiming at improving the 
standard and tributes to our success in that respect have reached me from many 
quarters. There can be no question that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in his 
remarks does less than justice to the splendid work which has been carried out by the 
Colonial Service in Africa and to their achievements. If we can provide the Service 
with the means of carrying the development programmes into effect we can be sure 
that we shall get first-rate work out of these men. At the same time we are giving 
special attention to the organisation of Colonial Governments; past defects in this 
respect have been or are in the process of being put right. The Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff is wrong in suggesting that our normal practice is to promote 
Governors and other senior officials only from their own regions. In fact we move 
people widely throughout the Colonial Empire in our senior promotions, although 
we have to weigh the advantages of this against the need for developing local 
loyalties. Of the nine present Governors of African Territories, six have spent either 
the whole or the majority of their previous service outside Africa. Two have spent 
most of their working lives in Africa, but on the other side of the Continent to their 
present posts. Only one, the Governor of Kenya, has served most of his time in his 
present region; and he is hardly a good example of lack of drive and intellectual 
ability. 
10. Past lack of money. The reason why progress was retarded in the past was not 
lack of vigour in the Service but lack of appreciation by past Governments in this 
country of the needs of Colonial development and consequently lack of money. The 
policy of successive Governments here was to make Colonies pay their way and the 
retrenchment which took place as a result of the 1931 economic crisis had a 
disastrous and lasting effect on all plans for development. The responsibility lies on 
past Governments, which took a short-sighted view and were not prepared to 
recognise that without a very large investment of money the African Territories 
could not be developed adequately. Matters have been rectified by the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Acts and the Overseas Resources Development Bill. The 
sums provided under this legislation, large as they are, are yet not big enough to 
produce the development we all want and they will have to be supplemented by 
private investment under conditions of proper public control. 
11. The need for capital and consumer goods and technical staff. At present, 
however, and I cannot emphasise this point too strongly, the bottle-neck is not so 
much lack of money as shortages of capital goods, consumer goods and technical 
staff, the need for which I have already mentioned. The Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff has given prominence in his memorandum to the requirements of new railway 
construction and to the unsatisfactory condition of existing railways in the African 
Territories. I entirely agree with him; communications, including railways, roads 
and ports, are the principal bottle-neck holding up increased production in Africa. 
The African railways did a first-class job during the war and as a result are now worn 
out. They are urgently in need of locomotives, rolling stock, rails, etc. There are 
acute difficulties in the supply of steel for these requirements and, largely as a result, 
there are serious hold-ups of groundnuts in Nigeria and copper in Northern 
Rhodesia, while on the Kenya, Tanganyika and Gold Coast railways the services are 
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not sufficient for the traffic offering. In these circumstances the construction of new 
railways is obviously even more difficult. At the same time schemes of hydro-electric 
development and many other economic projects of first-class importance are held up 
owing to shortage of steel. The whole development programme of Nigeria is being 
delayed because 1,000 tons of steel cannot be secured for building purposes. The 
acute shortage of consumer goods, and particularly of textiles, is making it 
impossible to get the best out of African labour. The difficulty of obtaining technical 
staff from this country, and particularly engineers and doctors, is also a very severe 
handicap to all the African Governments. 
12. If we are to give effect to the policy of quick and vigorous development which 
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff demands, if we are to fulfil our frequent 
pronouncements on the subject, and if we are to retain the confidence of the African 
people, who are expecting rapid development to take place, we must give the needs of 
Colonial Territories in the three fields I have mentioned, and particularly in the 
supply of capital goods, a much greater priority than we have done hitherto. The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer told the African Governors at the recent conference that 
the rapid development of Africa was vital to the survival of this country1• If we are 
going to translate that statement into action, what we need is not only a vigorous 
service which we are creating and vigorous planning, which we have, but also the 
provision of the supplies and skilled staff without which plans cannot become 
realities. 
11. Political questions 
13. Importance of friendly relations with the African peoples . In paragraph 12 of 
his memorandum the Chief of the Imperial General Staff refers to the dangers of 
nationalist movements among Africans fomented by Communism. Communism has 
so far made only limited progress in our territories, but there are incipient 
nationalist movements in Nigeria and Kenya. These may well be a danger to the 
development of the territories concerned and I agree entirely that our policy with 
regard to them must be firm and resolute. But the real answer to these movements 
does not lie in uniformity of policy, or in federation, or in any other imposed 
measure. It lies in the maintenance and development of our existing friendly 
relations with the African peoples. This can be achieved by building up responsible 
native institutions and by giving them a real part in the constructive work of 
government. That is the policy which we are pursuing and its success has been 
conspicuous in the Gold Coast under the administration of Sir Alan Burns.2 The 
African members of the Legislative Council there have shown ability and a real sense 
of responsibility and the settlement of the recent railway and mining strike in the 
Gold Coast was largely due to their efforts. This policy is, of course, incompatible 
with one of dictation from the centre; its successful application in the Gold Coast and 
elsewhere shows the importance of not ignoring political considerations. 
14. I do not agree with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that Communist 
agents are exploiting the lack of any uniform native policy throughout our 
territories; in my view they would find it far easier to exploit a uniform policy 
imposed everywhere without regard for local conditions. In fact, however, subject to 
the inevitable local variations, there is a broadly uniform policy of native administra-
1 See part 1 of this volume, 66. 2 Gov, 1941-1948. 
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tion, as was strikingly illustrated at the conference of Administrative Officers from all 
our African Territories held at Cambridge during the summer. We cannot, of course, 
have anything like a uniform policy in native administration with the Union of South 
Africa. They aim at maintaining white supremacy; we at building up self-government 
for the Africans. 
15. Regional co-ordination. On page 5 of his memorandum the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff proposes certain political groupings or federations of the 
African Territories. What he says generally about the necessity for regional grouping 
of course represents existing policy. We have set up the Eastern African High 
Commission and the Central and West African Council[s] to encourage the closest 
co-ordination of policy and action on matters of common interest within the three 
regional groups. In East Africa, owing to the close geographical ties of the 
Territories, and their political and administrative co-operation in the past, we have 
been able to establish an inter-territorial body with executive powers; in Central and 
West Africa the Councils are, and in my view can be, merely consultative. All three 
bodies deal particularly with economic development, communications, research and 
defence, and I believe that they provide the machinery for regional co-ordination in 
defence which I entirely agree to be necessary. I warmly welcome the decision of the 
Southern Rhodesia Government referred to in paragraph 127 of the memorandum to 
bring their forces under the umbrella of the East Africa Command. I told Sir Godfrey 
Huggins3 a year ago that I favoured this and I know that all the Colonial 
Governments concerned will willingly work in with Southern Rhodesia on defence 
matters. 
16. The three regions, East, Central and West Africa. In his proposals for closer 
and wider political federations I am afraid that I do not share the Chief of the 
Imperial General Staffs views. I will deal with the three regions one by one:-
(a) East Africa. While I agree that in defence, research and certain other matters 
closer co-ordination between Mauritius and the Seychelles and the East African 
Territories is desirable, I do not believe that anything would be gained by any form 
of political federation. Zanzibar already has all the ties which are necessary with 
the mainland territories. I will refer to Somalia later. 
(b) Central Africa. I do not understand what the Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff means when he says in paragraph 120 that in Central Africa each territory is 
being left to grope along individually. The Central African Council was set up 
precisely for the purpose of securing co-ordination between the two Rhodesias and 
Nyasaland. It has done first-class work in this respect, in practically all the fields 
affecting economic development, road and rail communications, hydro-electric 
power, migrant labour, research, industrial development, supplies, to mention 
only a few of the matters covered. My information is that the Council is generally 
recognised to be a success. Any closer political union of the three territories would 
involve giving the whole group internal self-government under the effective 
control of the white population of Southern Rhodesia. Such a step would be, and 
indeed has been, strongly objected to by the African populations of the two 
northern territories and I am sure that no British Government could agree at the 
present stage either to amalgamation or to political federation; nor am I by any 
3 Prime minister of Southern Rhodesia, 1933-1955 (later Lord Malvern). 
[106) AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS 203 
means certain that Southern Rhodesia could effectively shoulder the responsibil-
ity. 
(c) West Africa. I am anxious to develop the West African Council as a 
co-ordinating body in a wide field of activities; but the West African Territories are 
not contiguous and I am certain that it would be wrong to aim at any political 
federation of Nigeria and the Gold Coast. This would weaken rather than 
strengthen our position in West Africa and would greatly complicate the political 
development of the two territories. Our present policy is aimed at welding together 
the diverse peoples of Nigeria and the Gold Coast into Nigerian and Gold Coast 
nations. The new constitutions of the two territories were designed to this effect 
and considerable progress is being made. But federation of Nigeria and the Gold 
Coast should, I am sure, be ruled out. 
17. Tanganyika. There can be no question of going back on the Trusteeship 
Agreement for Tanganyika which was negotiated with the United Nations as the 
result of a deliberate decision of the Government. What might have happened had we 
not freely offered to place Tanganyika under trusteeship is well indicated by the 
present predicament of the South African Government over South West Africa. Our 
situation would have been a great deal worse owing to our position as a permanent 
member of the Security Council. Our interests in Tanganyika, both strategic, 
political and economic, are fully safeguarded by the terms of the Agreement. Any 
attempt to go back on it, quite apart from its other effects, would be violently 
objected to by the United States and would have a disastrous effect on the American 
attitude towards our African policy and perhaps over a wider field as well. 
18. The Union of South Africa. While I have always supported the closest 
co-operation with the Union of South Africa in technical fields, in communications 
and in defence, I should be opposed to any form of political link-up. The wide 
differences in our approach to African problems in my view make such a link-up 
most undesirable. The suggested division of Bechuanaland and the handing over of 
part of it and the two other High Commission Territories to the Union are matters in 
which the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations is more directly con-
cerned than I am; but such a step, which would be against the wishes of at any rate 
the majority of their inhabitants, would have a very bad effect on African opinion in 
other parts of the continent. 
19. The Somali territories . The Colonial Office has pressed strongly from 1945 
onwards for the creation of a unified Somalia under British trusteeship, including 
both Italian Somaliland and the Ogaden. I still believe this to be the right solution 
both from our own point of view and that of the Somali people; but when this 
proposal was put forward by the Foreign Secretary at the Council of Foreign 
Ministers in 1946 it was badly received by the other three Foreign Ministers, and I 
understand the present view of the Foreign Office to be that this solution cannot be 
put across internationally. For that reason we have been pushing forward negotia-
tions with Ethiopia for an alternative and admittedly less satisfactory solution under 
which the essential grazing areas in the Ogaden of the British Somali tribes would be 
exchanged for Zeila and a corridor behind it at present forming part of British 
Somaliland. These negotiations with the Ethiopians are now proceeding and I 
understand that proposals regarding Italian Somaliland are likely to be submitted to 
the Cabinet shortly. Meanwhile I will only say that the Chief of Imperial General 
0 
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Staffs suggestion that a United Somalia should be included in an East African 
federation, so that East African money could be used to support the country, seems 
to me quite impossible. I see no means by which we could justify the imposition of 
such a burden on the East African Territories, which are already themselves 
financially overburdened; nor would there be the slightest chance of the Legislative 
Councils in East Africa accepting such an arrangement. 4 
Ill. Military questions 
20. Control and financing of the African forces. I warmly welcome the Chief of 
Imperial General Staffs proposal that the African forces should come under the 
control of the War Office. The Colonial Office have pressed for this arrangement 
since before the end of the war and I am sure that it is the right one. I do not agree, 
however, that the whole of the cost of these forces should be borne by the African 
Governments. If, as I understand, this is £8 million (or even £6 million) for East and 
West Africa, the sum is certainly beyond their present resources and the only effect of 
imposing this financial burden on them would be to make it impossible for economic 
and other forms of development to go forward on the lines which the rest of the Chief 
of Imperial General Staffs memorandum recommends. Some increase in the 
contributions of the African Governments for defence purposes should certainly be 
possible and I understand that this matter is now being discussed inter-
departmentally. If the War Office retain control and the African Governments are 
making a substantial financial contribution, it will be necessary to work out some 
means by which representatives of the local public can be kept generally informed on 
defence matters. This need in no way interfere with the control by the War Office. 
What is needed is some form of consultative machinery. 
21. Railway link between East Africa and the Rhodesias. I do not propose further 
to lengthen this memorandum by commenting on detailed points in the military 
section of the Chief of Imperial General Staffs memorandum, which can no doubt be 
pursued between the War Office and the Colonial Office. I would, however, like to 
refer to paragraph 119 of the memorandum which deals with the lack of a railway 
link between East Africa and the Rhodesias. The possibility of building such a link 
was considered early in 1947 when the Minister of Defence recommended that at the 
present time, in view of the expenditure involved, there was no strategic justification 
for the full scale development of any land route across Africa.5 The Colonial Office 
was invited to consider further with other departments the economic justification for 
some further development of rail communications between the two regions and I am 
hoping shortly to arrange for an expert investigation of the many factors involved. I 
am convinced, however, that, with the present shortage of steel and other supplies, it 
will not be possible to develop a railway link between East and Central Africa within 
the next five years if the justification is to be purely economic. A decision on strategic 
grounds would be necessary to enable such a project to be given the required degree 
of priority. 
4 See part 3 of this volume, 292 & 293. 5 See 118. 
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107 PREM 8/923, GEN 210/1 9 Jan 1948 
'Report by the CIGS on his visit to Africa': minutes of a Committee of 
Cabinet ministers to discuss the memorandum by Field-Marshal 
Montgomery 
The meeting had before them:-
(i) a report by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on his tour in Africa in 
November-December, 1947;1 
(ii) a memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies commenting on 
certain aspects of this report. 2 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that he was in agreement with the Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff as to the importance of a quick and vigorous 
development of Africa. Much had, in fact, already been done. The African Colonial 
Governments had already prepared comprehensive ten year development plans, 
based on the maintenance of a fair balance between social needs and economic 
development, to be financed partly under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act 
and partly from local resources. In addition, all Colonial Governments had been 
asked to put forward schemes of economic development to be undertaken by the 
Colonial Development Corporation. As regards machinery, the Division of the 
Colonial Office concerned with finance and economic development had recently been 
reorganised and strengthened, and placed under the direct supervision of the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. The Colonial Economic Development 
Council had been set up to scrutinise development proposals by Colonial Govern-
ments, and a working party had recently been set up, under the supervision of the 
Chief Planning Officer, to examine Colonial requirements for resources from this 
country. In the Colonies, the local administrations had been strengthened in recent 
years by the recruitment of large numbers of first-class young men and women from 
varied walks of life in this country. Special attention had been given to the 
organisation of training courses, both for new recruits and for serving members of 
the Colonial Service. In many Colonies, Development Boards had been established, 
and substantial progress had been made in East and Central Africa with the 
establishment of inter-Colonial machinery for economic collaboration. 
Ministers recognised that in recent years much progress had been made in the 
economic development of the Colonies. They felt, however, that the world economic 
situation made it necessary to review both our policy and the adequacy and 
suitability of the machinery for giving effect to it. It could not be assumed that 
Marshall Aid, over the period contemplated, would be sufficient to restore the 
economic independence either of this country or of the other participating European 
countries. For that we must look to the economic development of the Colonial 
territories in Africa and elsewhere controlled by the Western European powers. It 
was essential, therefore, that we should devote as much attention and energy to 
Colonial development as we had to European economic co-operation, if results 
adequate for our needs were to be achieved before Marshall Aid came to an end. 
1 See 104. 2 See 106. 
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Ministers considered that the planning of Colonial economic development which 
had hitherto taken place was defective in that insufficient attention had been given to 
the integration of our policy in this direction with economic policy in this country. 
No attempt had been made to determine on broad lines what proportion of the 
resources of the United Kingdom ought to be devoted to Colonial development or to 
assess the relative values of the objects to which these resources might be applied, 
either between the United Kingdom and the Colonies or between individual Colonies. 
Thus, for example, there was no agreed criterion by which a decision could be 
reached on the allocation of United Kingdom output of agricultural machinery 
between this country and the Colonies, or on which priorities could be determined in 
the allocation of scarce resources such as steel. As a result it had been found 
impossible, in preparing the Economic Survey for 1948, to give any indication of the 
extent to which progress in Colonial development might contribute towards the 
solution of the balance of payment difficulties of the sterling area. As a first step, it 
seemed necessary that the machinery within the Colonial Office should be reviewed 
and strengthened in order that a plan of development might be prepared urgently for 
the Colonial Empire under which there would be full co-ordination both between the 
United Kingdom and the Colonies as a whole, and between the development plans of 
individual Colonies. As a second stage, it would be necessary to co-operate both with 
the Dominions and with the other Colonial powers in Western Europe with a view to 
ensuring the maximum degree of co-operation and co-ordination between the 
various political authorities in the regional or continental areas. 
It was assumed that any important military issues arising from the report by the 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, on which Ministerial decision was required, 
would be referred to the Defence Committee. It was pointed out, however, that the 
Colonial territories were of vital importance to the future of Western Europe in the 
strategic as well as in the economic sphere, and that this double aspect of the 
problem would have to be borne in mind in framing Colonial economic policy. 
108 CAB 124/1089 18 Mar 1948 
[Development of Africa]: address by Mr Marquand (paymaster-
general) to a press conference 
As you know I returned last week from a seven weeks' tour of Africa, which took me 
from Cairo to the Cape. I visited the Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Northern 
and Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa. Officials who were with me 
also visited Nyassaland [sic] and Bechuanaland. We visited farms and factories and 
mines, steelworks and power stations, research centres, schools and colleges. We had 
meetings, public and private, with manufacturers, traders, managers, trade union-
ists, and farmers. We met men of European, Indian and African descent. Above all of 
course we had long discussions with those responsible for the government in all 
these territories, and we received from them large quantities of information. 
Obviously I can do no more today than give you some of my outstanding 
impressions. 
In South Africa I was concerned mainly with questions of current trade between 
the Union and ourselves. South Africa took £92,000,000 worth of British goods last 
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year-more than any other single country. We value that export market very highly. 
We want to maintain and if possible expand our exports there. We are very grateful 
for the timely assistance which South Africa gave us by means of the gold loan. If we 
can earn additional gold beyond that by selling goods in South Africa, we shall be 
helping to meet our dollar deficit because gold can be exchanged at any time for 
dollars. I was able to assure all whom I met that we have not asked our exporters to 
divert supplies from S. Africa to the dollar markets. I had very full discussions with 
South African ministers on the problem of South African exports to the British 
Colonies. We recognise their anxiety to keep the natural channels of trade open as 
wide as possible even at a time when our adverse balance of payments makes it 
necessary to us to scrutinise carefully every import into the United Kingdom or the 
Colonies which is not absolutely essential. We have agreed to import £60,000 worth 
of South African footwear to the U.K. in 1948 and that if a modified import policy by 
the Colonies does not yield satisfactory results individual applications for import 
licences will be discussed by the two Governments. 
I found everywhere in South Africa among persons of all shades of opinion great 
admiration and sympathy for the immense productive effort made since the end of 
the war by workers and management in British industry. It is difficult for friends 
living six thousand miles away from us and naturally preoccupied with their own 
affairs to understand the paradoxical development in 1947, wherein our industrial 
output and our volume of exports greatly expanded and yet the deficit in our balance 
of payments grew worse. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has explained that many 
times and I need not do so again, though of course I lost no opportunity of doing so 
in South Africa! I hope that all who care for the welfare of the Commonwealth and for 
British trade and industry will remember that if a true story is to be told our 
productive achievements as well as our trading difficulties must be fully explained. 
In the other territories which I visited, though of course I devoted a good deal of 
time to current trading problems, I was chiefly concerned to study projects of 
economic development. Before leaving London I stated that all these plans needed 
investment of capital goods, some in very large quantities. I said that it was obvious 
that all could not be undertaken at once and that orders of priority would have to be 
established. 
I have repeated that wherever I have been in Africa. Indeed nobody could travel 
through Africa, as I have done, without being aware that many useful, though small, 
increases of output of raw materials and foodstuffs-quite apart from large-scale 
long-term developments-are held up by lack of capital goods. If I mention some 
outstanding potential development it does not mean that I think it can be 
commenced next week or even next year. We are determined, in co-operation with all 
other nations who are willing to help, to do all we can to forward the development of 
Africa, but we realise that our resources are limited. We must plan the allocation of 
resources for this purpose. We are hard at work on those plans now. I cannot 
announce plans today. I can only mention some of my most vivid impressions. 
Development must begin with transport. That means ports and railways with some 
roads developed as feeders to the railways. At present the railways of Africa are barely 
able to cope with the traffic now offering. In one conspicuous instance they are not 
able to cope. I allude to the Rhodesias, where the full production of copper and 
chrome cannot be brought to the coast for lack of wagons. It is also well known that 
the ground nut projects in Tanganyika were held up for a time because the railways 
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could not at that time deal quickly enough with the peak of the traffic coming into 
Dar-es-Salaam. These difficulties are being met reasonably quickly. All the railways 
of Africa have placed orders for additional rolling stock and equipment and British 
manufacturers are co-operating well in supplying them. But my point is that bigger 
developments beyond the present will call for corresponding increases in rolling 
stock and equipment and in some instances new railways and ports. 
In the past the major developments carried out in Africa by Europeans have been 
concerned with minerals. Gold, diamonds, coal, iron, copper are being developed on 
a big scale already. They will be developed still more in the future, as will other 
metals. I do not want to underestimate their importance: far from it. A great deal of 
attention is being paid to them by able men all over Africa, and quite rightly. But it is 
time that we should devote a similar amount of energy, skill and capital investment 
to farm products. 
The population of Africa is increasing fast. There are very few vital statistics. It is 
extremely difficult to take a census of a largely illiterate population scattered over 
vast areas. But if you travel through Africa the evidence of your eyes-the abundance 
of children everywhere-will tell you what is happening. The major problem of Africa 
is how to ensure that farm output keeps pace with population growth. As you fly over 
Africa what you notice most is millions of acres of uninhabited land. You might 
suppose that the growing population could spread out over this land, even though 
that would need hard work in bush clearing. That will no doubt happen one day. But 
it cannot be done easily, and it cannot be done quickly. In some places the soil is thin 
and poor. But that is not the main obstacle everywhere. Vast areas of the bush are 
controlled by the tsetse fly-an enemy which has not been conquered. His empire 
can be pushed back by bush clearing and effective settlement, but settlement is 
useless unless there is adequate water to supply man and beast and render the soil 
fertile. 
In many thickly populated parts of Africa where water is available agricultural 
methods are utterly primitive. The "farm" is a small patch cultivated by a woman 
with no better implements than one hoe. The consequence is bad husbandry and soil 
erosion. Even in other parts where there are farms run by Europeans who have 
modern machinery to help them, failure of rain-fall from time to time ruins crops. 
And so our first task must be to help Africa to feed herself. 
That means that we must encourage good husbandry by every means in our power 
and we must help Africa to make proper use of her water. There is plenty of water 
available, but the heavy rain-falls are concentrated in particular areas and in short 
seasons. Thus the precious water to a large extent runs away in flooded rivers which 
carry soil to the sea, confer very little benefit to the surrounding land, and later dry 
up again. More rivers must be dammed to provide storage, flood control and 
irrigation. According to circumstances, some of these schemes can be small and 
fairly widespread; others must be larger. One or two of the large schemes, such as 
that for damming the Owen Falls near Lake Victoria have the great advantage not 
only that they would make water available for irrigation, but that they would provide 
electric power. This power could be used not only to establish secondary industries, 
but also for the processing of metals, thus rendering their transport to the coast an 
economical proposition. We must work out what earth moving machinery, steel and 
cement we can make available for the dams. We are already planning a big increase of 
our output of agricultural machinery and equipment, not only to satisfy the needs of 
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farmers who could use it today, but over a longer period to satisfy those who will be 
able to use it in four or five years time. 
One of the major causes of Great Britain's acute economic difficulties today is the 
failure of the world's agricultural production since the war ended to meet the needs 
of the world's expanding population. The consequence has been to turn the terms of 
trade against us, and we have to pay far more in manufactured exports for every unit 
of farm products imported than we did before the war. Thus an increase of 
agricultural production anywhere and everywhere in the world is a help to us. This is 
always in our minds when we think of African development. But I do want to make it 
clear that the peoples of Africa themselves cannot multiply and prosper unless the 
development takes place. We are thinking just as much of their welfare as of our own 
when we undertake these plans. If we are successful there will not be less land but 
more land available for the native African in British Colonial Africa, there will be 
better equipment for him to use, more local manufactures in which he can find 
employment and better opportunities for the education which he so highly values. In 
so far as we obtain for ourselves food and materials from this development we will 
pay for them with implements and railways and clothing and all the other necessities 
of a fuller life for the peoples of Africa. 
I have tried to sketch some of the background against which I think development 
of Africa must take place. We must not underestimate the difficulties or the size of 
the investment of scarce resources which will be necessary. But many of the 
difficulties can be overcome and I am confident that we can work out a properly 
phased programme of development over a period of years which can yield worth-
while results both for ourselves and for Africa. In considering many African problems 
we are frequently in harmonious consultation with other Governments, and we 
certainly look forward to ever-increasing collaboration with them in the task of 
economic development. 
Don't imagine that nothing is beil)g done yet. Our Colonial Servants have been at 
work for years encouraging and teaching Africans better husbandry. Africans 
themselves are at work in these Services teaching their fellows about the rotation of 
crops, about terracing and contour ploughing, about cattle protection and the proper 
use of animal manures and so on. One of my most vivid recollections is of a long 
conversation I had with a native African farmer who showed me his well-planned 
small farm, explained his rotations, discussed most expertly the need · for more 
pedigree bulls from England, showed me his onion crop ready for sale in the Nairobi 
market and his clean but poorly furnished hut with its pictures of the King and 
Queen and the Princesses and of his own wedding day. He is not only a jolly good 
farmer. He teaches in the local School four or five hours a day. Another high-light 
was my meeting with the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union. They have 30,000 
African farmer members, who grow their own food for themselves and also grow 
coffee for the market. They gave me the best cup of coffee I had in Africa. They sell 
substantial quantities of coffee every year to our Ministry of Food. They run the 
whole of their association themselves and have only one European to help them. Like 
all progressive farmers in Africa they want more of our agricultural machinery, and 
they want it soon. 
I have talked a lot about water storage and irrigation. I was greatly impressed with 
what I saw of this in the Sudan in a district called the Gezireh. Here there are about 
800,000 acres under cultivation by means of the waters of the Nile, brought by a 
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series of canals from the great Nile dam at Sennar. There are 20,000 tenant farmers 
on this huge estate in which they co-operate with the Sudan Government and the 
Sudan Plantations Syndicate. The scheme has been in existence nearly 25 years and 
has provided over that period very large quantities of cotton for the cotton industries 
of many parts of the world, including Lancashire. At this moment the main irrigation 
canal is being widened to provide more water for an addition of another 100,000 
acres to the scheme. In years to come this great collective farm can be extended still 
further if agreement can be reached about even more extensive storage and flood 
control in the upper waters of the Nile. 
In my tour I met hundreds of members of Chambers of Commerce and Chambers 
of Industry, and many farmers who rightly impressed upon me their need for more 
tools to expand the production they are now undertaking. There is need for more 
storage equipment for all sorts of farm produce. There is a pressing need for building 
materials, for not only is Africa, like the rest of the world, suffering a housing 
shortage as a result of war-time decline in building, but in many places housing for 
staff is the essential preliminary to expansion of new undertakings. We had some 
pretty lively discussions with Chambers of Commerce about the need for increased 
supplies of textiles and other consumer goods to satisfy the native worker who often 
lacks incentive to produce a surplus if there is nothing in the shops on which to 
spend his money. We also had some straight talking from farmers and sisal and 
tobacco growers who want more tractors and implements. But those discussions are 
encouraging. We found an immense fund of goodwill for Britain among all who came 
to them. I was able to assure them of our determination to increase the flow of 
essential goods to help them to play their full part in our common effort. I would like 
also to say that I found a similar willingness to help among those trade unionists 
whom I met. Perhaps I might mention in particular those in the Copper Belt who 
assured me that they would help in the dollar-saving drive by examining every way of 
increasing copper output. 
The greatest difficulty in giving impressions of a tour covering so immense an area 
in which one met so many people is that one can select only a few groups of persons 
or interesting projects for mention. And of course I have spoken only of those parts of 
Africa which I visited myself. For all that I have left unsaid may I be forgiven. I hope I 
have conveyed to you my prevailing impression of measured and sober confidence 
that the obstacles are not insurmountable, that we can accelerate development and 
that in partnership with the peoples of Africa we can in due course achieve not only a 
significant contribution from Africa to the redress of the world's economic balance, 
but a raising of the whole level of life and culture in the immense continent. 
109 CAB 124/1089, EPC(48)35 2Apr 1948 
[Development of Africa]: report by Mr Marquand on his visit to Africa, 
11 Jan- 9 Mar 1948, section A-general conclusions [Extract] 
In the past the major development effort in these parts of Africa has been devoted to 
the extraction of minerals and production of a few plantation crops for export, such 
as cotton, sisal and tobacco. In dollar-saving and dollar-earning, mineral develop-
ment still offers opportunities of great value in the short term and for several 
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decades; but Southern Africa has reached the stage when disproportionate employ-
ment in mining gravely threatens the balance of the community. At the same time 
the mono-culture of export crops in "plantations"-which is in many ways the 
agricultural equivalent of mining-is an outmoded form of development which must 
increasingly be replaced by a pattern of many-sided agriculture which raises 
"subsistence" crops simultaneously with "cash" crops. The native populations of 
Africa are increasing fast. The major problem confronting us is how to ensure that 
farm output keeps pace with population growth. At present there are vast areas out of 
which all inhabitants have been expelled on account of the risk of sleeping sickness; 
these areas are for the time being expropriated to the tsetse fly. There are still vaster 
areas where the tsetse fly and rinderpest frustrate the establishment of a healthy 
cattle population. At the same time other areas lack surface water and have a 
relatively low and unreliable rainfall which leads to the recurrent failure of crops and 
the production of famine conditions. When rainfall is both torrential and unreliable 
primitive methods of agriculture produce over-grazing, decline in soil fertility and 
soil erosion. In many regions the growth of population is overtaking the capacity of 
the soil as at present used to maintain it with essential food. Though this is 
particularly true in areas of African population, there is a strong trend in the same 
direction in some areas of white settlement. Even in South Africa, with its numerous 
social and economic problems, soil erosion is Public Enemy Number One. It is only 
in very favourable years that many of the territories I visited are not net importers of 
food. 
2. Though the rapid increase of population is partly responsible for this situation, 
there is not enough man-power as at present used to do all that has to be done. For 
the time being the number of mouths to feed is increasing faster than the number of 
hands at work, and to a large extent the hands are wastefully employed. Men work as 
laundresses, housemaids, cooks, waiters and flower gardeners, while women, with 
babies strapped to their backs, strive ineffectively to cultivate the land with no aid but 
primitive hoes. One of the chief tasks of development must therefore be to increase 
the productivity of labour. Greater mechanisation is one way. Increased incentive is 
another. But without improved health and education, little will be achieved by these 
other methods. Health means not only medical services, hospitals, inoculations, 
clean water, better balanced diet and so on. It means houses. Not only is adequate 
housing a fundamental condition of good health, but to the urban African to-day the 
prospect of securing a better house or the need to pay rent for an adequate house is 
probably the strongest incentive of all to increased productivity. I have not arrived at 
this conclusion without testing it by enquiry whenever and wherever I had the 
opportunity. It has been confirmed by many men with long experience in African 
administration. Of equal importance is education. The African values it very highly 
indeed. I have been surprised at the depth of feeling revealed by Africans when 
speaking of this subject. While payment of a small fee is still required, the necessity 
to earn the school fees is an incentive to the parent. More important than this, of 
course, is the fact that mechanised production and proper farming cannot be carried 
on by totally uneducated persons. Still more important is the possibility that the 
education of girls will not only produce wives who want their .husbands to work for a 
higher standard of living, but will in the long run break down the social customs 
which at present compel women to do work which men can do better and leave men 
to do work which is most suitable to women. Thus Health and Education services 
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must be extended as a coherent part of any realistic plan of economic development. If 
development is to be accelerated then these services must be accelerated. Obviously, 
I have had no opportunity to study in any detail the plans which are being made in 
these fields by the Colonial Secretary. I merely wish to make it clear that I regard 
them as necessary economic investment as well as an act of social justice. I think that 
an early step should be the raising of the salaries of African teachers, which are far 
too low in comparison with those of competing occupations and in relation to the 
scarcity of teachers. Books in the native languages on agricultural and technical 
problems should be made widely available and in as many centres as possible model 
co-operative farms which will be an example to the locality in the benefits arising 
from the use of knowledge in farming might be established. 
3. Though in the large towns there are many Africans-especially clerks and the 
like-who live with their families in permanent houses which are their homes, the 
typical worker in industries and on plantations is a migrant who spends part of the 
year in a variety of types of shelter provided by the employer at the workplace, and 
then returns for a further period to his village. There is no space to dilate here on the 
crop of social problems which this system produces. I suggest, however, that in all 
big development schemes for the future those responsible should try wherever 
possible to build around the industrial unit or plantation a settled African commun-
ity in which there is housing for wives and families and in which there is sufficient 
land available to permit the whole family to maintain its traditional association with 
the land and to provide at least some of its own food. To put the argument upon no 
higher grounds, too sharp a distortion of the pattern of African tribal and village life 
by rapid economic development may wreck the development itself by the social and 
political friction it will develop. 
4. To put health and education first is not to deny the importance of more 
tangible incentives, such as textiles and bicycles, though this is sometimes 
exaggerated. These are undoubtedly essentials to the African and he is getting less of 
them than he wants and often less than he got before the war. To increase the 
effective supply, from whatever source, will give him a greater incentive to work. 
Bicycles will improve his efficiency as a producer, for a great deal of time is wasted in 
Africa by walking long distances. In some areas textiles may be dollar savers as well as 
incentives. In many places in which we were told by employers of the lack of 
incentive goods, shops catering for the native trade were visibly crammed with 
textiles and also contained many unsold bicycles. The explanation is that prices are 
too high in relation to native purchasing power. The problem of satisfying the 
demand is further discussed in Section E. 
5. Part of the present gap between demand for and supply of consumer goods will 
have to be met by wage increases. Statistics of wages in relation to cost of living are 
scanty and the position is complicated by the fact that it is customary for the 
employer to provide free food and lodging. But my impression is that in general 
money wages have not risen as fast as the prices of consumer goods. Already there 
have been significant rises in the wages of railway workers. Such a trend is an 
inevitable part of the redistribution of labour which must accompany development. 
As labour becomes more costly to the employer he will be compelled to use it more 
economically. Incidentally, i~ is to be hoped that rising wages will drain labour away 
from domestic and personal service into productive employment. No doubt there will 
be friction in this process of adjustment. There will be strikes and wild statements. 
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We must expect them and we need not be unduly alarmed when they occur. In 
general, I am sure that the Labour Officers appointed by the Secretary of State are 
doing a good job in this field. We shall need more such men as development goes on, 
but we should have clearly in mind the probability that the African is no more likely 
in the long run than the Briton to accept trade unions made for him by either his 
employer or the Government. Where peasants rather than wage-earners are 
concerned it is by no means always true that an increase in the effective supply of 
consumer goods would stimulate effort. Many peasants and some wage-earners, after 
a certain level of earnings has been passed, buy leisure rather than consumer goods. 
Only by education and training and the practical demonstration of the advantages of 
a higher standard of living can such habits be changed. 
6. Expansion of the present very small labour force in these ways and expansion 
of the land available for production by means of clearance, fly and pest elimination 
and irrigation are the fundamentals of development in Africa. It is of the utmost 
importance that our plans should always be based on a careful calculation of the 
availability of both land and labour. In general, I think that the former is usually 
given more careful consideration than the latter. An Agricultural Officer who is asked 
if he can secure a bigger output of cotton or tobacco, for example, quickly calculates 
how far that can be done without a sacrifice of food production. But I have a feeling 
that labour has hitherto been so easily available that the possibility of its quickly 
becoming scarce it [? is] not so prominently in the minds of planners as it ought to 
be. To take an outstanding example, I doubt whether industrialists in South Africa 
appreciate what a profound effect development in the Rhodesias will have upon their 
labour supply. 
7. Even when land and labour are available, certain bottlenecks in the economic 
system must be widened. The chief is transport. This is dealt with at some length in 
Section D. In no part of the economic field is it more important that there should be 
combined planning by the Governments of Africa. They have in large part met the 
need for standardisation of gauges, &c., but there is competition among them for 
scarce supplies of locomotives, rolling stock, track and equipment. There is 
sometimes lack of knowledge of industrial plans affecting transport-for instance it 
is not certain that plans for developing coal mining and cement production in 
Portuguese East Africa may not require a considerable modification of the Rhodesian 
Railways' present admirable plans. Above all the alternative routes for new railways 
have not been weighed up by anybody with a wide enough knowledge of different 
territories and of their economic possibilities as well as strategic considerations. An 
outstanding problem here is the railway outlet from the Rhodesias. It is disturbing to 
find against a background in London of Western Economic Union that there have 
been no joint discussions between the Rhodesian and Congo copper belts on the best 
solution of their railway problems. It is disturbing to find advocates of a new railway 
to Walvis Bay who are unaware of the possible attractions of an alternative outlet for 
Rhodesia to Mikindani, the new groundnut port. I understand that there has been no 
widely inclusive conference on transport in Africa since 1936. I suggest that we 
should call a Pan-African Transport Conference as soon as possible, inviting to it 
representatives-both administrators and transport experts--of our own Colonies 
and Protectorates, of other Colonial Powers, of the Union of South Africa, the Sudan 
and perhaps Egypt. 
8. Other "bottlenecks" of great importance are the following:-
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(a) Building materials. Especially roofing; nails and other small metal goods; and 
cement. In many instances, e.g., the expansion of railway transport in the 
Rhodesias-important schemes of development are prevented by lack of housing 
for key staff. 
(b) Bags. There is serious shortage even now. Increased supplies are essential if 
there is to be expansion of output of cotton, maize, groundnuts, &c. Reference is 
made in Section B to possibilities of African production of fibres for bag-making. 
(c) Earth-moving machinery, water-boring machinery and heavy tractors. So 
important are these for building dams, clearance, roadmaking, &c., that their 
availability.may be the main determinant of the extent and speed of development. 
In some cases the provision of a small amount of machinery, even if dollars be paid 
for it, would pay in dollar saving in its first year. In the short run increased 
supplies must come, if at all, mainly from America. I suggest that in order to 
ensure maximum utilisation a stock of such heavy machinery be procured, hired 
out, and, if necessary, sometimes operated by a specially created subsidiary of the 
Colonial Development Corporation. It seems reasonable that our production of 
lighter tractors should be supplemented by some production of heavy types. I 
suggest, however, that (if this is not already being done) the Planning Staff should 
assess carefully how far such plans as those of Vickers--Rolls-Royce or Massey-
Harris to produce heavy tractors should be extended. This looks like being a 
product almost exclusively for export, especially when we cease to produce 
open-cast coal, and therefore it may be a precarious undertaking in view of 
American comparative advantage. Would it not be wise also to set up a special 
section in the D.S.I.R. to report not only on the best types and methods of 
production of heavy field machinery, but also upon decorticators, retters and other 
types of ancillary machinery which are an essential part of an extension of supply 
of farm products? (See Section B.) 
(d) Hand tools. The good effect of several excellent centres for training craftsmen 
is largely wasted because the carpenters, smiths, plumbers, &c., are later unable to 
set up business for lack of tools. 
9. To many questions about development possibilities the reply is that the answer 
awaits the completion of research. Nobody is to blame for this, but if we want 
answers quickly, we must intensify research. Tsetse fly research is obviously most 
important. Unless and until the fly is conquered large-scale ranching, for which parts 
of Africa are otherwise eminently suitable, is impossible. Geological research is 
hampered by small establishments. Yet the greater part of the possibilities of mineral 
development in Tanganyika, for instance, is unexplored. Forestry departments are 
too often overworked in controlling bush fires and day-to-day problems and too little 
staffed to cope with the large-scale plans and research needed for forest regeneration 
and exotic plantations. Veterinary scientists, agronomists, soil chemists, entomolog-
ists, mycologists and others are needed. It is good news that terms and conditions of 
service attractive enough to secure good men are likely to be approved in the near 
future. Where there is likely to be a shortage of British specialists for some years let 
us try to fill the gap temporarily by engaging Americans or others. Let us ask for 
more help in these matters from the Rockefeller Foundation. There should be a 
Director of Research in each group of territories with authority to plan his work 
without detailed financial control. Let us encourage not merely the circulation of 
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papers but the interchange of visits between active research and technical workers in 
one colony and their opposite numbers in others and let us include the Sudan in 
such a programme. 
10. Increased production of farm products on any large scale in Africa necessi-
tates provision of water by boring or damming-mainly the latter. The Gezira 
Scheme in the Sudan is the most important of its kind now in existence in Africa. 
More than 20,000 tenants farm 800,000 acres, from which they largely feed 
themselves, their families and their hired labour-a total population of at least 
250,000-and also produce for export substantial quantities of cotton of the highest 
quality. In the eighteenth century in England a revolution in agriculture was 
brought about largely by requiring tenants to observe suitable crop rotations. 
Something like a similar revolution-without its consequences of dispossession and 
unemployment-is becoming necessary in Africa to-day. The Gezira Scheme is an 
outstanding exemplar in the evolution of a controlled husbandry suitable to African 
conditions. From this scheme valuable lessons in collective farming, rotation of cash 
crops with subsistence crops, co-operative buying and marketing, integration of 
scientific research with farming practice, education of native cultivators, &c., &c., 
can be learnt. Officers of that Scheme should be asked to visit various agricultural 
experiments, pilot schemes, &c., in the Colonies. Colonial Officers in the agricultu-
ral service should be not merely encouraged but instructed to visit and study the 
Gezira Scheme. 
11. At present, widening of the main Gezira irrigation canal is going on. When 
these works are completed (probably in 1952), a further 100,000 acres in the Gezira 
can be cultivated. But by damming Lake Tana in Ethiopia additional water could be 
made available for both Egypt and the Sudan. It has been calculated that it would 
enable Egypt to increase her crop acreage over a number of years from 7% million 
acres to 10 million acres. It would make possible the doubling of the cultivated area 
of the Gezira: 40,000-50,000 more acres would be brought under cultivation each 
year following completion of the dam until the total additional 800,000 acres were in 
hand. The dam itself-which may cost about £4 or £5 million-would take about 
four years to build. Some preliminary work of surveying, &c., has been done, but for 
technical reasons a re-survey is said to be necessary. Obviously the sooner the 
agreement of Ethiopia to commence construction can be obtained the better. 
Of greater importance to Egypt and considerable importance for the Sudan is the 
scheme to provide water storage and Nile flood control by damming the White Nile at 
Owen Falls in Uganda and raising the level of Lake Victoria by about 4 feet. This 
would make possible hydro-electricity generation on the grand scale in Uganda. At 
present the principal proposed user would be a textile factory, but two major 
schemes may be developed. These are further discussed in Section D, paragraph 18. 
In my opinion planning of the control of the Nile waters, with its associated 
possibilities of agricultural and industrial expansion, is the most important of all 
development possibilities in Africa. The full cost of the maximum scheme is 
estimated to be somewhere in the region of £60 million. Construction would take 
ten years and the full effects could not be realised for a further twenty years. Of 
course, it must be remembered that, though capital investment from this country in 
the Sudan would be welcomed, any definite tie-up of the product to the British 
market must be ruled out. For that reason this project is a particularly suitable one 
for the International Bank to consider. 
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12. Other large schemes which seem to be sound and feasible within a reasonable 
time are:-
(a) The Sabi Basin Scheme in Southern Rhodesia. Reports by the consulting 
engineers are not yet available and it is too early to pronounce a final judgement; 
but it is very likely that this will be a major food-producing project covering 
500,000 acres. It is probable that the consulting engineers will recommend an 
initial pilot scheme covering 30,000 acres and providing water by pumping. If so, 
this should be started as soon as possible. Those likely to be concerned should visit 
the Gezira Scheme before commencing operations. 
(b) Rice production in Tanganyika. 
(c) The securing of hardwood timber from the groundnut area, Southern 
Tanganyika. I have not mentioned any of the groundnut projects in this report as I 
made no attempt to study these in detail, but reference is made in Section C to the 
timber which may be, as it were a by-product. 
13. In the longer term, apart from rather vague schemes about which no 
judgment can be made until more research has been done, the following are very 
important:-
( a) Food (probably including groundnuts) and fibre (cotton and possibly jute or 
jute substitutes) in the rainfall areas (about 10,000 square miles) of the Southern 
Sudan. Reports of experimental plantings are not yet available, but the prospects 
seem to be good. The territory would have to be opened up by new railway 
construction and a close study of future labour supply in the light of other 
development plans seems to be necessary. 
(b) Softwood afforestation in Kenya and Tanganyika. This is dealt with in Section 
C. If it is to be undertaken so as to yield results in 30 years or so, a decision in 
principle and an expansion of research activity is required as soon as possible. 
(c) The Tana River Scheme in Kenya. The Member for Agriculture for Kenya has 
promised to come-or to send a representative-to Britain within three months to 
discuss this fully. 
(d) The Kariba Gorge hydro-electric scheme in Southern Rhodesia. Provided 
electricity could be produced at a low enough price, this would greatly reduce the 
transport demand on the Rhodesian railways, release coal for other purposes than 
copper-refining and reduce the cost of copper, besides making possible other 
industrial development. Sir Miles Thomas, 1 who has carefully studied the scheme, 
has told me that he thinks it could be completed in ten years' time. On the other 
hand some copper companies wish it to be completed by 1956, by which date they 
say their present refining plant must be renewed. A possible and less expensive 
alternative to this is the Kafue Scheme in Northern Rhodesia, about the feasibility 
of which a report is expected in two months. 
(e) Bechuanaland. Here absence of tsetse fly and rinderpest make possible 
large-scale cattle ranching provided that the Khansi Area can be opened up. The 
construction of a railway connecting Southern Rhodesia with the Atlantic coast 
would do this provided a suitable route were chosen. This is probably the most 
powerful argument for such a railway. 
1 Chairman of BOAC and member of board of CDC. 
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14. Those mentioned above are some of the outstanding projects which might 
yield very substantial results. Other projects are discussed in Sections B and C, as are 
some aspects of industrial and agricultural undertakings already in active operation. 
Concerning the Wankie Coalfield I had an interesting conversation with Sir Godfrey 
Huggins about which a verbal would be more appropriate than a written report. Until 
the estimates of quantities of steel and capital equipment required, which the 
respective Ministers have asked the territories to produce, are available it is not 
possible to assess the investment required or the return upon it which can be 
expected. 
15. There is much talk but little action about tourism. Yet, with little investment 
required, tourism could be a substantial dollar earner in the short period. American 
interests have offered to erect a prefabricated hotel in Nairobi, near which there is 
hunting and mountaineering country and which has an excellent game reserve. The 
Northern Rhodesian Government is about to advertise carefully chosen land near the 
Victoria Falls which they will grant to an approved concern willing to erect a hotel at 
a cost of £250,000. We should, I think, make a special effort to supply all the 
materials which cannot be provided locally so that the project can be completed as 
soon as possible. Some £300,000 is being spent on an airport, near the Falls. This 
should certainly be completed by June 1949 and will accommodate the large aircraft 
of the American Services to South Africa. 
16. If there are equally eligible development projects in West Africa, not to speak 
of other Colonies, the total investment which could prudently be undertaken will 
probably be beyond our ability to undertake within a period sufficiently short to give 
as early results as we need. The supply of certain vital items of the necessary capital 
equipment can be secured quickly enough (if at all) only from the United States. The 
planning of full utilisation of the Nile Waters depends upon agreement with Egypt 
and Ethiopia. Agreement with Belgium and Portugal and possibly France about 
transport, labour supply and the exchange of scientific information would greatly 
help our planning. For all these reasons consultations with these and perhaps other 
European countries are essential. There is not a great deal of foreign investment in 
the Colonies I visited. The American holdings in copper mining are perhaps the chief 
example. But there is evidence of a fair amount of interest by American private 
enterprises in possibilities. I think Colonial Governors would welcome a directive as 
to what attitude to adopt to such enquiries. Such a directive should give them full 
authority to act (within the general limits laid down by the directive) without waiting 
for further reference. American business men are apt to lose interest quickly if they 
see a prospect of long triangular correspondence between America, a Colonial 
Government and Whitehall. 
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110 CAB 134/217, EPC(48)35 27 Apr 1948 
'Report by the paymaster-general on his visit to Africa and interim 
report by the Colonial Development Working Party': memorandum for 
Cabinet Economic Policy Committee by SirS Cripps (Exchequer) 
The report by the Paymaster-General on his visit to Africa from 16th January to 9th 
March1 and the Interim Report by the Colonial Development Working Party are 
circulated together. These two reports are complementary and agree in their broad 
conclusions. 
2. The Paymaster-General's report covers all aspects of development within 
eastern Africa from the Sudan to the Cape. It draws attention to the urgent problem 
of raising native standards of farming to provide food supplies for the expanding 
native population, to the shortage of trained staffs and to the substantial new capital 
investment in transport, particularly railways, which will be necessary before any 
considerable development of export production in Africa can take place. He suggests 
that the Colonial Administrations should be given guidance about the investment of 
foreign capital in the African colonies. 
3. The Working Party on Colonial Development in their Interim Report have 
dealt with a few broad problems of development in all the territories administered by 
the Colonial Office, whether in Africa or other Continents. They have reached very 
similar conclusions. They state that resources, and not finance, limit the pace of 
colonial development and that iron and steel in particular are reaching the colonies 
in quantities inadequate to maintain existing capital. Expansion in areas already 
developed is to be preferred to the development of entirely new areas, which would 
require railways and other basic services. The shortage of administrators and trained 
technicians is a serious problem. Given appropriate safeguards, foreign financial 
loans will be a means of achieving developments which must otherwise be 
indefinitely deferred. 
4. I invite my colleagues' attention to the Paymaster-General's note covering his 
Report on the matters upon which decisions or further reports are desirable. The 
conclusions and recommendations of the Working Party on Colonial Development 
are summarised on page 17 of the Interim Report. 
5. I also attach (a) the observations of the Economic Planning Board on the 
Interim Report of the Working Party and (b) a note by the Chairman of the Working 
Party setting out the lines on which he proposed they should proceed. 
6. I recommend that the Interim Report of the Colonial Development Working 
Party should be endorsed and that the Central Economic Planning Staff should be 
invited to review the detailed recommendations of the Paymaster-General's Report 
with the appropriate Departments and to co-ordinate action on them. I also 
recommend that the proposals of the Chairman of the Working Party should be 
accepted.2 
1 See 109. 2 This paper was discussed on 6 May 1948: see 125. 
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111 CO 537/3561, no 1 27 Sept 1948 
'West African tour- 1948': report by Mr Rees-Williams to Mr Creech 
Jones, conclusions and recommendations 
1. General 
I submit the conclusions and recommendations arising out of my tour ofWestAfrica. 
I have not gone into details, first because you know the area so well and secondly 
because I have cleared problems wherever possible with the Governments on the 
spot. A full report of all meetings wherein such matters were discussed has, in every 
case, been despatched to you . 
2. Conclusions 
(1) Political 
Whilst my tour was not directly concerned with political matters, they naturally 
arose in the consideration of economic questions. I found that in the country areas, 
i.e. out of the artificial atmosphere of the capitals, people were interested in crop 
prices, high cost of living, shortage of supplies and the like. They were only 
interested in politics to the extent to which they believed these matters could be 
improved by political action. Politicians, like Danquah, 1 had played on economic 
disturbances to gain political ends. The responsible elements were horrified at the 
thought of self-government. The old ones remembered the barbarism of the time 
before the British arrived in the country and had no wish to return to such a 
condition, and return it would be. But not being sure of the Government's 
intentions, they were sitting on the fence. They did not know whether the rebels of 
to-day might not be the masters of tomorrow. The people of the Northern 
Territories, too, are both friendly and anxious to retain the European association for 
a considerable time to come. 
When we consider that only 50 years ago barbarism had full sway it will be seen 
how thin is the veneer of civilisation. In my view the West African is nothing like as 
advanced as the Malay or the Burman and of course far behind the Chinese. So too, 
as in East Africa, his attitude is a mendicant one. He looks on Government as a 
gigantic Father Christmas able to dip in his bag and pull out trains, schools, 
hospitals, roads, motor cars and everything else. 
(2) Defence 
There would seem to be no difficulty in raising two or three divisions of West African 
troops. The local commanders are of our mind on the questions of King's 
Commissions, technical training and mass education. 
In my view the present size of the Force is entirely inadequate even as a 
gendarmerie. The liaison between civil and military authorities is good. 
(3) Security 
The Governments agreed with our views on intelligence and the respective roles of 
political and police officers. 
1 J K K B Danquah, lawyer and journalist; founder of United Gold Coast Convention, 1947. 
p 
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As to the police arrangements, whilst improved, they are to my mind entirely 
inadequate. In Nigeria for example there is no radio communication even to the 
various residencies, and for a country the size of Great Britain, France and pre-War 
Germany with a population of 27 million they have a police force of less than 
one-third of the Metropolitan police. In Sierra Leone the Commissioner of Police for 
the Colony has no authority over the police (called Court Messengers) in the 
Protectorate. 
The Jack of organization, the small size of the police force and the inadequacy of 
the military forces gives rise in my mind to serious apprehension if serious disorder 
breaks out. 
(4) Agriculture 
In West Africa, as in East, the greatest problem is the tsetse fly. This occupies at least 
three-quarters of the area. It makes any radical improvement of the soil or methods 
of agriculture practically impossible, for without animals soil fertility must decline, 
and shifting cultivation continue. 
In tree crops as a rule the species are mediocre. This applies, for example, to cocoa 
and palm oil. In the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone there is a dangerous reliance on one 
export crop. 
To add to these depressing features, the land tenure systems discourage good 
farming practices, and the agricultural departments are chronically short of staff. 
There are isolated good pieces of work being done in the North to encourage mixed 
farming and in research at Tafo and Benin on cocoa and oil palms respectively. 
The Marketing Policy and the Marketing Boards are, I am sure, the right policy so 
long as the latter do not fall into the wrong hands. This is important when one 
realises that, for example, the income of the Gold Coast Cocoa Board is greater than 
the revenue of the Gold Coast Government. 
(5) Industrialization 
There is a great demand for industrialization with no conception of what it means. 
Every territory wants to be self-sufficient in everything which is absurd. In fact 
agriculture must remain the staple, but there is room for processing plants and also 
for light engineering firms and for those making consumer goods. The Industrial 
Development Corporations have made a beginning but there is a great Jack of the 
African entrepreneur and manager. The African looks for safe jobs where he can wear 
a white collar. His mendicant outlook however blames government for all his 
shortcomings and believes that it has all the means to provide him with an 
up-to-date economy with no trouble or work on his part. 
(6) The co-operative movement 
This as yet is almost entirely confined to producer societies, mainly cocoa. The 
societies themselves are small in membership but have fairly large ·turn-overs 
because of the high price of cocoa. 
The movement is capable of considerable expansion on the consumer side. But the 
societies must be able to import as well as retail. 
(7) The monopoly firms 
Everywhere I met hostility towards the big import houses, especially U.A.C., among 
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Europeans as much as among Africans. This is the one matter upon which there is 
common agreements 
I believe this to be a matter of the highest political importance. In fact, more than 
anything else, the Labour Government will be judged on its treatment of the big 
monopoly firms. 
There are only two courses available. One is to nationalize the big firms; the other 
is to bring into being either state trading or co-operative societies as real competitors 
and thus break the monopoly. I do not believe the former method is practicable. 
As to the tin mining royalty of the U.A.C. for which no return is given and which 
amounts to approximately £235,000 a year, I have suggested various courses to the 
Nigerian Government, and a note of my suggestions has already, I believe, been sent 
to you. I do not believe that this royalty is justifiable. 
(8) Public relations 
I believe these to be bad first because of the lack of the right approach, secondly 
because of the lack of machinery. 
The average officer, and more particularly the technical officer, does not regard it 
as any part of his job to explain to the people what is happening, thus the most 
appalling ignorance is present. This is regrettable always but it is highly dangerous 
when the people are called upon to undertake some task they hate e.g. to cut out 
trees in the swollen shoot campaign. 
There is no general system of radio broadcasting. 
The Overseas Broadcast of the B.B.C. is puerile and quite unfitted for Africa. The 
news items especially would seem to have been chosen by someone whose delight it 
was to create alarm, despondency, mistrust and derision in the African mind. 
The Public Relations departments are doing their best within their limited 
resources and have achieved some success with the local press. 
With regard to the Regional Public Relations Offices, I feel here as I felt in East 
Africa that their scope is too limited. On the present basis I doubt whether they are 
worth the money they cost. They should either be more or not exist at all. It is 
difficult to see the justification for spending the British taxpayers' money, for 
instance, on the appointment of a superintendent to control the work of two expert 
photographers. 
(9) Mass education 
This is almost non-existent and even at Udi it has fallen away badly. We are now 
dropping between two stools. In Nigeria the Education Department has taken it over 
and is trying to run it with paid assistance. The political officer regards it as another 
departmental matter and not his pigeon. 
In the other territories 'mass education' has hardly got to the blue print stage. 
(10) Transportation 
(a) All the territories are inadequately served in railway communications. In 
Sierra Leone the problem is one of relaying and re-aligning a 2 ft. 6 ins. gauge, in 
Nigeria the new locomotives cannot be used on parts of the line because of the 
light-weight rails. 
(b) Roads are a problem, dusty in the dry weather, a sea of mud in the wet. 
Development is held up until the railway and road services are adequate. 
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(c) Air Services are poor. The inter-territorial schedule is operated by Doves 
which are not suitable in my opinion for the long and dangerous haul over Liberia 
and French territory. I cannot understand, too, why West African Airways in 
conjunction with East African Airways do not run a trans-continental service. They 
are now losing the very paying pilgrim traffic to Jeddah and the Levantine traffic to 
Syria and the Lebanon. A South African Charter Company is getting it all. 
(11) Groundnuts hold-up 
The hold-up at Kano is based on a misconception. Even more than engines and 
waggons the difficulty is one of too light rails. The section south of Kaduna is now 
two-thirds relaid, the other part between Zaria and Kano will be relaid after the 
harvest. Locally they expect a bumper harvest of 350,000 tons with 40--50,000 tons 
from French territory. At the rate of 40,000 tons clearance a month, the Railway 
estimate, the stores should be cleared by November 1949. They only lost 300 tons last 
year, due to faulty covering of one pyramid. Local dealers told me that they prefer 
storing nuts in pyramids to storing them in warehouses. There is a shortage of 
tarpaulins as waggon covers. 
(12) Swollen shoot 
I have already sent to the Office, at the request of Lord Listowel, my views on the 
swollen shoot situation. 
Briefly these are that the only known method is to cut out diseased trees at an 
early stage of the disease. At Tafo they are experimenting with mealie bug eating 
insects, resistant strains and other weapons but as yet no sign of success is in sight. 
The campaign in the Gold Coast had considerable prior publicity but undoubtedly 
there were some unpleasant features. Payment was made by the acre, and the 
labourers were paid on the basis of every 25 trees cut out. As could be foreseen the 
good were cut out with the bad. When they were operating in the devastated areas 
this did not matter so much but when they swung over to Ashanti with the idea of 
creating a cordon sanitaire and meeting the disease from the North, the situation 
became changed. There was little swollen shoot and the farmers were disturbed. 
Cocoa was at a high price, there was little sign of damage and compensation was 
inadequate. Into this picture came Danquah and his associates. They spread stories 
that the Government had become leagued with the U.A.C. to ruin the Gold Coast 
Cocoa industry and replant it in South America and in Malaya. The explosion 
followed. 
(13) Staff shortages 
A really serious situation has arisen in the West African Colonies owing to the lack of 
European staff. Unlike South-East Asia or East Africa, there are no Chinese or 
Indians to perform the semi-skilled work. Thus the European has to do both skilled 
and semi-skilled tasks. 
The lack of skilled man and woman power felt everywhere in the Colonies is 
accentuated by the above condition and by the bad name West Africa has got for 
climate, disease, lack of educational facilities and political disturbance. Added to all 
these there is the practice of virulent press campaigns against individual European 
officers. 
The African of course with his childlike outlook wants the best of both worlds. He 
[111] AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS 223 
wants more of European technical assistance with fewer Europeans. This does not 
apply to the people of the Northern territories who desire the aid of Europeans and 
are prepared to pay for it. The Administrative Service is receiving a number of 
excellent young men but they necessarily have little or no experience. It is rare to 
find anyone other than a Cadet in charge of a district. 90% of the Administration in 
the Gold Coast and 75% in Nigeria have been appointed since 1945. Even so the 
Administration is desperately short of officers. 
This shortage of administrative and technical officers is having a serious effect on 
normal administration and it makes, of course, complete nonsense of large scale 
development. 
(14) Supplies and the inflationary tendency 
I found that in Nigeria supplies of cotton goods of the Japanese re-printed variety are 
coming through quite well . In West Africa generally there is a great demand for 
traditional English cotton goods, for kerosene, Raleigh bicycles, corrugated iron 
sheeting and concrete. The market is almost inexhaustible for the above. 
In order to deal with the inflationary tendency of a doubled price for cocoa, an 
enhanced price (about 20-25%) for other vegetable export products and vast 
inducement sums for cutting out trees infected with swollen shoot and replanting 
(£9 million in Gold Coast alone) large imports of consumer goods of the right types 
will be needed immediately. 
I believe that there is no drive in West Africa in the Savings Campaign. In no place 
where large sums were being paid out did I see posters, propaganda, or a van. Savings 
would help a great deal in combating the inflationary tendency. 
(15) The modem state 
One feature that strikes me more than any other is that the West African Colonies, 
like all others, are battling with the problems of the modern world with little of the 
machinery or the outlook of a modern state. Some of the senior officials seem to 
regard modern planning and development as just the most recent Whitehall fad . 
First it was indirect rule, then social welfare, later mass education and now economic 
development. There are few aids such as up-to-date statistical data. The departments 
keep a departmental mind and the agricultural departments do not for example 
always visualise the profound economic and social implications of what they are 
doing. 
Unless all departments work as one machine with a common purpose the result 
must end in frustration and a great loss of effort. 
They have lost very largely the contact with the people on the ground that the 
colonial officials in the old days had without gaining the expertise of modern 
administration. We must help them to regain the former and to achieve the latter. 
Finally 
I have given my conclusions based on my observations. It may be thought that I am 
critical or pessimistic but the reverse is the case. The tropical soil harbours diseases 
of the most malignant kind, the administration is suffering from the niggardly 
pre-war policy to an unprecedented extent, technical and semi-technical men and 
women are desperately short. . 
Yet we have positive achievements that have been overlooked. In the lifetime of a 
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man of late middle age the country has been recovered from barbarism, law and 
order prevails if somewhat tenuously, social and educational progress has been 
made. 
I feel that there is great vitality in the people and that there is an immense fund of 
goodwill towards us except among the political self-seekers on the Coast. 
I believe that it will be possible to enthuse the people to develop themselves. They 
are desperately keen on education for their children and on economic development 
which they tend to see as industralization. 
I have therefore ventured to make the following recommendations, which relate to 
the foregoing conclusions and are similarly numbered. 
Recommendations 
(1) Political 
In my view our policy on building up local government and identifying the people 
with the progress of their country is the sound one. We should build on a broad basis 
and not as in India and Burma on a narrow one. The people as a whole must go 
forward and not a few politicians on the sea coast out-of-touch with the needs of their 
own people. 
There can be no real advance unless the people share in the desire as well as in the 
achievement. 
We should give full support and encouragement to our friends, especially those in 
the Northern territories in every Protectorate. 
(2) Defence 
We should urge the Cabinet to come to a decision on a West African Corps, and the 
War Office to clear the outstanding points at issue. 
(3) Security 
The Police Adviser should go into the whole question of police, intelligence, 
transportation, communications and size of forces. 
(4) Agriculture 
We must push on with our war against the tsetse fly and our research into crop 
diseases and into better yielding strains. 
In those areas where there is no tsetse fly the State should set up model mixed 
farms of its own. 
In other areas the State should set up pig farms. 
In both the local farmers should be induced to take advantage of the breeding or 
fattening stock available. 
Apart from these suggestions our plans for mechanised groundnut and rice 
production and the introduction of better yielding strains of cocoa and palm trees 
would seem to be on the right lines. 
(5) Industrialisation 
We should point out to Trefgarne2 that even more than finance the Africans need 
2 Sir George Morgan Trefgarne (1st Baron, 1947); founder chairman of Colonial Development Corpora-
tion, 1947-1950. 
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managerial and technical training. His corporation is their great hope of the former. 
There is no need of him to be frightened of the Gold Coast. I found that I was able to 
persuade them of the need for the C.D.C. without great difficulty. 
As regards technical training in all its branches, I feel that all the West African 
Governments should give more attention (a) to the setting up of trade schools (b) to 
the setting up of technical colleges (c) to the training establishments run by the 
P.W.D., railways and other governmental concerns and (d) to scholarships for 
apprenticeships in engineering in United Kingdom shops. I consider, too, that the 
Governments might also consider business scholarships for young Africans with 
commercial firms in the United Kingdom. 
(6) The co-operative movement 
I believe it is necessary to organize a double tier consumer co-operative movement. 
The first being a wholesale-import co-operative whose members would be unions of 
small retail societies or the societies themselves. These societies would form the 
second, or retail, tier. It is quite obvious that the present societies cannot run them 
themselves so I suggest that business executives from the C.W.S. and the Scottish 
C.W.S. be imported to run the former and executives from the big retail societies like 
the Woolwich Arsenal and the South Suburban [sic] be imported to run the latter. 
(7) The monopoly firms 
These should be dealt with by the Co-operative Societies I have mentioned. In 
addition I suggest that price control be reimposed on rare commodities all the way 
down to the consumer. 
As to the tin mining royalty of the U.A.C. this can be (i) extinguished without 
compensation (ii) be reduced to a nominal figure unilaterally under the original 
Treasury minute or (iii) extinguished for a comparatively small sum to be fixed by the 
Nigerian Government. 
(8) Public relations 
(a) In Sierra Leone, in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria respectively the installation 
of radio transmitters powerful enough to reach the whole territory. In towns that 
these broadcasts be re-diffused and in country districts that arrangements be made 
for public listening in every village, through the most convenient authority 
(headman, chief, policeman, postmaster). The programmes be arranged locally and 
that local material be used as much as possible. 
(b) That the B.B.C. be approached urgently to re-cast its overseas programmes to 
make them more suitable for the African listener. 
(c) That technical officers of Government be encouraged to give talks on their 
work from time to time, and that Government departments as such have a nation 
wide 'week' when, for example, the educational or agricultural department is on 
show. 
(d) That Governments realize that people want circuses as well as bread. The 
administration is honest and hard-working but dull. More bands, more parks, more 
fairs, more sparkle is wanted. 
(e) That every officer be made to realize i:hat he is a public relations officer. 
'Theirs not to reason why' went out with Tennyson. 
(0 With regard to the Regional Public Relations Offices, I suggest that Ministers, 
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with the officials concerned, should as soon as possible go into this whole question 
and on the basis of the experience gained and on the views which have been formed 
evolve the future policy with reference to this organization. I am not at all satisfied 
from what I have seen in both East and West Africa that its scope, and hence the work 
it is doing, justifies its expense. 
(9) Mass education 
In my view this can only be achieved through the medium of broadcasting on the 
scale I have suggested, by extending publications of the type of "Nigerian Citizen" 
and "Gaskija", and by persuading the leaders of African opinion to take a hand in the 
movement. 
(10) Transportation 
(a) Rail. I think the Sierra Leone railway should change to a 3 ft. 6 ins. gauge. As 
to the rest we must continue to give these railways all the assistance we can in 
getting supplies. ) 
(b) Road. I think that where it is impossible to tar all roads the bad parts should 
be tarred; often a few hundred yards makes a road of 50 miles long impassible. 
(c) Air. We should assist West African Airways to obtain more powerful 'planes 
than Doves for the inter-territorial services and should approach the Ministry of Civil 
Aviation in order that transcontinental traffic may be started, Kano-Khartoum-
Jeddah and Damascus. 
(11) Groundnuts hold-up 
There is nothing we can do here other than that already mentioned except to assist in 
obtaining more tarpaulins for the trucks. 
(12) Swollen shoot 
The only solution is to cut out all trees immediately they become infected and to pay 
compensation per tree cut out and replanted on a generous scale. 
These measures, which are being taken in hand in the Gold Coast and should be 
followed in Nigeria, must be accompanied by a vigorous propaganda campaign. It 
really means officers speaking to small bodies of farmers in every district affected and 
answering their questions. The written word is not enough. This is a case where 
nation-wide radio broadcasts would be a great help but would not in themselves 
suffice. 
If the B.B.C. Overseas broadcasts could be persuaded to turn from their 
pre-occupation over bandits in the Balkans, strikers in the Midlands, the latest panic 
rumours from Berlin and English football and racing results and consider for a time 
the needs of our Colonial territories they too might assist in this matter. 
(13) Staff shortages 
The only answer is to offer such terms in pay and conditions as will induce people of 
the right type and with the right qualifications to go to West Africa. 
Finance Committees should be told to stop crying for the moon and to take a 
realistic attitude on this matter. If put to them bluntly I am sure they will do so but 
there must be no beating about the bush. If they want good men they must take 
them on the good men's terms. 
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There will, too, have to be a considerable addition to the European semi-skilled 
ranks to relieve the skilled men of much routine work. This particularly applies to 
agriculture. 
(14) Supplies and the inflationary tendency 
(i) Our policy in this direction, accepted in the main, I understand from Mr. 
Poynton's letter, by the other Government Departments concerned, is the right one. 
(ii) I suggest that we should send a despatch to all Colonies where there is an 
inflationary tendency pointing out the necessity for a savings drive accompanied by 
propaganda and facilities for paying in and drawing out whether to or from a mobile 
van or otherwise. 
(15) The modem state 
We must suggest to Governments their requirements to bring men from the old 
Colonial outlook to that of the modern state. We must help them with the advice and 
technical assistance they require. 
On the economic side, the Economic Development Liaison Officers can help a 
great deal. After they have had a tour of their respective areas I would like to have a 
conference with the appropriate officials arid with the Development Liaison Officers 
to ascertain in what way we can assist the Colonial territories in this part of their 
evolution. 
112 CO 852/603/6 28 Mar-7 May 1946 
[Tanganyika groundnuts scheme]: minutes by S Caine, AB Cohen, 
GM Roddan1, Sir H Tempany2, Mr Hall and Mr Creech Jones 
We had already heard of this. It is prima facie of the greatest interest and will be 
examined as promptly as possible. Obviously a lot of difficult questions will 
arise-soil possibilities, native rights, labour conditions, source of finance, availabil-
ity of plant, etc . . .. 
S.C. 
28.3.46 
I can only speak from the point of view of the development of Tanganyika, not from 
the world food situation point of view. From the purely Tanganyika point of view, if it 
could be carried into effect, this might be an immensely valuable means of 
developing the territory and filling the vast empty spaces along the central line of 
Tanganyika. I understand that Mr. Samuel3 discussed a much smaller project briefly 
with the Chief Secretary and Financial Secretary when he was recently in Dar es 
Salaam and that subsequently his local representative has put this smaller scheme to 
1 Assistant agricultural adviser, CO, from 1943; deputy adviser, 1947; deputy director of agriculture, 
Kenya, 1948. 
2 Assistant agricultural adviser to S of S colonies, 1936-1940; adviser, 1940-1946; vice-chairman, Colonial 
Advisory Council on Agriculture, 194il-1943. 
3 Managing director of the United Africa Company. 
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the Tanganyika Government tentatively, and that they have welcomed it (of course it 
is all in a stage of preliminary examination). I understand also that this scheme is 
regarded by Mr. Samuel as a project beyond the scope of unassisted private 
enterprise. It would, in fact, be necessary to form a public utility company with large 
scale Government participation. 
I suggest that when the letter to Sir F. Tribe4 has gone off, Mr. Caine, Mr. Monson 
and I might have a talk as to the various points to be investigated with a view to 
having an early talk with Mr. Frank Samuel himself. 
I make no comment at this stage on the proposition that Sir C. Lockhart5 should 
be put in charge of this development. 
The Agricultural difficulties are these:-
1. Unreliable rainfall 
A.B.C. 
29.3.46 
About half of the stretch in question, Dodoma to Tabora, is in the Central Province, 
the most arid in the territory, with a rainfall in the under 30" class. The tract 
suggested lies within the main groundnut producing zone in Tanganyika Territory. 
The groundnut exports from T.T. over the past 13 years have been: 
1933 19,177 
1934 8,036 - Drought 
1935 16,429 
1936 22,786 
1937 22,251 
1938 3,579 - Severe drought and 
rosette disease 
1939 4,496 - Badly distributed 
rainfall 
1940 8,185 
1941 11,312 
1942 13,193 
1943 1,752- Drought 
1944 627- Continued drought 
The project appears to be precarious on this count. 
2. Soil 
I am always suspicious when I hear of vast tracts of uninhabited fertile land. There is 
usually a snag, it may be soil, or lack of water, or it may be tsetse. The area in 
question is some 3000 to 4000 ft. up and undulating and the Central Province 
presents some of the worst examples of soil erosion in the territory. The soil is light 
and easily erodible, and it is certain that soil conservation measures (not estimated· 
for) will be essential. Obstruction by conservation measures to mechanical cultiva-
tion may possibly be overcome by adopting strip cultivation. 
4 Permanent secretary, Ministry of Food, 1945-1946. 
5 Chief Secretary, East African Governors' Conference; formerly financial secretary of Northern Rhodesia 
(1937), of Kenya (1938), and of Nigeria (1942). 
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3. Fertility 
Soil types vary tremendously within this area even over quite small distances and 
within any large block and under the best conditions. I understand that if 50% of the 
area is suitable for groundnuts, this would be a maximum. The area is largely scrub 
and woodland covered, and does not possess any marked degree of fertility. The light 
soils in particular are of low fertility. In regard to the maintenance and improvement 
of this fertility, I gather the proposal is to crop, for four years, two crops of 
groundnuts then one other crop followed by a further groundnut crop and then grass 
fallow for three years. I know it is a common practice in many parts of the tropics to 
take successive crops of groundnuts from the same land. Only experiment can show 
whether this can be done in this area without the aid of manure (not estimated for). I 
am, moreover, doubtful whether the three years grass fallow will have the desired 
effect. Firstly if by "grass" is meant natural regeneration of scrub growth, etc., this is 
not an efficient restorer of fertility over a short period, or if, as seems implied by the 
grazing proposals, it is proposed to establish grass, this can only be done by planting 
(which is, of course impossible on such a scale) or by seeding, and we have not yet 
reached the stage when we can suggest a suitable mixture or provide the necessary 
seed. Secondly, when Dr. Martin of Uganda, the East African authority on this 
subject, visited T.T. in 1943 and made chemical and structural tests on a range of soil 
samples, he pointed out how lacking in colloidal binding material are the lighter 
soils and how, therefore, on these soils there is doubt if benefit can accrue from a 
grass rotation. 
4. Rosette disease 
Experience everywhere has shown how important it is that groundnuts be planted 
immediately there is sufficient moisture to make this possible if rosette disease is to 
be reduced to a minimum. The optimum planting time is very limited, even a few 
days may make all the difference between a full crop and failure, due to the onset of 
this disease. It seems doubtful whether sowing of the vast areas can be completed in a 
short period without a most extravagant use of expensive machines. Further, I have 
confirmed by speaking to Dr. Neave, that by continuous and concentrated cropping 
with groundnuts there would be a very strong tendency for the vector of this disease 
(Aphides) to multiply and therefore also a corresponding increase in the disease. 
Control of Aphides by spraying is not practical. In this regard we would be at a 
disadvantage as compared with America where rosette disease does not occur. 
5. Distribution of labour 
The quick maturing varieties will suit this area best, and these have a growth period 
of about four months. During the initial stages it will be possible to use men and 
machinery during the off-crop season for stumping, clearing, etc., but when this 
work is completed it is difficult to see how employment is to be provided throughout 
the year. 
6. Selection by aerial survey 
A preliminary selection might usefully be made in this way but it would have to be 
correlated with existing knowledge and a further and no doubt very considerable 
arnount of ground work. 
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7. Seed supply 
Difficulty will be found in obtaining the large amount of seed of varieties which have 
been proved suitable under T.T. conditions. 
I take it it is intended to export the decorticated nuts. We want the valuable 
"Poonac" (residue after extraction of oil) for cattle feed here, but surely it savours 
very strongly of mining to take everything out of the T.T. soil and put nothing back. 
Under a system of peasant holdings on the lines of the Sudan Plantations it might be 
possible to extract the oil on the spot but retain the Poonac for cattle feed and to 
return it to the soil in this way. But this is another question. 
From the agricultural point of view, I do not regard the project with any 
enthusiasm. 
G.M.R. 
4.4.46 
I was invited to attend a short discussion of this scheme with Mr. Samuel on April 
15th. at 3 p.m. having returned to the office that morning after a three months 
absence. I had only time to obtain the sketchiest idea of what it was all about and 
could make no useful contribution to the discussion, beyond indicating that so far as 
I could see Mr. Roddan's criticisms are valid. 
Even now as this paper is marked in red I have not been able to examine it 
carefully but I have been able in the short time available to make a cursory 
examination of it. That examination increases my sceptism [sic] of it. 
The scheme envisages the cultivation of 21/z million acres that is 3900 square 
miles, rather less than the total area of Jamaica. The largest plantation area in the 
world is the Sudan Plantations dealing with an annual crop-cotton-this occupies 
1 million acres of which 850,000 acres are cultivated. Having recently seen 
something of this enterprise and the difficulties that have had to be overcome, I 
frankly doubt if it is possible to build up what would probably be the largest single 
crop plantation enterprise in the world at short notice. 
It seems remarkable that the proposal should have received such very cursory 
scrutiny from the agricultural point of view, in the initial stages, since it is primarily 
an agricultural scheme. I do not think that e.g. a large scale engineering scheme of 
comparable magnitude could possibly have got as far as this without full preliminary 
examination of the technical aspects by a committee of experts. I would urge that if it 
is possible this ought to receive similar treatment. 
I know that the proposal to send out a delegation is supposed to provide for this, 
but I do not think that this should be done until the scheme has been properly 
examined on this side. 
In regard to the proposed team for the visit, I do not think that the composition is 
satisfactory. I would not care to rely on the verdict of only experts nominated by Mr. 
Samuel, supplemented by Mr. Roddan and members of the T.T. Dept. of Agriculture. 
Mr. Roddan has great ability but he has had no practical experience at all of ground 
nut cultivation, while among the Tanganyika Department there is no officer that I 
am aware of who has first hand experience of really large scale mechanised plantation 
agriculture. It would throw the main responsibility on this side on Mr. Samuel's 
nominee who presumably is responsible for devising the plan. If it should be decided 
to send out an expert on our side I would strongly advise that the attempt should be 
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made to enlist the assistance of Captain Mackie6 who knows groundnut cultivation 
from A to Z in its Nigerian aspects and is a very sound agriculturist. 
From a very cursory examination of the estimates I am inclined to question the 
validity of some of the premises on which they are based e.g. I doubt whether a staff 
of 3 Europeans can adequately supervise a block of 35,000 acres under an annual 
crop which has to be planted within a short space of time with the onset of a very 
variable rainfall, and only takes 4 months to mature. 
I also doubt whether entire reliance can be placed on mechanical means to carry 
out the weeding in the early stages of growth. Certainly in the Sudan with cotton it 
cannot and the problem of finding labour to perform this essential task is one of the 
biggest headaches the Syndicate have to face. Sir Frank Engledow7 and I spent half a 
morning with the Manager of the Syndicate discussing this particular problem. Mr. 
Samuel assures that all the problems of mechanisation have been solved in the States 
but no details are forthcoming. I have no information myself on the subject and we 
ought to have full details since the whole scheme hinges on employing a very small 
labour force. 
I will not comment further here but would urge that before the step is taken of 
sending out a delegation a small committee of experts should be asked to examine 
the scheme here. If so desired I would be prepared to suggest names. 
H.T. 
30.4.46 
Sir George Cater discussed with Sir Harold Tempany, Mr. Cohen and myself. It was 
agreed:-
(1) That we should proceed with arrangements for local investigation, but that 
the investigating team when chosen should have preliminary discussions with a 
"briefing committee" of which Sir Harold Tempany and Sir Frank Engledow would 
form the nucleus. 
(2) That the investigating team should be somewhat stronger than envisaged in 
the previous minutes, and should consist of a senior man with wide Colonial 
agricultural experience, the U.A.C. representative, another agriculturist with experi-
ence of mechanised agriculture, and an administrative man from the Colonial Office. 
The names of Sir Geoffrey Evans8 and Captain Mackie were mentioned in the first 
category, although considerable doubt was felt as to whether it would be possible for 
Captain Mackie to work in harmony with any U.A.C. representative. Sir Harold 
Tempany mentioned the name of Mr. Cuplin (?) as an expert on mechanised 
agriculture. 
It was agreed that the immediate steps to be taken were:-
(a) to tell the Ministry of Food of our proposals and get their agreement; this I 
have done-see copy of letter attached; 
(b) to have a preliminary conversation with Sir Frank Engledow, which Sir Harold 
Tempany, Mr. Cohen and I hope to have this afternoon; and 
6 J R Mackie, director of agriculture, Nigeria, since 1936. 
7 Drapers' professor of agriculture, Cambridge; member of Colonial Advisory Council on Agriculture, 
Animal Health and Forestry. 
8 Economic botanist, Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew, since 1938; formerly principal of Imperial College of 
Tropical Agriculture, Trinidad. 
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(c) to recirculate the file for the information of the Secretary of State and Mr 
Creech Jones. 
This should be proceeded with all speed. 
s.c. 
3.5.46 
G.H.H. 
6.5.46 
A.C.J. 
7.5.46 
I think the inclusion of Mackie & Ceoffrey Evans in the team would be of immense 
value. There seems great force in the Minute of Sir Harold Tempany. The course 
suggested in Mr Caine's Minute seems a wise one. 
A.C.J. 
7.5.46 
113 CO 85211003/3 23 Apr-29 May 1946 
[African agricultural policy]: minutes by S Caine, AB Cohen, Sir G 
Clauson, Sir F Stockdale1, and Sir G Gater 
We have for some time been concerned about the very fundamental question of the 
speed at which it may be possible to effect technical improvements in Colonial and 
especially African agriculture, having regard to the nature of the social structure and 
the forms of economic organisation with which we are working. The topic keeps 
coming up in one form or another. Various aspects of it crop up from time to time on 
the Economic Advisory Committee, and it was repeatedly touched upon at the recent 
Colonial Service Conference in Oxford. 
2. It is hardly necessary to emphasise the basic importance of the improvement of 
agricultural technique in Africa. Production per acre or per unit of manpower is low, 
and although it is easy to exaggerate the possibilities of improvement and to ignore 
the absolute limitations set by the basic soil fertility and climatic conditions, there is 
very little doubt that substantial improvement could be made. 
3. Equally there is no doubt of the urgent desirability of such improvement in 
productivity. There has been too great a tendency to allow the temporary and purely 
marginal surpluses which were so troublesome in the 1930's to obscure the fact that 
the world is still short of everything, and above all food, and is likely to go on getting 
shorter if the present powerful trends towards increased population continue to 
operate. The essential message of the Hot Springs Conference and the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation is fundamentally true, i.e. that the world must have more 
food if a higher standard of welfare is to be attained, and it is not impossible that the 
present acute food crisis is only a specially sharp attack of an underlying condition of 
scarcity which will be with us for many years to come. 
1 CO adviser on development planning, 1945--1947; deputy chairman of CDC, 1947; formerly comptroller 
for development and welfare, West lndies, 1940-1945. 
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4. It is therefore a matter of urgent public importance, in the widest sense of the 
word public, that the land should be used in the most productive way possible, i.e. 
productive over a long period of years. It is important that its current fertility should 
be enhanced as much as possible without destroying its permanent fertility. 
Accordingly, it is necessary to steer between the extremes of mining the land for 
immediate advantage and adopting cultural routines which leave the soil permanent-
ly undamaged only at the expense of making quite inadequate current use of it. 
5. The attainment of the right middle course requires, therefore, an intelligent 
and discriminatory application of many novel technical methods. The use of 
mechanical cultivation, greater application of fertilisers, more elaborate systems of 
mixed farming, and more scientific methods of preventing soil erosion are among 
possible lines of improvement. 
6. At certain points, however, any such developments inevitably come into 
conflict with customary practices and ways of thought which are closely bound up 
with the whole social system of the communities concerned, and the question 
constantly arises whether some modification which will have significant social 
consequences is worth while for the sake of the technical improvement it would 
make possible. Broadly, there can be little doubt that the social structure throughout 
most of our African territories acts as a pretty heavy brake on change. That is by no 
means wholly a bad thing, but at least we must face the fact that we cannot have 
technical improvement and a changeless social structure at the same time. 
7. Typical of the problems which arise in this field is that of land tenure. It would, 
I imagine, be generally agreed that African systems of land tenure and the cultural 
routines associated with them, if maintained to the full in their traditional form, 
would effectively prevent any rapid technical change, possibly any change at all. On 
the other hand, the relationship of the community to its land is so fundamental to 
the social structure that changes in it would have large and not easily calculable 
effects in many departments of social life. There is, therefore, a natural reluctance to 
embark on change. At the same time, there is little unanimity as to the kind of 
change at which we ought to aim. A line of development which is not very commonly 
advocated openly nowadays is that of the development of individual tenures of the 
type with which we are familiar in this country, but it is certainly possible to make 
out a case for that as a liquifier of the system and a powerful agency for 
experimentation and change. Probably there would be more intellectual support 
today for the deliberate transformation of communal land tenures into some system 
of collective or State or co-operative farming. Others again, and perhaps the most 
powerful in practice, incline towards a less clearly thought out modification of the 
existing systems by adding controls, prohibitions, etc., aimed at enforcing particular 
cultural practices thought to be desirable in the public interest. I was struck in this 
connection with the very general inclination among the officials present at the 
Oxford Conference to accept a quite substantial degree of compulsion in the 
introduction of agricultural and other improvements. 
8. There is an analogous problem in the improvement of the productivity of 
Colonial populations themselves viewed as a factor of production. It cannot be 
questioned that today the majority of Colonial populations, certainly in the West 
Indies, are inferior in efficiency as manual labourers and in initiative, enterprise and 
organising ability as entrepreneurs and managers to the average of this and other 
countries which are advanced in the western sense. We cannot reject entirely the 
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possibility of innate racial inferiority, but there is certainly insufficient reason at 
present to accept that explanation. Climatic and living conditions and a social 
structure which, as already noted, is inimical to change, and therefore to enterprise, 
are at least substantial factors in this inferiority. Both are to some extent susceptible 
of control, and changes in the social sphere may possibly in the long run be the most 
potent of influences towards increased efficiency of productivity. It is at least a very 
plausible social hypothesis that a major civilising influence comes from the action of 
the elite among a community, but only if the social structure permits the natural 
elite to emerge from the average ruck. It is certainly very doubtful whether 
traditional social customs in many of our Colonies have given full scope for such 
emergence of the more enterprising individuals in the community, and there might 
be substantial economic benefit from change which genuinely made all careers open 
to the talents. 
9. It would, I think, be quite fair to say that official policy has hitherto held back 
from active encouragement of such changes, because of a general preference for 
social stability . My personal inclination is to doubt very much the emphasis hitherto 
laid on that aspect. For one thing, I doubt whether the dams it has been sought to 
create against the current of change will hold. We cannot wholly prevent the impact 
of modern conditions and modern ideas on Colonial communities, and changes will 
happen whether they are encouraged and recognised or not. If we try not to 
recognise them, the result is that they merely go on underground or in less desirable 
forms, or that we fail to deal adequately with their incidental evils because dealing 
with the evil would be necessarily recognising the fact. I do not pretend to any great 
knowledge, but I have a strong impression that many social evils of urbanisation are 
developing in Africa because of an unwillingness to admit that the urbanised, 
de-tribalised native has come to stay and must be properly provided for . 
10. Apart from these purely general considerations, the problems of inter-action 
of economic development and social structure are constantly arising in individual 
form, e.g. in connection with the present apparent difference of opinion between the 
Colonial Office and the Government of Nigeria about general policy with regard to 
industrialisation, in connection with the proposed large-scale development of 
groundnut production in Tanganyika, and in connection with the attitude of the 
Government of Uganda towards a project for development of increased sugar 
production. 
11. It will be remembered that these subjects were brought up in a theoretical 
way in memoranda circulated to the C.E.A.C. largely written personally by Dr. 
Arthur Lewis2 when he was Secretary of the Committee. He put forward the necessity 
of what he called agricultural and industrial revolutions in the Colonies in forms 
which did not wholly appeal to the Committee, but the discussion led directly to the 
fundamental issue of the compatibility of such changes with policy in the social and 
political fields. The Committee accordingly felt that before they could usefully 
pursue the discussion, they needed guidance from the Secretary of State, and they 
put a series of questions to him. These questions and the answers will be found at 
No.31 in 19260/44.3 The general purport of the answers was such as to persuade the 
2 (Prof) W A Lewis, lecturer at London School of Economics, 1938-1947. 
3 See BDEEP series A, J M Lee & P Rich, eds, Colonial policy and practice, 1924-1945. 
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Committee that there was little advantage in pursuing the discussion of "revolution-
ary" economic change any further. I suggest that the whole subject should be 
reconsidered now. On the agricultural side, some members of the C.E.A.C. indicated 
at the last meeting a desire to be given an opportunity of re-examining certain 
fundamental questions of agricultural development on the Committee's Primary 
Production Sub-Committee, but if anything of that kind is to be done usefully, a first 
essential is, I think, to withdraw the limitations implicit in the answers given to the 
Committee's questions in 1944. Perhaps the best thing would be to ask the C.E.A.C. 
to re-examine the whole subject, while suggesting that there should be associated 
with them for this particular purpose others more directly concerned with the social 
aspects, including perhaps members of the Office particularly responsible for the 
African territories which constitute the nub of the problem. 
S.C. 
23.4.46 
I am very glad indeed that Mr. Caine has raised this matter. It ties up closely with 
certain ideas which we have been trying to develop in the African Division and I agree 
that this particular problem needs urgent tackling. 
On what I judge to be Mr. Caine's main point, the necessity for the adaptability of 
native institutions to social and economic change, I entirely agree. I believe that in 
many parts of Africa opinion has developed rapidly during the last ten years and that 
a wide measure of support would be found for Mr. Caine's views among Governments 
and individual officers. We at this end are at present engaged in considering the 
possibility of a re-definition of policy with regard to native administration. Put very 
briefly we believe that the Lugard-Cameron policy of building up the native 
administrations in accordance with local custom has served its purpose and had its 
day and we should like to see the emphasis in the future placed on the following 
points:-
(1) Native administrations should be regarded as local authorities and their 
composition etc. should be reviewed with the object of securing the maximum 
degree of efficiency in operating local services. 
(2) They should be adaptable to the needs of social and economic change. 
(3) They should find a much greater place than they have in the past for the more 
progressive and the educated man. 
This is not the place to go into all the implications of the above. What is involved is 
not the throwing overboard of tradition, but the shifting of the emphasis from 
tradition to efficiency. From this point of view I do not believe that the answer to the 
first question at No.31 on 19260/44 ought to be allowed to stand in its present form. I 
do not believe that we can afford to sit back and allow the process of social change 
slowly to work itself out over a period of generations. Native society in its traditional 
form is dissolving in many areas as a result of the impact of European ideas. The 
natural process is a good deal faster than is often admitted and Governments have 
themselves also got to move pretty fast unless they are to be left behind altogether. 
In our approach to the problem of re-defining policy with regard to native 
administration we are aiming at making the native authorities a more suitable organ 
for encouraging desirable developments, both social and economic, and for dealing 
with the consequences of those developments whether they derive from the 
Q 
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conscious actions of Government or from natural processes. In this we have so far 
concentrated on four aspects:-
(1) Land tenure. We have tried to provide what was hitherto lacking, machinery 
for discovering the facts and advising Governments on policy, so that this may be 
less haphazard and more consciously directed. Machinery for this purpose has 
been set up here and is being set up in the African territories. 
(2) Legal systems. We have recently sent a despatch to all African Governments 
(copy attached)4 emphasising the necessity for guiding the development of African 
law to meet the requirements of social and economic progress. 
(3) Native authorities. We are in process of considering how the native authorities 
themselves can best be fitted to play their part in economic and social develop-
ment. 
(4) Administrative machinery. The Governments must have proper machinery for 
forming and carrying out policy if they are to play a more positive and constructive 
role in the stimulation of social and economic change. What we have in mind is a 
Secretary for Native Affairs (or whatever more suitable title can be found) who 
would be the Government's adviser on the general policy as well as technical 
matters connected with native administration. He would have on his staff officers 
specialising on land, law, agricultural organisation, co-operation etc. (according 
to the size of the territory). This machinery has already been set up in Kenya 
where more active thought is being given to these problems possibly than 
anywhere else in Africa at the moment. 
What the above would do, if carried into effect, would be to create the necessary 
framework for economic and social development in the sphere of native administra-
tion. But what form is this economic development to take? That is a question to 
which I have not yet seen the answer, and all these plans must come to nothing 
unless a satisfactory answer can be given. Most people agree that peasant agriculture 
is not enough, but are we to aim at large-scale co-operative units with European 
management in the first instance, at plantations largely financed by private 
enterprise with Government control of general policy and of conditions of labour, 
etc., at betterment areas with existing social customs but subject to strict control of 
methods of cultivation etc., or at settlement based on individual tenure by Africans? 
Probably the solution will vary from area to area, but what, to my mind, is urgently 
required is a study of what has already been done in Africa and elsewhere in the 
Colonial Empire and in other parts of the world and considerable experiments in the 
field in different methods of agricultural organisation. With this in view, we need, I 
believe, a far greater emphasis on agricultural economics than Colonial Agricultural 
Departments have hitherto placed on it. We also need strong directions from here as 
to the problems which must be tackled, (rather than detailed solutions of these 
problems) . Finally we need very considerable finance to cover the cost of the 
increasingly large experiments which will be required as the policy develops. I doubt 
whether this finance can be found to any large degree by the Colonial Governments 
themselves or from their own territorial or regional C.D. and W. allocations. 
One point which Mr. Caine does not mention in his minute but which was 
4 Not printed. 
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emphasised both by Sir P. Mitchell in his recent despatch on land policy and by Sir F. 
Engledow in his talk on his East African visit is the present inefficiency of African 
labour and the unwillingness of the average African peasant to make the effort which 
would be necessary in connection with any radical change in the basis of agricultural 
production. I believe myself that this is an even greater bar to economic progress 
than the unsu itability of native administrations in certain areas in their present 
form. Mr. Caine refers to compulsion and I agree that this may be necessary. But you 
cannot compel large numbers of peasants to adopt a way of life for which there is not 
a fairly general desire among them. You can in fact only do it through the native 
administrations themselves. Compulsion may have to be resorted to, but inducement 
will I think be a more powerful method and it is to the kind of inducement required 
that we ought to direct our attention. A good deal of research in labour efficiency will 
I am sure be necessary. 
As regards the procedure for considering the economic aspect of this problem 
reference to the Primary Production Sub-Committee will no doubt be appropriate, 
but the problem is an intractable one and I feel sure that if such a reference is to 
produce useful results we shall have to have something pretty concrete to put before 
the Sub-Committee when they are asked to consider the subject. Could we adopt for 
this the same technique as we have adopted recently for African law and earlier for 
land tenure? Could we have a small official group (perhaps under Mr. Caine 's 
chairmanship) to draw up a memorandum of what we have in mind? If that would 
help, Mr. Cartland's services could be provided as secretary seeing that he is 
concentrating now on these long term problems. 
I am sorry to have delayed this file . 
A.B.C. 
6.5.46 
I am sorry that I have somewhat delayed this paper, but it did not seem as urgent as 
the mass of stuff which has recently been passing through my hands; and it certainly 
needs very earnest thought. 
Money is proverbially the root of all evil , but I believe that in the ultimate analysis 
the reason for most of the economic stagnation in Africa is a lack of money 
consciousness. The reason why most Africans lack the will to make more productive 
effort is that they have no particular desire to earn more money. It is not for one like 
myself who has never penetrated further into Africa than Cairo, which is wholly 
atypical, to pontificate on the subject of what goes on in the African mind, but the 
impression left on me by the second-hand information which is all that I have, is that 
the needs and desires of the African are few . He wants enough to eat and drink, 
female (or male as the case may be) society, social prestige to the extent to which his 
social posit ion permits it (which may be evidenced, as the case may be, by such 
th ings as the possession, individual or communal, of land or cattle, a good practice as 
a witch doctor, a position as chief and so on) and beyond that leisure. Most of these 
are either easy to get (food and society) or definitely unattainable (e.g. the hereditary 
position of witch doctor). The balancing factor is leisure. Until the African mind can 
be stirred, he will go on preferring leisure to other joys involving effort, and the 
largest inroad he will voluntarily make on his leisure is to earn enough to fill the gap 
between what he has and what he at present wants .. 
In these circumstances, short of the long term policy of education, which may 
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need generations to debunk the charms of idleness, we have, it seems to me, to think 
out more or less unscrupulous or disingenuous methods for discrediting leisure and 
stimulating a desire for money. One obvious method is to stir up the women to make 
greater demands on their men. It is the fashion papers and the like which cause 
many wives and daughters in this country to drive their menfolk to the tread-mill. 
Fashion papers in the ordinarily accepted sense of the term are not a starter in an 
illiterate country, but the experts with local knowledge might well be able to suggest 
methods of stimulating feminine cupidity or vanity. 
Another possibility is the French method of using decorations and titles as a 
stimulus. The Palmes Academiques and the Ordre (or Medaille?) de Merite Agricole, 
are partly a form of political pandering to the inherent snobbishness of the French, 
but partly also a carefully designed plan for stimulating intellectual and economic 
activity. A considered scheme by which the Chief whose chiefdom was agriculturally 
most advanced got the African Medal for Native Chiefs quicker than his less 
progressive neighbours, and the individual farmer with a good record got a medal for 
agricultural efficiency might well lead to results. 
Again one can use idleness to defeat itself by persuading the African that improved 
methods will mean the same result for less effort, and hope that the results increase 
efficiency of production quicker than the effort decreases. 
Other devices could no doubt be suggested by others better qualified than myself. 
My conclusion however is pretty clear. This is a mixed problem of psychology and 
technology. 
Oo the psychological side it is for the sociologists to think out a scheme of 
research designed to discover why the African does not like work and what means can 
be found of making him like it. This may lead into fascinating medical by-paths, such 
as the relationship between idleness and diseases like hook-worm. 
On the technological side, which personally I rate lower than the other, though 
the fashion is rather the contrary, it is for the agricultural researchers to investigate 
means of increasing the productivity of labour. 
A combination of the two, i.e. more work and more efficient work, seems the only 
way out of our present impasse. 
G.L.M.C. 
20.5.46 
I am in entire agreement with many of the views expressed in the previous minutes. 
There is, in my mind, no doubt that Colonial policy is at the present time at the 
parting of the ways. It can no longer proceed along the traditional lines of the past 
and unless there is a breaking of new ground the present feelings of frustration-still 
pent up in the hearts of many-will lead eventually to explosions which will have 
far-reaching effects. 
I will not deal at length with the West Indies in this minute as the peoples of that 
area are not representatives of indigenous peoples with their anchors in the land and 
their traditional customs. They have all been nurtured on the British model and their 
social changes and advancements have followed upon the lines of social develop-
ments in this country. This will continue. Our first aim in the West Indian area 
should be to encourage the evolution and development of a sound "middle class" and 
afford to these the opportunity of service to their fellows through local government 
and social services. The upsurge of feeling in Jamaica is an expression of the lack of 
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opportunities and of the desire to secure remunerative employment in productive 
occupations of interest and possibility. There is, however, a lack of middle class 
attachment to the land. In Grenada a middle class which has its roots in the land 
exists and has a stabilizing effect. Throughout the West Indies, however, there is 
amongst educated youth a deep feeling of frustration because of the lack of 
opportunity and because of the barriers which West Indian society has erected in the 
paths of many. Whatever we may think here, there is still a marked colour barrier in 
many parts of the West Indies and whilst colour prejudice has its base in economic 
fields, this does not represent the whole picture in the minds of very many of those of 
all races who were born in the West Indies and who have lived their lives there. These 
prejudices will be outgrown with the spread of secondary and higher education and 
will be overcome if we can succeed in creating men of substance and of affairs in 
what I have described above as "middle class". 
In the West Indies the people must be encouraged (1) to protect their natural 
resources in land, water, forests and minerals; (2) to plan the utilization of the 
resources which are available to them; (3) to diversify their occupations; (4) to 
improve efficiency through educational systems designed to afford opportunities for 
all and give technical or vocational training for a greater number than is provided at 
present. Progress will only be made, however, by jerks unless Governors and 
Administrators are given fairly precise directions in regard to the policy to be 
pursued, which must include a greater use of the knowledge of technical specialists 
and of the people of the area. 
I -will not expound further in regard to the West Indies. What applies in that field, 
applie's equally to many of the smaller scattered island communities, even though 
some of these, e.g. in the Pacific-have their traditions and customs from the past. 
Fiji is an example where "detribalization" is taking place fast and it must be 
recognised. It is impossible to expect the youth to conform to the customs of their 
"elders" and there must be found room in local government for the conservatism of 
the elder and the liberalism demanded by youth. 
The main issue has however to be faced in Africa. It is there that we shall be 
confronted with distress and explosion in certain areas unless early steps are taken to 
map out a course for the near future. From all I have been able to gather recently 
there is growing in East Africa a great feeling of frustration-not only among the 
younger members of the Colonial Service-both administrative and technical but 
amongst the peoples themselves. British rule has, it has been argued, removed the 
excitements of life which were known in the past. No longer are there inter-tribal 
wars, no longer exciting chase against wild animals. Life for the young members of a 
tribe has become much more drab and where are the outlets for the activity of what 
should be the "productive" years. Populations are increasing. Many of these are being 
cramped, either by nature or the tsetse, into circumscribed areas and the devastation 
of the soil which is taking place is now accepted by all. In a few decades many areas of 
East Africa will be little better than deserts-with their misery for untold numbers. 
In many areas, remedial measures can no longer be economically practicable and 
may have to be abandoned to nature. The reduction of population and of stock is 
inevitable and we cannot face the transfer of man and beast to other areas-in order 
to relieve the present growing distress-without creating safeguards against a 
repetition of the pending disaster. I am certainly glad to see that Sir Philip Mitchell 
has placed on record his views on the population and land problems of Kenya-and 
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indeed of East Africa as a whole. These views have been fully confirmed by Sir Frank 
Engledow, Sir Harold Tempany and Professor Munro5 who have recently returned 
from a visit to East Africa. 
Action must be taken soon and this action should be based not only upon 
administrative changes but also upon technical knowledge. These two branches of 
the service must be brought into closer working harmony and there must be, in my 
view, much decentralization from the centre. The bottleneck of the secretariat 
system should be done away with, local administration given a wider freedom and the 
progressive youth of the dependency brought into local councils. I know that steps in 
this direction have already been made but it should in my view be greatly hastened. 
There should also be experiments in regional development or reconstruction. 
T.V.A.'s for African conditions are worthy of being tried out and there is much which 
can be learned from some of the rural reconstruction units of India. A beginning 
might indeed be made in connexion with the Machakos Reserve of Kenya. 
Mechanical aids for cultivation purposes should also be tried out in certain areas. I 
personally feel that such a trial might be worth while in connexion with ground-nut 
production in the Gambia and possibly also in Northern Nigeria. From what I have 
seen of collective farming in some of the settlements of Palestine I do not believe that 
such a system could be other than repugnant to British thought but I do feel that 
co-operative farming systems could readily be evolved by local administrations where 
the tradition of local authority is well established and where finance is well-handled 
by the local authority Treasury. I also feel that the Postal Departments may require 
to bRfurther developed in respect of Saving Banks and of Saving stamps. They can do 
mucH to spread money sense, thrift and that thought for the opportunity of the 
morrow which education should awaken. 
The real problem as I see it, is so to plan our Colonial policy that there is 
opportunity fo r youth and progress in the utilization of the natural resources 
(without their destruction by improvident exploitation) in the shaping of local affairs 
and of social advancement. The conservative policy of Lugard-Cameron cannot 
persist much longer and it must be liberalized in such a way that the co-operation of 
the older and younger members of the communities are effectively brought together 
for the common weal. 
Mr Caine 
F.A.S. 
21.5.46 
I have read these minutes with great interest and am most grateful to you for 
raising this matter. I agree that the answers to the questions put by the Economic 
Advisory Committee to S of Sin 19260/44 should be re-examined. Since 1944 a great 
deal has happened and it is becoming clear that we shall have to face more 
revolutionary methods if we are to achieve success in raising the standard of living in 
Colonial Territories. Major Cavendish Bentinck6 made it clear in our recent talk with 
5 J W Munro, prof of zoology and applied entomology, University of London; member of CO Committee for 
Colonial Agriculture, Animal Health and Forestry Research. 
6 F W Cavendish-Bentinck, chairman, Agricultural Produce and Settlement Board, Kenya, since 1942; 
legislative council member for agriculture, and natural resources since 1945. 
[114) AFRICA 241 
him in connection with African resettlement that compulsion might become 
necessary to secure improvements in soil cultivation. 
As a first step I consider that a small working party consisting of yourself, Sir F. 
Stockdale, Mr Cohen, Mr O.G.R. Williams7 and a representative of the West Indian 
Dept. should review the answers and make suggestions on redrafting them. Perhaps 
you will report results to me in due course. 
7 CO assistant secretary, West Africa Dept, 1938--1946. 
G.H.G. 
29.5.46 
114 T 16111371/S53997/l, pp 83-85 28 Oct 1946 
'Groundnuts in East & Central Mrica': Treasury brief by J I C Crombie1 
The scheme is for the promotion of large scale mechanised agriculture in East Africa 
to secure a production of some 800,000 tons of groundnuts a year so as to increase 
the supply of fats to the world at large and, in the process, to this country. 
Particulars of the scheme are set out in the attached memorandum2 prepared in 
the Colonial Office. The Treasury have been consulted on this and have raised a 
number of pertinent questions on the present scheme. They have made it plain that 
they are not parties to the memorandum and that they may have to recommend 
oppOSition to the project. 
The Colonial Office and Ministry of Food proposal is that this venture should be 
conducted by a public corporation, the capital of which would be subscribed by the 
Exchequer. Some £18 million would be required for this purpose. The corporation 
would not work for profit; any difference between production costs and the selling 
price being returned to the Exchequer. On this basis it is claimed that the whole of 
the capital would be repaid by 1953 or 1954. Eventually it is contemplated that if the 
scheme is a success the undertaking will be taken over by the Colonial Governments 
concerned on terms to be arranged. 
The following Treasury points arise: 
(1) The scheme will certainly produce some additional fats, but so long as 
international allocation is in force this country will not be guaranteed the full 
out-put resulting from this considerable financial venture. Indeed, it is probable 
that our share would be a relatively meagre one. 
(2) The proposition that the capital will all be repaid by 1954 depends on a 
number of conditions, none of which can be guaranteed, viz:-
(a) that the cost of labour and materials will not rise; 
(b) that the selling price of groundnuts will remain at its present level for two 
years and at two-thirds of its present price for the remainder of the scheme; 
(c) that the scheme will not be jeopardised by such natural disasters as 
droughts, operational troubles during a short planting period, disease, rodents, 
etc. 
1 A third secretary at the Treasury. 2 Not printed. 
242 ECONOMIC POLICY [114) 
(3) The scheme can only succeed if large quantities of agricultural and similar 
equipment are made available, in the earlier stages, at any rate, from U.S.A. This 
will mean giving this scheme priority over United Kingdom agriculture, and, 
perhaps even more important, over open-cast coal mining. It also involves major 
long-term developments, such as the provision of new port facilities and a new 
railway line. 
For all the above reasons the scheme seems a doubtful starter, and the present view 
of the Treasury would be against it. Even if the scheme is to proceed, serious thought 
will have to be given about its operation. 
The first point is, which Department should run the scheme. The Treasury have no 
doubt that it is essential for the Ministry of Food and not the Colonial Office to run it. 
If the Colonial Office run it, the scheme is bound to be a financial failure, since the 
Colonial Office will, all along, tend to look at it, not as a commercial venture in 
which H.M. Government have invested money which they expect to see returned, but 
as a scheme for the betterment of the Colonies concerned. The Colonial Office would 
be quite happy to see the scheme used as a means for extracting further financial 
benefit for these Colonies from this country. 
Secondly, it is extremely doubtful whether the idea of an independent corporation 
is a sound one. It will involve legislation and, according to the Colonial Office ideas, 
handing over a large amount of independence to an undertaking financed entirely 
out of public funds. It is felt that the Department should be content with something 
far less ambitious in the form of an agency agreement with some existing 
commercial enterprise with experience in these matters. 
Finally, there is the question as to whether the Colonies should not take some 
financial risk. If the scheme is a success, they will cash in on our enterprise. Even if it 
is a failure, they will benefit by the employment and trade promoted in their 
territories. It is even suggested by the Colonial Office that they should be free to 
charge tax on the operations of the enterprise. For these reasons, it seems essential 
that the Colonies should take part in financing the venture. 
It is understood that the Minister of Food may propose that, pending further 
examination of the full long-term scheme, a limited scheme should be put into effect 
for 1947 only. The 1947 cost is estimated at £3.6 millions and, apart from the fact 
that this is a considerable amount in itself, a limited scheme is open to the same 
general objections as the long-term scheme indicated above. In addition, there is 
always the risk that, even for a short-term scheme, some expenditure will have to be 
incurred that could only be remunerative as part of a long-term one. 
It should be added that the Treasury understood that the Minister of Food had set 
up a Working Party (on which the Colonial Office would be represented) to examine 
the full scheme and report by the end of November. It is not clear why this 
programme should not now be followed; it would establish the merits, or demerits, 
of the scheme more plainly. 
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115 CAB 2112277, M 373/46 29 Oct 1946 
[Foreign settlement in Africa]: minute by Mr Attlee to Mr Creech 
Jones 
I have read your note with regard to the possibilities of foreign settlement. In my 
view this matter must be explored further. While I am aware that there are large 
regions at present uninhabitable, either due to lack of water or the presence of tsetse 
fly, or for other reasons, I cannot believe that it is right that these great areas of the 
earth's surface should continue to contain so few inhabitants. Kenya, Tanganyika 
and Northern Rhodesia contain 875,000 square miles, with a population of just over 
ten million. Our position internationally is affected by the knowledge of these 
figures . I should like, therefore, for you to consider the suggestion that I put up 
before, that there should be a special investigation of the possibilities of these areas 
for closer settlement. 
116 CAB 129/16, CP(47)10 4 Jan 1947 
'East African groundnut project': Cabinet memorandum by Mr 
Strachey (minister of food) 
The-attached paper1 asks for authorisation to proceed with the main part of the East 
African groundnut project. 
2. My colleagues will see that this is a big enterprise; it has to be if it is to meet 
even a substantial part of our desperate need for fats . My colleagues would not believe 
me if I tried to pretend to them that such a scheme was free from risk. Of course, 
serious difficulties and delays, many of them unforeseeable, may arise in the course 
of a great undertaking of this sort. 
3. But what I would ask my colleagues to consider are the risks of not 
undertaking this project. If we do not make a determined effort such as this to open 
up a new supply of oils and fats, we shall risk two things. First: in 1950 we may have 
the same, or a lower, margarine ration than today. Or second: in 1950 we may have 
to spend so many dollars on buying fats from dollar sources that we shall have too 
few left to buy other indispensable dollar imports. 
4. Again a large enterprise of this type is the only way in which our Central 
African [sic] possessions can be rapidly developed, so that they may become an 
economic and strategic asset instead of a liability, as to a large extent they now are. 
5. It may be objected that public money should not be used in an enterprise of 
this kind. But shall we not have failed as a Government unless we can, on suitable 
occasions, substitute public, socialist enterprise for private enterprise? The alterna-
tive would be to turn the whole thing over to Unilevers with a blank cheque to do 
what they liked. There are a dozen reasons why the Colonial Secretary, and indeed all 
my colleagues, would not allow us to do that. But if we are quite unwilling to use 
private enterprise for such purposes as these, must we not face up to using public 
1 CP(47)4: not printed. 
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enterprise? Otherwise we shall use neither kind of enterprise, and we shall fail as a 
Government because of a stalemate between the two systems. 
6. The finance of the scheme is set out in paragraph 3 of the attached paper. The 
salient figures to keep in mind are these:-
(i) The maximum investment of public money which will be "at risk" at any given 
moment (31st August, 1950) is estimated at £251/2 million. 
(ii) The profits which will be made during the 25 years to the 31st August, 1971 
are estimated at just on £17 million. 
(iii) In addition, the United Kingdom and East African Governments should, 
during this period, have derived £21 1/2 million from the scheme in taxation. 
(iv) All these figures are based on an estimated cost of production of groundnuts 
of rather under £18 f.o.b. per ton, and on a selling price of £30 per ton in the first 
four years and £20 per ton thereafter. We are about to pay between £40 to £50 per 
ton for a comparable product from West Africa and are paying something like £70 
or £80 per ton in dollars for comparable products outside the Empire (i.e. the 
Argentine). 
117 CAB 128/9, CM 5(47)3 13 Jan 1947 
'Production of ground nuts in East Africa': Cabinet conclusions 
I 
Thel:abinet considered memoranda by the Minister of Food (C.P. (47) 4 and lW 
about the project for the large-scale production of ground nuts in East Africa. 
The Minister of Food recalled that on 31st October, 1946, the Cabinet had 
sanctioned a limited scheme, at a cost of not more than £3 million, on the 
understanding that the implications of the larger scheme which had then been 
outlined to them would be fully investigated by the Departments concerned. 
Satisfactory progress had been made with the limited scheme, and he now sought 
authority to proceed with the full scheme, involving Treasury advances of about £25 
million. The financial details and the arguments in favour of proceeding with the 
large-scale development were set out in the two memoranda which he had circulated 
to Cabinet. There was undoubtedly some element of risk in undertaking this project; 
but he was satisfied that there would be even greater risk in refraining from 
developing some such alternative source of supply of edible fats. The maintenance of 
adequate supplies of margarine for this country by 1950 was likely to depend on the 
success or failure of this scheme. Much of the capital cost, particularly for 
machinery, would involve dollar expenditure; but, if the scheme were successful, a 
limited initial expenditure of dollars should ultimately relieve us of a heavy 
continuing dollar expenditure. 
He had been asked whether it could be assumed that the groundnuts produced 
under this scheme would be available for our own use and not subject to 
international allocation. He thought it likely that the system of international 
allocation of fats would have been discontinued by the end of 1947, and any 
production under this scheme would then be a net gain for us. Even if it were 
continued, however, we should be able to take the whole of this production against 
1 See 116. 
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our allocation and to reduce by that amount the quantity which we had to buy from 
dollar sources. 
If his proposals were approved, he would make an annual report to the Cabinet on 
the progress of the scheme. In the first instance, the United Africa Company would 
administer it as a managing agency; but he proposed that legislation should be 
introduced in the autumn to establish a Government Corporation to which 
responsibility for the scheme would be transferred in August 1948. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he had discussed the details of the 
scheme with the Minister of Food, and he was satisfied that the balance of the 
argument was in favour of undertaking this development. He was glad that the 
Minister had been able to give the Cabinet satisfactory assurances on two points to 
which he had attached importance, viz., that this country, rather than an interna-
tional pool, should get the benefit of all this new production, and that annual reports 
should be made to the Cabinet on the progress of the scheme. A third point which he 
hoped the Cabinet would accept in principle was that the Colonial Governments, who 
would derive substantial benefit from the scheme, should be asked to consider 
making some contribution towards the capital cost. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that his Department had been 
associated with the Ministry of Food in the detailed examination of these schemes 
and he supported the proposals which the Minister of Food had placed before the 
Cabinet. Substantial difficulties would have to be overcome. In particular, there 
might be difficulties in obtaining adequate supplies of labour in this area; much 
ma[hinery would have to be imported; large supplies of fertilisers would have to be 
obtained; and a good deal of irrigation work would be required. On these and other 
points, however, the Departments had take[n] great trouble to secure the best advice 
obtainable; and the balance of argument was, in his view, in favour of proceeding 
with the scheme. He would discuss with the Chancellor of the Exchequer the 
question of securing some contribution from the Colonial Governments towards the 
capital cost of the scheme. 
Points in further discussion were:-
(a) If any substantial part of the machinery required were to be supplied from this 
country, this would prejudice the production of agricultural machinery for use in 
the United Kingdom. 
The Cabinet were informed that the bulk of the machinery required was to be 
obtained from Canada. 
(b) It was said that the full scheme would involve the annual consumption of 
400,000 tons of fertilisers. Might not this prejudice the supply of fertilisers for use 
in the United Kingdom? 
The Cabinet were informed that extensive new deposits of phosphates had been 
discovered in Uganda, and it was hoped that these might be exploited for the 
purposes of this scheme. 
(c) Large numbers of soil chemists and other technical experts would be required. 
Might not this also prejudice the interests of British agriculture? 
The Cabinet were informed that the Colonial Service already included a number 
of competent soil chemists, who would form the nucleus of the technical staff 
required for this scheme. Though others would be required, it was unlikely that 
recruitment for this staff would seriously prejudice British agriculture. 
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(d) Was it not possible that, by the time the scheme produced full results, ample 
supplies of butter would be available to relieve the present shortage of fats? 
The Minister of Food said that the prospective world shortage of fats was so 
great that there was no risk of our being unable to make effective use of this 
additional production. 
(e) The view was expressed that the success of this scheme would depend largely 
on management; and it was suggested that for this reason progress reports should 
be submitted to Ministers more frequently than once a year. 
The Minister of Food undertook that, in the early stages, he would submit more 
frequent progress reports to the Cabinet. 
(f) The necessary legislation would not be introduced in the present Session. It 
would assist the arrangement of the Legislative Programme if it could be prepared 
in time for introduction at the beginning of the 1947--48 Session. The legislation 
might with advantage be framed in terms sufficiently wide to cover other similar 
schemes for Colonial development. 
The Cabinet:-
(1) Approved the proposals outlined in C.P. (47)4 and 10 for the development of 
the large-scale production of ground nuts in East Africa. 
(2) Authorised the Minister of Food to make an early announcement of this 
scheme in the form of a White Paper. 
(3) Invited the Minister of Food to arrange for the necessary legislation to be 
pfepared in time for its introduction at the outset of the 1947--48 Session of 
Parliament. 
118 DEFE 4/2, COS 28(47)5, annex 19 Feb 1947 
'African development': draft report by the Chiefs of Staff on transport 
in Africa 
[This report was drawn up by the Principal Administrative Officers Committee, 13 Feb 
1947. The COS approved the report at their meeting on 19 Feb 1947.] 
1. It will be recalled that the Defence Committee at their meeting on 5th April, 
1946,1 favourably considered the Foreign Secretary's proposal that the following 
possibilities should be examined: 
(a) of locating our main military reserve area in East Africa, and 
(b) of developing a line of communications across Africa. 
With regard to (a), it is not possible to determine the scale of our permanent 
military requirements in East Africa until our strategic position in the Middle East 
has been decided. When this decision has been made, a further study of our long 
term administrative requirements can be undertaken. 
2. With regard to (b), the formation of an expert Commission was proposed at the 
Defence Committee meeting. Before this Commission could be appointed, however, 
it was deemed necessary to assemble on an official level as much factual information 
as possible about the present state of communications in Africa and the possibilities 
1 See part 3 of this volume, 322. 
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of future development. This information has now been collated and is contained in a 
memorandum by the ad hoc Committee which was set up for the purpose and which 
has drawn certain conclusions. 
3. In this report we examine the memorandum by the ad hoc Committee with a 
view to determining whether the strategic advantages likely to accrue from the 
development of a line of communications across Africa are sufficient in themselves to 
justify such development. 
The routes 
4. The routes examined by the ad hoc Committee are shown on the map at 
Annex.2 They are:-
West to East 
Northern Route (A1) 3,900 miles long, including 2,100 miles of desert tracks 
and roads and 890 miles of river transport. 
Duala Routes (A2) 2,500 miles long, including 2,300 miles of single track 
road. 
North Congo Route (A3) 2,200 miles long, including 1,000 miles of river trans-
port and 600 miles of road. 
South Congo Route (A4) 2,650 miles long, including 850 miles of river and lake 
transport and 300 miles of road. 
Benguela Route (AS) 3,150 miles long, including 1,500 miles of road. 
South to North 
Cape Route (A6) 3,550 miles long, including 1,500 miles of road. 
5. It will be seen that the routes are all very long; for comparison the distance by 
air from London to Cairo is 2,500 miles. Owing to the various bottlenecks which 
exist, the present capacity of any one route is estimated to be at the most only 200 
tons per day, and all the routes at present include long stretches of river and/or road 
transport. Even if all the suggested developments were to be carried out, Routes A1 
and A2 would still involve over 2,000 miles of road transport; Route A3 would include 
two transshipments and 1,000 miles of river transport; and route A4 would include 
four transshipments and 320 miles of lake transport. 
6. The administrative overheads, in terms of manpower, stores and transport, 
required to operate and maintain any one of these four routes A1 to A4 as a major L 
of C would be out of all proportion to the results achieved, particularly as regards 
economy in shipping. For instance, for every 1,000 tons per day carried on the road 
portions of routes A1 and A2 we estimate that 5,000 ten-ton lorries and trailers would 
be required which would consume 500 tons of diesel fuel per day and would require 
new engine assemblies after every three turn rounds. The drivers and maintenance 
personnel would number 17,000. Furthermore, the transshipments and river 
journeys involved in Routes A3 and A4 would entail a very heavy administrative 
commitment, over and above that required for the rail portions of the routes. Two or 
more major river ports and a large fleet of river steamers would be required if any 
appreciable tonnage were to be carried. 
2 See map on p 251. 
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7. We consider therefore that routes A1-A4 can be dismissed as administratively 
unprofitable, and we have confined the rest of our examination to the West-East 
route (AS) and the South- North route (A6), both of which, if developed, would 
provide a through single line rail route across Africa and would thus be the least 
expensive of the routes in terms of administrative overheads. It was previously 
thought that such a route would be unable to carry heavy and awkward loads, an 
essential condition if there is to be a substantial saving in shipping, and that 
therefore a parallel road route would be required; but we understand now that, 
subject to the provision of the necessary special wagons, there is no technical reason 
why the African railways, when developed, should not be able to carry the vast 
majority of the heavy and awkward loads at present envisaged. 
Capacity of routes AS and A6 
8. We estimate that the maximum useful physical capacity of either of these 
routes, assuming that all possible developments are carried out, short of doubling 
the track, will not be greater than 5,000 tons per day, including civil traffic. For 
comparison, the highest average tonnage carried on the relatively short (860 miles) 
trans-Iranian railway in the late war, as part of the Aid to Russia route, was 
approximately 5,000 tons per day. 
9. The capacity of the routes could be further increased if the railways were to be 
doubled throughout their length but only at very heavy cost. Personnel could be 
carri-e4 on either route at the expense of a proportion of the supply tonnage 
transported, but stringent medical precautions would be required on the West- East 
route in view of the unhealthy climate of Central Africa. 
Strategic value of the routes 
10. The strategical requirement for the use of either of the trans-African routes in 
war would be as a line of communications to East Africa or beyond. Their use might 
present the following advantages: 
(a) Increased security of the L of C and a reduction in the losses of ships, 
personnel and supplies. 
(b) A saving in the time of transit of personnel and supplies. 
(c) A saving in the number of ships, and their escorts, required to maintain the 
base. 
We examine in the following paragraphs the extent to which the above advantages 
might accrue. 
Increased security of the L of C 
11. The use of either of the overland L of C, especially the West to East route, 
would lessen the risk of loss or damage to ships, personnel and supplies, as a result of 
attack by submarines or surface craft. It has been stated* that this risk is likely to 
increase in the future, in view of developments in the performance of submarines 
and torpedoes. Nevertheless we consider it to be unl ikely that losses in the Southern 
Hemisphere in a future war would of themselves justify the development of an 
* TWC (46) 15 (future Development of Weapons and methods of war) 
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overland L of C, other than perhaps for the carriage of personnel for short periods. 
There is also the consideration that Route A5 runs for approximately half its length 
through foreign territory (Portuguese West Africa and Belgian Congo) , whereas A6 
runs through British territory throughout its length. 
Time of transit of personnel and goods 
12. We estimate that, in view of the slow overall rate of movement of goods traffic 
on a railway and the additional handling necessitated by the long rail route, there 
will be no saving of time if the routes are used for the carriage of supplies. There 
might, however, be some slight saving in the time of transit of personnel if the 
West- East route were to be used, but the amount is unlikely to exceed three days in a 
journey of about a month. 
Saving in shipping 
13. As an example, the number of cargo ships, if available in war, of an average 
lift of 4,000 tons, required to deliver one thousand tons of supplies per day from U.K. 
ports to East Africa, or the terminal ports of the routes, is shown below. We have 
allowed for the tonnage required from outside Africa for the operation and 
maintenance of the routes, which we estimate will be 10% of the total tonnage 
carried. We have also assumed that the terminal ports have been developed to the 
necessary extent. 
Direct delivery to East Africa 
Delivery to terminal ports of the 
South- North route 
Delivery to Lobito, the terminal port 
of the West- East route 
Cargo ships required 
37 
33 
26 
14. It will be seen, therefore, that if the routes were to be developed to a capacity 
of 5,000 tons per day, and assuming that the whole of the capacity is available for the 
through traffic to East Africa (which, in fact, will not be the case on account of the 
intermediate civil traffic) , the resultant theoretical saving in the number of cargo 
ships required from U.K. or North America would be: 
South to North route (A6) - 20 ships 
West to East route (AS) -55 ships 
Cost of the routes 
15. It has been suggested that in order to provide a through rail route by A5 or A6 
it would be necessary to construct a rail link between Northern Rhodesia and Kenya 
and to convert the metre gauge railways of East Africa to 3' 6" gauge, the initial cost 
of which we estimate would be at least £27,000,000. The cost of the additional 
locomotives and wagons required to increase the present capacity of the lines to 
5,000 tons per day on either route would be approximately £55,000,000. In addition, 
new railway workshops would have to be provided and extensive development work 
would be required on the existing railways to enable them to handle the required 
tonnage. Thus, the initial cost of the development of either route to a capacity of 
5,000 tons per day will be at least £80-£90,000,000 . 
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16. The manpower required to develop either route and to handle the wartime 
traffic would be very considerable. For instance, we estimate that 13,000 additional 
railwaymen of European standard, or 30,000 Africans, would be required solely for 
the wartime operation and maintenance of the South-North railway. The provision 
of troops for this purpose would throw a heavy load on our limited manpower 
resources; native labour would require considerable initial training and could not be 
absorbed in the commercial operation of the railway in peacetime in the foreseeable 
future. 
17. As an example of the scale of material resources required, we estimate that 
over 1,000,000 tons of coal per year would have to be mined and distributed in Africa 
to satisfy locomotive requirements, if the capacity of either route were to be 
maintained at 5,000 tons per day. This represents about 4% of total annual 
production of coal in South Africa. 
Strategic value of the routes in relation to their cost 
18. We deduce from the foregoing that the military advantages likely to be 
derived in war from the prior construction of an overland L of C from the South or 
West to East Africa would amount to a saving in the number of cargo ships required 
for a maximum capacity of 5,000 tons per day, namely 20 or 55 ships, depending on 
whether the South-North (A6) or West-East (AS) route were to be used, apart from 
some1 increase in the security of the L of C and a theoretical slight saving in the time 
of transit of personnel. 
19. We consider, therefore, that the strategic advantages accruing from the 
construction of either route are not sufficient in themselves to justify the heavy 
initial and subsequent costs of construction and operation of the route. We consider, 
however, that the economic aspect should be carefully studied to determine whether 
the resulting commercial advantages would be sufficient, taken in conjunction with 
the strategic advantages, to justify such expenditure. In particular we would welcome 
the construction of a through rail link between East Africa and the Main Support 
Area of South Africa. 
Conclusions 
20. We conclude that:-
(a) the strategic advantages likely to accrue from the development of a line of 
communications across Africa are not sufficient in themselves to justify the heavy 
cost of such development; 
(b) if, in the future, the construction of a through trans-continental rail route 
becomes economically desirable, such construction should be supported on 
strategic grounds. 
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119 CO 852/1003/3, no 1 22 Feb 1947 
[Agricultural productivity in Africa]: CO circular despatch to African 
governors 
Recent consideration of the prospects and the need for the development of the 
African Territories under British administration have impressed many observers with 
the overriding importance of substantial technical changes in methods of produc-
tion, especially methods of agricultural production. I do not propose in this despatch 
to discuss the technical changes in detail but rather to direct attention to the 
consideration of the degree of social change which may arise out of, or indeed be a 
necessary condition of, technical and economic developments . 
2. Governments are committed to an endeavour to raise rapidly the standards of 
living of African populations . It is today more than ever apparent that the attainment 
of this objective must involve an increase in productivity, both in the agricultural 
and industrial spheres, of such an order that it can properly be described only as a 
revolution in African productivity. It is equally clear that in the sphere of agriculture, 
which is bound for many years to come to be of predominant importance in the 
economic development of tropical Africa, this revolution can be ach ieved only by very 
great changes in the technique of production. Present methods of utilisation of land 
are not merely a definite obstacle to any marked improvement in productivity, but 
ther(Yis most disturbing evidence that the continuance of those methods will lead 
inexorably to a decline in agricultural production within a very short space of time. 
The seriousness of this situation has been most graphically put in a recent despatch 
by Sir Philip Mitchell analysing the position in Kenya, and is confirmed by every 
expert who has recently visited East Africa. There can be little doubt that a radical 
reform in present methods of land utilisation is one of the most important tasks, and 
perhaps the most important task, facing administrations at any rate in East Africa. I 
do not propose to express any opinion whether that task can best be tackled by 
greater mechanisation, by the adoption of markedly different systems of general 
husbandry, by a vastly greater use of fertilisers or by any other particular change in 
agricultural practice. That choice is largely one for Colonial Governments and will 
no doubt be fully considered by all of them, since there can be no question that 
existing agricultural practices are almost everywhere incapable of yielding a 
production which will support the standards of life at which we are aiming for the 
African cultivators. 
3. It is apparent also that the kind of standards aimed at today are impossible of 
attainment on a purely agricultural basis , and that in the course of years there must 
be a very substantial development of secondary industry if markedly higher standards 
are to be achieved. 
4 . In both spheres, agricultural and industrial, the changes which appear 
necessary on technological and economic grounds must exercise a very great 
influence on the whole way of life of the peoples concerned. 
5. In the agricultural sphere, it will I feel sure be necessary to consider very 
substantial changes in the present customary systems of land tenure. This subject of 
land tenure is one to which Colonial Governments are already in many cases 
devoting close attention and which has formed the subject of much study in the past. 
The importance of the whole subject was strongly emphasised in a circular despatch 
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to African Governors in 1944 and machinery for organising the study of land tenure 
policy is now being set up by several Governments and will be set up by others when 
the staff situation permits. The studies so far initiated have, however, been mainly of 
a descriptive character in the sense that they have been concerned primarily with 
securing a closer understanding of existing systems of land tenure and of the trends 
of development inherent in them. I think it will be necessary also to consider more 
closely the objective of government policy in this field and the new forms in which 
land tenure systems might best be moulded e.g. whether there should be a deliberate 
attempt to promote either collectivisation of land holding on the one side or whether 
on the other hand individualisation on Western lines subject to adequate community 
control may be more appropriate to certain areas . 
6. This despatch is concerned with the main economic problem of the African 
territories, that of agricultural productivity, but, in order to complete the picture, it 
must be emphasised that, in the development of industry also, the requirements of 
technical efficiency are bound to require considerable changes in customary ways of 
life. Special problems will be created by the establishment of factory workers in new 
centres of population, and Colonial Governments are likely to have to consider cases 
of competition between traditional hand working or domestic industries and more 
modern factory production of similar articles. Such a process of industrialisation has 
already taken place on the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia and has created many 
difficult problems, the study and solution of which will be of the greatest interest to 
othef Governments. 
7. The changes necessary to promote economic development will have very great 
sociological and political repercussions . Alterations in land tenure systems must 
obviously go to the root of deep seated social and family customs. Changes in the 
organisation of agricultural production must equally have a profound influence on 
the development of African customary law and may have the effect of weakening 
tribal sanctions. 
8. In its social repercussions the problem of increased productivity is closely 
connected with the development of an efficient system of African local government. 
Progress in agriculture cannot take place unless the people themselves can be 
induced to co-operate, and the process of inducement, however much it may depend 
on the leadership of Government officers, can only be made effective through the 
agency of the native administrations. Whatever form these native administrations 
may take, the primary requirement is that they should be efficient, that they should 
be adaptable to the needs of social and economic progress and that while retaining 
the confidence of the mass of the people, they should find an adequate place for the 
more progressive and educated Africans. I am of course aware that throughout Africa 
the Governments are pressing forward with the development of native administra-
tions as more efficient organs of local government and that this process has been 
going on progressively for many years. It will however be generally agreed that in 
many areas of Africa the native administrations have not yet reached the stage when 
they can exercise effective control over land usage, much less when they can play any 
substantial part in the re-organisation of agricultural production. In most cases 
progress in the development of local government has been hampered by the 
ignorance of the people, so that the problem is closely linked with the development 
of education . But, within the confines of the problem of obtaining an efficient system 
of local Government, it may be necessary to re-examine the whole policy of native 
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administration with a view to determining the extent to which the needs of social and 
economic progress require the modification of traditional systems of government. In 
many cases effective local government bodies can be developed by evolution of the 
existing organisations; but where this is not possible, it may be necessary to consider 
how far traditional systems should be reinforced by recourse for example to direct 
appointment of native authorities by Government or by the introduction of methods 
of direct election by the people. Such changes are indeed already taking place in a 
number of areas. It is sometimes suggested that progress towards the higher 
material standards of living which are the declared objective of British Colonial 
policy is incompatible with the accepted system of native administration now 
practised in most parts of British tropical Africa. I do not believe this to be the case, 
but as Sir Arthur Richards said in his despatch proposing the new constitution for 
Nigeria: "If the Native Authorities are to play their full part in the constitutional 
framework, they must be prepared continually to adapt themselves to modern 
conditions. The system of indirect rule cannot be static; it must keep pace with the 
development of the country". It is not my purpose in this despatch to lay down 
policy, but to suggest questions which require examination. I believe that in 
re-examining our policy, greater emphasis should be laid on the adaptability of native 
institutions to the developing needs of social and economic progress. 
9. Finally attention must be paid to the human problem of the African peasant 
himself. At present economic development in the agricultural sphere is held back by 
the low,standard of productivity of the African peasant, by his unwillingness to adopt 
improved agricultural methods and by his failure to take proper measures for the 
conservation of the soil. This low standard of productivity is causing anxiety 
throughout West, East and Central Africa and, as was clear to me during my visit to 
East Africa last year, it is at the root of the economic problem of the East African 
Territories. In discussions on this subject the use of compulsion is frequently 
advocated and the question is canvassed whether the adoption of compulsory powers 
would be justified. I suggest that an equally important question is whether 
compulsion would be likely to be effective, but there can be no question as to the 
necessity of ensuring that proper methods of cultivation are adopted and that the soil 
is conserved, and if this can only be achieved by the use of compulsory powers, then 
the native administrations will have to take such powers since neither they 
themselves nor the Government can stand by and see the soil ruined and the well 
being and development of the people prejudiced. But whether compulsory powers are 
or are not adopted, the process of securing efficient agricultural practices must be 
one of inducement of the native administrations and through them of the people 
themselves. It follows that in any re-organisation of the basis of production, the most 
careful attention must be paid to the human aspect, so that any new system adopted 
may have the best chance of securing the support of the African peasants themselves. 
Without their support it is not possible for any effective progress to be made. In 
considering this problem of the organisation of the African himself, attention will no 
doubt be given to the possibility of deliberately stimulating and encouraging the 
formation of new economic and social units on bases related to the Africans' present 
way of life, e.g. on the basis of kinship groups. 
10. As I have already said my object in this despatch is not to lay down any 
general rules of policy, but to urge that the problems of agricultural productivity 
should be examined with an open mind and as urgently and comprehensively as their 
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importance clearly warrants. I should like to receive as early as convenient the fullest 
expression of views from all administrations, and a [?I) hope that in formulating such 
views the fullest opportunity will be given for discussion with all grades of the 
Colonial Service who are brought in contact with these matters, and with educated 
African as well as unofficial European opinion. As already indicated, I have had the 
great advantage of an expression of views from Sir Philip Mitchell, but this is a 
matter of such wide importance that it calls for the application of as many minds as 
possible. 
11. It will no doubt be some considerable time before any new principles of policy 
can be clearly formulated. There are, however, many practical issues arising which 
will brook little delay. I should, therefore, be prepared to consider with every 
sympathy any proposals which Colonial Governments may have to make for new 
initiatives of an experimental character. It is likely in any event that a considerable 
process of trial and error will be needed before satisfactory solutions of general 
applicability can be worked out and I hope, therefore, that Colonial Governments will 
be prepared to be bold in trying new methods, particularly in connection with land 
tenure and land utilisation. 
120 CAB 129/19, CP(47)176 8 June 1947 
'East African groundnuts scheme': Cabinet memorandum by Mr 
Strachey 
At their meeting on 13th January (C.M.(47) 5th Conclusions, Minute 3) 1 the Cabinet 
approved the proposals outlined in C.P.(47)4 and 102 for the large-scale production 
of groundnuts and other food products by means of the large-scale mechanised 
clearance of land in East Africa, and invited me to arrange for the necessary 
legislation to be prepared in time for its introduction at the outset of the 1947/48 
session of Parliament. One of the points made in discussion at this meeting was that 
the legislation might with advantage be framed in terms sufficiently wide to cover 
other similar schemes for Colonial development. 
2. Since then the Colonial Secretary has discussed with me the proposals which 
he has outlined to the Prime Minister and to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and 
which he is putting before the Cabinet in his paper C.P.(47)175 for the establishment 
of a Colonial Development Corporation.3 We have agreed that there would be 
advantages in combining into one Bill the powers required to set up the Colonial 
Development Corporation and those required to set up a Corporation to manage the 
East African Scheme. 
3. As the Cabinet is aware, I have already announced the names of the men I have 
invited to become members of the Corporation which must take over the East 
African Scheme (work on which is now being pressed forward-clearance of the bush 
started on 1st May last and some 8,000 acres have so far been cleared). I believe that 
the men selected will form a most energetic and efficient body to which other 
schemes for producing food for the United Kingdom in the Colonies could with 
advantage be entrusted. In any case it has been from the outset necessary to seek 
1 See 117. 2 See 116. :! See 81. 
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powers for this Corporation to grow food products other than groundnuts, since it 
must rotate its crops on its original East African lands, and for it to grow groundnuts 
elsewhere in the Colonial territories since no one yet really knows where the most 
suitable lands will be found. I have little doubt that the main development work of 
this Corporation will remain within Colonial territories . It does seem possible, 
however, that it may be advantageous for it in the future, and as it acquires 
experience, to do work, probably on a contractual basis, or by acting as a managing 
agent, elsewhere. As a matter of fact we have already had a tentative enquiry from an 
Indian ruling Prince as to whether the Corporation would be willing to show him 
how to put the groundnut cultivation of his State on a more mechanised basis. The 
production of a larger Indian exportable surplus of groundnuts would be of very great 
value to this country and work of this kind-by which contracts of technical and 
managerial assistance were entered into, might be highly remunerative to the 
Corporation and allow it to pay back its advances from public funds at an earlier date . 
This kind of activity might prove to be of great value in helping Governments who 
may be greatly in need of managerial skill and technical knowledge for the 
development of their resources to expand their food production for export to the 
United Kingdom. If schemes of this sort materialise they might lead to further 
benefits to the United Kingdom in the way of providing markets for our own 
manufacturers of agricultural machinery and equipment. On the other hand nothing 
may come of this kind of development. Only experience will show. But it would seem 
a pit)i if the terms in which the Legislation were drawn actually excluded it. I 
therefore suggest that the geographical field in which the Corporation which is to be 
responsible immediately for the East African Scheme should be empowered to 
operate should be defined widely enough to allow it to work outside the Colonial 
Empire if this appears to be advantageous. No such operations would, of course, be 
undertaken in any territory unless the Government of that territory and the 
appropriate Minister of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were in 
favour of it. 
4. After discussion with the Secretary of State for the Colonies I suggest that the 
Bill to set up the two Corporations should be called The Overseas Resources 
Development Bill, and that the Corporation to be responsible immediately for the 
East African Scheme, and for any subsequent activities on the lines of the preceding 
paragraph should be known as the Overseas Food Corporation. The distinction 
between the functions of the Overseas Food Corporation and the Colonial Develop-
ment Corporation would, I think, be clear; the Colonial Development Corporation 
would have wider powers to develop mineral resources, improve communications, 
develop water power, etc. as well as to produce food and other agricultural products 
such as rubber, cotton, fibres and so forth; in so far as it produces food in the 
Colonies it would normally do so as a part of its plans for the general development of 
the Colonial Empire, whereas the Overseas Food Corporation would be concerned 
primarily with production of food for export to the United Kingdom as part of the 
Ministry of Food's overseas procurement programme. 
5. To ensure that the two Corporations work closely together the Colonial 
Secretary and I have agreed to recommend that the Chairman of each of the 
Corporations should be an ex officio member of the other. 
6. As explained in C.P.(47) 10 the maximum investment of public money which is 
estimated to be "at risk" at any given moment in the East African Scheme is £251/2 
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million. To give the Overseas Food Corporation sufficient scope to undertake new 
schemes (each of which would, of course, be subject to the approval of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer) without further legislation I suggest that the aggregate 
of amounts outstanding in respect of any Treasury advances to the Corporation and 
of the principal of any stock issued and of any temporary loans raised by the 
Corporation, should be increased to £50 million. 
7. I ask for the approval of the Cabinet to the proposals contained in paragraphs 
2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Paper. 
121 PREM 8/923 14 Jan 1948 
[African economic policy]: minute by Sir N Brook (Cabinet secretary) 
to Mr Attlee on possible criticism of the government 
At recent meetings there has been general support for the view that the development 
of Africa's economic resources should be pushed forward rapidly in order to support 
the political and economic position of the United Kingdom. I wonder whether 
Ministers have considered sufficiently the difficulties of defending this policy against 
the criticisms, and misrepresentation, which it may provoke? It could, I suppose, be 
said to fall within the ordinary definition of "Imperialism". And, at the level of a 
political broadcast, it might be represented as a policy of exploiting native peoples in 
orderto support the standards of living of the workers in this country. 
This policy is doubtless inevitable-there are compelling reasons, both economic 
and international, for adopting it. But if it is disclosed incautiously or incidentally, 
without proper justification and explanation, may it not be something of a shock to 
Government supporters-and, indeed, to enlightened public opinion generally? It 
would certainly expose a Labour Government to very damaging misrepresentation. It 
can, of course, be argued that the more rapid development of Africa's resources will 
bring social and economic advantages to the native peoples in addition to buttressing 
the political and economic influence of the United Kingdom. I should have thought, 
however, that some care and preparation would be needed in order to put this 
argument across successfully, both here and in Africa. 
If you think there is anything in this point, perhaps you would care to discuss it in 
the first instance with the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 1 
1 Mr Attlee minuted: 'Yes. C.R.A., 15.1.48', and spoke to these ministers after the Cabinet meeting on 5 
Feb 1948 (see also 84 in this volume). 
122 CO 537/3631, no 4 5 Feb 1948 
[Foreign settlement in Africa]: minute by Mr Creech Jones to Mr 
Attlee on Sir A Pim's1 report 
At my request Sir Alan Pim, K.C. l.E., has recently undertaken in this country, on the 
1 Former Indian Civil Service officer who undertook financial and economic commissions in Swaziland, 
Bechuanaland, Basutoland, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Zanzibar and British Honduras, 1932-1937. 
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basis of factual information provided by the Governments concerned, an enquiry into 
the possibilities of large scale settlement in Kenya, Tanganyika and Northern 
Rhodesia with a view to a partial solution of the problem of the European Displaced 
Persons. 
2. As I foreshadowed in my minute of the 17th December, 194 7, on the subject of 
an enquiry into the implications of a large measure of dispersal of population and 
industry throughout the Commonwealth, Sir Alan Pim's report shows that there is 
no scope in the three Territories for substantial agricultural settlement of persons 
from temperate zones. His broad conclusion is that, although physically a small 
number might be accommodated by stages over a number of years settlement of 
these people, even on a small scale, would be at the risk of vigorous opposition from 
all races and would be impracticable unless considerable capital expenditure, often 
on costly communications, was first incurred. In reaching this conclusion he draws 
attention to the likelihood of political trouble particularly from Africans, since, 
generally speaking, the most suitable areas for settlement of the kind envisaged are 
precisely those in respect of which H.M.G. has imposed limitations on their use for 
other than African interests. Finally, he sees difficulty in reconciling the transplant-
ing of an European peasant economy on any substantial scale to tropical Africa, with 
the advance towards African self-government. 
3. I agree with the broad conclusions drawn by Sir Alan Pim. I am certain that 
white penetration on the land in those Territories would cause serious political 
trouble, in view of their existing land policies, and that, in accordance with present 
policy, it should be admitted only with the greatest circumspection. It is true, on the 
other hand, that our development programmes for Africa will require a good deal of 
skilled labour, of which there is a shortage. The African Governments are pushing on 
with trade, craft and technical education and instruction of Africans, and will 
naturally wish to make the greatest possible use of persons so trained but we shall, of 
course, have to supplement them with outside help, some of which is bound to be of 
a permanent character. But large scale agricultural settlement of foreign displaced 
persons is another matter and should not, in my view, be entertained. 
4. You may wish that Sir Alan Pim's report should be made available to any 
scientific committee which may be set up to consider the wider investigation which 
you have in mind. I shall of course be glad to supply copies for that purpose. 
123 PREM 8/733 Feb 1948 
'Economic development in the colonies': draft memorandum for 
Cabinet Economic Policy Committee by Mr Rees-Williams 
On the 5th February the Secretary of State for the Colonies circulated to a number of 
Ministers, including all the members of the Economic Policy Committee, a detailed 
memorandum on economic development in the Colonies. 1 The Prime Minister has 
now asked for a short paper to be submitted to the Economic Policy Committee 
setting out the points for decision. 
2. The proposals requiring decision are-
1 See 88. 
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(1) An expansion of the activities of the Economic Division of the Colonial Office 
for which additional staff will be requ ired. The Secretary of State proposed-
(a) the appointment of a Director of Economic Investigation with a small 
permanent staff to organise investigations into particular economic projects and 
problems, such as the economic possibilities of a project for a new railway or of 
extensive irrigation works; 
(b) the appointment of Liaison Officers, whose function would be to act as close 
link between the Colonial Office and the executive agencies in the Colonies, to 
co-ordinate information on the development programmes in their respective 
areas, to be a channel through which inspiration and guidance could flow from 
the centre and information be brought to the centre about obstacles in the way 
of implementing development plans. One such officer would be needed fo r West 
Africa, at least one for East and Central Africa, and others for South East Asia 
and the West Indies. Eventually four or five such appointments might be 
required , but the posts would only be filled as men with the necessary 
experience, drive and tact could be found. 
I now ask for general approval to an expansion of staff on these lines, on the 
understanding that the details will be discussed with the Treasury. 
(2) In order to stimulate the development efforts of Colonial Governments, to 
secure the very necessary goodwill of local legislatures and to discuss practical 
ways of achieving our ends, one Conference of Governments (including, when they 
so desire, unofficials) should be held in April in Nairobi to cover East and Central 
Africa and another thereafter in West Africa, both of which I should attend on 
behalf of the Secretary of State. If these conferences are to achieve the purposes we 
have in view I must have authority to give those attending them an unqualified 
assurance that His Majesty 's Government are going to extend to the Colonial 
authorities all the help in their power, not merely in money but also in the supply 
of materials and men. 
I ask therefore for general approval of the principles and policy which are 
implicit in any such statement to the African Colonial Governments. Its precise 
terms can be worked out later between the Departments concerned but, as a 
minimum, I must make it plain, if our objective is to be secured, that 
requirements fo r plant and materials for development in the Colonies are in future 
to be given equal priority with requirements for capital development in the United 
Kingdom, and that a general directive has been issued to the Departments 
concerned with the allocation of materials in short supply, with the express 
intention of ensuring that essential Colonial requirements of iron and steel and 
other materials required for current plans and for approved new projects will be 
met. 
Precisely what machinery will be entailed to ensure proper co-ordination 
between the requ irements of the Colonies and requirements for other purposes is 
now being considered by the Colonial Development Working Party under Sir 
Edwin Plowden. 
260 ECONOMIC POLICY [124] 
124 PREM 8/733, M 38/48 27 Feb 1948 
'Economic development in the colonies': minute by Mr Attlee to Mr 
Rees-Williams (reply) 
I have seen the paper1 which you have prepared in response to my Minute M.27/24 of 
15th February. 
I do not think that the Economic Policy Committee need be consulted at this stage 
on any of the specific points raised in this paper. 
I support, in principle, the proposals for strengthening the Economic Division of 
the Colonial Office, and I suggest that you should settle the details with the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
I accept the Secretary of State's view that it would be useful if Conferences on 
economic development were held in East and West Africa as soon as definite 
assurances of our support can be given. 
I am not satisfied, however, that you can properly give assurances in the wide 
terms suggested about the supply of plant and materials from this country. The 
working party under Sir Edwin Plowden's Chairmanship are now considering what 
resources can be allocated for maintenance and development in the Colonies and the 
terms of the assurances to be given at the proposed Conferences cannot profitably be 
considered until their recommendations are available. They should be asked to 
include among their recommendations a statement showing what assurances of our 
support could safely be given; and this question could then, if necessary, be reviewed 
by the Economic Policy Committee in the light of their recommendations . 
1 See 123. 
125 CAB 134/216, EPC 18(48) 6 May 1948 
'Colonial development': Cabinet Economic Policy Committee minutes 
The Committee considered a memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
(E.P.C.(48)35) covering (i) an Interim Report by the Colonial Development Working 
Party, together with a note by the Chairman on the future work of the Working 
Party, and (ii) a report by the Paymaster-General on his recent visit to Africa.1 
In his memorandum, the Chancellor of the Exchequer pointed out that the two 
reports were complementary. The Paymaster-General had drawn attention to the 
urgent problem of raising native standards of farming, to the shortage of trained 
staffs and to the need for substantial new capital investment in transport, particularly 
railways, as a condition precedent to the expansion of production in Africa. The 
Working Party had reached similar conclusions . Their report showed that the pace of 
Colonial development was limited by the shortages, not of sterling finance , but of 
material resources, especially iron and steel. In their view, the first need was to make 
good the productivity of existing facilities, especially transport and communications, 
as these would yield the quickest returns on a given outlay. They had expressed the 
hope that allocations of United Kingdom steel to the Colonies would be increased by 
1 See llO. 
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100,000 tons annually. They had made detailed recommendations for improving the 
machinery for the allocation and supply of steel to Colonial territories; for securing 
additional administrative and technical staff; and for encouraging investment in the 
Colonies. 
The Paymaster-General supported the Working Party's recommendations on 
steel. There were various short-term development schemes which deserved support: 
these, with the groundnuts project, would in themselves make heavy demands on 
our resources. But it was important to consider our long-term development policy 
against the background, not only of our efforts to establish the economic independ-
ence of Western Europe, but also of the eventual effects of soil erosion and increasing 
population. These factors seemed to call for the initiation of major development 
schemes. These could not be undertaken without consultation with other countries, 
in particular the other Colonial Powers, and final decisions on our own long-term 
plans ought not to be taken until such consultations had taken place. As regards his 
detailed proposals , he hoped that an early decision would be reached on terms of 
service for scientific research officers employed by Colonial Government[s], since 
delay was prejudicing recruitment; and it was desirable that a Working Party should 
be appointed to prepare, for publication, a report on the future Colonial market for 
Japanese and Indian textiles. 
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies supported the 
Working Party's recommendation that the immediate need was to concentrate on the 
repair and improvement of existing facilities, especially transport and communica-
tions. In East Africa, the framing of a long-term development policy presented 
special difficulties. In this area, equivalent to the whole of Western Europe, the 
population was only twelve millions; yet, in consequence of the encroachment of the 
tsetse fly, this population was heavily concentrated in the regions of lowest rainfall. 
In consequence, the areas of settlement were grossly overcrowded, and this situation 
was aggravated by wasteful methods of native agriculture and the inertia of the native 
farmer. Our first task must be to defeat the tsetse fly. The African must be converted 
into an efficient farmer and for this purpose there ought to be close control over 
methods of agriculture in the native reserves, and in the settlements on land 
reclaimed from the tsetse fly. A model might be found in the Gezira plan. Both light 
and heavy industries should be developed, and in this way labour would be drained 
away from the overcrowded reserves. The African should be taught animal husban-
dry. Finally, there was a great need for the recruitment of skilled Europeans to teach 
and supervise the African. 
In discussion the following points were made:-
(a) Ministers were in general agreement with the Working Party's conclusion that 
the first need, and the most profitable use for scarce resources, was to make good the 
productivity of existing facilities, notably railways and communications. 
(b) In planning both short-term and long-term Colonial development, defence 
considerations should be taken fully into account, particularly in connection with 
the repair and improvement of communications. It was important, for instance, to 
adopt a uniform railway gauge, wherever possible. 
(c) For strategic and economic reasons the possibilities of developing heavy 
industries, particularly steel production, in the Colonies ought to be fully explored. It 
was doubtful whether United Kingdom industry would at any time be able to meet 
Colonial needs in full, and it was desirable to avoid excessive dependence on the 
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United States. 
(d) No agreement on the scheme for the damming of Lake Tana would be possible 
until a settlement of outstanding political questions had been reached with the 
Governments of Egypt and Ethiopia. 
(e) The signatories of the Brussels Treaty, together with Portugal, would be 
primarily responsible for the development of European Colonial territories overseas. 
It might be advisable to set up a co-ordinating body, with appropriate sub-
committees, through which day-to-day consultation could take place. 
(f) In view of the international aspects of Colonial development, it would be 
advisable to consider the possibility of recruiting foreign experts for employment in 
Colonial territories. 
(g) The failings of native labour were largely due to inadequate or unsuitable food, 
and an authoritative enquiry into the nutritional problems of the African population 
ought to be undertaken urgently. 
(h) The help of .the International Health Organisation might be sought in the 
campaign against the tsetse fly. 
(i) Urgent consideration should be given to the possibilities of European 
settlement in Africa. There were many parts of Europe, such as Sicily, with surplus 
population for whom an outlet by immigration would ultimately have to be found. 
U) The Minister of Food suggested that projects for the development of food 
production should be given high priority in the allocation of United Kingdom 
resources. Progress was largely dependent on an adequate supply of heavy tractors 
and clearing machinery, and there appeared to be strong arguments for developing 
their manufacture in this country. The manufacturers would, however, need firm 
orders. 
(k) The Foreign Secretary drew attention to the difficulty of recruiting British 
staff for the Sudan on account of the policy of Sudanisation. He thought that the only 
solution was to recruit staff on a permanent basis, on the understanding that, when 
their services were no longer required in the Sudan, they would be absorbed in the 
Colonial Civil Service. 
(I) The Foreign Secretary asked that no action should be taken on the proposal 
for setting up a Working Party on the Colonial market for Japanese textiles until he 
had been able to consider the matter further. 
(m) The Advisory Council on Scientific Policy could be fully consulted on 
questions of scientific research in the Colonies. 
The Committee:-
(!) Approved in principle the Interim Report of the Colonial Development 
Working Party annexed to E.P.C.(48)35. 
(2) Approved the specific proposals made by the Chairman of the Colonial 
Development Working Party in his covering note to that Report. 
(3) Instructed the Central Economic Planning Staff to review, in consultation 
with the Departments concerned, the detailed recommendations in the 
Paymaster-General's report annexed to E.P.C.(48)35 and to co-ordinate action on 
those recommendations. 
(4) Agreed that copies of the Paymaster-General's report might be circulated to 
Colonial Governments and other authorities concerned, subject to the omission of 
passages relating to political matters and to the Colonial market for Indian and 
Japanese textiles. 
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126 CO 847/37/7, no 34A 16 June 1948 
[Financial devolution in Africa]: CO circular despatch to African 
governors 
[In May 1948 H T Bourdillon minuted on proposals being made concerning financial 
relations between HMG and the colonies: 'the basic thought throughout is that we should 
in future attempt to understand (and where necessary, influence) financial developments 
in Colonial territories by the use of appreciations submitted in advance of the estimates, 
rather than by scrutiny and control of the estimates themselves'. Where colonies 
required, or might require, assistance from the British government (other than COW), 
the Treasury would be brought in (on a consultative basis) for those who might need it. 
'We cannot expect the Treasury to see the light if we keep them in the dark. If we are to 
hope that they will consent to any real "liberalisation" of the system of Treasury control, 
we must give them in return some real advanced insight into the state of affairs in 
Territories likely to be concerned'. The Treasury seemed willing to consider this and get 
rid of the present system of Treasury control 'with its absurd waste of time over details' 
(CO 847/37/5, p 9) . Cohen was much involved in drafting this circular despatch, and 
regarded it as 'of real importance in the development of our relationship with Colonial 
Territories in Africa' (CO 847/37/6, no 85) . It would not mean the Colonial Office paid less 
attention to finance, for it would actually become more difficult to influence it. This was 
thought both inevitable and desirable. Creech Jones agreed to the despatch in principle, 
'though there is much that is technical here which is not too clear to me. Some greater 
discretion & !attitude to the Colonies is necessary if responsibility is to grow healthily' 
(CO 847/37/5, minute, 8 Apr 48). Caine believed the question arose- why confine a 
financial devolution to Africa?-'Apart from a few places like the Gilbert & Ellice Islands 
or North Borneo, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the non-African territories are 
more, not less, fit than the African to exercise powers of local self-government, and many 
of them, particularly in the West Indies, are in fact already further advanced on the road. 
If we can dispense with this power for Kenya and the Gold Coast, we do not need it for 
Jamaica and Barbados' (ibid, minute 17 Dec 1947). The proposals were well received in 
Africa, so a circular despatch was issued on 23 Aug 1948 to non-African governors, 
suggesting an extension to them. Some, Hong Kong and Fiji especially, felt that unless 
they got devolution simultaneously with Africa there would be criticism; such speed was 
not desirable or possible-so the idea was dropped (CO 847/37/6, no 94).) 
The Conference of African Governors held in London last autumn considered the 
relations between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and Colonial Governments 
in the sphere of finance and addressed itself particularly to the relaxation of the 
formal controls exercised by the Secretary of State in this sphere. I am in agreement 
with the general recommendations of the Conference on this subject and consider 
that the changes set out in this despatch, which will apply to all Territories in Africa 
whose finances are not under the control of His Majesty's Treasury, should be 
brought into effect as soon as possible. 
2. It was agreed by the Conference that the Secretary of State's general authority 
over the broad financial policies of the African Governments must be retained, but 
that the Colonial Office should concern itself with detail only to the extent necessary 
to secure the Secretary of State 's interest in the broad issues of fiscal policy, 
measures against inflation, exchange and currency control, development finance and 
loan policy. The conclusion was reached that the Secretary of State 's interest in these 
broad issues can most effectively be secured by consultation and discussion between 
the Colonial Office and the Governments concerned, which should keep the Colonial 
Office fully informed of the financial situation in the Territory and should supply 
advance information with regard to financial policy. 
3. In accordance with these principles, it is my intention that formal control over 
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the finances of African Territories whose finances are not under the control of His 
Majesty's Treasury should in future be exercised only through the Secretary of State's 
function of advising His Majesty on the assent to the Appropriation and Sup-
plementary Appropriation Ordinances and other legislation of a financial character, 
e.g. Loan Ordinances. Other types of formal control will be dispensed with, except of 
course where payments by the Imperial Government are involved, whether these 
take the form of subsidies for specific purposes or of assistance under the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act. Estimates will thus not in themselves require the 
Secretary of State's approval, but both the annual estimates and supplementary 
estimates should be sent to the Colonial Office for information at as early a date as 
possible. The writing-off of losses, etc., will not require the approval of the Secretary 
of State and the other requirements of formal reference to the Secretary of State in 
financial matters laid down in the Colonial Regulations will be dispensed with. 
4. In order to carry these measures for devolution in financial matters into effect, 
the Colonial Regulations will require substantial revision and I propose to take early 
steps to set up a committee to advise me on the changes required. Furthermore the 
major change involved in this relaxation of formal control necessitates a thorough 
review of the local machinery of budgetary authorisation and control, which the 
Conference of African Governors considered should be conducted in consultation 
between Colonial Governments and the Colonial Office. 
5. The local machinery of control outside the Executive is centred in the 
Standing Finance Committees of the Legislative Councils, which in fact exercise a 
strict supervision over the financial operations of Governments. Audit should 
continue to be operated as at present under the Director General of Colonial Audit, 
the auditors' report being submitted to the Government concerned and presented to 
the Legislative Council. In the new conditions it may well be desirable to set up 
Public Accounts Committees at an early stage, in order to differentiate between the 
functions of authorisation and of review, but in the meantime the auditors' report 
should be examined by the Standing Finance Committee of the Legislative Council. 
6. As already stated, the Secretary of State will continue to have the function of 
advising the King on the assent to the Appropriation and Supplementary Appropria-
tion Ordinances. In addition, where there is an unofficial majority in the Legislative 
Council the Governor will be in a position in the last resort to exercise his reserve 
powers under the constitution. These powers should, however, be regarded as 
constitutional safeguards only to be used in extreme circumstances . By the means 
described in this and the preceding paragraph the responsibility of the executive to 
the Legislative Council on financial matters in accordance with the constitution will 
be secured, while at the same time the Secretary of State's responsibility to 
Parliament in respect of the broad issues of policy will be preserved. 
7. As a necessary corollary of these measures of devolution the machinery by 
which Governments keep the Colonial Office generally informed in advance of the 
financial position and policies will need to be developed. The full success of the policy 
of financial devolution, implying consultation rather than formal approval, requires 
that full information of a general character should be available to the Colonial Office 
at the stage when Colonial Governments are considering their plans. This is 
particularly important at a time when both the United Kingdom and Colonial 
Territories, along with the rest of the Commonwealth and indeed the world as a 
whole, are facing economic difficulties of extreme gravity, and when co-ordination of 
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action in both the financial and economic field is of special importance. I intend that 
the Colonial Office should supply an increasing amount of information to Colonial 
Governments on general economic and financial issues. I have no doubt that 
Colonial Governments themselves will readily agree that they should keep the 
Colonial Office fully informed of their economic and financial position. The 
necessary co-ordination between Colonial Governments and the Colonial Office can 
then increasingly be secured by means of discussion between myself and members of 
the Colonial Office on the one hand and Governors, Financial Secretaries and other 
senior officers from Colonial Territories on the other. For the purpose of supplying 
the information required I consider that Financial Secretaries should keep in regular 
touch by correspondence with the Colonial Office on important financial issues, so as 
to keep the Colonial Office regularly informed of major developments. In particular a 
memorandum giving in broad outline the anticipated budgetary position and 
proposals should be forwarded to the Colonial Office at as early a stage as possible in 
the preparation of the Estimates, so as to give the Colonial Office an opportunity of 
sending the Government concerned any comments which they may wish to make if 
possible before the submission of the Estimates to the Legislative Council and in any 
case before the discussion of the Estimates by the Legislative Council reaches a stage 
at which such comments would no longer be effective. I should also desire to receive 
advance copies of the Annual Estimates for information purposes at as early a date as 
possible each year. 
8. The work of review proposed in paragraph 4 will take time, and the Committee 
on Colonial Regulations will have to consider conditions not only in Africa but in all 
Colonial Territories. Concurrently the African Governments will no doubt take steps 
to put in hand the review of the local machinery of budgetary authorisation and 
control to which I have referred in paragraph 4 and which will presumably involve an 
examination of the General Orders of each Territory. It seems desirable that those 
concerned in each Territory in this local review and the Committee considering the 
revision of Colonial Regulations should work in close touch with each other. 
Meanwhile, and without waiting for the results of this review, I am anxious, and I 
know that this view is shared by Governors, that the measures of devolution which I 
have decided upon for the African Territories whose finances are not under the 
control of His Majesty's Treasury should come into force as soon as possible. I should 
be grateful accordingly if you would inform me whether you agree with the 
arrangements for consultation proposed in paragraph 7 and if you would explain in 
your reply how you propose to implement them. If, as I confidently assume, you are 
prepared to make the arrangements proposed in paragraph 7, the following measures 
of devolution may be brought into effect as soon as you desire, subject to any views 
which the Legislative Council may express. 
9. Formal approval of the Annual Estimates by the Secretary of State can be 
dispensed with, and it follows that it will be the approval of the Legislative Council 
rather than of the Secretary of State which should be the authority for expenditure 
from public funds required by Colonial Regulation 245. Colonial Regulations 224 and 
225 regarding the execution of important public works will in consequence cease to 
operate. The formal approval of the Secretary of State for supplementary expendi-
ture, as prescribed by Colonial Regulation 265, will no longer be required. The 
Colonial Office should, however, continue to be informed of supplementary esti-
mates whether by schedules of additional provision or other appropriate means, not 
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later than their presentation to the Legislative Council. The authority of the 
Secretary of State will no longer be needed under Colonial Regulations 240 and 278 
for the writing-off of losses, the abandonment or omission of claims or the 
writing-off of assets, on the understanding that the approval of the Legislative 
Council will be obtained for all writes-off, with prior reference to the Standing 
Finance Committee where substantial amounts or questions of principle are 
involved, and that similarly the Standing Finance Committee will be consulted 
regarding the abandonment or omission of claims where substantial amounts or 
questions of principle arise. 
10. The formal sanction of the Secretary of State in connection with loan 
expenditure under Colonial Regulations 279 to 283 will no longer be needed, 
although Governments will of course understand that proposals for the raising of all 
loans, including local loans, and the issue of securities will necessarily continue to 
require my agreement. The consent of the Capital Issues Committee will of course 
continue to be required for the issue of loans on the London market. In view of 
international obligations I also desire that proposed changes in customs rates and 
regulations, whether or not associated with the Annual Estimates, be referred to me. 
11. I intend to address you separately on the control of the Colonial Development 
and Welfare Vote, but Governments will appreciate that expenditure from His 
Majesty's Government's funds will continue to require my prior approval which in 
the case of the Colonial Development and Welfare Vote will be conveyed by my 
approval of the schemes in question, or their subsequent variation. 
12. This despatch is not itself intended for publication, but it will clearly be 
desirable that the Legislative Councils of the Territories, and the East African 
Assembly, should be informed at an early date what changes it is proposed to make 
with regard to financial procedure, so that they may have an opportunity of 
commenting on them. I suggest that it will be sufficient if the Legislative Council is 
informed of the substance of the changes to be made, and, if you agree, you will no 
doubt arrange for this to be done in whatever form is most appropriate . I shall be 
grateful if you will in due course inform me of any comments which the Legislative 
Council make on the changes. 
13. I am addressing this despatch to the Governors of all the African Territories, 
to the British Resident, Zanzibar, and to the Chairman of the East Africa High 
Commission. Copies are being sent to the Chief Secretaries of the West and Central 
African Councils. 
127 CO 537/3316, no 22 19 July 1948 
'Association of Italy with African development': CO memorandum on 
settlement and labour opportunities. Minute by K E Robinson 
[This paper was received with some scepticism in the Foreign Office . Sir 0 Sargent 
minuted: 'Personally I doubt whether in face of the ever growing economic and 
demographic needs of Europe we shall be able indefinitely to maintain the policy of 
protecting the natives against European immigration. It has already broken down in 
Palestine where with the general approval of European public opinion the natives are 
being driven out to make way for European settlers. The problem in a somewhat different 
form already dominates South African policy and Malan's1 recent victory shows that the 
1 Or D F' Malan, leader of the National Party of South Africa and prime minister, 1948-1954. 
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European settlers in South Africa are determined to retain and strengthen their position·. 
Bevin minuted: 'We lost U.S.A. in trying to stop expansion there. I am sure in a few years 
we shall lose the battle here. I will discuss it further' (FO 371169153, no 5392, minutes, 3 
[& nd) Aug 1948). The discussion with Creech Jones took place on 9 Aug; Bevin 
concluded there was nothing more to be done for the time being, but continued to think 
the whole position over. No official record was kept of this meeting, but Creech Jones 
minuted that he had replied to all of Bevin's points, viz, (i) colonial governments should 
encourage more European workers in Africa, (ii) Indians should be regulated, because 
they were likely to swamp European values and culture, and Europeans and Africans 
encouraged to move into trade, (iii) everything possible should be done to encourage 
development in Africa by Europeans (he did not explicitly mention Italians, but Creech 
Jones was sure they were in his mind) (CO 537/3316, minute, 9 Aug 1948: see also part 3 
of this volume, 301, para 6).] 
1. The Colonial Office have examined various proposals for associating Italy with 
the economic development of Africa. These proposals come under the following 
heads:-
(a) The permanent settlement of Italians in the British territories in Africa. 
(b) The employment of Italian artisans in the British territories in Africa. 
(c) The use of Italian contractors for the execution of development schemes and 
projects. 
(d) The association of Italy with African development through the O.E.E.C. 
Permanent settlement 
2. The opportunities for the permanent settlement of Europeans on the land in 
the British territories in Africa are extremely limited. In practice they are confined to 
Kenya and, to a much lesser extent, Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika. 
3. At the request of the Colonial Secretary, Sir Alan Pim, K.C.l.E., recently 
undertook an enquiry into the possibilities of large scale settlement in these three 
territories, with a view to a partial solution of the problem of European displaced 
persons. His report shows that there is no scope in the three territories for 
substantial agricultural settlement of persons from temperate zones. His broad 
conclusion is that, although physically a small number might be accommodated by 
stages over a number of years, settlement of these people, even on a small scale, 
would be at the risk of vigorous opposition from all races and would be impracticable 
unless considerable capital expenditure, often on costly communications, was first 
incurred. His report draws attention to the likelihood of political trouble, particular-
ly from Africans, since generally speaking the most suitable areas for development of 
the kind envisaged are precisely those in respect of which we have imposed 
limitations on their use for other than African interests. His report also draws 
attention to the difficulty of reconciling the transplanting of an European peasant 
economy on any substantial scale to tropical Africa, with the advance towards African 
self-government. 
4. There are at present about 30,000 Europeans in Kenya. The numbers of 
Europeans in the other two territories are very much smaller. The post-war scheme 
of the Kenya Government for settling European farmers in Kenya aims only at about 
700 and obviously nearly all the vacancies will be taken up by British settlers. The 
possibilities for future European settlement in all three territories must therefore be 
reckoned in hundreds, not thousands; consequently, even if it were possible 
politically to permit Italian immigration, the numbers involved would necessarily be 
infinitesimal. 
s 
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projects on existing approved schemes, and I have asked Miss Deane to consider how 
we should go about collecting more data on this subject. We no doubt could provide 
some, particularly in relation to the groundnuts scheme, and I should think we could 
provide some for other existing industries, e.g. sisal in Tanganyika. But I doubt 
whether we can provide much, even by way of illustrative material. We shall have to 
do our best. But, generally speaking, I feel that we have got to insist that we should 
go laboriously over the ground on the general lines of (22). I hope we shall take the 
opportunity of once again rubbing it into the Foreign Office that this question of the 
non-employment of Europeans as artisans, etc. in Africa is not a matter on which the 
Colonial Office or Colonial Governments are free to decide on policy. Within very 
narrow limits we have to do what the Africans will accept, and this cannot be put too 
strongly to the Foreign Office, who seem to me to live in the middle of the 
nineteenth century on this, as indeed on other subjects. If we wish to be able to take 
an effective part in the development of West Africa, it is quite certain that there is no 
scope for any activities on our part designed to produce large numbers of Italian 
immigrants or temporary employees there. The only result would be that we should 
have to employ substantial military forces in West Africa or find ourselves no longer 
able to exercise effective control. I sometimes think that our anxiety not to 
exaggerate has perhaps led us not to make as clear as is desirable to the Foreign 
Office and other Departments that this question is not simply one of what Colonial 
Governments or the Colonial Office would like but a question of what the Africans 
will put up with. On the immediate issue I think we must generally argue that there 
is no alternative but to be quite honest, putting out the position as we see it on the 
lines of (22) clearly in the Manpower Committee, or anywhere else where the Italians 
may raise it, and supporting our case with such statistical material as we are able to 
provide. If this is agreed, the papers should be recirculated very quickly to Economic 
Intelligence and Planning Department (Miss Deane) to set about collecting such 
illustrative material as may be practicable. It should be made quite clear that it will 
take some time and that we may not be able to produce very much. 
128 FO 800/435, ff 116-117 
K.E.R. 
17.9.48 
23 Oct 1948 
'African development: Beira port and railway': despatch from Mr Bevin 
to Sir N Ronald (Lisbon) on the conversation between the secretary of 
state and the Portuguese ambassador 
I asked the Portuguese Ambassador to call on me this morning to discuss the 
question of the Beira port and railway. I recalled that, when I met the Portuguese 
Foreign Minister in Paris last year, we had discussed African development and that he 
had been enthusiastic in his support for close co-operation between the British and 
Portuguese in this task. I was worried, therefore, to find that the very important 
question of the Beira port and railway was not being considered in the general 
context of African development but rather as an isolated question on its own. 
2. I told the Duke of Palmella that I was going to speak frankly and confidentially. 
As he probably knew, the question of an Atlantic Pact had been under discussion in 
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Washington and it was likely to be decided that Portugal should be invited to adhere 
to it. He also knew that the international situation had made it necessary for us and 
the United States to start rearming. For this purpose we had great need of strategic 
raw materials. Moreover, in connexion with the European Recovery Programme we 
had an obligation to supply the United States with raw materials necessary for 
American rearmament. And the United States were pressing us to fulful this 
obligation. In Rhodesia there were many raw materials, such as copper, chrome, 
mica and coal, which were of the greatest importance to us, and it was therefore 
essential that every effort should be made to make these raw materials available as 
quickly as possible and in sufficient quantities. In this connexion the development of 
the railway and port of Beira would be of decisive importance. As an additional 
argument I then explained to the Ambassador the very vital part which the Beira 
railway must play in our strategic arrangements in Tanganyika and Rhodesia. I gave 
the Ambassador the broad outline of these arrangements and explained the extent to 
which they depended on the development of railway communications. 
3. I said to the Ambassador that apart from defence there was the question of 
European recovery, which was hardly less important. The raw materials of Rhodesia 
must be made available to the members of O.E.E.C., for not only were they badly 
needed but they would enable us all to effect an important saving of dollars. For this 
reason, therefore, the Portuguese Government and ourselves must press forward 
with the development of the port and railway of Beira in concert with the other 
Powers interested in the development of Africa as a whole. 
4. The Minister of State had recently been in America and had spoken to the 
president of the International Bank, Mr. McCloy. He had been given to understand 
that there was great interest in America in the question of African development and 
that, if it became clear that serious plans existed, both private finance and the 
International Bank would be ready to provide capital. 
5. In the case of Beira, I thought that if only the matter could be dealt with at the 
level which its importance warranted it ought to be possible for the Portuguese, 
Rhodesian and British Governments to arrange for a Joint Operating Board for the 
port and railway as a whole. I was anxious that the whole problem should be lifted 
above the level of railway companies. 
6. I understood that plans were being made to develop the transport system to 60 
per cent. beyond its present capacity. I thought this was far too little and that we 
should plan for development on a much more ambitious scale. Moreover, I thought 
that if my principle were accepted, it would be important to ensure that steps were 
taken to attract the best outside experts to help in the development of the port and 
railway. That was a principle which we followed here in this country and we found it 
most advantageous. 
7. For all these reasons I wanted to take this matter up with the Portuguese 
Government. I wanted to get the principle accepted and I thought it was of the 
utmost importance, from the political, economic and defence point of view, to 
develop the African continent and to make its resources available to all. If the 
Portuguese Government accepted this principle, and I was sure that they would, I felt 
that a solution could be found to individual problems, but I emphasised that the key 
to everything was communications. 
8. The Duke of Palmella undertook to convey what I had said to his Government 
and we agreed to discuss the matter further when he had had their reply. 
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129 CAB 134/216, EPC 35(48)4 9 Nov 1948 
'Colonial development': Cabinet Economic Policy Committee minutes 
The Committee considered a memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies (E.P.C.(48)92) covering a report by the 
Colonial Development Working Party. 1 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer recalled that on 6th May2 the Committee had 
approved in principle an interim report (E.P.C.(48)35) by this Working Party. The 
further report now submitted discussed the broad objectives of Colonial economic 
policy in the light of current conditions; it laid down the principles on which 
Colonial investment policy should be based; and it set export targets for Colonial 
primary products. The Working Party had examined the factors determining the 
scale of future investment and the extent to which certain kinds of physical resources 
were likely to be available; and they had P1ade detailed proposals for securing the 
effective integration of Colonial investment with the system of control and allocation 
of United Kingdom resources. Finally they had suggested that an inter-departmental 
Committee of officials should be set up to keep the progress of Colonial development 
under continuous review. The report was a notable piece of work, but it would not be 
advisable to publish it in view of the provisional nature of many of the figures and 
estimates included in it; he thought, however, that it would be useful to publish 
something on these lines as soon as more accurate figures became available. There 
were three main conclusions to be drawn from the Working Party's report. First, 
plans for Colonial development should maintain a proper balance between economic 
development and social welfare. Secondly, the speed of Colonial development would 
be severely limited by shortages of plant and materials in the United Kingdom, and 
by the problems of adjustment created by large-scale economic development in 
primitive communities. Thirdly, while resources were scarce, they were best applied 
to restoring and improving existing capital equipment rather than initiating new 
development schemes. The Colonial Economic and Development Council and the 
Economic Planning Board had both·suggested that the report attached insufficient 
weight to the fundamental importance of agriculture and forestry in Colonial 
territories, and it was important that investment policy should take full account of 
their needs. He supported the proposal for the appointment of an inter-departmental 
Committee, and proposed to discuss its composition with the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies. A member of the Central Economic Planning Staff should act as 
chairman. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that he was in general agreement with 
the Working Party's recommendations and with the comments made by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. Notable progress had been made in recent years in 
repairing the effects of war and in expanding Colonial production, and he was 
confident that the export targets set out in the report could be achieved if supply 
difficulties could be overcome. He attached particular importance to the practical 
proposals made by the Working Party for ensuring that Colonial needs were taken 
into account in framing United Kingdom investment policy, and for co-ordinating 
and progressing [sic] Colonial orders for scarce equipment and materials . 
Discussion showed that the Committee were in general agreement with the 
1 See 93. 2 See 125. 
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recommendations put forward by the Working Party, and Ministers expressed 
appreciation of the valuable and constructive report which they had prepared. The 
report would provide a sound basis for integrating Colonial investment policy with 
United Kingdom policy in the same field. Ministers wished, however, to be assured 
that sufficient attention had been given to adjusting the internal organisation of the 
Colonial Office to meet the requirements of this policy. In the past, the economic 
development of the Colonies had been largely relegated to private commercial 
enterprise, and it had not been necessary for the Colonial Office to exercise a direct 
control over economic investment. As the result of the Government's policy of direct 
participation in the task of Colonial development, there had been a fundamental 
change in the situation. Moreover, Colonial development made demands on scarce 
resources and, in allocating these resources as part of the United Kingdom 
investment programme, His Majesty's Government must apply to Colonial require-
ments the same criteria of urgency and relative values as were employed in this 
country. It was a necessary corollary of these developments that the Colonial Office 
should be in a position to maintain a general control over Colonial development: the 
Colonies could not effectively be brought within the ambit of United Kingdom 
economic policy unless the Colonial Office were able to present their case, to advise 
on priorities and to control allocations on the same lines as were followed by 
Departments such as the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Supply for industries in 
this country. Ministers were not satisfied that the weaknesses in the past organisa-
tion of the Colonial Office and the Crown Agents for the Colonies, which had been 
disclosed by the investigations made by the Working Party, had been fully eradicated, 
and they thought that this point ought to be examined in greater detail. 
In further discussion, the following points were made:-
(a) The Minister of Defence suggested that a representative of his Department 
should receive the papers of the proposed inter-departmental Committee, and attend 
its meetings as necessary, in order that the defence aspects of Colonial development 
might be taken fully into account. This suggestion was approved. 
(b) Although the first aim should be to restore and improve the existing capital 
equipment of the Colonies, this policy should not be too narrowly interpreted. It 
should not, for example, be assumed that the reconstruction of the railway through 
Portuguese East Africa and the expansion of the port of Beira would afford a 
completely satisfactory solution for the needs of Northern and Southern Rhodesia for 
additional transport facilities. 
(c) Attention was drawn to the difficulties of United Kingdom Government-
financed Corporations in Colonial territories. In Tanganyika, for instance, the 
Colonial Government had been unable to finance from its own resources health and 
welfare services for the workers on the groundnuts scheme, and this charge had 
consequently fallen on the Overseas Food Corporation itself. This added substantially 
to the Corporation's costs. Ought not the local Government to finance the cost of 
such services either from loan or Treasury grant until such time as they could recoup 
the additional cost from taxation on the company's operations? In fact, the Colonial 
Government had recently decided to reduce the rates of local income tax; and this 
action illustrated the difficulties which beset United Kingdom Corporations. In view 
of the Government's direct responsibility in Colonial development, and the fact that 
the capital resources to make it possible had to be found from the United Kingdom, 
ought not the Colonial Office to exercise more positive control over Colonial 
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Governments in the economic field? 
On the other side, it was argued that, whatever the residual powers of the 
Secretary of State, it would be contrary to the fundamental principles of Colonial 
policy to attempt, at this stage, to treat Colonial Governments as subordinate 
departments of His Majesty's Government. The accepted aim of Colonial policy was 
to help the Colonial peoples to stand on their own feet, and gradually to devolve 
executive and legislative responsibility to them, and this could only be effected by the 
gradual transfer of real power. The co-operation of Colonial Governments in 
development policy had to be secured largely by persuasion, and account had 
therefore to be taken of the limited powers of the Colonial Office to take direct 
executive action. Nevertheless, full co-operation of Colonial Governments had, in 
general, been secured, but their powers were often limited by scanty resources and 
an inadequate administrative machine. The arrangement adopted in Tanganyika, 
under which the Overseas Food Corporation assumed a large measure of responsibil-
ity for the provision of health and welfare services for their employees, was not 
unusual: in Colonial territories with limited financial resources, it had not been 
uncommon to require commercial enterprises to provide such services for their 
employees. 
(d) There was a danger that the attention given to integrating Colonial invest-
ment policy with United Kingdom economic plans might mean that inadequate 
attention was given to the development needs, not only of other Commonwealth 
countries, but of foreign countries in the Middle East and elsewhere in whose 
development we had a direct interest. Would it not be advisable for the Investment 
Programmes Committee to take their needs into account also when the levels of 
home investment were being considered? It was pointed out, however, that in this 
matter a clear distinction must be drawn between Colonial territories and foreign 
countries. His Majesty's Government had a direct responsibility for the economic 
development of the Colonies: they could not, however, directly control the develop-
ment of foreign countries and the supply of capital goods to those countries must be 
regarded from the angle of export pQlicy rather than investment policy. 
(e) It was also suggested that the proposed inter-departmental Committee might 
work in close touch with the committee appointed by the Organisation for European 
Economic Co-operation to consider joint measures for the development of overseas 
territories. It was pointed out, however, that this latter body was concerned only with 
African territories and it would be undesirable that it should extend its enquiries to 
cover British Colonial territories in other parts of the world. 
The Committee:-
(!) Approved the recommendations contained in the report of the Colonial 
Development Working Party annexed to E.P.C.(48)92. 
(2) Invited the Secretary of State for the Colonies to submit a paper describing the 
organisation available within the Colonial Office for carrying out the recom-
mendations of the Working Party, and its relations with the Crown Agents for the 
Colonies on the one hand and, on the other, the economic Departments of the 
United Kingdom Government. 
(3) Invited the Secretary of State for the Colonies to submit a paper on the 
question whether the Overseas Food Corporation should continue to be required 
to finance the provision of health and welfare services for staff employed by them 
on the ground-nuts project in Tanganyika. 
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130 DEFE 4119, COS 6(49)2 10 Jan 1949 
'The strategic aspect of the proposed railway development in East and 
Central Africa': COS minutes. Annex: report by JPS, JP(48)122 
[Earlier investigation having ruled out west-to-east African transport links, discussion 
after 1948 centred on railway development in Central Africa which would link Rhodesia 
(and thus South Africa) to Tanganyika. These discussions became tied in with the 
problem of evacuating Tanganyikan groundnuts. Mr Marquand urged that a conference 
should be held of interested parties (see 108, ll8). The Portuguese proposed an African 
transport conference. Officials welcomed this, as it would give them information on the 
proposals of other Powers, and generally prepare for the British conference. What 
emerged was a two-stage international conference, the first doing the preliminary work 
and preparing an agenda. The first conference was held in Lisbon, 24-31 May 1949, 
between British, French, Portuguese, Belgian and South African representatives. The 
delegates decided to hold the major conference the following year in Johannesburg (FO 
371/73042 & 73043). The idea of a north-south rail link, however, withered away for a 
variety of reasons: (a) its strategic value was in doubt if there was to be no major base in 
Kenya; (b) its economic value was in doubt, since only low-grade agricultural crops could 
be expected to be generated in the Rhodesias; (c) the costs were enormous; (d) the 
difficulty of being seen to co-operate with South Africa was growing, and (e) the General 
Manager of Rhodesian Railways, Sir Arthur Griffin, could see no specific Rhodesian 
purpose in a rail link to the north, and in any case argued that Beira was the best outlet 
for Northern Rhodesia; he believed the Portuguese would be co-operative, certainly more 
so that the South Africans (CO 795/159/45500/49/3, 5 Oct 1949). See map, p 251.) 
The Committee considered a report by the Joint Planning Staff examining the 
strategic importance of certain railway development in East and Central Africa. 
Lt. General Templer1 said that he thought that the development of the three 
alignments concerned were not essential but were strategically desirable. If a railway 
was to be built linking Northern Uganda and the Sudan, then a line connecting 
Northern Rhodesia and Tanganyika would assume greater strategic importance 
provided that it was of the standard gauge. Even so such a project still could not be 
called a strategic essential. There was, however, no project in view for a line from 
Northern Uganda to the Sudan. 
He understood that the Colonial Office had the impression that the Ministry of 
Defence considered that certain railway developments in East and Central Africa 
were strategically essential. He did not believe that this was true. He understood that 
Anglo/American consideration of East and Central African railway development 
would be taking place within the next few days and it was therefore important that 
the views of the Chiefs of Staff should be communicated to the Colonial Office as a 
matter of urgency. 
Sir John Edelsten2 said that some emphasis had been laid on the submarine 
menace to the sea routes round the Cape. Submarines in the last war had little 
adverse effect on our sea communications in these regions, and he did not believe 
that the submarine risk would be greatly increased in the area in a future war. In any 
case he thought that it would be more economical to deliver the cargoes by sea to 
East African ports than to trans-ship them and move them by land from West or 
South African ports. 
In discussion general agreement was expressed to the report by the Joint Planning 
Staff. 
1 Vice-chief of the imperial general staff, 1948-1950. 2 Vice-chief of the naval staff, 1947-1950. 
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The Committee:-
(a) Approved the report at Annex and instructed the Secretary to send it to the 
Colonial Office as an expression of the views of the Chiefs of Staff, with the proviso 
contained in paragraph 3 of the cover note . 
(b) Instructed the Secretary to send copies of the approved report to the 
Commanders-in-Chief, Middle East, for their information. 
(c) Instructed the Secretary to send copies of the approved report to the U.K. 
Service Liaison Staff in South Africa. 
Annex to 130 
The Union of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the British territories in East and 
Central Africa have an important role to play in the event of war. Firstly, the 
industrial developments which are now taking place there, especially in Southern 
Rhodesia and South Africa, enhance the value of the African continent as a support 
area; th!s is particularly important in view of the vulnerability of the United 
Kingdom. Secondly, it is hoped that these countries will provide forces not only for 
their own local defence but also for the defence of the African Continent as a whole; 
we visualise that these latter forces would be deployed in the Middle East. Finally, a 
stores-holding area for the support of the Middle East campaign is being developed in 
Kenya. 
2. The contributions which these countries can make to the Allied cause will be 
governed to a large extent by the efficiency of their communications. There is a 
strategic requirement for the best possible communications:-
(a) By land and sea from South Africa, Central Africa and East Africa, to the 
Middle East. 
(b) Between the countries themselves, so as to assist in the general economic 
development of their war potential. 
(c) Between the inland producing areas and ports, so that products may readily be 
shipped overseas and necessary materials imported. 
Existing railway systems 
3. The map at Appendix shows that the eastern and southern areas of Africa 
contain two separate groups of railways. The group in the south is well-developed 
and of 3' 6" gauge throughout. That in the east is of metre gauge and lacks cohesion; 
it consists of lines connecting the ports of Mombasa, Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam with 
their respective hinterlands. 
No rail link exists between these two groups of railways, and the Rhodesias have no 
direct access to the sea through British Colonial territory. 
Project to connect Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia 
4. It is estimated that the proposed line (marked (a) on the map at Appendix) 
would cost between £9m. and £llm. to build and that it would be self-supporting 
commercially within 15 years. The road following this route was used during the last 
war for transporting important war materials. 
5. A railway would meet the following strategic requirements:-
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(a) It would provide the Rhodesias with a railroad through British and British 
Mandated territory to the Indian Ocean, and thus obviate the Portuguese 
controlled ports. 
(b) It would link the stores-holding area in Kenya with the South. 
(c) By opening up rail communications in a new tract of territory it would 
encourage the development of this region and consequently add to its potential 
value as a support area. 
6. We therefore consider that the construction of this line is strategically 
desirable. 
Project to connect Mikindani and Northern Rhodesia 
7. Mikindani has a good natural harbour which is being developed to handle the 
export of ground nuts. A metre gauge line is under construction to link the port with 
the ground nut plantations, and a project (marked (b) on the map at Appendix) is 
under consideration to extend the Mikindani railway to link up with the projected 
Rhodesian system. At present these two railways will be of different gauge. 
8. If Mikindani were developed enough to handle the extra traffic and were 
connected with Rhodesia, it would provide an alternative outlet to the sea thus 
reducing the pressure on the ports of Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam. Under these 
circumstances this project would be of some strategic value. 
Project to connect Southern Rhodesia and ports in S. W. Africa 
9. The proposal is to link Walvis Bay with Wankie, in the centre of the South 
Rhodesia coalfield, by extending the existing line inland (marked (c) on the map at 
Appendix) . 
10. This line, in conjunction with the link between Northern Rhodesia and 
Tanganyika, would provide an additional overland L. of C. to East Africa from the 
west. A previous examination concluded that the strategic advantages likely to accrue 
from the development of a Line of Communications across Africa were not sufficient 
in themselves to justify the heavy cost of such development; but that if, in future, the 
construction of a through trans-continental rail route becomes economically 
desirable, such construction should be supported on strategic grounds. 
11. This project would give the Rhodesias a railroad through Commonwealth 
territory to a port in the west, but the bulk of the Rhodesian output of war materials 
would need to be sent up the northern line towards the Middle East. 
12. The line is not, therefore, of especial strategic importance. Nevertheless, 
inasmuch as it adds to the flexibility of the Central African railway system it would be 
of some military value in war. 
The gauge problem 
13. The strategic benefits to be derived from the first two projects will be greatly 
limited if there remained a difference of gauge between the interconnected systems, 
involving delay and expenditure of labour in offloading and reloading every trainload. 
It is noted that the projected railway from Mikindani to Northern Rhodesia is of 
metre gauge, whereas the projected railway between Northern Rhodesia and East 
Africa is of 3' 6" gauge. The conversion of the metre gauge railways to 3' 6" is clearly 
strategically desirable. This has been anticipated to some extent since all recent 
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deliveries of rolling stock for East Africa have been specially designed for easy 
conversion. The total cost of widening the existing East African system to 3' 6" has 
been estimated at £16m. We do not know the cost of constructing the Mikindani line 
at 3' 6" gauge as opposed to metre gauge. 
Conclusions 
14. We conclude that:-
(a) A link between the Rhodesian and Tanganyikan railway systems is strategically 
desirable. 
(b) Railways between the Rhodesian system and-
(i) the port of Mikindani 
(ii) the port of Walvis Bay 
are not essential on strategic grounds; but if it is decided to construct them on 
economic grounds, they would be valuable in war. 
(c) As a complementary project, the conversion of the East African railway system 
to 3' 6" gauge is strategically desirable. 
(d) The strategic arguments in favour of constructing these railways, though 
sufficient to warrant their use in support of a claim for assistance from E.R.P. 
funds, are not of such force as to warrant a contribution from the United Kingdom 
defence vote. 
131 CO 537/4736, no 1 July 1949 
'The economic development of the Nile Valley': FO paper. Minutes by 
AB Cohen, J M Martin, A H Poynton, Sir T Lloyd, Lord Listowel and 
Mr Creech Jones 
In the course of his conversation with the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs in 
Paris on the 1st June, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs expressed the hope 
that the territories of the Nile Valley would cooperate politically and economically in 
the joint development of their resources and the welfare of their peoples. 
2. Mr. Bevin has given further thought to this conception and has now had an 
opportunity of discussing it with the Governor-General of the Sudan, who considered 
that from his point of view the proposal should be explored further. Mr. Bevin has in 
mind an international Board, the function of which would be to help Governments to 
achieve coordination in the social and economic development of the Nile Valley, in 
the prosperity of which so many different territories have a common interest. The 
following preliminary ideas with regard to the terms of reference, composition and 
functions of the Board have occurred to Mr. Bevin: 
(a) The Board would have no political or executive authority. Its task would be to 
advise and to make recommendations. 
(b) The Board might consist of representatives of: 
(i) Egypt 
(ii) The Sudan 
(iii) Ethiopia 
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(iv) Uganda (or the East Africa High Commission) 
(v) The Belgian Congo. 
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(c) For the sake of continuity and in order to avoid the constitutional difficulties 
which might arise from the different international status of the territories 
concerned, the members of the Board should be selected from prominent 
independent personalities who command authority in their own country, or from 
senior officials, or from elder statesmen outside the sphere of current politics. 
(d) The Board might most appropriately sit in Cairo.1 
(e) The Board might have discretion to appoint subordinate bodies for the 
coordination of specific enterprises of concern to more than one territory, e.g. the 
Nile Waters schemes, cotton production, and the generation of hydro-electric 
power. (The Technical Council which it is already planned to set up to supervise 
the execution and later the administration of the Nile Waters schemes might, 
therefore, be subordinate to the Board.) 
(0 The title of the Board might perhaps be "The Nile Valley Development Board" 
or "The Nile Valley Advisory Board". 
3. Th·e Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is most anxious that agreement on 
the creation of some such body as he has in mind should be reached as soon as 
possible for the following reasons. First, the need for the economic and social 
development of the Middle East and Africa is urgent. Secondly, agreement on the 
establishment of such a Board would have a significant effect on various matters of 
importance which are to be discussed at the next General Assembly of the United 
Nations, which is to begin in September. Finally, the present state of our relations 
with Egypt conduces to such an enterprise. 
4. His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo has been asked to comment urgently on the 
possible composition, terms of reference and functions of such a body. The Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs is anxious, however, that this proposal should be 
discussed as soon as possible in London in order to avoid unnecessary delay. 
Minutes on 131 
First as regards procedure. I have told Mr. Pearson that in my view this proposal has 
so many political implications that it certainly ought to come to the Africa 
Committee first, and he is communicating this view both to the Foreign and Cabinet 
Offices. If the proposal gets the blessing of the Africa Committee-which it will get 
over my practically moribund body-it might then be right to put it to the Colonial 
Development Committee, but I hope that this will not be necessary. 
On the substance of the proposal, I have discussed with Mr. Wallace2 and Mr. 
Robertson.3 We all feel strongly that the setting up of a Board of this kind, with broad 
terms of reference covering social and economic development generally, would not 
only serve no practical purpose, but would actually interfere with the social and 
economic development at any rate of Uganda; while it seems to us also that the 
proposal is open to the gravest political objections from the Colonial Office point of 
view. 
1 Cohen wrote against this: 'very embarrassing·. 
2 W I J Wallace, acting CO assistant secretary, 1949. :l W A Robertson, CO forestry adviser. 
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We are, of course, in entire agreement with the proposal to establish a Technical 
Council to supervise the administration of the Nile Waters scheme or schemes; but 
this will only be concerned with water and matters directly related to water. The 
establishment of such a Council is fully in accordance with the spirit of the Nile 
Waters Agreement, and I think that I am right in saying that it is accepted policy that 
the United Kingdom Government should press for the establishment of such a 
Council at the appropriate moment. 
But a Board to deal particularly with social and economic development is entirely 
another matter. It is not clearly brought out in the Foreign Office paper what precise 
purpose this Board would serve. It is stated in paragraph 2 of (1) that its functions 
would be to help Governments to achieve co-ordination in the social and economic 
development of the Nile Valley. What exactly does that mean? As far as I can see it 
does not mean anything at all except in relation to actual water control or 
hydro-electric schemes which could perfectly well be discussed in the Technical 
Council. Is there really anything to be gained by trying to co-ordinate educational 
development as between Uganda, the Belgian Congo, Egypt and Ethiopia? We already 
have perfectly satisfactory machinery to deal with matters on which international 
co-operation is necessary, e.g. tsetse, locust and rinderpest control, and for 
discussing other matters of common interest where the exchange of ideas is 
desirable, e.g. soil erosion, rural development etc. 
The Colonial Office, of course, is fully in agreement with the view expressed in 
paragraph 3 that the economic and social development in Africa, as well as the 
Middle East, is urgent. But in our view it is a fallacy to suppose that the rapid 
development which is desirable is going to be promoted by an international Board of 
this kind. The way to promote it is to give the maximum support to the Uganda and 
other colonial governments (as we are doing) in securing staff, supplies and finance 
to get on with their own carefully thought out development programmes. Uganda by 
common consent has an excellent one. The rapid carrying into effect of this 
programme will not in any way be assisted, as far as we can see, by the establishment 
of a Board of this kind. 
We would go considerably further than this and say that not only would the 
carrying into effect of the development programmes not be assisted by the proposed 
machinery, but that it would actually be impeded. The effect of setting up such a 
Board would be that plans and proposals might very well get held up while they were 
being examined by this outside and possibly not very vigorous body. We should be 
linking ourselves in a sense with Ethiopia, which is infinitely more backward than 
our territories, with the Sudan, where politics tend to interfere with material 
progress, and with Egypt, which might be co-operative during one period, but might 
equally well be intensely unco-operative at other times. We have created an East 
African region which corresponds to the economic and geographical needs of the 
territories. To include Uganda or the whole of the East African territories in an 
entirely new region would only confuse the administrative and executive machinery. 
From the political point of view we regard the proposal with intense dislike. We 
have always been most careful to keep our African technical co-operation to Africa 
south of the Sahara. The interest of Egypt in the Sudan has I imagine already been 
sufficiently embarrassing to His Majesty's Government. Surely we do not want to 
encourage Egypt to take any interest in Uganda and the rest of East Africa other than 
her purely technical interest in the control of the waters of the Nile. We feel pretty 
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sure that the Belgian Government would view this proposal with considerable 
suspicion from their point of view, and, although this is really a point for the Foreign 
Office rather than ourselves, the sponsoring of the proposal would, in our view, be 
harmful to our policy of close co-ordination with Belgium in the African field. The 
proposal will also be regarded with the gravest suspicion by the East African 
Governments, and in sponsoring it we should, in our view, be laying ourselves up a 
fruitful source of trouble in the future and potential friction between the African 
population of Uganda and Egypt. Egypt would not interest herself in Uganda for the 
benefit of Uganda, and African nationalists would be quick to seize the opportunity of 
criticising our good faith. 
(1) states that the Foreign Secretary is anxious that agreement on the creation of a 
body of this kind should be reached as soon as possible. Two reasons are given for 
this, other than the need for the social and economic development of the territories 
which we do not believe this proposal would promote. The first of these additional 
reasons is the fostering of good relations with Egypt; the second, the creation of a 
favourable atmosphere in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Both are of 
course admirable objectives, but we cannot sacrifice the interests of colonial 
territories for these purposes. It seems to us important that the proposal should be 
most firmly resisted. 
The matter will we hope be discussed at the Africa Committee on Friday (a time 
has not yet been arranged). We do not, of course, want to seek any final decisions 
from Ministers pending that meeting, but if there is time the Secretary of State may 
like to see the papers meanwhile. He mentioned the proposal to me orally last week 
and was, I think, himself inclined to doubt whether such a proposal was practicable. 
A.B.C. 
4.7.49 
I entirely share Mr Cohen's feelings about this. The Nile Valley is not the right 
"region" for most of the purposes for which the Board seems to be intended. 
J.M.M 
4.7.49 
This is a characteristic piece of F.O. nonsense. I agree that it should be vigorously 
opposed. 
... I agree with Mr Cohen throughout. 
We must try to bring the F.O. down to earth .... 
A.H.P. 
5.7.49 
T.I.K.L. 
5.7.49 
L. 
6.7.49 
While the F.O. objectives are praiseworthy, I am sceptical as to the practicability of 
any such Council, and for the following reasons: 
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(a) Our experience in the Caribbean with the Advisory Commission for Social and 
Economic Development is far from encouraging. The jealousies, the differences, 
the conflicts of interest make co-ordination of efforts in many fields most difficult 
and disappointing. The T.V.A. Scheme is different and within the confines of a 
single nation. 
(b) There exists already machinery for exchange of ideas, for study of technical 
problems, for consultation and co-ordinated action on technical issues such as 
pests and diseases and other matters of common interest. There is agreement 
about a Technical Council as well. 
(c) The economic and social problems are the concern of the individual territor-
ies, and as yet the development of these territories is too sketchy and political 
responsibility by the people too limited to allow of much active co-operation in 
some kind of super-political council of an international character. Such a body 
(often unrealistic and irresponsible in its decisions) may prove a hindrance rather 
than help. If we have to wait for agreement by other members of the Council to 
some of our projects (e.g. the delay over the Owen Falls Scheme with Egypt) we 
may have to wait a long time and abandon many schemes. The Council would 
virtually determine the scope of the hydro-electric scheme, cotton production and 
other developments in our own territories. 
(d) I am not anxious to introduce Egypt too much into the affairs of Africa south 
of her own territory. Nor do I wish a dualism for Uganda as between the East 
African Commission on the one hand and the new Council on the other. 
I think the arguments of Mr. Cohen are weighty and must be considered against 
what arguments the Foreign Office may bring up. It would be worth while for them 
to state their case. 
A.C.J. 
6.7.49 
132 MAF 85/589 6 Oct 1949 
'Notes on the latest paper on the East African groundnuts scheme': 
memorandum by Dr E E Bailey (Ministry of Food) 
I have the following points of detail on this paper. 
1. I should like to see the documents justifying the statement that it was made the 
responsibility of the Principal Finance Officer to set up (by which I understand, to 
constitute) the Special Section. According to my recollection, without consulting 
documents, the Special Section was originally constituted at a meeting presided 
over by Sir Percivale Liesching1 and attended by Sir Herbert Broadley,2 Mr. Ryan3, 
Mr. Feavearyear4 and myself. I nominated the Finance representative but, unless 
the documents show otherwise, I cannot accept responsibility for the nomination 
of the other members. 
1 Permanent secretary, Ministry of Food, 1946-1948; permanent under-secretary of state, CRO, 1949. 
2 Second secretary, Ministry of Food, 1945-1948. 
:I J S Ryan, legal assistant, HM Procurator General and Treasury Solicitors LJepartment. 
4 A E Feavearyear, deputy secretary, Ministry of Food. 
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2. The Special Section's Report was never signed by any of the members. The 
reason, as I understood it, was that while all the members of the Special Section 
were prepared to assume joint responsibility for the Sections of the Report leading 
up to the Conclusions, they were not prepared to assume such responsibility for 
the Conclusions themselves, which were written by Mr. Hollins alone. In the 
result it was apparently agreed to send the Report forward unsigned. In this 
connection it is worth noting that the Director of Castings, who was not a member 
of the Special Section, insisted upon making his Report to me direct, and this 
Report is signed. 
3. As I remarked in my Memorandum of the 20th December 1946, the conclusions 
of the Director of Castings cannot safely be divorced from the assumptions on 
which they were based, including, as these assumptions did, the necessary 
assumption of the physical success of the Scheme. Nevertheless, this divorce 
makes its appearance once again in the present paper. 
4. I note a statement on the last page of the present paper that when Command 
7314 was published in early 1948 there was still no one in the Ministry of Food 
who had been out to East Africa to see the developments. In fact, the Internal 
Audit Team of the Ministry of Food had been in East Africa since August 1947 and 
was reporting back to the Director of Internal Audit. 
5. I feel that less than justice has been done not only to my Minute of 20th 
December 1946 but also to Sir Percivale Liesching's Minute of the same date. In 
particular, with regard to my Minute, I think it inadequate to report me as saying 
that, having drawn attention to the risks, I did not regard it as my duty to decide 
whether those risks should be incurred. What I actually said was that I found it no 
part of my duty to recommend the hazarding of public money however high the 
cause or stakes. I added that if it was to be decided that the risks should be run, 
that decision should, in my view, be taken at Ministerial or Cabinet level in the 
light of all the factors involved. I ended this passage in my Minute by saying that it 
was my duty to draw attention to the risks, leaving it to others to decide whether 
they should be incurred. In another place I described the Scheme as "full of 
hazards" and in two places stigmatised the Report as "begging the question", 
which was, of course, whether the full Scheme should be adopted or not, 
complicated as that question was by the fact that, pursuant to Ministerial decision, 
the Scheme had already been launched. I specifically said that I could not accept 
Conclusion 1 of the Report, that a critical examination of the Scheme led 
inevitably to the conclusion that it was a practicable plan for alleviating the world 
shortage of fats, adding that there was, unfortunately, no inevitability about any of 
the conclusions to be drawn from the Report. It is not enough, as the present 
paper does, to quote my refusal to accept Conclusion 2, that viewed strictly as a 
commercial proposition the Scheme involved no unjustifiable risks, a conclusion 
which I also described as unwarranted . 
With regard to Sir Percivale Liesching's Minute, I am sure that he would feel 
that insufficient attention has been paid to his express agreement with my views. If 
he put more weight than has perhaps been justified by the event upon the labour 
risk, he did so expressly without neglecting other points to which I had drawn 
attention and referred to "risks which cannot lightly be dismissed". 
So much for detailed points. From a more general standpoint the following points 
strike me. 
T 
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The paper is altogether too much of an apologia, if not of an appology. There is too 
much writing down of the Special Section and its work. I am, and always have been, 
aware that the dice were heavily loaded against the Special Section for one reason 
and another, including the reasons given in the present Report. That is not to say, 
however, that their work, with all its faults, can be dismissed out of hand. They were 
a body of people worthy of some respect and their labours were Herculean. While I, 
in effect, rejected their Report, I cannot associate myself with any wholesale 
depreciation of it or of the work which in many quarters of the Ministry was 
subsequently devoted to this subject. They and others were the objects of Ministerial 
pressure of the severest kind, a factor which should never be left out of account in 
any judgment founded only on the documentary record. And I cannot believe that 
any main actor in this long drawn out drama would accept for a moment the 
apologetic last paragraph of the present paper, which, if I may say so, is faintly 
reminiscent of the school room. 
If anyone is minded to draw lessons from our experience in this field, I feel that the 
following lessons cannot be ignored. 
In the first place, extreme Ministerial pressure on officials who are charged with 
forming objective judgments is a bad thing and may lead to disastrous results. 
In the second place, the Private Office channel of communication should be used 
with great discretion and should never be allowed to cut across the Civil Service 
channel or the Civil Service chain of reporting and responsibility. 
Finally, objective judgment by officials is difficult, if not impossible, in the face of 
conflicting Ministerial decision in the same field. 
It remains only for me to say that, so far as I personally am concerned and have 
need to do so, I shall rely upon the full history of these events, documentary and 
otherwise, rather than upon any selective version of them, however detached or 
well-meaning. 
133 CAB 129/37/2, CP(49)231 11 Nov 1949 
'The East African groundnuts scheme': Cabinet memorandum by Mr 
Strachey on its future [Extract] 
Ulhat are the alternative policies? 
13. The Corporation set out in paragraph 9 of their memorandum their 
considered view that there are only two alternative courses of action-either to adopt 
the plan which they have proposed or to abandon the whole scheme forthwith. But is 
no middle course possible? At first sight such a middle course appears to have much 
to commend it. Its adoption would avoid either of the drastic alternatives postulated 
by the Corporation-the termination of the scheme, with all that this would involve 
or a further large scale programme involving the borrowing of another £15-17 
million at a difficult juncture in our financial history. Would it not be better to clear 
in the next two years some "minimum" economic acreage in the Southern Province 
(say 30,000 to 50,000 acres) and then-unless both the general financial position in 
the United Kingdom and the prospect of the scheme itself were brighter than 
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now-for the Corporation to settle down for some time to operate their total 
holdings of say 300,000 acres in the most economic manner possible? This would 
give the Corporation an opportunity of testing and deciding what would be the most 
effective longer-term use of the cleared land and it would be in the light of their 
knowledge that, at a later date, the Government and the Corporation would be able 
to determine whether the time was ripe for further development work to be 
undertaken in the Southern Province. Such a view might commend [sic] a good deal 
of support at the present time, when we are being obliged to restrict capital 
investment. My officials have considered this possibility but have put forward what 
seem to me very cogent reasons for rejecting it. 
14. Firstly the Corporation have greatly improved the efficiency of their organisa-
tion in East Africa. They have already built up the ancillary services such as 
communications and workshops which will be needed for going on with compara-
tively large scale development work. They have available a "striking force" of 
experienced staff and equipment which is capable of carrying through a clearing 
effort-which though small in comparison with the original plan will yet employ all 
their existing resources. It would obviously be wasteful to under-employ this force in 
what would be no more than a relatively small scale clearing operation. Moreover, a 
decision to curtail development work would almost certainly result in breaking the 
force up. It would be the signal to the able men in East Africa to seek a new job 
elsewhere. They would feel that the scheme had seen its death sentence. And once 
the team of experienced men was dissipated it would be almost impossible to build it 
up again. 
15. And the resulting asset would have far less chance of successful and economic 
operation than a total area of 600,000 acres. It would burden the scheme with even 
greater overheads because the capital expenditure required per cleared acre would be 
even more disproportionate if spread over only 300,000 acres. Much the larger 
proportion of capital outlay in the Corporation's programme occurs during the next 
two years at the end of which the cleared acreage is expected to have reached 300,000 
acres, and, although this expenditure is geared to a programme of 600,000 acres, it is 
very probable indeed that a disproportionate amount, in addition to the sums already 
spent on preparation, would be involved in undertaking a smaller programme. 
16. Furthermore, a reduced programme would not give the scheme a satisfactory 
trial. It would of necessity limit development in the Southern Province. 160,000 
acres would be cleared in Kongwa and Urambo and therefore there would only be the 
balance to be cleared in the Southern Province which is the most promising area of 
the three. Any chance of the scheme proving its viability would be severely 
prejudiced, if not lost. 
W'hat would "closing down" mean? 
17. What would be involved in a decision to "close down" the scheme immediate-
ly? If this were done on financial grounds it would require the immediate 
cancellation of all contracts for the supply of equipment, the dismissal of all the staff 
in East Africa save those who would be required for the disposal of all equipment and 
the immediate cessation of all work there. It is most unlikely that more than a small 
proportion of the cleared land could be used by the Government of Tanganyika. The 
assets in East Africa would consist of a partly constructed port and nearly completed 
railway in the Southern Province (the purpose for which would have vanished), 
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several considerable settlements ranging from the new town of Kongwa (which is 
already the second largest town in Tanganyika) and various scattered housing 
developments throughout the territory. These towns and townships have each 
considerable public works in the way of water supply, drainage, electric light and the 
like-none of them, in the absence of the groundnut scheme itself, would serve any 
visible purpose; many hundreds of miles of new roads-some, no doubt, of these 
would be of some use to the community, but in the absence of the groundnut scheme 
they would also be, to a large extent, wrongly sited: some 100,000 acres of cleared 
area at Kongwa in the Central Province, in what is proving the least promising 
because the least well watered area of the three, 20,000 cleared acres at Urambo in 
the Western Province and some 2,000 cleared acres in the Southern Province. It is 
very doubtful whether these cleared acres on these sites would in themselves 
represent a workable proposition from the agricultural point of view. There can be no 
reason for questioning the Corporation's views that if the scheme is abandoned now 
there will be a loss of £30 million. And abandonment of the groundnut scheme will 
mean the end of the Overseas Food Corporation at a time when there is every sign 
that they are really taking a grip of the scheme. Mistakes have been made but the 
great majority of our difficulties result from the early years of the scheme before 
experience had been built up and when all were working to unattainable targets. The 
Corporation took over effective control of the scheme on 31st March, 1948, and I 
have been encouraged by the way in which they have overcome many of the problems 
which they inherited. 
Can His Majesty's Government agree to a closing down policy? 
18. Is this course of closing down the scheme a policy to which the Government 
can subscribe? We embarked on this job with due realisation of the risks which we 
had to run. In my paper recommending the adoption of the scheme (C.P.(47)10 
dated 4th January, 1947)1 I said: "My colleagues will see that this is a big enterprise; 
it has to be if it is to meet even a substantial part of our desperate need for fats. My 
colleagues would not believe me if I tried to pretend to them that such a scheme was 
free from risk. Of course, serious difficulties and delays, many of them unforeseeable, 
may arise in the course of a great undertaking of this sort." It was because the risks 
were so high that we selected a public corporation to tackle the enterprise. An 
enterprise of this nature involves considerable risks and I think it would be 
disastrous for the prospects and prestige of public enterprise if we were to abandon 
the East African Groundnuts Scheme because some of the risks in the opening years 
have gone against it. How many of the really large business concerns have been 
successful right from the outset? Surely commercial experience shows that many of 
the really great businesses have only been built up after years of extraordinary 
difficulty-years without dividends, years when capital was written down-but yet 
successful in the end. Our policy necessarily implies that only public enterprise will 
be available to take the really big risks involved in opening up new frontiers in our 
Colonial Empire. It is vital, therefore, that we should persevere with our efforts 
unless we are to discredit the very principle of public enterprise, at any rate in this 
field. 
19. And, above all, how could we, after having spent £30 million, abandon the 
1 See 116. 
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Scheme at this stage, before we have enough experience to judge whether it will 
prove a success or not? We have no grounds whatever for saying that it will fail, any 
more than we can "prove" its ultimate success . We cannot use the costs during the 
first two years as a sound basis on which to estimate the final operating costs of the 
Scheme. Until we have allowed development to go on long enough for more reliable 
estimates of costs to be made, how can we make any real estimate of the final 
outcome? Surely we should lay ourselves open to every sort of criticism if we were to 
give up now. Not only should we be abandoning a project which had not had a chance 
of proving itself, but we should be dealing a severe blow to enterprise throughout the 
Commonwealth. For the groundnuts scheme has come to be looked upon as a 
prototype for this kind of large scale development. 
The world needs more food 
20. The Chief Scientific Officer of the Ministry of Agriculture recently gave it as 
h is opinion that because the population of the world is increasing at the rate of 20 
million a year it will be necessary to double the world's food production in the next 
26 years . If we are to plan for a satisfactory food supply for the housewives of this 
country, and for the population of our Colonial territories, we must not try to ignore 
the effect which this increase in world population, coupled with a general acceptance 
of the fact that the pre-war standard of nutrition is unacceptable, will have on the 
world food situation. If we are to plan for plenty we must base our plan on increased 
production. This means that new frontiers must be opened up. The East African 
Groundnut Scheme is a pioneering effort to use modern equipment to bring 
marginal land into service for the production of food and if necessary other raw 
materials . The real need for the increased supply of food is no less urgent today than 
it was when the scheme was launched and to abandon it now would only make our 
eventual long term food problem more difficult. If we can make this project succeed 
we will have provided a prototype for similar developments elsewhere throughout the 
world. We will have developed and demonstrated a new clearing and production 
technique for tropical countries. 
The effects of abandonment on our colonial territories 
21. The Groundnut Scheme has become an important symbol in our Colonial 
Empire. It is a bold experiment to raise the economic productivity of the African 
territories by replacing the primitive hoe by modern mechanical agricultural 
machines. The output per head of the agricultural worker can be lifted substantially 
and so provides an economic base for the development of a higher standard of life . 
The work provides openings for skilled and semi-skilled labour. One of the more 
spectacular successes of the scheme has been the way in which it has been possible to 
recruit and train local labour for many skilled jobs. Men have trekked from all over 
Tanganyika Territory to secure jobs. The possibilities for the Africans are consider-
able. If we abandon all this and break up the Scheme, the Africans not only in 
Tanganyika but throughout the whole of East Africa will suffer a great disappoint-
ment and it will be another blow for British prestige. 
22 . The effect in the United States. Some Americans have watched the develop-
ment of this scheme with close interest. It represents firstly a convincing proof of our 
determination to develop sterling sources of food supply. Secondly it is a real 
demonstration of our belief in the development of our backward territories. We are 
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hoping to take full advantage of any opportunities which may arise for United States 
capital investment in the British Colonies. It would greatly discourage United States 
help in this field if we abandoned the one really large scale food production project 
which we have started since the end of the war. How could we expect United States 
investors to take the kind of risks which we admit to be too great? 
23. I feel that it is on these wider grounds of policy that our decision must be 
based. Our detailed estimates of probable income and expenditure are essential-but 
not the decisive-evidence. It is not possible to demonstrate that a 600,000 acre 
scheme will be able to cover its costs-but at the same time it is not possible to prove 
that it would lose money. The outcome depends on factors which we cannot estimate 
with any degree of precision. I would be the first to admit that for as far as we can see 
at the moment we cannot justify the scheme as a purely commercial venture in the 
precise sense that, allowing for the risks, it is likely to provide a rate of profit in the 
accepted business sense of that term. The original estimates of costs contained in the 
Wakefield/Rosa report were too far out for this. But I think that there is every 
justification for going ahead with the scheme on the sharply reduced basis now 
proposed when the wider aspects have been taken into account. 
24. In making this recommendation that the scheme should go forward on the 
lines proposed by the Corporation I would ask my colleagues to bear in mind the very 
great differences between these proposals and those which we had when we first 
considered the project. The present proposals are based on three years' practical 
work in the bush under tropical conditions in East Africa. They are put forward by 
men who have now had years of experience on the job. The plans are based on lessons 
which have been learnt and in the sure knowledge that the administrative base to 
support the enterprise has been safely established. The communications, the 
workshops, the spare parts and all the other administrative facil ities which did not 
exist in 194 7 have now been provided. Experienced men now have the tools with 
which to finish the job. And the Overseas Food Corporation, although it only took 
over responsibility eighteen months ago, has already shown itself capable of more 
sustained leadership and effective organisation in East Africa than the Managing 
Agency. 
25. I believe, however, that it is essential to strengthen the Board of the 
Corporation. For obvious reasons I do not want to go into details in this paper, but I 
will indicate orally to my colleagues the changes which I have in mind and which I 
have discussed with the Chancellor. I am confident that the result of these changes 
will be to secure a Board which will ensure not only that the approved programme is 
carried out with vigour but that the maximum economies in organisation are 
achieved. 
26. In particular the strengthened Board will have to pay special attention to the 
pressing problem of improving the accounting arrangements of the Corporation. It 
is, of course, very unsatisfactory that the Auditors should have had to qualify the 
1948-1949 accounts. Undoubtedly there were extenuating circumstances of con-
siderable significance: the bulk purchase of surplus stores, difficulties of accom-
modation, an acute shortage of experimental staff. But some part of the failure has 
been .due to an inadequate appreciation of the problem on the part of the Managing 
Agency and of the Corporation itself at the early stages. The Board is already taking 
emergency measures to deal with the back-log of accounts, and to strengthen its staff 
and overhaul its accounting organisation in East Africa. I have formally drawn their 
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attention to the urgent importance of doing everything possible to avoid a position in 
which the 1949-50 accounts are also subject to qualification by the Auditors. 
27. On the agricultural side I am making arrangements to broaden the advisory 
field on which the Corporation draws. This will ensure that all the technical matters, 
such as rotation and selection of crops, are fully explored in the light of experience 
elsewhere, and that the experimental work is such as to yield results which can be 
used as a reliable guide for future plans. In particular I am arranging for regular 
consultation between the Corporation's experts and the Colonial Secretary's agri-
cultural advisers whose experience will, I believe, contribute materially to the 
development of the Scheme on the right lines. 
Summary of the problem 
28. It may be helpful if, in conclusion, I endeavour to set out the essence of the 
problem as I see it. 
(i) By the end of this financial year, the Corporation will have cleared and planted 
112,000 acres and the clearing of a further 90,000 acres will be in train. The 
borrowings by the Corporation in the same period will have amounted to approx-
imately £32 million. The Corporation propose that they should be authorised to 
proceed with further development plans over the ensuing four year period designed 
to bring the total cleared area up to 600,000 acres . They estimate that such a 
programme would involve a total borrowing of the order of £47.6 million. 
(ii) The Corporation state that in their view the alternative to this programme is 
to close the scheme down, involving an estimated loss of £30 million. 
(iii) My Department has examined the Corporation's proposals and, broadly 
speaking, are satisfied with the physical and financial assumptions underlying the 
capital development programme. But they have re-assessed the Corporation's 
estimate of earnings in a typical post-development year in the light of what they 
consider to be more realistic assumptions of price and total crop. On this basis the 
surplus envisaged by the Corporation would become a deficit. 
(iv) They have also examined the possibility of a policy of limited liability-e.g. a 
four year development programme involving a total cleared area of 300,000 acres. 
But their conclusion is that although this would involve a modest saving of capital 
(say of the order of £5 million including the total cost of clearing the 300,000 acres 
cut from the target) the resultant net revenue would be more than halved owing to 
the impossibility of bringing down the operating overheads proportionately. In 
addition to this there would be a serious waste of the new railway and port 
installations built in the Southern Province. Under the Corporation's proposals these 
would handle the produce of 420,000 acres, whereas under a 300,000 acre scheme 
the acreage in that Province will be limited to 120,000 acres-i.e. there would be a 
reduction of 72 per cent in payable freight. 
(v) The conclusion is that-quite apart from the effect of a smaller scheme on the 
morale of the Corporation's staff in East Africa-a limited objective would involve an 
uneconomic use of resources and increase the financial difficulties of the scheme. 
Recommendation 
29. I therefore recommend that the Overseas Food Corporation should be 
authorised to proceed with their revised programme to clear 600,000 acres of bush in 
East Africa for agricultural production by November, 1953. 
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134 CAB 128/16, CM 66(49)3 14 Nov 1949 
'Production of groundnuts in East Africa': Cabinet conclusions 
The Cabinet considered memoranda by the Minister of Food (C.P (49) 231) 1 and the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies (C.P. (49) 232) on the future of the East Africa 
Ground-nuts Scheme. They also had before them a further memorandum by the 
Minister of Food (C.P. (49) 210) covering the report and accounts of the Overseas 
Food Corporation for the year 1948--49. 
The Minister of Food said that he would be expected to make a full statement on 
future policy in the debate in the House of Commons on 21st November on the first 
annual report of the Overseas Food Corporation. That report had revealed the wide 
discrepancy between the original estimates as set out in the White Paper of 1947 
(Cmd. 7030) and the actual expenditure incurred and results achieved to date. The 
original plan had provided for the clearance, by 1952-53, of 3,210,000 acres at a cost 
of nearly £24 million; in fact, by March last, only 46,000 acres had been cleared, but 
this had cost over £21 million. There would no doubt be strong criticism of past 
mistakes, but Parliament would be mainly concerned to discuss the future of the 
Scheme. The Overseas Food Corporation had now themselves submitted detailed 
proposals for its revision. Briefly, this plan provided for the clearance of 600,000 
acres by 1953-54 at an aggregate capital cost of £45 million; and a further £3 million 
would be required to cover possible losses on current operations during the 
development period. There were thus three possible courses of action: to abandon 
the Scheme altogether; to restrict its scope even more drastically than was proposed 
by the Overseas Food Corporation; or to adopt the plan put forward by the 
Corporation. For the reasons set out in C.P. (49) 231 he rejected the first two courses 
and recommended that the Overseas Food Corporation should be authorised to 
proceed with their revised programme. It should be recognised that this policy would 
involve a commitment for the expenditure of a further £16 million for capital 
development up to 1953-54; and that, in view of the impossibility of making any firm 
assumptions about either yields or prices so far ahead, no assurance could be given at 
this stage that the Scheme would be able to make a profit, even on current account, 
after the development period. He thought it would be essential at the same time to 
strengthen the Board of the Overseas Food Corporation, and he had already 
submitted to the Prime Minister detailed proposals for doing so. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that he was in full agreement with the 
recommendations made by the Minister of Food. The Scheme should not be judged 
from a purely commercial point of view: a substantial part of its capital outlay had 
been devoted to the provision of development and welfare services, which were 
normally the responsibility of the central Government or of the local authorities. The 
abandonment of the Scheme at this stage would be a major disaster for East Africa, 
and would involve the loss of valuable experience in the technique of economic 
development under tropical conditions. It seemed certain that the Government 
would be pressed in the debate to agree to arrangements involving closer Parliamen-
tary control over the operations of the Overseas Food Corporation; and it would no 
doubt be suggested that responsibility for the Scheme should be transferred to the 
1 See 133. 
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Colonial Development Corporation. The latter suggestion should not be accepted: 
the existing commitments of the Colonial Development Corporation were so heavy 
that it would not be able to undertake this additional responsibility. 
The Cabinet agreed generally that, for the reasons set out in C.P. (49) 231 and 232, 
there could be no question of abandoning the Ground-nuts Scheme. Some Ministers 
were, however, doubtful whether it would be advisable at this stage to take a firm 
decision to adopt in full the revised plan put forward by the Overseas Food 
Corporation. This involved a further heavy expenditure of public funds in the clear 
knowledge that the Scheme would never earn enough for payment of interest or 
amortisation of capital, and that it might have to be run at a substantial recurrent 
loss. Before a final decision was taken, ought not further information to be obtained 
about the suitability of the Southern Provinces, in which future development would 
largely take place? Was it expedient to accept the Corporation's proposals without 
fuller investigation into such matters as the rainfall prospects and the soil conditions 
in this area? For this purpose, the Corporation should call upon the best scientific 
advice available, not only in the Colonial Service, but in the United Kingdom; and an 
approach might perhaps also be made to the United States Government for technical 
and even financial help in accordance with the policy laid down in President 
Truman's Fourth Point. In reply it was pointed out that, as the result of actual 
experience, a programme of future development could now be framed with a much 
greater accuracy than had been possible in 1947. The technique of clearing the bush 
had been mastered; and the section of the Corporation's annual report dealing with 
scientific research had shown the extent to which investigation into the suitability of 
the Southern Provinces had already proceeded. Nevertheless, the Corporation 
recognised the need for proceeding cautiously in this area, and only 2,000 acres 
would be cleared there in 1950. There would be no substantial advantage in seeking 
to obtain further scientific or technical advice at this stage; and in any event the 
Colonial Schemes already submitted to the United States Government for assistance 
under the Fourth Point policy would already fully employ the available funds. 
Acceptance of the Corporation's proposals did not, of course, mean that further 
changes might not in due course have to be made in the Scheme; but, on present 
information, there appeared to be no case for instructing the Corporation to prepare 
an even more restricted scheme, since an area of about 600,000 acres seemed to be 
the minimum on which there was any prospect of operating a successful and 
economic scheme. 
Discussion turned next on the line which the Government spokesmen should take 
in the forthcoming Parliamentary debate. Criticism was likely to take two main 
forms: it would be argued that the Scheme had been initiated with undue haste and 
on too grandiose a scale; and it would be said that the Government had relied on 
unsuitable persons for the planning and administration of the Scheme. The answer 
to the first criticism was that the world food shortage had made it necessary to accept 
abnormal risks; but, in reply to the second, the Government should admit that grave 
mistakes had in fact been made. The main responsibility for this lay partly with those 
who had prepared the original estimates, and partly with the managing agents; but it 
would be neither accurate nor expedient to suggest that the Overseas Food 
Corporation or the Government itself were free from blame in this matter. In the 
debate, therefore, the Government spokesmen should admit that, whatever the wider 
value of the Scheme, its results had hitherto fallen far short of expectations; and they 
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should be ready clearly to apportion the responsibility for this situation. Both 
Parliament and the public were, however, primarily interested in the future of the 
Scheme, and it was essential that a full and detailed statement of the Government's 
intentions should be given to the House of Commons. No attempt should be made to 
disguise the speculative aspects of the revised programme proposed by the Corpora-
tion: on the other hand, it should be made clear that the Government were firmly 
convinced of the need for continuing the Scheme on the restricted basis now 
proposed. In this connection, it would be relevant to point out that its merits should 
not be judged solely by reference to its ultimate capacity to earn a profit: even in this 
country new agricultural production required Government subsidy-the production 
of sugar beet was still subsidised-and it was virtually inevitable that the production 
of ground-nuts should in its initial stages involve direct financial assistance, such as 
the writing-off of part or the whole of the capital invested. The Minister of Food 
should also be in a position to explain what action he was taking to improve the 
accounting arrangements of the Corporation. 
The Cabinet were also informed of the changes proposed in the Board of the 
Overseas Food Corporation. These would involve the replacement of two of the 
existing full-time members of the Board, and the addition of two experienced 
business men on a part-time basis. After discussion, there was general agreement on 
the need for strengthening the Board on the lines proposed; and it was agreeed that it 
would be preferable if an announcement on this point could be made in advance of 
the debate in the House of Commons. 
The Cabinet:-
(1) Approved the recommendation in C.P. (49) 231 that the Overseas Food 
Corporation should be authorised to proceed with their revised plans to clear 
600,000 acres of bush in East Africa for agricultural production by November 
1953. 
(2) Took note that the Prime Minister would settle with the Minister of Food the 
detailed changes to be made in the membership of the Board of the Overseas Food 
Corporation. 
(3) Agreed that the Minister of Food and the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
should speak for the Government in the debate in the House of Commons on 21st 
November. 
135 T 229/712 12 Jan 1950 
[African transport] : 'Survey on east and central railway link': minute 
by P Nicholls (Treasury) 1 
Phase I of the Survey has been completed by Sir Alexander Gibb2 and Overseas 
Consultants, who have made proposals to proceed with Phase 11. 
The Colonial Office ask for agreement to their own proposals for proceeding to 
Phase 11, which involve doing a proportion of the engineering work and aerial 
photography themselves or through the East African authorities, and making an 
E.C.A. project out of the remainder. This remainder would consist of an economic 
1 Principal officer. 2 A consultant civil engineer. 
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survey of the whole of the area traversed by the routes and the engineering survey of 
the south-western part of the route, from the northernmost point of the existing 
railway in N. Rhodesia to Utengula in the middle of S. Tanganyika, where the routes 
under discussion divide, route 1 to go N.E. to join the Kenya/Tanganyika/Uganda 
system at Korogwe, and route 2 to go East to join the line joining the port of Mtwara 
(formerly Mikandini) [sic] to Nachingwa [sic], the centre of the Southern nuts area. 
Apart from the consultants' report on Phase I, there is a mass of comment on it by 
various East African authorities, who are meeting about now to consider their 
attitude further. The general view seems to be that the consultants' proposals for 
Phase 11 are very expensive anyway, and that part of them (as the Colonial Office 
accept) have been or can be covered by local effort; it is also thought that the 
estimate of thirty to forty million pounds is excessive for the cost of constructing the 
1,200 miles of route 1 to join the two railway systems. 
The consultants' report contains some broad pictures of the economic potentiali-
ties of the areas traversed, and emphasises the obvious point that expenditure on 
constructing the railway must be accompanied by expenditure on development of the 
areas which it serves. Whether it is an economic proposition can only be answered by 
Phase 11, but at least one East African view is that it would be forty years before the 
line could pay its way. The same view agrees that it is probable that the line will be 
built anyway at some stage in the future, and it is this 'inevitability' which seems just 
as sensible an approach to the final decision as any amount of surveying and 
estimating of economic possibilities. Unless the line is going through a desert, the 
chances are that its presence will enforce development. Meanwhile it is possible to 
argue endlessly on the interconnection between this and any other transport 
developments which may occur in East and Central-and even to West-Africa; the 
only thing that is clear is that we have not got, and shall not have, the money to 
construct the railway and develop the area ourselves. 
This is really the main issue; if we are to get United States capital to develop the 
area, we must make use of E.C.A. help now to survey the possibilities; the 
consultants' proposals are needlessly extravagant, and the Colonial Office propose a 
compromise out of which they can put up a project to E.C.A. for help over a part of 
Phase 11. If a railway is inevitable sooner or later, then we might just as well get what 
help we can now for the survey, and thus stake a claim for help later in the main 
expenditure of construction. 
136 CAB 128/18, CM 83(50)4 7 Dec 1950 
'Production of groundnuts in East Africa': Cabinet conclusions 
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies and the Minister of Food (C.P. (50) 289) on the future of the East African 
groundnut scheme. 
The Minister of Food said that the Overseas Food Corporation had now made a 
careful review of the long-term future of this scheme, and their report was 
reproduced in Annex I of C.P. (50) 289. The Corporation had reached the conclusion 
that the large-scale production of groundnuts could not be carried on in East Africa 
on a commercial basis, and that there was no hope of obtaining any significant 
supply of oil-seeds from this scheme. There was no escape from the conclusion that 
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the project, as originally envisaged by the Government, had proved a costly failure. 
That being so, he had at first been disposed to recommend that the whole project 
should be abandoned. But a large investment had been made in the scheme, valuable 
capital assets had been created in East Africa, and useful practical experience in 
tropical agriculture had been gained. These assets could not be lightly cast aside; and 
he had therefore discussed with the Secretary of State for the Colonies means of 
turning them to good account. As a result they now submitted the plan, outlined in 
the memorandum, for carrying through a limited experiment in agricultural 
development over a period of seven years. 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that he was satisfied that, for the 
reasons given in paragraphs 21-24 of C.P. (50) 289, the wiser course was to use the 
agricultural assets of the scheme for the purpose of making a contribution to the 
further development of Tanganyika and providing experience in tropical agriculture 
which would be of value to the whole Colonial Empire. He was seriously alarmed at 
the indications that world population was expanding faster than world food 
production; and he believed that the United Kingdom, as a great Colonial Power, had 
a special obligation to promote the expansion of food production. From this point of 
view he thought it would be disastrous if the scheme were entirely abandoned. He 
recognised, however, that on this conception the responsibility for the scheme must 
be transferred from the Ministry of Food to his Department. He had considered 
whether it should be taken over by the Colonial Development Corporation; but he 
had decided against that course-partly because he thought it unreasonable to 
expect that the new scheme should pay its way, and partly because the Colonial 
Development Corporation had enough to do with the fifty projects for which it was 
already responsible. He therefore proposed that the new scheme should continue to 
be administered by the Overseas Food Corporation, strengthened by the addition to 
its board of representatives of the Government of Tanganyika and the Colonial 
Development Corporation; but that the net cost of the scheme should be carried on 
the Colonial Office Vote. It the Cabinet should be disposed to favour the abandon-
ment of the scheme, he asked that the Governor of Tanganyika should be given an 
opportunity to express his views before a final decision was taken. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the original scheme had clearly failed, 
and the Government must expect political criticism on that account. The volume of 
that criticism would not be substantially lessened by an announcement that the 
Government intended to go forward with a limited scheme on the lines recom-
mended in C.P. (50) 289; and he therefore hoped that the Cabinet would consider 
that scheme on its merits. From his point of view it had the great disadvantage that it 
contained no assurance that substantial further losses would not be incurred. 
Indeed, the proposal that the new scheme should not be entrusted to the Colonial 
Development Corporation was due largely to the fact that it was not expected to pay 
its way. There was nothing in the memorandum to indicate the scale of the further 
financial risks involved. Yet, in spite of this financial uncertainty, the Cabinet were 
asked to give a guarantee that this limited scheme would be continued for at least 
seven years. Apart from the financial liability, there was also the question whether it 
was right to devote to East Africa all the technical resources which this scheme 
involved. Resources of the same kind were urgently required for agricultural 
development in South-East Asia, under the Colombo Plan; and it was for considera-
tion whether some of those resources should not be diverted to South-East Asia. 
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In further discussion the following points were made:-
(a) There was general agreement that a final judgment on the possibilities of food 
production in East Africa could only be based on the results of practical experience of 
cultivation over a substantial period. The proposal for a seven-year period for the 
experiment was probably justified. As conditions varied in different parts of 
Tanganyika, it was also desirable that cultivation should be continued on an 
experimental basis in several different parts of the territory. On the other hand, it did 
not follow that the experiment need be on so large a scale as was proposed in C.P. 
(50) 289. It was the large scale of the proposed operations that made the financial 
risks so large. 
(b) In determining the scale of the continuing experiment, the Overseas Food 
Corporation had been concerned only with economic considerations. Another 
possible method of approach was to assess the amount of social capital which had 
been created under the original scheme in the form of harbours, railways, hospitals, 
&c., which would have an independent value for the social development of the 
territory; and to consider what amount of agricultural development would be 
required in order to warrant the maintenance of that social equipment. 
(c) It was also proposed in C.P. (50) 289 that responsibility for the Queensland 
scheme should now be transferred to the Queensland Government. This scheme had 
been more successful than the groundnut scheme; and some Ministers were on that 
account reluctant to agree that it should at this stage be handed over to the 
Queensland Government. They recognised that it would be inappropriate for the 
Colonial Office to retain responsibility for the administration of a project located in 
Australia; but they thought it preferable that the United Kingdom Government 
should retain some interest in the scheme, possibly through the Commonwealth 
Relations Office. The Cabinet were informed that the Prime Minister of Queensland 
would shortly be visiting this country; and it was agreed that there would be 
advantages in holding preliminary discussions with him, while he was in London, 
about the future of the Queensland scheme. 
The Cabinet:-
(1) Invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer to discuss with the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies and the Minister of Food the financial implications of the 
proposals in C.P. (50) 289 regarding the future of the East African groundnut 
scheme; and agreed that the Chairman of the Overseas Food Corporation and the 
Governor of Tanganyika should be brought into these consultations. 
(2) Invited the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Minister of 
Food to hold preliminary discussions with the Prime Minister of Queensland 
regarding the future administration of the Queensland scheme. 
(3) Agreed to resume their consideration of the proposals in C.P. (50) 289 in the 
light of the discussions to be conducted under Conclusions (1) and (2) above. 
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137 CAB 128/19, CM 1(51)7 2 Jan 1951 
'Production of groundnuts in East Africa': Cabinet conclusions1 
The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the Chancellor of the Exchequer (C.P. 
(50) 324) and by the Minister of Food (C.P. (50) 326) on the future of the East African 
Groundnut scheme. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that, in the light of the Cabinet's discussion 
on 7th December, 1 the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Minister of Food and 
he had considered the financial aspects of this problem, in consultation with the 
Governor of Tanganyika and the Chairman of the Overseas Food Corporation. They 
had decided to recommend that farming should continue, as planned, on the land 
already felled in Kongwa and Urambo and that 60,000 acres should be developed in 
the Southern Province. The main arguments in favour of the development of a 
further 60,000 acres were that this would cost little more than the complete 
abandonment of the scheme and that the development could be expanded to 105,000 
acres after two or three years if it were found that the scheme was likely to be a 
financial success. If the Cabinet approved the proposals in his memorandum he 
would send to the Minister of Food certain amendments to the draft White Paper 
appended to C.P. (50) 326, which would have the effect of setting out the facts and 
financial implications more clearly. 
There was general agreement that the balance of advantage lay in continuing the 
scheme on the lines proposed in C.P. (50) 324. Complete abandonment would have 
serious consequences in Tanganyika and would harm the prestige of this country in 
all the African Colonies. 
The Cabinet:-
(1) Approved the proposals for proceeding with the 60,000 acres scheme, on the 
lines and subject to the conditions proposed in C.P. (50) 324. 
(2) Agreed that the Minister of Food should present a White Paper in the terms of 
the draft annexed to C.P. (50) 326, subject to amendments to be notified to him by 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
(3) Agreed that the Minister of Food should assume direct responsibility for the 
activities of the Queensland-British Food Corporation. 
(4) Agreed that the Minister of Food should arrange for the drafting of the 
necessary legislation to amend the Overseas Resources Development Act. 
1 Previous reference: see 136. 
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CHAPTER4 
International Relations Policy 
Document numbers 138-194 
138 FO 371150912, no 5471 Aug 1945 
'Stocktaking after VE-Day': memorandum by Sir 0 Sargent 
(11 July, revised) 
[This document has been printed in DBPO, series I, vol I, no 102.) 
The end of the war in Europe leaves us facing three main problems, none of which 
has any resemblance to the problems with which we were faced at the end of the last 
war. They are (a) the military occupation by Soviet troops of a large part of Eastern 
Europe, and the Soviet Government's future policy generally; (b) the economic 
rehabilitation of Europe so as to prevent a general economic collapse; and (c) the 
task of administering Germany and deciding on her future institutions in agreement 
with the Soviet, United States and French Governments. 
2. Our own position, too, in dealing with these problems is very different from 
what it was at the end of the last war, when we and France shared and disputed, and 
eventually lost, control of Europe. This time the control is to a large degree in the 
hands of the Soviet Union and the United States, and neither of them is likely to 
consider British interests overmuch if they interfere with their own and unless we 
assert ourselves. 
3. Thus it suits us that the principle of co-operation between the three Great 
Powers should be specifically accepted as the basis on which problems arising out of 
the war should be handled and decided. Such a co-operative system will, it is hoped, 
give us a position in the world which we might otherwise find it increasingly difficult 
to assert and maintain were the other two Great Powers to act independently. It is 
not that either the United States or the Soviet Union do not wish to collaborate with 
Great Britain. The United States certainly find it very convenient to do so in order to 
fortify their own position in Europe and elsewhere; and the Soviet Union recognise in 
Great Britain a European Power with whom they will certainly have to reckon. But 
the fact remains that in the minds of our big partners, especially in that of the United 
States, there is a feeling that Great Britain is now a secondary Power and can be 
treated as such, and that in the long run all will be well if they-the United States 
and the Soviet Union-as the two supreme World Powers of the future, understand 
one another. It is this misconception which it must be our policy to combat. 
4. We have many cards in our hands if we choose to use them-our political 
maturity; our diplomatic experience; the confidence which the solidarity of our 
democratic institutions inspires in Western Europe; and our incomparable war 
record. Unlike our two great partners we are not regarded in Western Europe either 
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as gangsters or as go-getters. But we must do something about organising our side 
or we shall find our friends gradually drifting away from us. Time is not necessarily 
on our side. For this reason and because we are numerically the weakest and 
geographically the smallest of the three Great Powers, it is essential that we should 
increase our strength in not only the diplomatic but also the economic and military 
spheres. This clearly can best be done by enrolling France and the lesser Western 
European Powers, and, of course, also the Dominions, as collaborators with us in 
this tripartite system. Only so shall we be able, in the long run, to compel our two big 
partners to treat us as an equal. Even so, our collaboration with the Soviet Union, 
and even with the United States, is not going to be easy in view of the wide 
divergence between our respective outlooks, traditions and methods. 
5. To take the Soviet Union first. It is particularly dangerous to assume that the 
foreign policies of totalitarian governments are opportunist and fluctuating, like 
those of liberal governments (using the term "liberal" not of course in its narrow 
meaning connecting it with a British political party, but in its widest sense as 
representing a system of government which stands for freedom of speech, writing, 
and association, and for the rule of law, and as such opposed to totalitarianism, 
whether to the Right or to the Left). All totalitarian governments-and Russia is 
certainly no exception-are able to conduct a consistent and persistent foreign policy 
over long periods because the government is not dependent on public opinion and 
changes of government. And precisely because totalitarian governments need not 
explain or justify their policy to their own people it is much more difficult for the 
foreigner to analyse the government principles which underlie it. It is true that in 
the case of Nazi Germany Hitler kindly explained in Mein Kampfboth his objectives 
and methods. We were thus duly warned, but did not heed the warning. Again, 
Mussolini, by crudely imitating Hitler, revealed to us the secrets of his long-term 
policy. But in the case of the Soviet Union Stalin is not likely to be as obliging. We 
shall have to try and find out for ourselves what is his plan of campaign and to 
anticipate the tactics which he intends to employ from time to time to carry it 
through. And this is not going to be easy, nor shall we always be able, even among 
ourselves in this country, to agree on the conclusions which ought to be drawn from 
known facts. 
6. Without attempting on this occasion to analyse Russia's foreign policy and 
foretell its future course, it is worth calling attention to one factor in the policy of 
modern totalitarian governments which seems to be fairly constant, namely, their 
desire to obtain for their regime the maximum degree of security both at home and 
abroad. As a result of the defeat of 1918 the Nazis feared encirclement by the rest of 
Europe and sought security by means of territorial conquest. Hence their demand for 
Lebensraum. Mussolini resented the encirclement of the Mediterranean by France 
and Great Britain and tried to break out into Africa. Soviet Russia now fears a world 
coalition of the liberal Powers ("liberal" again being used in its widest sense), and the 
revival of Germany as a "liberal" Power; for Stalin knows even better than we do that 
it was the material strength and wealth of the liberal Powers, combined with the 
belief in their own philosophy of life, which really won the war, and he probably is 
more convinced that we and the Americans are as to the capacity of Germany to 
recover first her economic, then her political, and lastly her military power in 
Europe. Stalin, however, does not necessarily intend to obtain his security by 
territorial conquest, as Hitler wanted to. He may well prefer to obtain it by creating 
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what might be termed an ideological Lebensraum in those countries which he 
considers strategically important. If he eventually is convinced that the danger of a 
liberal coalition is not going to materialise he may relax somewhat his search for 
security, or rather change its nature so as to apply only to Germany. It must be 
remembered, too, that, unlike Hitler, he fortunately has not the motive of revenge to 
spur him on. 
7. At the present moment the Soviet Union has been so weakened by the war that 
Stalin is hardly in a position to force through ruthlessly his policy of ideological 
penetration against definite opposition. For instance, in the case of Greece, Venezia 
Giulia, and to a certain extent Poland, he has not pressed matters to extreme and has 
actually compromised, though it may well be that he has only made a temporary 
retreat. It can surely be assumed that he does not want and could not afford another 
war in Europe, and it is also doubtful whether he aims at further territorial 
expansion. At Annex 11 will be found a memorandum by Sir R. Bruce Lockhart on 
Soviet policy and the best means of reacting to it. 
8. The economic strength of the United States has certainly impressed Stalin no 
less than the potentiality of the Western Air Forces. He has seen what has happened 
to Germany from the air and what is happening to Japan. No doubt Stalin feels that 
now before his troops have been withdrawn from the countries which they are now 
occupying and before their demobilisation has begun he must seize the opportunity 
to reap the fruits of victory to the full , since if he delays or hesitates there may be 
some which later on he will no longer be able to grasp. As for ourselves, though 
economically we shall grow stronger as t imes goes on, militarily our strength in 
Europe will soon decline from its present peak-even quicker than the Russian 
strength. For this reason we must take a stand in the immediate future if we are to 
prevent the situation crystallising to our permanent detriment. This means in 
practice that we must maintain our interest in Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Austria, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, even though we may have to acquiesce in Russian 
domination in Roumania and Hungary. 
9. If there is to be a trial of strength between us-that is to say a diplomatic trial 
of strength-now is the time for us to take the offensive by challenging Russia in 
these six countries, instead of waiting until the Soviet Government threatens us 
further west and south in Germany, in Italy, in Greece, and in Turkey. This is what 
inevitably will happen if we let Stalin pocket for good these six countries which at 
present he controls by a combination of pol itical force and military pressure. Further 
reasons for this policy on our part and the tactics to be employed in applying it are 
examined in Annex 11. 
10. It must be an essential feature of our European policy to maintain close and 
friendly relations with Italy, Greece and Turkey, so as to secure our strategic position 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially now that Russia, stretching down from the 
North, is once again exerting pressure on this all-important link between Great 
Britain on the one hand, and India, Malaya, Australia, New Zealand, and our Persian 
and Iraq oil supplies on the other. It ought to be possible for us to maintain our 
position in these three countries by building them up as bastions of "liberalism" even 
though this may involve us in responsibilities and commitments of which we 
otherwise would be only too glad to be rid. It will be all the more important to do so if 
1 Annexes 1-111 not printed. 
u 
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Russia remains in political control of Bulgaria and acquires physical control of the 
Straits. 
11. We must, of course, also be prepared for the Soviet Government to use every 
opportunity and make every effort to mould the future political institutions of 
Germany in order to obtain a dominating position in that country. This may well lead 
to a struggle for mastery in which it is to be hoped we shall have the full support of 
the United States. Even so, the struggle, if it is engaged, will be a hard one and the 
result may well be decisive for the whole of Europe. For it is not over-stating the 
position to say that if Europe is won over to totalitarianism this may well decide the 
fate of "liberalism" throughout the world. 
12. In every country of Europe the Soviet Government will have the great 
advantage of being able to exploit for their own ends the economic crisis which in the 
coming months may well develop into a catastrophe capable of engulfing political 
institutions in many European countries and paralysing all orderly government in a 
large part of the Continent. It is the existence of this economic crisis which makes it 
so important to obtain the wholehearted co-operation of the United States, who 
alone have the material means of coping with it. 
13. It should not prove impossible for us to perform the double task of holding 
the Soviet Government in check in Europe and, at the same time, amicably and 
fruitfully co-operating with the Soviet and United States Governments in the 
resettlement of Europe if once the United States Administration realise both the 
political and economic implications of the European situation. But the process of 
inducing the United States to support a British resistance to Russian penetration in 
Europe will be a tricky one, and we must contrive to demonstrate to the American 
public that our challenge is based on upholding the liberal idea in Europe and not 
upon selfish apprehensions as to our own position as a Great Power. Mr. Lippmann2 
is by no means alone in fearing that British antagonisms with Russia that filled the 
second half of last century will survive into the coming post-war period and embroil 
the much less interested United States. We shall therefore be well advised 
consciously and consistently to enlist American support upon some principle, and 
perhaps even to exercise some restraint in not pursuing cases where a principle 
cannot easily be shown. In particular, the diplomatic interventions in the internal 
affairs of other countries, which may be necessary in certain contingencies, must not 
seem to be motivated by personal hostility to, or support of, individuals in the State 
in question unless these are pretty obviously the opponents or champions of the 
"liberal" idea. Such common material interests as oil development in Persia would 
not be an issue in which we could count on American support very far. This is not to 
say that United States policy is always based on principle, far from it; but it is a fact 
that a British policy is suspect if it is based on anything else, and particularly so at 
the moment in regard to Russia. 
14. The foreign policy of the United States, indeed, like that of the Soviet Union, 
is difficult to forecast, but not because, as in Russia, it is secret, but because the 
"liberalism" of the United States constitution makes it fluctuating, uncertain, and 
emotional. But if we accept the view that after this war the United States 
Government is going to be very much in the same position as Great Britain was after 
the last war, it may be easier to guess the general tendency of American policy in 
2 Waiter Lippmann, American writer and journalist. 
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Europe. Just as we considered France troublesome, quarrelsome and reactionary 
after the last war, so the United States will co~sider us to be so now. If they tend to 
act as conciliators between us and Russia (and Germany), if they try to free 
themselves from what they consider to be British tutelage in European affairs, they 
will be following the same line as we took after the last war, when we tried to 
reconcile France and Germany at the expense of France's policy of weakening 
Germany in every way possible. This policy of ours gradually broke the spirit of 
France, and final disillusionment came with the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 
1936. We must take care that United States policy does not have the same effect upon 
us now. France felt that she could not rely upon Great Britain and at the same time 
could not stand up to Germany without us. We must not allow ourselves to get into 
the same defeatist mood in dealing with post-war Europe. We must have a policy of 
our own and try to persuade the United States to make it their own. This ought not to 
be too difficult. It is true that the United States may falter from time to time when 
called upon to pull their weight in Europe, and may prefer the more agreeable and 
less arduous role of mediator in any disputes between Great Britain and Russia, even 
threatening that only on such terms will they be prepared to make their indispens-
able contribution in the economic sphere. But however suspicious the Americans 
may be of having their European policy dictated to them by Great Britain, the fact 
remains that their fundamental outlook and reactions to European problems are the 
same as ours, even though American sectional interests may sometimes tend to 
confuse the issue. When, however, the United States do refuse to support us and 
insist upon mediating instead, we must be prepared to stand by our own policy. To do 
so effectively we shall need as much European support as possible, and that means 
collaboration with France and the smaller European countries of Western Europe. 
We must face the fact that the United States will feel that being the richest and 
strongest Power they must also be the wisest and the most fair-minded, and will 
therefore resent any contradiction by us. In particular, they may suspect our political 
motives to be reactionary when we, rather than they, intervene in the countries 
which the Soviet Government is intent on controlling. They will, however, be more 
ready to co-operate in solving the economic problems of Europe, and once their 
interest and prestige are engaged in these questions it is to be hoped that they will 
find it difficult to disinterest themselves in the political development of the countries 
whom they are saving materially. An estimate of the outlook of the men who will be 
responsible for United States policy in the immediate future will be found in Annex 
Ill. Incidentally, it must be remembered that the French were exasperated after the 
last war by the vagueness and sentimentality of British policy in Europe and did not 
hide their resentment nor curb their irritation. Learning by this example we ought in 
our dealings with the Americans to be ready patiently to pay lip service whenever 
possible to what we may consider American "woolliness" and idealism, while of 
course at the same time clinging fast to the real essentials. 
15. In considering how best to co-operate with the United States in world affairs 
we must also take into account the whole series of economic and financial questions 
which remain to be settled between us and the United States Government, such as 
the financial accommodation we require after the end of the Japanese war, our 
financial and commercial policy in the context of Article 7 of the Mutual Aid 
Agreement, and the problem of the consideration to be given to the United States in 
respect of the Lease-Lend [sic] deliveries and services we have received. The spirit in 
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which these questions are handled is bound to be reflected in the realm of 
Anglo-American co-operation throughout the world. Moreover, with the end of the 
war with Germany they have become urgent and their settlement cannot be further 
delayed without great danger to Anglo-American relations generally. 
16. At present our European problems, in so far as they are political, are 
concerned with the Soviet Government rather than with Germany. But Germany will 
shortly have it in her power to play an important and dangerous part. She will have a 
still greater incentive than in 1918 to seek revenge, and it would be wise not to 
under-estimate her innate capacity for recuperation and reconstruction. Against this 
there is this time nothing left of her administration and institutions, and she will 
have to evolve a new political and economic system without being able, as after 1918, 
to use the Army with its traditions, and big business with its machinery, as the 
nucleus around which to build. Thus the process of reconstruction will be slower, 
but it is likely, for the same reason, to be more carefully thought out and planned. 
After the last war Germany was hamstrung until 1933 by having a liberal form of 
government alien to her temperament. This is not likely to happen this time, unless 
we make very great efforts to support the cause of "liberalism" in Germany, for her 
natural tendency will be to strive to return to some form of authoritarianism. If we 
hesitate or allow our German policy to be at the mercy of the emotions and 
ignorance of the people of the United States we shall be outmanreuvred, for it will 
give Germany the opportunity not only to decide and plan her own future because of 
the lack of an agreed policy between the Allies, but also to put herself up, when the 
time comes, to the highest bidder so as to play off each of the three Great Powers one 
against the other. Once such a competition begins the Soviet Government has the 
best chance of carrying off the prize, and, as already said, the winning of this prize 
may well decide the future of Europe and of "liberalism" throughout the world. It 
may be argued that Germany in her present state of chaos cannot afford the luxury of 
a "liberal" regime, and that only a dictatorship can handle the overwhelming 
problem of her reconstruction. We may be inclined to overstate the magnitude of 
Germany's problem, but if a temporary dictatorship is necessary then that dicta-
torship must not be exercised by Germans but must be a dictatorship resulting from 
Allied occupation. Here, indeed, is a reason why a long occupation will probably be 
necessary, first, in order to restore economic order, and secondly, to give time for 
liberalism to take root in the new Germany. 
17. The problems we have considered have been primarily those of post -war 
Europe. It is too early to make a similar analysis of the corresponding problems 
which will face us in the Far East. So long as the war there still continues it is 
impossible to foresee what will be the relative positions of both victors and 
vanquished when victory has been achieved. It is, however, fairly safe to suppose that 
British interests will agaiQ be best served by a policy of co-operation between the 
three Great Powers, for in isolation we should be in a weaker position even than in 
Europe. For the same reason we shall probably find it useful to organise under our 
leadership the lesser colonial Powers who have a stake in the Far East; in other 
words, France, the Netherlands and Australia. But unless we take a more active 
interest in the Far East and bestir ourselves to re-establish our influence there, there 
will be little question of such co-operation. We and the lesser colonial Powers will be 
ignored by both Russia and the United States in Far Eastern matters, and the smaller 
Powers will gravitate to the United States. We are perhaps in danger of regarding 
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ourselves as a European Power and tend to overlook the fact that we are still the 
centre of an Empire. If we cease to regard ourselves as a World Power we shall 
gradually cease to be one. In spite of our participation in the Far Eastern war and 
occasional statements about our interest in the Far East and in China in particular, 
we tend to be apathetic on the subject and to under-estimate the importance of the 
Far East in our future policy. 
18. For the rest the United States are more likely to be more aggressive and 
pertinacious in the Far East than they will be in Europe, while the Soviet 
Government may well be less security-haunted than it is in Europe. If so, its Asiatic 
policy may be less coldly realistic and more opportunist. But all will in the last resort 
depend on the state in which Japan and China are left by the war, and what part they 
will be able to play in Far Eastern politics after it is over. It seems almost inevitable 
that the United States and the Soviet Union will eventually struggle for the body and 
soul of China unless the latter can acquire in time such a degree of national unity as 
is necessary to enable her to develop her latent resources in man-power and 
economic resources in defence of her national independence. If such a struggle 
develops it seems almost inevitable that Japan would sooner or later be called in to 
help by one of the protagonists. 
19. To sum up:-
(a) We must base our foreign policy on the principle of co-operation between the 
three World Powers. In order to strengthen our position in this combination we 
ought to enrol France and the lesser Western European Powers and also the 
Dominions, as collaborators with us in this tripartite system. 
(b) We must not be afraid of having a policy independent of our two great partners 
and not submit to a line of action dictated to us by either Russia or the United 
States, just because of their superior power or because it is the line of least 
resistance, or because we despair of being able to maintain ourselves without 
United States support in Europe. 
(c) Our policy, in order not to be at the mercy of internal politics or popular 
fashion, must be in keeping with British fundamental traditions and must be based 
on principles which will appeal to the United States, to the Dominions, and to the 
smaller countries of Europe, especially in the West. It must be definitely 
anti-totalitarian, and for this purpose be opposed to totalitarianism of the Right 
(Fascism, &c.), as much as to the totalitarianism of the Left (Communism, &c.). 
In pursuance of this policy of "liberalism" we shall have to take risks, and even live 
beyond our political means at times. We must not, for instance, hesitate to 
intervene diplomatically in the internal affairs of other countries if they are in 
danger of losing their liberal institutions or their political independence. In the 
immediate future we must take the offensive in challenging Communist penetra-
tion in as many of the Eastern countries of Europe as possible, and we must be 
ready to counteract every attempt by the Soviet Government to communise or 
obtain political control over Germany, Italy, Greece, or Turkey. 
(d) We must exert every effort to grapple with the economic crisis in Europe-not 
only in our own interests (a prosperous Europe is Great Britain's best export 
market) but in order to use the material resources at our and America's disposal as 
a makeweight throughout Europe against Communist propaganda, which the 
Soviet Government will use for their own ends wherever possible. 
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(e) In the Far East, while collaborating with the United States and the Soviet 
Union, we ought to try to organise under our leadership the lesser colonial Powers 
who have a stake in that part of the world, i.e., France, the Netherlands, and 
Australia. 
139 FO 371/44557, no 2560 9 Aug 1945 
[Anglo-American relations and the position of Britain] : despatch from 
Lord Halifax (Washington) to Mr Bevin (FO). Minute by Sir 0 Sargent 
[This document has been printed in DBPO, series I, vol Ill, no 3.] 
During recent months the concept has steadily gained ground in this country that 
Great Britain has come to occupy a position on the world stage which in terms of 
power and influence is inferior to that of the United States and the U.S.S.R. The 
degree to which this concept has now implanted itself in the American mind was 
revealed in a recent five-nation Gallup poll conducted in the United States, Canada, 
France, Denmark and Australia, on the question of which country would have most 
influence in the post -war world. Only 5 per cent. of the Americans questioned during 
this survey recorded their vote for Great Britain, as compared with respective 
percentages in favour of the United States and the Soviet Union of 63 per cent. and 24 
per cent. The United States easily headed the survey in the other four countries, 
although in France the margin was 43 per cent. in favour of the United States as 
compared with 41 per cent. for the U.S.S.R. In Canada 19 per cent. voted for Britain 
and in France no more than 4 per cent. 
2. In order that this idea of Britain's inferiority to her two associates in the Big 
Three partnership may be assessed in its true perspective, I propose in the present 
despatch to describe the various factors which have caused it to become prevalent 
amongst the American public, and to examine what effect it is likely to exercise on 
Anglo-American relations. 
3. It is, in the first place, evident to every thinking American that the 
contribution of his country on this occasion to the defeat of Germany is out of all 
proportion to that rendered during the first world war. Whereas in 1917-18 America 
was in process of transforming herself into the main arsenal of democracy and 
became, from the date of Russia's collapse, the principal source of Allied man-power 
reserves, she has emerged from the present European struggle as the one Great 
Power in the world whose population aqd metropolitan territories have suffered 
noth ing from enemy action. Of the leading Western Allies in the forme r 
Armageddon, liberated France is still no more than a shadow of her former self: a 
poor relation admitted on sufferance to the family of the Great Powers. Italy, thanks 
to her apostasy under Fascist rule, has but lately ceased to be a battle-ground and is a 
suppliant for the good graces of the conquerors. Great Britain alone, who won 
imperishable renown for herself in a year of single-handed resistance to Nazi 
aggression, has ridden out the storm to a triumphant finish . But in the course of a 
bitter struggle for existence she has been severely strained and her resources have 
been greatly depleted. For this and other reasons presently to be enumerated, her 
star has ceased in American eyes to burn with quite the same accustomed radiance in 
the international firmament. 
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4. By contrast with the exhausted and devastated countries of western Europe, 
the United States sees itself, as a result of the war, endowed with colossal productive 
and fighting capacity. Ever since the inception of lend-lease in March 1941 it has 
been plain to the average American that other nations, beginning with Great Britain, 
have been largely dependent upon United States bounty for their ability to wage 
effective warfare. Although there is a widespread feeling that recompense of one sort 
or another ought eventually to be forthcoming for lend-lease aid, it is generally 
recognised that, on this occasion, the United States has been constrained to make 
good the deficiencies of others rather than, as in the earlier war, to sustain them with 
loans which it was thought at the time would be repaid in full at some later date. In 
spite of constant efforts on our part at enlightenment, the general public still too 
often ignores all that Great Britain has done in the way of reverse lend-lease 
assistance. 
5. Whilst the press and radio are apt with unstinted exuberance to dwell almost 
exclusively on American achievements in the common struggle, the war output 
which the United States has attained is in itself miraculous enough to inspire the 
most sober-minded citizens with the liveliest satisfaction and patriotic pride. In three 
and a half years, moreover, of front-line combat, and at the cost of casualties which 
now exceed 1 million, American fighting men have proved their valour in every 
major theatre of war. With, however, little justification, the idea is prevalent among 
the public that after D-day American forces took the lion's share of fighting in the 
European theatre. In the Pacific Britain's role is popularly regarded as still more 
puny by comparison with that of the United States. Looking towards the future 
Americans see their own two-ocean navy as mistress of the waves. If anything further 
were needed to convince Americans that their country has become the amphibious 
Leviathan of modern times, it is the knowledge that its stupendous war output and 
mobilisation of man-power has been achieved without any substantial encroachment 
on normal activities. As Mr. J. A. Krug, chairman of the War Production Board, put it 
in his report on war production in 1944, made public on the 14th June last, "the 
important and astounding fact is that in 1944, the year in which the crescendo of war 
mounted to a thunderous climax, the American consumer was furnished with more 
goods and services than in any year since 1941." The only shadow on the landscape, 
and it is a lengthening one, derives from the many complex problems of reconversion 
and redeployment which are even now putting a certain strain on the national 
economy. 
6. Turning now to the light in which Americans view Great Britain. As already 
indicated, the prestige that we acquired for ourselves before the United States 
became a belligerent has since been largely eclipsed by the burden imposed upon us 
as a result of six years of warfare. Whilst thoughtful Americans were profoundly 
impressed by the analysis of the United Kingdom war effort recorded in the White 
Paper issued last November, the extent of British sacrifices which it revealed 
stimulated their awareness that very onerous demands had been placed upon our 
resources, including man-power. To a people inclined to measure power in terms of 
monetary wealth our situation may well appear somewhat parlous. And it is widely 
felt that, quite apart from her domestic difficulties, a Britain heavily denuded of her 
overseas assets and of other sources of invisible exports, will find herself grievously 
handicapped in achieving equilibrium in her post-war balance of payments. 
7. In the field of foreign relations the aggressively independent line followed by 
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the Australian Minister for External Affairs throughout the San Francisco Confer-
ence demonstrated once and for all that there was no truth in the popular American 
fallacy that the British Commonwealth voted as a block at international gatherings 
under United Kingdom <£gis. However salutary in this respect, Dr. Evatt's attitude, 
by demonstrating with equal clarity that Britain could not count in her international 
dealings on the steady support of her sister nations of the Commonwealth, also gave 
an added impetus to the belief that the influence of the mother country and of the 
Commonwealth in general as a unit of world power is now on the wane. Whilst 
Americans take small stock of an Eire which has maintained a stubbornly neutral 
position during the war, the recent cryptic announcement of Mr. de Valera1 that his 
country is an independent republic served to lend its particle of colour to the picture 
of an enfeebled and isolated Britain. A threat to our lines of imperial communication 
is, moreover, seen in such current developments as the Russian interest in Tangier 
and the Dardanelles, in the pressure of a Soviet-influenced Yugoslavia on the 
frontiers of Istria and western Thrace, and in the mounting nationalism of the Arab 
States. Although far from typical of the public attitude as a whole, the light in which 
we to-day appear on the lunatic fringe of American opinion may be illustrated by 
citing the recent remark of an anti-British United States general: "Britain is 
nowadays of no more significance than Costa Rica." 
8. The war, which by one-sided and incomplete comparison has somewhat 
dimmed the reputation of Britain as a world Power, has placed the prestige of Soviet 
Russia well in the ascendant. Here, as earlier reports have indicated, American public 
opinion, according to the particular outlook of the groups or individuals concerned, 
is animated by a gamut of feelings ranging from unreasoning fear and hatred to 
genuine admiration. Almost all thoughtful Americans are, however, imbued with the 
belief that, by reason of her vast size, limitless resources in men and raw materials, 
and industrial potential, Soviet Russia is the only world Power comparable in stature 
to the United States. 
9. This Big Two concept derives in the first instance from the spectacle of Soviet 
Russia's newly-fledged military migt"lt spread athwart Central and South-Eastern 
Europe and now in at the death against the Japanese in Northern China. Anxiety on 
this score is, however, to some extent assuaged in moderate-minded and liberal 
circles by those factors in her contemporary life which appear to provide a basis for 
the long-term development of peaceful relations between herself and the United 
States. The most notable of many recent expositions of these factors was contained in 
two speeches delivered at New York on the 24th May and the 4th June last by Mr. 
Henry Wallace, the Secretary of Commerce and former Vice-President. In them Mr. 
Wallace developed the thesis that, having now emerged to the most powerful 
positions on the world stage and occupying geographical situations which had never 
led to any essential conflict of interests, Russia and the United States could find 
common ground for permanent amity because the one symbolised economic 
democracy to backward peoples and the other was the great exponent of political 
democracy. Neither country, he pointed out, possessed colonies. Both of them were 
groping for a way of life which would enable the common man everywhere to derive 
the most good out of the maximum use of modern technology. In his earlier and 
more detailed address Mr. Wallace declared that Germany had supplanted England 
1 Prime minister of Ireland. 
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from 1900 onwards in the domination of world commerce; that the cultural and 
political overlordship of western nations had now passed and that in the conditions of 
the world to-day there was no place for old-fashioned or economic imperialism. 
10. When examining the effect which the Big Two concept is likely to exercise on 
Anglo-American relations it is important to recollect that many other attitudes of 
mind also determine the outlook of Americans towards foreign countries in general 
and Great Britain in particular. At the risk of platitudinous repetition of what has 
been said in former reports from the embassy, it cannot in the first place be too 
strongly emphasised that the events of the war have revolutionised American 
thinking on the subject of security. The new and deep-seated conviction that the 
United States must assume wider responsibilities to buttress its own and world 
security was aptly symbolised in the Senate on the 27th July, when its members paid 
Senator George of Georgia, a former chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
the rare tribute of raising [sic] to their feet after he had eloquently appealed to them 
to ratify the United Nations Charter as a means of redeeming the promise of a better 
world for which the flower of American youth had given their lives. 
11. In their search for security in a world that modern science has contracted, 
Americans may be counted upon to display the virtues and defects inherent in a 
people which, throughout the comparative short span of its history, has seen itself as 
dedicated to the advancement of human freedoms and blessed beyond the inhabi-
tants of other lands with a moral and democratic way of life. Now that the full 
strength of their country has become manifest to them, Americans hold that they are 
bound to take a leading part in the readjustment of international relationships. Faith 
in the magic of large worlds; an enthusiastic belief that the mere enunciation of an 
abstract principle is equivalent to its concrete fulfilment; a tendency to overlook the 
practical difficulties that obstruct the easy solution of current problems; above all, a 
constant disposition to prefer the emotional to the rational approach-these are 
amongst the salient traits that are likely in the future, no less than in the past, to 
provoke Americans to impatience with the more stolid, disillusioned and pragmatic 
British, and to give rise to current misunderstandings between our two Govern-
ments. Taken in the aggregate these traits, for all that they at times bear the stamp of 
arrogant self-righteousness, spring from a core of genuine idealism which requires 
to be handled with more generosity and imagination and, be it also said, in a less 
patronising spirit than it has always received. In the meantime, increased contacts 
with other regions are causing many Americans to shed their ignorance of the 
outside world. 
12. The fact that Americans now tend to rate Great Britain somewhat lower in the 
scale of power values than their own country and the U.S.S.R. does not mean that 
they have written her off as a negligible factor in the comity of nations. On the 
contrary, esteem for the sterling qualities of the British stands as high as it ever did. 
This esteem, fortified by the thousand and one strands of sentiment that derive from 
the background of a common Anglo-Saxon heritage, co-exists, as it always has done, 
with a keen sense of rivalry and with the apparently ineradicable idea that nature has 
endowed the British with a well-nigh inexhaustible store of superior cunning, of 
which they are only too prone to make the fullest possible use in international 
negotiations with the object of "outsmarting" the more simple-minded Americans. 
13. Whenever they find reason to complain of our actions Americans do not fail 
to apply to us a number of ugly catchwords that owe much of their origin to the 
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traditional mistrust of British policies and to the above-mentioned sense of rivalry, 
e.g., balance of power, spheres of influence, reactionary imperial ist trends, colonial 
oppression, old-world guile, diplomatic double-talk, Uncle Sam the Santa Claus and 
sucker, and the like. Anti-British outbursts are as a rule the result of the propensity 
of Americans to over-simplify vexatious issues which lie beyond their immediate ken. 
They need not, therefore, unduly disturb us, provided always that our own 
conscience is clear and that we are able in any given instance to rebut the 
accusations levelled against us by reference to some yard-stick of readily understood 
first principle-whether it be expressed in terms of moral responsibility, idealism, or 
leadership. It must, in any case, be borne in mind that criticism of Britain is 
something that is bound to recur in a country of the continental proportions of the 
United States which comprises so many hyphenated communities within its borders 
and elements that are either inveterately anti-British or self-impelled to advertise 
their genuine Americanism. This being so, we should beware of hastily attributing to 
Americans as a whole the anti-British sentiments of one section of them. 
14. To return to the central theme of this despatch: Americans, to whom, as a 
witty observer once remarked, all facts are free and equal, attach particular 
importance to quantitative standards of value. It follows that they are bound on a 
basis of sheer statistics to draw unfavourable comparisons between the British Isles, 
with their static population and dependence upon irnported goods and raw materials, 
and the U.S.S.R. with its huge untapped resources and conglomeration of peoples 
destined, according to expert forecasts, to expand in numbers far beyond the 200 
million mark. To an America which, on all reasonable showing, has ceased to believe 
that she can remain safely sheltered behind ocean barriers, the Soviet Union appears 
as the only country in the world now capable, if it feels so inclined, of measuring 
odds with her. 
15. Much public uncertainty prevails as to how best to deal with this new 
international portent. Accustomed enough at home to the idea of bigger and better 
elephants, most Americans none the less find themselves filled with a sense of uneasy 
bewilderment when they contemplate an unfamiliar Russian bear which is barred off 
from the cakes and buns of alien propaganda and refuses to be coaxed into behaviour 
that approximates to Western notions of democratic propriety. In their fear of the 
unknown, the bulk of American commentators who share the well-nigh universal 
conviction of the public that armed conflict with the Soviet Union is an unthinkable 
expedient, have tended to relapse into a mood of baffled dismay whenever danger 
seems to threaten from unilateral Russian action. Their main theme on such 
occasions has been to bewail the ineffectiveness of their own diplomatic agents and, 
as often as not, to accuse them of allowing themselves to be dragged along in a 
campaign of bear-baiting "at the tail of the British kite." These aspersions, which 
were particularly vocal early this summer at the time of the Polish and Trieste 
crieses, began to subside after Mr. Stettinius2 in his speech at San Francisco on the 
28th May had declared that the United States, whose interests extended to the whole 
world, must mediate between other great Powers when their interests conflicted 
amongst themselves. Much comfort is now derived from the belief that President 
Truman can be counted upon to pursue an independent American policy, and that 
2 ER Stettinius, US secretary of state, 1944-1945; chairman of first American delegation to UN general 
assembly, 1946. 
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Mr. Byrnes,3 who is reputed to be a born mediator, will succeed in resolving Soviet 
and American differences on a basis of honourable compromise. 
16. The uncertainty in American thinking where the Soviet Union is concerned is 
much less marked when it comes to questions that relate to the role of the United 
States in that segment of the world which lies outside the Russian orbit of power. 
Here a blend of idealism, hard business instinct, and motives of security is propelling 
the United States to a greater extent than ever before into international fields far 
beyond the limits traced by the time-honoured Monroe doctrine and notions of 
hemispheric defence. An America which has found her place in the sun is resolved 
that the more efficient units of her vastly augmented merchant fleet shall not be laid 
up in idleness as occurred with the bulk of her ocean-going commercial vessels after 
the last war. Federal regulated civil aviation lines can rely upon constant official 
support to secure the foreign bases and facilities necessary to enable them to girdle 
the globe. The weight of administrative backing can readily be mobilised for the 
establishment of American-controlled telecommunications systems in undeveloped 
regions, and for securing the maximum possible American share in the exploitation 
of Middle East oil resources. 
17. As citizens of a country that has tended to acclaim rapidly acquired material 
success as proof of moral rectitude, the leaders of the influential pressure groups that 
promote these activities may be pardoned if they regard them not merely as 
profit-making enterprises, but also as the media for disseminating the blessing of the 
American way of life to other and less fortunate peoples. By the same token they are 
quick to suspect the use of a privileged position to exclude themselves whenever 
circumstances confront them with the older established competing rights of Great 
Britain in her imperial possessions or in other territories vital to her security where 
she has hitherto exercised a paramount influence. For the time being, at any rate, a 
Soviet Union rotating within its own orbit presents no comparable points of friction, 
with the exception of a nascent Russian interest in Middle Eastern affairs and the 
possibility of future clashes of interest in the Far East, in regard to which 
speculation, long since manifest, is likely to become more acute now that the Red 
army is sharing the credit of the coup de grace of the Japanese. 
18. A world that rotates in two orbits of power. Enough has been said to show 
that this concept is beginning to crystallise in the American mind. At the same time, 
as already indicated, the fact that Americans have come to believe that the key to 
world peace lies in the relationship of their country with the Soviet Union does not 
mean that they have ceased to view Great Britain with a twin sense of esteem and 
rivalry. Along, moreover, with this familiar psychological pattern there is to be found 
a deep-seated conviction amongst a wide range of Americans, and not least amongst 
persons prominent in the Administration and general staff, that, whether from the 
political, economic or strategic point of view, a strong and prosperous Britain is an 
essential United States interest. Indeed, even if many of them would not acknowledge 
the fact to themselves, it is no exaggeration to say that the majority of those elements 
which give shape and purpose to all that is best in their country's mode of existence 
are aware in their heart of hearts that the continuity of her moral values is 
inseparably bound up with the welfare of Great Britain. Even these elements, 
however, would incline to distinguish in their thoughts between Britain and her 
3 J F Byrnes, US secretary of state, 1945-1947. 
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Empire and to hold the view that in areas of Europe and the Middle East adjacent to 
the Soviet orbit of power British foreign policy is liable at times to embark on 
ill-advised courses which in the last analysis might constitute a threat to United 
States security. 
19. All in all, therefore, it begins to look as though we are witnessing a gradual 
American shift away from the pattern traced by President Roosevelt in his grand 
design, which, at any rate when he first conceived it at the height of the war, 
envisaged the coequal collaboration of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United. 
States with the object of defeating the enemy and of creating a United Nations 
Organisation for the maintenance of world peace. Victory in Europe is won. America 
has committed herself in spectacular fashion to the United Nations Charter, in the 
elaboration of which at San Francisco she can justly claim to have played a leading 
part. But, unless appearances are deceptive, the United States is also now groping 
towards a new order of things in which Great Britain, whilst occupying a highly 
important position as the bastion of Western European security and as the focal point 
of a far-flung oceanic system, will nevertheless be expected to take her place as junior 
partner in an orbit of power predominantly under American regis. This theory of a 
United States destined for the role of leadership was implicit in a passage of the 
speech delivered by President Truman at Kansas City on the 3rd July, where he 
stated: "I am anxious to bring it home to you that the world is no longer county-size, 
no longer State-size, no longer nation-size-it is one world, as Willkie said. It is a 
world in which we must all get along. And it is my opinion that this great republic 
ought to lead the way." 
20. On the economic side the United States Administration sees itself as destined 
to point the way to an era of economic liberalism which will promote the exchange of 
goods and services between nations and restore prosperity to a war-stricken world. 
The renewal by Congress this summer of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act and its 
approval of the Bretton Woods proposals are regarded as milestones that mark 
progress to this end. The next and most important stage on the road will be to 
complete the discussions with His Majesty's Government preparatory to the 
international conference on trade and employment planned for the early part of next 
year. It is the present hope of the United States Government that this conference will 
in its turn lay the basis for the expanding world economy contemplated in article VII 
of the master lend-lease agreements. 
21. Excepting in the Far East, where the United States has plainly asserted its 
leadership, the outlines of the new dispensations in the political sphere are as yet 
somewhat imprecise. An Administration conscious of its country's stake in world 
security, but sensitive to the movements of an immensely variegated public opinion 
that is by no means rid of isolationist phobias, still displays hesitancy as to the 
lengths of which it should go to dispel storm clouds in distant regions. It is, of 
course, true that, quite apart from collaborating in the manifold tasks connected 
with the liquidation of the European war and the preparation of peace settlements, 
the United States has given many other positive proofs that it recognises the need for 
sharing the burden of world responsibilities. Thus, American influence has been 
steadily exerted to secure an equitable solution of the Polish problem. It has also 
been brought to bear to mitigate the crisis which arose last autumn in Soviet-Persian 
relations and to support our intervention this summer in the Levant. In the Trieste 
affair the United States went further than mere diplomatic representations and, 
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albeit somewhat reluctantly, joined us in action which might have resulted in an 
armed clash between American troops and Yugoslav Partisans. The United States 
stands ready to participate in the future administration of Tangier and in supervising 
the Greek elections. America has sought to encourage a reconciliation between 
Chungking and the Yenan Communists. 
22. The above-mentioned occurrences do not, however, imply that the United 
States is invariably prepared to march on parallel lines to His Majesty's Government 
in resolving problems of immediate concern to ourselves and more particularly those 
that arise in our dealings with the Soviet Union. The late President Roosevelt 
himself, although a firm believer in Anglo-American collaboration and to some 
extent under the spell of the superior genius of Mr. Churchill, jealously preserved the 
appearance of independent manreuvre. Indeed, after the Moscow and Tehran 
Conferences he was not averse to encouraging the idea that the United States 
occupied the position of mediator between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, and 
that his powers of conciliation had more than once averted a breach between Marshal 
Stalin and Mr. Churchill . After the Greek crisis in December last the view gained 
ground that Britain was concerned to perpetuate reactionary Governments in 
Europe. It was felt that, unless the United States intervened to promote more liberal 
tendencies, that continent would relapse into anarchy from which only the Soviet 
Union could derive benefit. 
23. Against this background the previously unannounced decision of President 
Truman to send Mr. Hopkins4 on his mission to Moscow at the end of May, together 
with the concomitant visit of Mr. Davies5 to London, is to be regarded as no mere 
move to demonstrate to the United States public and to the world at large that the 
new President was continuing the mediatory role of his predecessor at a time when 
differences over Poland and the veto dispute at San Francisco seemed to imperil 
inter-Allied relations. It must also be ascribed to the growing belief in responsible 
official circles, already noticeable under the late Administration, that it should 
devolve on the United States in the first instance, as the major Western Power, to 
take the initiative in determining the shape of things on the periphery of the Soviet 
orbit no less than elsewhere. President Truman's decision to proceed direct from 
Washington to Potsdam without breaking his journey in Britain provided another 
sign of the same process of thought. 
24. Out of the hubbub of emotional talk which the announcement this week 
about the atomic bomb has unleashed throughout the country, it is already clear 
enough that America's consciousness of superior power, or, as one columnist puts it, 
"her capacity for Promethean rule," js being vigorously stimulated by the fact that 
she alone, for the present at any rate, possesses the means to exploit this 
awe-inspiring and revolutionary invention. 
25. Whilst the advent of a Labour Government in Great Britain should in no way 
alter the shrewd reckoning of the Americans that the pattern of world power has 
radically shifted in their country's favour, it has injected new and unexpected factors 
into their calculations. Even amongst the more conservative-minded, who now see 
the United States as the last stronghold of capitalistic economy, there would be few, 
4 H L Hopkins, Truman's special adviser on British matters, in charge of Lend-Lease programme. 
5 J E Davies, Truman's special adviser during the Potsdam Conference, travelled to London in May 1945 on 
president's instructions for talks with Mr Churchill . 
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if any, supporters of the notion that a Britain about to embark on a Socialist 
experiment is in the least likely to gravitate towards communism. At the same time 
warnings are heard in financial and business circles that America should beware of 
countenancing any proposal to grant extensive credits to a Britain which would be 
likely to employ them to underwrite State socialism. Of even more importance than 
these vested interests, which are doubtless influenced by the knowledge that the 
British Labour victory will be attended by repercussions at home, is the attitude of 
official Washington. In this quarter the change has come as something of a shock 
from the standpoint of its probable effect upon the United States programme for 
fostering world revival through the international relaxation of restrictive financial 
and trade practices. The Administration is apprehensive lest Britain, for all her 
temperamental caution, will now commit herself to a thoroughgoing system of State 
trading with its attendant features of subsidies, bulk purchases and quotas which 
might effectively defeat any sound working of the reciprocal trade programme. 
26. An event that has multiplied our critics on economic grounds has none the 
less served to appreciate our political stocks. By capturing the imagination of 
Americans the vivid dynamic personality of Mr. Churchill had hitherto somewhat 
obscured the extent of our economic plight, which is now revealed in fuller 
nakedness. On the other hand, the Labour landslide should remove the hitherto 
persistent impression that Great Britain is concerned to encourage European 
reaction. No less than Left-wing pressure groups, middle-of-the-road and liberal 
opinion in general, which includes some of the most prominent newspaper and radio 
commentators with the widest audiences, has hailed the election results as a notable 
democratic achievement destined to usher in the era of the plain man. It is widely 
conceded that Britain, now further left of centre than America herself, is presented 
with a new opportunity to assume the leadership of all progressive forces and to 
arrest the drift in Europe towards anarchy and communism. 
27. During the months to come Britain promises to be the cynosure of American 
eyes. Our official pronouncements will be eagerly awaited: the development of our 
economic and foreign policies will be scrutinised with the utmost care. If in the 
former respect our position from the point of view of enlisting a sympathetic 
American attitude has become more complicated, in the latter respect there can be 
no question but our credit has been sensibly improved. From now onwards we 
should be less exposed to captious criticism of our actions in Europe; the charge that 
it is we who are needlessly provoking the Soviet Union to display intransigence 
should become void of content; our handling of vexatious problems in India and the 
Middle East should command a more receptive audience; there is a somewhat 
enlarged prospect of enlisting American· support, whenever we feel so disposed, in 
the effort to resolve debatable issues. 
28. In general, and this would seem to be of the first importance, we may expect 
the United States Administration to show a disposition to promote early reference to 
the World Organisation of all matters that seem likely to occasion friction between 
the Anglo-American and Soviet orbits of power. Within the broad overall framework 
set up by the United Nations Charter, which has been resoundingly approved by the 
nation at large, the United States Government is free to move with the Governments 
of other like-minded countries along firmer lines to secure what it considers to be 
just solutions than if it chooses to man~uvre on its own with the knowledge that 
whatever decisions it takes will have to answer on their independent merits of a bar 
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of a highly-temperamental public opinion. By adopting the former course the United 
States Administration is in any case far less exposed to the charge that it has shaped 
its policy in deference to the wishes of His Majesty's Government. Whenever 
negotiations are conducted on a purely Three-Power basis, United States domestic 
reasons, in the future as in the past, will undoubtedly play a certain part in causing 
the Administration to share our view that there should be no appearance of an 
Anglo-American attempt to "gang up" on the Russians. So, too, we may anticipate an 
analogous reluctance to aligning American policy too closely with that of Britain in 
the adjustment of post-war relations with China where, as already indicated, the 
United States is in any event peculiarly concerned to avoid possible causes of friction 
with the U.S.S.R. 
29. In our own bilateral dealings with the United States Government we should 
be careful to formulate requests for their support in such a manner as to avoid the 
appearance of teaching the Americans where their best interests lie. It is equally 
self-understood that in any instance where we have reason to protest against United 
States actions our ground should be well chosen and our complaint prompted by no 
mere shift of selfish expediency or passing mood of irritation. As men who 
themselves prefer the simple forthright approach, the Americans appreciate plain 
speaking in others. Nor will they take it amiss if we stand up for ourselves when our 
interests are well founded or, conversely, interpret it as a sign · of weakness if, 
whenever there is scope for the adjustment of conflicting Anglo-American views, we 
eschew methods of obstinate bargaining. In inter-governmental negotiations our 
case to the Americans should be presented not so much on grounds of sentiment as 
upon lucidly argued appeals to reason and the logic of hard fact. 
30. Last, but not least, the progressive elements of America will test our every 
word and deed on the touchstone of broad democratic principle. The early 
ratification by His Majesty's Government of the San Francisco Charter will be greeted 
here as an earnest of our intention to place ourselves squarely behind the cause of 
world peace. Rapid approval of the Bretton Woods proposals may do something to 
ease the thorny path of our trade discussions with the United States Government. In 
our day-to-day dealings with the Administration on current problems of foreign 
policy the omens are favourable. In the course of the last two centuries we have twice 
stood alone and have saved ourselves by our exertions. We are now seen to be better 
placed than ever before to save Europe by our example. 
31. I am forwarding copies of this despatch to the High Commissioner for the 
United Kingdom in Ottawa, His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow, and the Joint Staff 
Mission at Washington. 
Minute on 139 
This despatch describes the position of Lepidus in the triumvirate with Mark Antony 
and Augustus. The position is no easy one and it seems doubtful whether we shall get 
much support from the Dominions in the uphill task of maintaining ourselves as a 
world power in the face of the United States, who now for the first time is prepared to 
assume this position with the help of the almighty dollar, export surpluses (in other 
words the swamping of foreign markets with dumped U.S. goods), civil aviation, and 
all the other instruments which they can if necessary use in order to "penetrate" the 
world. 
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If this is so it behoves us all the more to strengthen our own world position 
vis-a-vis of our two great allied rivals by building up ourselves as the great European 
Power. This brings us back to the policy of collaboration with France with a view to 
our two countries establishing themselves politically as the leaders of all the Western 
European Powers and morally as the standard-bearers of European civilisation. Once 
we have acquired this position both the United States and the Soviet Union are more 
likely to respect us and therefore collaborate with us than they are at present. 
O.G.S. 
1.10.45 
140 FO 800/444, ff29-31 16 Sept 1947 
[Trade relations with Europe, America and the empire]: minute from 
Mr Bevin to Mr Attlee 
With reference to my letter to you of September 5th about Customs Unions, I 
understand that the President of the Board of Trade will not now circulate a paper 
but will instead raise this matter orally in Cabinet on September 23rd. You may like 
to have my preliminary thoughts in advance of the discussion. 
2. In the first place, I think we should press on with the establishment of the high 
level committee, which I suggested in my letter, to study the whole subject of 
Customs Unions. It is important that we should clear our minds on this as soon as 
possible. As you will have seen it is the general view at the Paris Conference that 
there should be some timetable set for the European customs union study Group, 
and it may be asked to report at a relatively early date. With all the other calls on 
officials we shall have very little time, especially as we must discuss the implications 
of a European Customs Union with the Commonwealth first. 
3. But there is a more general point arising in connexion with this proposed 
study. I am sure we must free ourselves of financial dependence on the United States 
of .America as soon as possible. We shall never be able to pull our full weight in 
fore ign affairs until we do so. Nor can we rely, in future, on assistance from the 
United States. I fear, however, that we shall not achieve this purpose solely by selling 
manufactured goods to a world which is becoming increasingly industrialised, and 
that multilateral trade may not suffice. It may come too late, or not be wide enough 
to help us. We must have something in the way of raw materials as well as 
manufactured goods with which to buy our food and our requirements in other 
countries. 
4. Hence the importance not only of closer trade relations with the Common-
wealth and Empire but also of an intensified effort for development within them. To 
take one example, if we could develop the Wankie coal field in Southern Rhodesia, we 
could sell coal to the Argentine which would help us indirectly to get food for the 
United Kingdom. I understand that this example is typical in that, as in so many 
other cases, the chief bottleneck is the railways, which need track and rolling stock. I 
know that the various development schemes which are under consideration cannot 
all be realised together overnight and that their needs compete with exports and vital 
home requirements. But I feel that there should be some body (I do not of course 
mean the proposed Customs Union Group) which is able to survey the whole field 
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and allocate priorities between conflicting demands. There are plenty of Committees 
dealing with parts of the problem. I should like to be sure that there is a body dealing 
with the whole. 
141 FO 800/444, ff62-67 9 Dec 1947 
[Anglo-American relations in the Middle East and eastern Mediterra-
nean]: draft letter by Mr Bevin for Mr Attlee to send to the prime 
ministers of Australia and New Zealand 
We have for some time past been disturbed at the incalculable and often inconsistent 
attitude of the United States Government towards problems in the Middle East and 
the Eastern Mediterranean. An example in point was the line taken by the United 
States delegate at the United Nations Organisation over Egypt. 
2. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs accordingly suggested to Mr. 
Marshall, 1 who agreed, that it might be helpful to both our Governments to talk over 
political, strategic and economic problems in the area at the departmental level, and 
without commitment at that stage, in order to clarify our respective ideas. 
3. Representatives of the Foreign Office and of the Chiefs of Staff went over to 
Washington in October and canvassed the ground with their American opposite 
numbers . The participants on both sides were able to reach virtually identical 
conclusions on most points and a general statement of policy arising therefrom, and 
submitted these to their respective Governments for consideration. On our side we 
have approved both the conclusion and the statement of policy recommended by our 
participants. Both the conclusions and the similar recommendations made by the 
American participants have been approved by Mr. Marshall, by the American National 
Security Council and by the President. We and the Americans are thus in the position 
of having adopted virtually identical and parallel policies without having concluded 
an agreement of any kind. 
4. The statement of policy reached by the participants in the talks on both sides is 
that the security of the Middle East and of the Eastern Mediterranean is vital to the 
security of the United Kingdom and of the United States, and to world peace; that 
neither the United Kingdom nor the United States can implement a policy of this 
nature without the support of the other; and that each country should therefore 
cooperate with the other in the area, each giving the other assistance and support 
and abjuring any sense of rivalry or desire for one country to replace the other. 
5. In the implementation of this policy the United States Government will do its 
best to support and strengthen the British strategic, political and economic position 
throughout the Middle East, and will cooperate with H.M.G. in assisting the 
countries of the Middle East along the path of social and economic reform and 
progress. In particular the United States Government will support H.M.G. in 
maintaining or obtaining the minimum strategic facilities requisite in the Middle 
East in peacetime and rights of re-entry in wartime . Such support would include 
American diplomatic support and support at U.N.O. for H.M.G. in maintaining the 
necessary strategic facilities in Egypt and Cyrenaica, and support in maintaining 
1 George C Marshall, US secretary of state, 1947- 1949. 
V 
316 INTERNATIONAL POLICY [141) 
facilities in Iraq. The Americans tell us that they wish to see H.M.G. retain their 
strategic position in the Sudan, Gibraltar, Aden and Cyprus. 
6. Throughout the conversations one of our major preoccupations was to find out 
to what lengths the United States Government might be prepared to carry this 
cooperation and support. For it is clear that if the Americans were not prepared to go 
beyond diplomatic support and support at U.N.O., H.M.G. might in the event of a 
major threat to peace in the Middle East be left in a most difficult position. 
7. After consideration the United States Government has reached the conclusion 
that the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, which is vital to 
the security of the United States, would be jeopardised if the Soviet Union should 
succeed in its efforts to obtain control of any one of the following countries: Italy, 
Greece, Turkey or Iran. It must therefore be the policy of the United States 
Government, in accordance with the principles and in the spirit of the Charter of the 
United Nations, to ensure the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle 
East and in particular to assist in maintaining the territorial integrity and political 
independence of Italy, Greece, Turkey and Iran. In carrying out this policy the United 
States must be prepared to make full use of its political, economic, and if necessary 
military power in such manner as may be found most effective. Before resorting to 
the actual employment of force, the United States should exhaust political and 
economic means, including recourse to the United Nations. Any resort to force 
would be in consonance with the Charter of the United Nations and, so far as 
possible, in cooperation with like-minded members of the United Nations. 
8. At the same time it would be unrealistic for the United States to undertake to 
carry out such a policy unless H.M.G. maintain their strong strategic, political and 
economic position in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean and unless H.M.G. 
and the United States Government follow parallel policies in that area. 
9. As I have said, both the Americans and ourselves decided separately and 
without any agreement to accept the statement of policy as set out in paragraphs 4 to 
8 with its implications. 
10. We took the opportunity of the presence in London of the Prime Ministers of 
Canada and South Africa to tell them verbally the gist of the above. They both 
expressed satisfaction with the result of the conversations. 
11. As I am sure you will appreciate it is of high importance that complete 
secrecy should be observed both about the fact and nature of these talks with the 
Americans and about the decisions reached separately by each of the two Govern-
ments. We told both Mr. Mackenzie King and Field Marshal Smuts that on these 
grounds we did not propose to make any formal communication on the subject in 
writing to any Dominion Government. But I am now sending to them a letter on the 
same lines as this. May I ask you, as I am asking them, to treat this letter as strictly 
personal and Top Secret? 
12. Our own feeling is that if the United States Government follows in practice 
the principles which it has now adopted, the position of H.M.G. and of the 
Commonwealth in the Middle East will be considerably strengthened. I hope that 
your thought will be the same as ours .... 2 
2 Mr Attlee approved this draft on 10 Dec 1947. 
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142 CAB 129/23, CP(48)6 4 Jan 1948 
'The first aim of British foreign policy': Cabinet memorandum by Mr 
Bevin 
It must be recognised that the Soviet Government has formed a solid political and 
economic block behind a line running from the Baltic along the Oder, through 
Trieste to the Black Sea. There is no prospect in the immediate future that we shall 
be able to re-establish and maintain normal relations with European countries 
behind that line. As I have explained in a separate paper these countries are 
dominated by the Communists, although they are only a minority in each country. 
Indeed we shall be hard put to it to stem the further encroachment of the Soviet tide. 
It is not enough to reinforce the physical barriers which still guard our Western 
civilisation. We must also organise and consolidate the ethical and spiritual forces 
inherent in this Western civilisation of which we are the chief protagonists. This in 
my view can only be done by creating some form of union in Western Europe, 
whether of a formal or informal character, backed by the Americas and the 
Dominions. 
The situation 
In another paper I have attempted to give my colleagues a sober and factual account 
of Russian policy. 1 It is clear that from secure entrenchments behind their line the 
Russians are exerting a constantly increasing pressure which threatens the whole 
fabric of the West. In some Western countries the danger is still latent but in 
Germany, France, Trieste, Italy and Greece the conflicting forces are already at grips 
with one another. In each country the issue is still in doubt and we must act 
resolutely if we are to prevail. The Soviet Government has based its policy on the 
expectation that Western Europe will sink into economic chaos and they may be 
relied upon to place every possible obstacle in the path of American aid and of 
Western European recovery. Our course is equally clear. I have done and will 
continue to do all I can to bring the Marshall Plan to fruition. But essential though it 
is, progress in the economic field will not in itself suffice to call a halt to the Russian 
threat. Political and, indeed, spiritual forces must be mobilised in our defence. 
The Western Union 
I believe therefore that we should seek to form with the backing of the Americas and 
the Dominions a Western democratic system comprising, if possible, Scandinavia, 
the Low Countries, France, Portugal, Italy and Greece. As soon as circumstances 
permit we should of course wish also to include Spain and Germany, without whom 
no Western system can be complete. This may seem a somewhat fanciful conception, 
but events are moving fast and the sense of a common danger drives countries to 
welcome to-morrow solutions which appear unpractical and unacceptable to-day. 
Almost all the countries I have listed have been nurtured on civil liberties and on the 
fundamental human rights. The recent proceedings of the Human Rights Commis-
sion at Geneva have shown that of the eighteen States represented, all except Russia 
and three satellites were in substantial agreement with the British draft of an 
1 See 143. 
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International Convention for the protection of these civil liberties and human rights. 
Moreover, most Western European countries have such recent experience of Nazi 
rule that they can apprehend directly what is involved in their loss. All in a greater or 
lesser degree sense the imminence of the Communist peril and are seeking some 
assurance of salvation. I believe therefore that the moment is ripe for a consolidation 
of Western Europe. This need not take the shape of a formal alliance, though we have 
an alliance with France and may conclude one with other countries. It does, 
however, mean close consultation with each of the Western European countries, 
beginning with economic questions. We in Britain can no longer stand outside 
Europe and insist that our problems and position are quite separate from those of 
our European neighbours. Our treaty relations with the various countries might 
differ, but between all there would be an understanding backed by power, money and 
resolution and bound together by the common ideals for which the Western Powers 
have twice in one generation shed their blood. 
I am aware that the Soviet Government would react against this policy as savagely 
as they have done against the Marshall Plan. It would be described as an offensive 
alliance directed against the Soviet Union. On this point I can only say that in the 
situation in which we have been placed by Russian policy half measures are useless. If 
we are to preserve peace and our own safety at the same time, we can only do so by 
the mobilisation of such a moral and material force as will create confidence and 
energy on the one side and inspire respect and caution on the other. The alternative 
is to acquiesce in continued Russian infiltration and helplessly to witness the 
piecemeal collapse of one Western bastion after another. 
The policy I have outlined will require strong British leadership in order to secure 
its acceptance in Europe on one hand and in the Dominions and the Americas on the 
other. Material aid will have to come principally from the United States, but the 
countries of Western Europe which despise the spiritual values of America will look 
to us for political and moral guidance and for assistance in building up a counter 
attraction to the baleful tenets of communism within their borders and in recreating 
a healthy society wherever it has been shaken or shattered by the war. I believe that 
we have the resources with which to perform this task. 
Provided we can organise a Western European system such as I have outlined 
above, backed by the power and resources of the Commonwealth and of the 
Americas, it should be possible to develop our own power and influence to equal that 
of the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. We have the material resources in 
the Colonial Empire, if we develop them, and by giving a spiritual lead now we 
should be able to carry out our task in a way which will show clearly that we are not 
subservient to the United States of America or to the Soviet Union. 
I have already broached the conception of what I called a spiritual union of the 
West tentatively to Mr. Marshall and M. Bidault,2 both of whom seemed to react 
favourably without of course committing themselves. I now propose, if my col-
leagues agree, to ventilate the idea in public in my speech in the forthcoming 
Foreign Affairs Debate and thereafter to pursue it, as occasion demands, with the 
Governments concerned. 
2 G Bidault, French premier, 1946 and 1949-50, also minister for foreign affairs concurrently and 
1947-1948. 
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143 CAB 129/23, CP(48)7 5 Jan 1948 
'Review of Soviet policy': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Bevin [Extract] 
Introduction 
The breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers and other recent events seem to 
point to the increasing difficulty of reaching any agreement with the U.S.S.R. on 
political topics. It therefore seems worth while to review the situation generally and 
to see what conclusions can be drawn about Soviet policy. 
Conclusions 
2. From the following review of Soviet and Communist activities in recent 
months, certain deductions may be drawn regarding Soviet policy. 
(a) The present policy of the Soviet Government is based on the assumption that 
the Marshall Plan will and must fail and that, as preached by Marx, the Capitalist 
Powers will quarrel among themselves and their power will disintegrate as a result 
of slumps and depressions. If these assumptions are proved by events to be untrue 
the Soviet Government might radically change its policy, but not till then. As 
things are at present they have proclaimed their idea of two worlds in conflict and 
are opposed to reconstruction in the West on the only terms on which it seems to 
be practicable. 
(b) The Soviet Government have ruthlessly consolidated their position within 
their orbit and in Eastern Europe. They have made a mockery of their many 
pledges about free elections &c., in the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements. Through-
out Eastern Europe, the same pattern of a Soviet and Communist dominated 
political and economic structure is becoming increasingly obvious. Even Czecho-
slovakia is now threatened. All opposition organisations within the Soviet orbit 
have been or are being liquidated. Contact with foreigners is everywhere being 
reduced to a minimum. Western, and particularly British and American, interests 
and influence are everywhere being eliminated. The former satellites of Germany 
are, in fact, now the satellites of the Soviet Union. Even in our trade relations with 
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe we must remember that such trade will 
always be subject to Soviet and Communist political requirements and therefore 
liable to sudden interruptions. It may even be used as a means of bringing political 
pressure to bear against us. 
(c) Soviet accusations against us at the Council of Foreign Ministers as to our 
action in Germany seem designed to cover up what they are themselves doing in 
their zone, while trying to saddle us with responsibility in the eyes of the German 
people for the partition of Germany. 
(d) They have given up hope of the Communist parties achieving power in France 
and Italy by legal means. For the moment the Communists' somewhat premature 
attempt at direct action in France has failed, though they have inflicted grave 
economic injury on the country. We must expect them to take some action in 
Italy, possibly a coup for which arms and specialists are believed to be held in 
readiness in Yugoslavia, possibly a wave of continuing industrial unrest on such a 
scale as to make Marshall aid or any attempt at reconstruction fruitless. We must 
expect a further attempt to get our troops out of Trieste, where they are an obvious 
impediment to Soviet policy. 
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(e) As the Soviet Government have decided to do their best to prevent the success 
of the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, we must now expect them to do the same 
in Western Germany. But so far as Western Germany is concerned the methods to 
be used and their timing are still not clear. This applies also to the policy which 
they are likely to pursue in Eastern Germany. 
(f) A further Communist effort seems to be imminent in Greece with the 
establishment of the so-called Democratic Greek Government and an attempt to 
detach large parts of Northern Greece is foreshadowed. This would bring Russian 
influence down to the .tEgean, and Turkey would not long remain independent. 
(g) The undermining of British and American influence is the keystone of Soviet 
policy in the Middle East, as elsewhere. By supporting partition in Palestine the 
Soviets may well hope to encourage disorder in the Middle East. Their attitude 
would not prevent them later on from supporting the Arabs if it suited their 
general policy. 
(h) There are signs that the Soviets may shortly stir up trouble afresh in Persia, 
particularly in Azerbaijan. 
(i) If the Soviets secured control of France and French North Africa, of Italy, and 
of Greece, and particularly if they could undermine our position in the Middle 
East, they would effectively dominate the Mediterranean and could (if they wished) 
deprive us of access to extensive markets and raw materials, especially oil, without 
which our economic recovery would be difficult or impossible and the strategic 
position both of ourselves and of the United States gravely jeopardised. 
(j) We must beware of the far-reaching effects of colonial propaganda even where 
it is disguised as support for nationalist aspirations. 
(k) It seems that we must expect the U.S.S.R. to pursue their forward policy in 
Sinkiang, Manchuria and Korea. There is a distinct danger that the Communists 
may succeed in dominating the whole of China, which would present a consider-
able threat to the territories of South-East Asia. 
(I) If the U.S.S.R. could gain control of China, France and a few other countries 
for international purposes, it would shift, politically, economically and 
strategically, the whole basis of power both in the United Nations and in the world 
at large. 
General outline of Soviet policy 
3. The first objective of Soviet policy is probably to advance and to hasten their 
own reconstruction. At the same time they wish to overtake the material prosperity 
of the West and to draw out of the post-war confusion in the world a number of 
important advantages for themselves. I do not believe that the Soviet Government 
would consciously wish to risk a war for this purpose, particularly while the secret of 
the atom bomb is a monopoly of the Anglo-Saxon Powers. They probably consider 
that they can get what they want by "cold war" methods. In carrying these into effect 
they can rely, both in the Soviet orbit and beyond, on the unqestioning obedience of 
the agents whom they have trained in Russia for years past, and whom they place in 
positions of authority wherever practicable (e.g., Marshal Tito, M. Modzelewski, M. 
Thorez).1 
1 Tito and Thorez were communist leaders in Yugoslavia and France respectively; Modzelewski was Polish 
minister of foreign affairs and a member of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party. 
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4. The Cominform Declaration published on 5th October proclaimed openly to 
the world with the greatest publicity the doctrine that the world was divided into two 
opposing camps which were in conflict. It called on Communists everywhere to close 
their ranks, not to underestimate their strength, and to intensify the struggle. It 
denounced the "Truman-Marshall Plan" as a component part of the general policy of 
the United States and Great Britain for "Strengthening imperialism and stifling 
democracy." It called upon the European Communist parties to head the resistance 
to these plans, to rally and unite their efforts on the basis of a common programme, 
for which new co-ordinating machinery was established. M. Zhdanov2 in his speech 
to the Cominform Conference, which was also given the widest publicity, said that 
"As for the U.S.S.R., it will make all efforts to see to it that the (Marshall) plan is not 
realised." ... 
South-East Asia and the Far East 
37. In South-East Asia and the Far East the Soviet purpose is two-fold: to turn 
Asiatic races against the Western democracies and to pose as the champion of 
oppressed colonial peoples. The attack against the Western democracies is levelled at 
the United Kingdom in Pakistan-India, Burma and British colonial possessions, 
against the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies, against the French in Indo-China, 
and above all against the Americans in China, Japan and Korea. In the general state 
of ferment in Asia, Soviet policy seeks to exploit local nationalist sentiment through 
local Communist Parties which, in many cases, contain Moscow-trained elements. 
For the present, Soviet technique is not fully developed in areas which have not 
hitherto been subject to Soviet influence or domination, but with the establishment 
of Soviet missions in various places (e.g., New Delhi and Bangkok), the general 
activity may be expected to increase. 
Afghanistan 
38. In Afghanistan pressure is not yet strong, but will tend towards the creation 
of trouble on Afghanistan's northern borders, while every encouragement will be 
given to differences which may arise with Pakistan. 
Pakistan and India 
39. In Pakistan and India the Soviet Union seeks to discredit Great Britain, while 
every advantage is likely to be taken of the differences between these two Dominions 
to promote discontent and discord. The unfledged state of Burma, which has an 
active Communist Party, offers opportunities of promoting dissension. In British 
colonial possessions, such as Malaya, Hong Kong and Borneo, local nationalist 
sentiment is stimulated against colonial rule, and the same technique is adopted by 
Communist Parties in the Netherlands Indies and French Indo-China (in the latter of 
which there is a very strong Communist influence) . 
China 
40. In China, the Soviet Union seeks to increase its control over Sinkiang, to 
support the Chinese Communist forces in their effort to obtain complete domination 
in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and to further their efforts to overthrow the 
2 Andrei Zhdanov, Soviet ideologist and propagandist. 
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National Government of China. There is a danger that the Communists may succeed 
in dominating the whole of China, in which case a considerable political, economic 
and strategic threat to the territories of South Asia will develop, the more so since 
there are large Chinese communities in many of these territories. 
Korea 
41. In Korea, Soviet-trained Communists, who have already established a virtual 
police State in the North, may be expected to overrun the whole peninsula when 
American forces are withdrawn owing to the inability of the United States to set up a 
sufficiently stable administration in the south to counter this Soviet move. 
Japan 
42. The Japanese, by recent history and tradition, are antipathetic to both Russia 
and Communism. The degree to which Communism may develop in Japan after the 
occupation ceases will depend to a considerable extent on the sentiments then 
prevailing towards the Western democracies. 
Colonial territories generally 
43. The Soviet authorities carry on perpetual propaganda against the "Imperialist 
exploitation of colonial peoples." This is aimed at the exclusion of the Western 
Powers from colonial territories, the promotion of independence movements (often 
nationalistic rather than Communist), e.g, in French North Africa and Indonesia, 
and at teaching colonial peoples to look to the Soviet Union as their champion and 
protector. The Soviet Government have made much use of the United Nations, the 
World Federation of Trade Unions and other bodies for colonial propaganda against 
us; their press and radio constantly pursue the colonial theme; and they have for 
years collected agents from colonial areas and trained them in subversive measures 
in Russia before sending them back. Hitherto these efforts have not had much 
success, but this may not last indefinitely. The public relations officer in Nigeria 
recently commented on the quite remarkable prestige which Stalin and his 
associates enjoy among the educated and semi-educated classes. He considered that 
"if it should ever become necessary for us to take a line which would be openly 
unfriendly to the Soviet Union, we should have the greatest difficulty in putting it 
across," and that our chief embarrassment would be our inability to meet the Soviet 
claim to sponsor racial equality. Similar conditions may well obtain elsewhere. 
Events in Indonesia have provided much grist to the Soviet mill and a recent report 
from Singapore has stated that Communist Parties in South-East Asia are growing in 
strength and present a serious menace to security in the Far East. 
United Nations and other international organisations 
· 44. So far as the United Nations is concerned, recent behaviour on the part of the 
Soviets suggests that they intend to maintain their membership, but to use the 
Organisation chiefly for propaganda purposes and for rallying their satellites and 
with the object of impeding so far as possible any constructive efforts put in hand by 
the Western Powers. So long indeed as they retain their power of veto in the Security 
Council they will hardly consider that the United Nations itself constitutes any 
serious menace to the Soviet Union, though it is evident that they fear the expression 
of majority opinion and for that reason will continue to attack such a body as the 
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Interim Committee. Indeed we know that Zhdanov himself said recently that it was 
the Soviet power of veto alone which had prevented the United Nations from 
attempting to turn the Soviet Union out of Eastern Europe. It seems likely also that 
the Soviets have by no means abandoned hope of establishing "friendly" Govern-
ments in France and China. If only one of these countries became a Soviet satellite it 
would be impossible to get the Security Council to pass a resolution condemning the 
Soviet Union, even in the event of her being a direct party to a dispute . Should both 
become satellites it is obvious that the whole present alignment of forces in the 
United Nations would be disrupted, and that the Soviet Union would have a good 
prospect of acquiring a normal majority favourable to its purposes in the General 
Assembly. While such a hope exists it appears that there is little prospect of a 
voluntary Soviet withdrawal. We may therefore conclude that for some time to come 
at any rate the Security Council will be doomed to frustration, but that the Assembly 
(always supposing that Soviet policy is unsuccessful in Western Europe) may develop 
into a vigorous body which will serve not only as a platform for Communist 
propaganda but also as a suitable vehicle for the expression of the point of view of the 
anti-Communist majority. 
45. The more intransigent attitude of the Slav bloc has been expressed in other 
international organisations also, e.g., at the World Federation of Trade Unions. Ever 
since the establishment of the Federation the Soviet[s] have regarded it as an 
instrument to be used for political purposes, but have been careful, until recently, to 
avoid any open conflict with representatives of the countries not sharing their 
political views. After the Cominform declaration, however, their attitude was 
suddenly and aggressively stiffened. Their trade union leaders and press denounced 
the "Reformist and Conformist influences" in the Federation, and Soviet delegates 
have been told to make it an active militant order of the working class movement. 
The Soviet Government is, therefore, not bothering to disguise its intention of using 
the Federation to further the aims of the Cominform. This means using it against the 
Marshal! Plan, even though such use may force a break with the Unions of Western 
Europe and the C.I.O. 
46. Similar exhortations towards promoting Cominform aims have been made in 
various sections of the World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International 
Democratic Women's Federation, though no public lead appears to have been given 
by Moscow. 
Danger of Soviet policy to British interests 
47. Political. From the foregoing it will be seen that the Soviet policy is actively 
hostile to British interests everywhere. All elements friendly to ours in the Soviet 
orbit are being or have been eliminated or removed from power. A concerted and 
co-ordinated attempt is being made to spread hatred against us throughout the 
world , by representing us with the Americans, as using "direct threats of force, 
blackmail, extortion, political and economic pressure, bribery" and other unscrupu-
lous means to support our wholly predatory and oppressive aims. Soviet policy has 
been sharpened in this respect by their estimate that the Truman Doctrine and 
Marshal! Plan, with the ultimate assurance of effective reconstruction in western and 
southern Europe, are contrary to Soviet interests and must be regarded as aimed 
against them. 
48. If the process of communisation were extended to other countries, and more 
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particularly to France or China, we should be increasingly and dangerously isolated, 
and incidentally might even be forced, together with the United States, into the 
position of having to make continual use of our veto in the Security Council. It is to 
be feared that the immediate Soviet objective is to dominate Italy, Austria, Greece, 
France and French North Africa (and presumably the French Colonial Empire). They 
also seek to make serious trouble for us in Palestine and the Middle East and to 
undermine Persian independence. Success in this plan, even if at the outset only 
partial, would enable the Soviets effectively to dominate the Mediterranean even 
without physical control of the Western approaches, and threaten our interests in, 
and communications with the Middle East, India and the Far East and with our main 
reserves of oil in the Persian Gulf. 
49. Economic. There can be little doubt that the broad objective of Soviet policy 
in the economic sphere is (a) to establish complete control over the territories which 
it dominates politically, and (b) later to extend its influence over adjacent areas. 
50. Eastern Europe is in the first category (a) above. In Eastern Europe, though 
in varying degrees, the Soviet Union has already succeeded in gaining a substantial 
grip through reparation deliveries, the seizure of ex-enemy assets and the establish-
ment of Soviet controlled banking, industrial and commercial eo-operations [sic]. By 
means of bilateral trade agreements, the commercial relations of these territories are 
being turned increasingly towards the East, though as long as the West has capital 
equipment and supplies to offer which the U.S.S.R. cannot provide, trade with the 
West on a strictly controlled basis, will be permitted. We must expect, however, that 
in the course of about five years these countries will be absorbed almost completely 
within the Soviet economic orbit. 
51. The prime example in the second category (b) above is Persia. Here it can be 
assumed that the U.S.S.R. is only biding its time before establishing economic 
control by political means. Soviet interest in obtaining control of the oil output of 
southern Persia is probably due as much to the desire to deprive the Western Powers 
of the use of this oil, as to the need for additional oil for its own use. 
52. The net economic effect of this situation for the United Kingdom is extremely 
serious. The deflection of the food resources of Eastern Germany, Poland and 
Hungary to the East largely deprives Western Europe of important sources of 
non-dollar supplies, and worsens the balance of payments position of Western 
Germany and Western Europe, with incalculable effects upon our own economic 
position. These losses, however, are trivial compared with the result which would 
flow from Soviet control of the oil-producing areas of Southern Persia or from the 
undermining of our interests in the oil-producing areas of Iraq and the rest of the 
Persian Gulf. 
53. It should be noted, however, that Soviet attempts at economic domination 
have not so far extended beyond the areas over which they exercise some political 
control. Their attitude towards international economic organisations which might 
give them an opportunity of extending their influence in other directions, has been 
one of indifference. One of their reasons for this attitude may well be their desire to 
prevent any intrusion of Western interests into the areas which they control. They do 
not belong to any of the economic "specialised agencies," and their interest in the 
Economic Commission for Europe has been spasmodic, giving no evidence of a 
considered policy of using this Commission-in which they could play a dominant 
role-for their own ends. 
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54. Although the Soviet Union is not in a position to dominate the economies of 
Western Europe, the economic effects of Communist political agitation in the 
countries of Western Europe are important. The recent Communist-inspired strikes 
in France and Italy have caused a serious set-back in the economic recovery of those 
two countries at a very critical period. 
55. The United States Congress has cut dangerously low the credits for interim 
aid under the Marshall Plan to both France and Italy. With the further set-back 
caused by the recent strikes the amounts which have been voted are now quite 
inadequate to deal with the growing crisis in both countries, and their economic 
recovery will be still further retarded. Delay in the pace of recovery in Europe has a 
directly adverse effect on the United Kingdom economy. Until Europe has recovered 
and is able to buy from us with convertible currencies, our own position of complete 
disequilibrium with the Western Hemisphere will inevitably continue. Increased 
production is vital to the recovery of Europe. Anything which hampers production 
delays recovery and brings chaos nearer. To the extent that the Communists are able 
to foster labour unrest and so hamper production they have a very powerful weapon 
which they have used very effectively and will not hesitate to use again. The loss of 
production in the recent strikes to France and Italy runs into millions of dollars and 
has made the whole of Western Europe still more dependent on the United States for 
the bare essentials of life. 
56. Political and social unrest in the Far East, much of which is Communist-
inspired, is undermining not only the economic stability of the territories in 
question, but is placing in peril our long-standing commercial and financial interests 
in Asia. The lack of return on our substantial investments in that continent is an 
important factor contributing to our present financial difficulties. 
57. Strategic. It seems unlikely that the Soviet Union is making plans to start a 
war with Great Britain or the United States. This is principally for two reasons. First, 
the Russians seem to be fairly confident of getting the fruits of war without going to 
war. This would be facilitated by any weakness, political, military or economic, on 
our part, or by any Russian success in driving a wedge between the United States and 
ourselves. Secondly, they probably realise that for the present at any rate their 
long-term chances in a war against the West are not good and that the best result 
they could hope for would be mutual destruction. Technically they are still backward 
compared with the Americans and ourselves, and their war losses were heavier. 
Nevertheless, they still maintain very formidable armed forces. They now have the 
largest land army, and numerically the largest air force and submarine fleet in the 
world. Their armed forces are about four times as great as their pre-war strength, 
and the necessity for military preparedness is constantly preached. It is true that they 
have taken the lead in calling for disarmament, but they have been careful to 
concentrate their proposals on the elimination of weapons in which other people are 
strong and their general tactics in disarmament matters have been highly disin-
genous. In fact, the impression left on me by the New York discussions on 
disarmament was that the main Soviet objective was to demobilise or immobilise the 
rest of the world while remaining mobilised themselves. 
58. It is evident that if the Russian political plans for Southern and Western 
Europe were to succeed, they would be in a position, with the armed forces described 
in the preceding paragraph, to put us in a hopeless position strategically. Their 
submarine fleet, in which they are incorporating all the latest German inventions, 
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would be operating from forward bases and would be a serious menace to our sea 
communications. They would be in a position to dominate the Mediterranean, and 
the difficulty of defending our interests in Africa and the Middle East would be 
immeasurably increased, quite apart from any direct threat to the Middle East. 
Without the oil reserves of South Persia and the Middle East neither the British 
Commonwealth nor even America can exert their full 'strength. Furthermore, the 
threat to the security of these islands would be very great. Finally, the Russians have 
developed and improved the Vls and V2s, to say nothing of other secret German 
weapons and of inventions of their own. 
59. It is thus evident that the success of Russian expansionist plans would 
threaten, if not destroy, the three main elements of Commonwealth defence, the 
security of the United Kingdom, the control of sea communications, and the defence 
of the Middle East. 
144 CAB 128/12, CM 2(48)5 8 Jan 1948 
'Foreign policy in Europe': Cabinet conclusions 
The Cabinet had before them the following memoranda by the Foreign Secretary:-
C.P.(48)7: containing a review of Soviet policy. 1 
C.P.(47)313: on the extinction of human rights in Eastern Europe. 
C.P.(48)6: outlining a policy for fostering a political union of Western European 
countries.2 
C.P.(48)8: on future foreign publicity policy. 
The Foreign Secretary said that the United States proposals for assisting the 
economic recovery of Europe had crystallised the opposition of the Soviet Govern-
ment to any closer organisation of the democratic States of Western Europe; and it 
was clear that, although the recent Soviet attempts to stir up trouble in France and 
Italy had largely failed, some closer form of union should be created in Western 
Europe in order to resist the increasing penetration of Soviet influence. It would 
have been premature to take action in this direction before the recent meeting of the 
Council of Foreign Ministers, but the breakdown of that conference and the 
encouraging progress made with the plans for European recovery, towards which the 
United Kingdom Government had made such an important contribution, had opened 
the way for an attempt to secure a greater measure of co-operation among the 
countries of Western Europe. It would be necessary to mobilise the resources of 
Africa in support of any Western European union; and, if some such union could be 
created, including not only the countries of Western Europe but also their Colonial 
possessions in Africa and the East, this would form a bloc which, both in population 
and productive capacity, could stand on an equality with the western hemisphere and 
Soviet blocs. 
In discussion there was general support for the proposal that positive steps should 
be taken to consolidate the forces of the Western European countries and their 
Colonial possessions. The following points were made:-
(a) It was important that in the execution of the policy outlined in C.P.(48)6 too 
1 See 143. 2 See 142. 
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much emphasis should not be laid on its anti-Soviet aspect. A policy which gained 
the unanimous support of the Press and public opinion of the Right would fail to 
rally the Socialist forces in Western Europe and would make it more difficult to 
foster cultural and trade relations with Eastern European countries, which, though 
dominated politically by Communists, still had a western outlook. The danger of 
pursuing a policy which concentrated on opposition to the Soviet Government was 
illustrated by events in Greece, where it had not been found possible to strengthen 
the influence of the centre Parties. Doubts were also expressed about the suggestion 
in C.P.(48)6 that Portugal should be included in the western democratic system. 
In reply, the Foreign Secretary said that it would be impossible for him to give an 
effective lead without being critical of Soviet policy, but it was his intention to 
concentrate mainly on the positive and constructive side of his proposals. So far as 
Greece was concerned, every effort had been made to encourage the centre Parties, 
but they had proved incapable of forming a stable Government. The inclusion of 
Portugal in any Western European union would be most important because of her 
Colonial possessions in Africa. There was no intention of attempting to bring Spain 
into the union so long as the Franco Government continued in power. 
(b) The most effective method of countering Soviet propaganda was to provide 
specific information refuting the misrepresentations made by the Soviet Govern-
ment. The Prime Minister's recent broadcast illustrated how this could be combined 
with encouragement of Socialist principles. 
(c) It would be necessary to work out more precisely the purposes for which a 
closer union of Western Europe was to be advocated. Co-operation might be for the 
purpose of defence or in the economic or cultural fields; but, unless some positive 
point of focus were devised, it would be difficult to make any satisfactory progress. It 
might be advisable, in the first instance, to try to work out the basic principles iJ! 
consultation with the French Government. 
(d) It might be desirable to establish some form of inter-departmental organisa-
tion, including the Board of Trade, the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth 
Relations Office, to work out the basic principles of co-operation and advise on the 
lines which propaganda should follow. 
(e) Much progress had already been made in securing the co-operation of Western 
European countries in colonial matters. The Secretary of State for the Colonies had 
also devoted special attention to developing the understanding of democratic 
principles in the Colonial Empire through the Press, films and broadcasting, 
through the fostering of the trade union movement, and through the guidance of 
students from Colonial territories attending Universities and Colleges in this 
country. 
(f) It would give much-needed encouragement to the Social Democratic leaders 
in Germany if in any proposals for closer union in Western Europe it was made clear 
that there would in due course be a place for Germany in the union. 
(g) The possibility of establishing a Western European broadcasting station 
should be considered. 
(h) The Dominion Governments should be fully consulted and kept in touch as 
the proposals for closer union in Western Europe were developed. 
(i) The Foreign Secretary undertook to advise the Labour Party whether they 
should participate in a public demonstration in favour of European union which was 
being organised at The Hague by the Joint International Committee of Movements 
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for European Unity. This demonstration had the support of the Dutch Government 
and M. Spaak and M. Blum.3 
The Cabinet:-
(1) Subject to the points made in discussion, endorsed the policy outlined in 
C.P.(48)6 and the recommendations for future foreign publicity made in 
C.P.(48)8. 
(2) Took note of C.P.(48)7 and approved the recommendations in paragraph 2 of 
C.P.(47)313 .... 
3 Paul-Henri Spaak, leader of Belgian Socialist Party and prime minister 1947-1949, presided over the 
first UN General Assembly; Leon Blum, leader of French Socialist Party and prime minister, 1946-1947. 
145 CAB 129/25, CP(48)72 3 Mar 1948 
'The threat to Western civilisation': Cabinet memorandum by Mr 
Bevin 
The fast increasing threat to western civilisation which Soviet expansion represents 
impels me once again to examine the extent to which the Soviet Government appear 
to be achieving their aims, together with the steps we should now take in order to 
frustrate them. 
2. As my colleagues will recall, I circulated four papers to the Cabinet at the 
beginning of January (C.P.(48)5-Policy in Germany; C.P.(48)6-The First Aim in 
British Foreign Policy1; C.P.(48)7-A Review of Soviet Polic/; C.P.(48)8--Future of 
Foreign Publicity Policy). 
3. It will be remembered (as set out in the Annex and in C.P.(48)7) that ever since 
the European Recovery Programme was devised, the Soviet Government have been 
carrying on a war of nerves and behind it resolutely using the Communist Party to 
achieve dictatorship. It is their intention to endeavour to expand their activities to 
cover the whole of Europe at the earliest possible date . So far as we are concerned, we 
have been proceeding on the basis, which we made quite clear to Stalin, that just as 
the Russians had built up in the east what they called security, we intended to 
develop a good-neighbourly policy in the west, not aimed against Russia but inspired 
by the sheer necessity of economic revival and development and of security. I made 
all this clear in my speech on 22nd January. But, as we foresaw, events have since 
moved quickly and aggressively, most recently in Czechoslovakia and now in 
Finland, and I am convinced that we have to go wider than the original friendly 
intent of our more limited approach to the Benelux countries, with France, on the 
basis of the Dunkirk Treaty. It has really become a matter of the defence of western 
civilisation, or everyone will be swamped by this Soviet method of infiltration. I ask 
my colleagues, therefore, to give further consideration to the whole situation and 
decide whether our policy should not now be broadened so that we can proceed 
urgently with the active organisation of all those countries who believe in 
parliamentary government and free institutions, and devise methods which will cope 
with this quickly moving stream of events. 
1 See 142. 2 See 143. 
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I have set out in the Annex headed "Considerations"3 in greater detail than in my 
earlier paper (C.P.(48)7) the steps that have been taken by Soviet Russia from the 
days of the war-time conferences until the present. 
There is only one conclusion to draw. After all the efforts that have been made and 
the appeasement that we followed to try and get a real friendly settlement on a 
four-Power basis, not only is the Soviet Government not prepared at the present 
stage to co-operate in any real sense with any non-Communist or non-Communist 
controlled Government, but it is actively preparing to extend its hold over the 
remaining part of continental Europe and, subsequently, over the Middle East and no 
doubt the bulk of the Far East as well. In other words, physical control of the 
Eurasian land mass and eventual control of the whole World Island is what the 
Politburo is aiming at-no less a thing than that. The immensity of the aim should 
not betray us into believing in its impracticability. Indeed, unless positive and 
vigorous steps are shortly taken by those other states who are in a position to take 
them, it may well be that within the next few months or even weeks the Soviet Union 
will gain political and strategical advantages which will set the great Communist 
machine in action, leading either to the establishment of a World Dictatorship or 
(more probably) to the collapse of organised society over great stretches of the globe. 
4. All our evidence indeed points to the probable staging by the Soviet 
Government of further efforts in this direction during the next few weeks or months. 
We cannot be sure where exactly this showdown will take place nor even that it will 
not occur in several places at once. All we know for certain (since the Cominform has 
proclaimed it openly) is that its object will be the frustration by one means or 
another of the European Recovery Programme and the consequent development of a 
situation in which the Communist cause will triumph in many countries largely as a 
result of a process of economic decay. But this does not mean that the Soviet 
Government are determined to have their way whatever the outside world may say or 
do. There is no reason even now to suppose that it could possibly welcome the World 
War which would undoubtedly result from its overstepping the mark. It is commonly 
accepted Communist doctrine that no issue should be forced until the moment is 
ripe and victory almost certain. If, therefore, the upholders of true democracy and 
opponents of dictatorship can present a really united front, and if the necessary 
economic means are made available by those who have them, the danger of war is, in 
my opinion, not imminent. Indeed it is my considered view that the only danger of 
war arises from the non-fulfilment of these two conditions. Provided they are fulfilled 
I believe that Communism will be forced on to the defensive and that for many years 
at any rate we may look forward to a period of relative clam. 
5. On these two "ifs", however, everything depends. As for the second one we can 
only do our best to assist the passage of the European Recovery Programme through 
Congress by continuing to warn the Administration of the dangers of delay. The first 
"if' depends very largely on ourselves. If we here, as a nation, are united on the main 
issue, then additional strength to resist will be imparted to our friends on the 
continent and, indeed, to our friends all over the world. If, on the contrary, we show 
evidence of irresolution and divided counsels, there will be a corresponding lack of 
the will to resist which may have terrible results even if aid should eventually be 
forthcoming under the European Recovery Programme. 
3 Not printed. 
330 INTERNATIONAL POLICY [145) 
6. Recent events have only brought to a head a fundamental contradiction which 
has been inherent in European politics at least since the formation of the Third 
International. It is the contradiction between an imposed solution of social 
difficulties, which in the last analysis can only mean Dictatorship, and a voluntary, 
reasoned and human solution which is summed up in all that we mean by the word 
"Democracy". 
7. With a view to stemming any further infiltration of dictatorship, I make the 
following recommendations to my colleagues:-
Recommendations 
(1) We should pursue on as broad a basis as possible in co-operation with our 
French allies, the conclusions of a treaty or treaties with the Benelux countries. We 
should aim as a matter of great urgency at negotiating multilateral economic, 
cultural and defensive pacts between the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux 
countries, which would be left open for accession by other European democracies. 
(This will be done on the basis of the Cabinet decision approving the recommenda-
tions in my earlier paper (C.P.(48)6).) 
(2) Simultaneously with this, the whole problem of the co-ordination of efforts for 
the cultural, social, economic and financial revival and development of the West and 
for the defence of western civilisation with the support of all friendly western Powers 
and of course of the Commonwealth should be proceeded with at once. Having in 
mind Soviet tactics from Yalta onwards, we should decide what common arrange-
ments can be made and what consultations should be entered into to prevent Soviet 
tactics succeeding on an even wider basis than hitherto and to halt any further 
expansion of Soviet dictatorship. The issue upon which we should consult with 
like-minded countries is not so much that of Communism as of the establishment of 
dictatorship as against parliamentary government and liberty. In this connection we 
cannot limit ourselves to Europe. We must bring in the Commonwealth and the 
Americas, and eventually every country outside the Soviet group. 
(3) This would include at an early stage Italy, which is at present the weakest link 
in the chain of anti-Communist states, but which-if we are to get a really effective 
western Union-must be brought in. But whether steps should be taken in advance 
of the April elections, or afterwards, is a matter to be determined. In the meantime 
we should do everything in our power to assist the parliamentary government of 
Italy. 
(4) If my colleagues agree to this as a policy, then I would ask to be authorised to 
proceed to discussions with the Commonwealth and, through the diplomatic 
channels and in every way open to me, with other countries sharing our western 
conception of democracy and liberty in order to build up the organisation necessary 
to give effect to such a policy. In these discussions it would be essential to decide 
what is required of each western country collectively and individually. This would 
affect, among other things, defence, the budgetary position, the supply of food and 
the building up of our economies on an entirely new basis. The division between us 
at the moment is so deep because Communism is playing such a part in the west, 
interfering with its economic revival and making consolidation so difficult. 
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146 CAB 128/12, CM 19(48) 5 Mar 1948 
'Foreign policy in Europe': Cabinet conclusions on the Soviet threat 
The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the Foreign Secretary on the 
Czechoslovak crisis (C.P.(48)71) and the Soviet threat to Western civilisation 
(C.P.(48)72). 1 
The Foreign Secretary said that the past actions of the Soviet Government, 
culminating in the recent events in Czechoslovakia and Finland, showed beyond any 
doubt that there was no hope of reaching a satisfactory settlement either by 
agreement among the four Great Powers or through the United Nations Organisa-
tion, and that resolute action must be taken to counter the Soviet threat to Western 
civilisation. He accordingly proposed that we should aim at completing, as a matter 
of urgency, the current negotiations for economic, cultural and defensive pacts 
between the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. Simul-
taneously, we should seek to strengthen the defence of Western civilisation by 
enlisting the co-operation of Commonwealth countries and all other friendly 
countries, including those in the Western Hemisphere; and special efforts should be 
made to strengthen parliamentary government in Italy, which was at present the 
weakest link in the chain of non-Communist States. A further step towards economic 
co-operation in Europe would be taken at the meeting of the Committee. of European 
Economic Co-operation which was to be held in March but, in addition, there would 
have to be discussions with Commonwealth Governments and, through diplomatic 
channels, with the Governments of foreign countries in order to bring about 
co-operation in other fields. If the Cabinet gave general approval to the policy which 
he had outlined, he would report from time to time on the action taken to give effect 
to it. 
In discussion there was general support for the policy proposed by the Foreign 
Secretary, special emphasis being laid on the urgent need to strengthen the forces of 
democratic socialism in France and Italy and to prevent the weakening of the 
Commonwealth through the secession of India, and possibly Pakistan. Resistance to 
further Soviet expansion could not be successful unless we could secure a high 
standard of living both at home and in those countries which were ranged on our 
side; but it would also be necessary to base our campaign on the higher moral and 
spiritual values of Western civilisation. In present conditions no country could afford 
the degree of mobilisation of man-power and resources attained during the late war, 
and a greater pooling of defence resources seemed inevitable. Meanwhile, however, it 
was desirable that the Cabinet should have an appreciation of the military strength 
needed to support diplomatic action under the policy proposed by the Foreign 
Secretary and of the defence measures needed if that policy failed to prevent war. The 
weapon of propaganda must be used to the full and it would probably be necessary to 
set up special machinery for this purpose. Propaganda must vary according to the 
country to which it was addressed, and it should be such as to avoid creating 
embarrassment for the Foreign Secretary in his dealings with foreign Governments 
through diplomatic channels. 
In further discussion, the following points were made:-
1 See 145. 
w 
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(a) The financial measures of the French Government had proved ineffective, and 
the economic situation in France was very serious. The Government's position was 
insecure and, if it fell, it was likely to be succeeded by a Government of the extreme 
Right or the extreme Left. 
(b) Should India and Pakistan secede from the British Commonwealth, their 
example might well be followed by Ceylon and, in due course, Malaya. Difficulty in 
retaining these countries within the Commonwealth would arise mainly from 
constitutional forms, the dominant political Parties being committed to an abstract 
republicanism which made it difficult for them to accept allegiance to the Crown. It 
might be possible to meet this situation by devising some fresh constitutional form 
of association which would enable these and similar countries to attain a new kind of 
independence within the Commonwealth. The possibilities of giving India and 
Pakistan special assistance for economic development should also be examined. 
(c) Experience in the war had shown the value of political warfare, and the Soviet 
Government and their satellites made exhaustive use of it. The primary object of any 
propaganda campaign should be to provide the people of Europe with the leadership 
in Western Europe which Governments had so far failed to provide, but its scope 
should be world-wide. It might be desirable to establish some organisation on the 
lines of the war-time Political Warfare Executive, which would work under 
Ministerial direction and in close touch with the Foreign Office. 
(d) There·were certain directions in which the Labour Party, rather than the 
Government, might be found to be the most effective instrument for conducting 
propaganda and strengthening and advising the social democratic Parties in Western 
Europe. 
(e) There was some prospect that the Christian Churches might be prepared to 
take common action in defence of Western civilisation, and it might be possible to 
secure this through the International Council of Christian Churches. In recent years 
there had been a significant growth of sympathy with the principles of social 
democracy in the Roman Catholic Church. 
(0 Communism had prospered in primitive conditions. There was reason to 
suppose that it might not be equally successful in retaining a hold over the peoples of 
more highly-developed countries. It was therefore important that every effort should 
be made to concentrate propaganda on the Eastern European countries which were 
nearest to Western Europe. 
(g) Bilateral trade agreements had hitherto been made with Eastern European 
States in the light of purely economic considerations. Was there now a case on 
political grounds for conceding more generous terms or for adopting more 
aggressive methods? 
(h) The possibility of affording greater economic assistance to Scandinavian 
countries, possibly by long-term agreements, ought to be considered. 
The Cabinet:-
(!) Gave general approval to the proposals made in paragraph 7 of C.P.(48)72 for 
countering the Soviet threat to Western civilisation; 
(2) Took note that the Prime Minister would consider what interdepartmental 
machinery was required to enable full effect to be given to some of these proposals; 
(3) Took note of C.P.(48)71. 
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147 CO 537/2758 1- 11 Oct 1948 
[Communism in the colonial empire ]: minutes by Trafford Smith1 and 
Mr Rees-Williams 
. . . I hope I may be forgiven for pointing out that a policy against Communism 
preferably throughout the Commonwealth, but if that is impossible (as it may well be 
for political reasons) at least throughout the Colonial Empire, is an urgent 
requirement. 
To mention only the points I can think of at the moment: 
1. Malaya . The M.C.P. has been proscribed but this proscription was not achieved 
until (if I understand it rightly) the Party had completed the organization and 
preparation of the present troubles. Notwithstanding the proscription of the Party, a 
Communist who is not a member of the M.C.P. is apparently at liberty to continue 
his activities. 
2. Hong Kong. Here, for local political reasons, the Communist Party pursues its 
avocation unhindered, with the full knowledge of the Hong Kong Government. 
3. Cyprus. Lord Winster maintains that every effort he has made to check the 
Communist Party has been frustrated by the Colonial Office. So far as I can make out 
the only action we are taking of an anti-Communist nature is to appoint an 
Information Officer to conduct counter-propaganda. 
4. Gibraltar. The Governor wishes to deport a known Communist who has put 
new life into the local Party. The case, I believe, is still under consideration, but the 
Geographical Department opposes deportation. 
5. British Guiana. The latest reports reveal that a certain Dr. Jagan and his wife , 
known Communists, are making great strides in organizing the Party there. No 
action is as yet being taken against them. 
6. Kenya. In a long despatch which I shall be sending on very shortly, Sir Philip 
Mitchell advocates the introduction of the lettre de cachet against Communists. 
7. Nyasaland. By way of contrast with 1- 6 above, the Government of Nyasaland 
have recently debarred the entry of a non-Communist against whom nothing is 
known whatever beyond the fact that he works for a cinema company whose South 
African directors are believed by the Union Security Services to "have Communist 
affiliations". 
In my view the above instances-they could probably be multiplied-amply 
demonstrate that at the moment we have no policy at all. It is argued that to take 
strong measures against Communism only drives the movement underground: but 
as a result Communists are allowed to complete their trouble-making organization 
undisturbed, and action is taken against them only at the much too late stage when 
they set their machine in motion. For my part I find myself in reluctant agreement 
with Sir Philip Mitchell (in the despatch referred to in 6 above) who argues that 
Western European civil ization versus Communism is a fight to the death, & that it is 
useless to apply to Communists, who know no rules of the game except those which 
serve their ends, the liberties of the subject, etc., and the whole attitude of mind of 
19th century liberalism, which they only exploit to their own ends. 
I hope that at least we shall be able to think of some guidance to give to Governors . 
1 CO assistant secretary, 1945-1950. 2 Baron, formerly R T H Fletcher; gov of Cyprus, 1946-1949. 
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When a Governor sees another Malaya or another Gold Coast round the corner, an 
Information Officer is not enough. 
SofS 
T.S. 
1.10.48 
The whole question of our approach to communism is to my mind one aspect of the 
general problem of defence and security; in it are (1) Intelligence and Intelligence 
organization in the CO and the Colonies (2) Defence, size and nature of forces, 
regular, volunteer & now gendarmerie (3) Police re-organization and (4) our attitude 
to the special problem of communists and communist parties. I do not believe that 
the arrangements in the CO or in the Colonies are adequate under any of these 
headings and I suggest that we have an office conference as soon as possible so that 
decisions can be taken and the resulting orders given. As time is short, may I submit 
that this conference takes high priority in what I know is your very full agenda .... 
D.R.R.W. 
11.10.48 
148 CO 537/2758, no 4 21 Oct 1948 
[Communist infiltration of the colonies]: note by I H Harris1 of a CO 
internal discussion (18 Oct) 
1. The Secretary of State opened by saying that the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Secretary had expressed concern at the danger of Communist infiltration in 
the Colonies; suitable arrangements would have to be made to deal with this problem 
and the time had arrived to take a stronger line than hitherto. Action should be 
taken: 
(1) To establish in Colonial territories the civil and military organisation capable 
of dealing effectively with any foreseeable emergency. 
(2) To improve the machinery in the Colonial Office for the collation of Security 
and Political Intelligence, and for advising Ministers on the political, economic 
and other repercussions in Colonies of events in Commonwealth and Foreign 
countries. 
(3) To formulate a positive and constructive policy towards Communism in all its 
manifestations and to give Colonies the lead which they now required. 
(4) To ensure that the public in the Colonies were educated to appreciate the 
nature of Communism and the steps which were being taken to counteract it. This 
would involve: 
(a) the improvement and extension of broadcast propaganda, 
(b) the building up of information services, 
(c) the use of the press, possibly with newspapers giving "official" news, 
(d) the control of newspapers, and other literature which set out to impose on a 
gullible public. 
2. Discussion then turned on the following three points: 
1 Assistant principal. 
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(1) Colonial "gendarmerie" 
The Secretary of State said that it had been suggested by the Foreign Secretary, who 
was basing himself on the course of recent operations in Malaya and the Greek 
Government's campaigns against General Markoa, that some kind of gendarmerie 
trained as a guerilla force was required in most territories as there appeared to be a 
gap between the civil police and the military forces . There had been increasing 
evidence in recent weeks of a Soviet intention to foment disturbances in British 
Colonial territories especially Africa, and the Secretary of State for War had just 
received intelligence confirming this. 
In the discussion which followed some doubts were expressed whether acceptance 
of this proposal for a separate gendarmerie would not weaken the case for a Colonial 
Defence Vote, and also whether reference to Governors should not be deferred 
pending further consideration of certain details. 
Mr. Rees-Williams explained that he did not believe it was the Foreign Secretary's 
intention to draw away from the existing conception of Colonial Local Forces, but 
rather to ensure that the Colonial Forces should be suitably organised to include an 
element capable of carrying out "gendarmerie" duties of the kind which had proved 
necessary in Malaya. This from our point of view might be regarded as providing an 
additional argument for the Colonial Defence Vote. 
It was pointed out that the existing organisation of Colonial Local Forces was in 
fact designed to cover all contingencies, though present scales would probably need 
revision in the light of experience gained in Malaya, and future training should be 
planned with local conditions in mind. 
The view finally adopted was that a third force should not be interposed between 
the Military and the Police but rather that the Military Forces should if necessary be 
retrained so as to be in a position to cope with local bush warfare conditions as well 
as other types of modern warfare. 
Conclusions. The Meeting: 
(a) agreed that the Colonial Local Forces to be financed with the aid of the 
proposed Colonial Defence Vote should where necessary include an element 
trained on gendarmerie lines in local bush warfare conditions: such an arrange-
ment would be preferable to a separate gendarmerie force, 
(b) decided that paragraphs should be added to the Colonial Defence Vote paper to 
bring in the point at (a), 
(c) decided that Defence Department should study the question of possible 
reorganisation of the scale and training of Colonial Forces as proposed at (a). 
(2) Intelligence Organisation within the Office. 
The Secretary of State felt that there was a need for some kind of central intelligence 
department to watch outside events for possible repercussions in Colonial territories, 
and to which Ministers could go for information and advice on particular problems. 
In the ensuing discussion attention was drawn to the fortnightly review of 
Communism produced by Sir Marston Logan2 which to some extent, though at 
present limited to Communism, represented a nucleus of the organisation Ministers 
had in mind. 
2 Temporary administrative officer in CO, 1947; formerly gov of Seychelles, 1942-1947. 
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The present intelligence organisation in the Office was limited to about 75% of Sir 
Marston Logan's time and to about 10% of Mr. Trafford Smith's. 
It was thought that the collation of Political Intelligence reports as suggested by 
Sir Thomas Lloyd, could be done by Defence Department; but that the scheme 
envisaged by Ministers would involve a much larger organisation, the relation of 
which to Geographical Departments would have to be carefully worked out. 
Conclusions. The Meeting: 
(a) agreed that the collation of Political Intelligence reports should proceed 
forthwith, on the lines laid down in detail in Sir Thomas Lloyd's minute of 9th 
October, 1948 (copy annexed to this recordV 
(b) agreed generally that some kind of wider intelligence organisation on the lines 
suggested by Ministers was required, and that this might possibly take shape as a 
Research Department in International Relations Department, 
(c) decided that the whole question of an Intelligence-cum-research department 
should be further considered by Assistant Under-Secretaries of State and then 
discussed with Sir Thomas Lloyd prior to a further meeting with Ministers. 
(3) Communism 
The Secretary of State affirmed that a direct lead to Governors was required, both as 
regards the positive response (propaganda etc.) and the negative response (examina-
tion of powers of deportation, suppression of seditious literature, etc.). 
In the brief discussion which followed it appeared that the actual powers now 
possessed by Governors were by no means uniform, nor was their extent clear. 
Conclusion. The Meeting: 
decided that the question should be reserved for further discussion at an official 
meeting, after Geographical Departments had had an opportunity to prepare a 
review of individual cases in which difficulty had been experienced, and that it 
should then be considered what recommendations could be made to Ministers. 
3 Not printed. 
149 FO 800/435, ff 118-120 6 Nov 1948 
[Communism in British overseas territories]: minute by Mr Bevin to 
Mr Attlee 
I have been discussing with the Colonial Secretary the question of Communism in 
our Overseas Territories. I am rather worried about the situation, especially in Africa, 
where it seems to me that we must ensure that we are properly equipped to deal with 
a really serious Soviet inspired Communist movement. My indications are that 
sooner or later the Russians will make a major drive against our position in Africa, 
and we ought to take steps now to counter it. Experience in Malaya and elsewhere 
shows the importance of having an intelligence organisation which will enable the 
police to forestall trouble, and of the local authorities possessing and using adequate 
powers to prevent trouble occurring. 
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2. The Colonial Secretary, who is actively studying this problem, has in hand 
certain very necessary and useful measures, such as the appointment of a special 
Police Adviser to co-ordinate with Colonial Governors the organisation of security 
intelligence, but I gather there is some difficulty about providing him with assistance 
and proper staff, and I fear that administrative and inter-departmental delays may 
handicap us in making these measures really effective. I understand for instance 
from the Colonial Secretary that there is some doubt whether the necessary 
expenditure is to come under the Colonial Office or Ministry of Defence vote. I have 
advised Creech Jones to prepare a paper for the Cabinet in order to get this and other 
similar difficulties settled rapidly, and I should be very grateful if you could see the 
Colonial Secretary, the Minister of Defence and if necessary the Secretary of State for 
War and get the matter cleared up. 
3. I feel sure you will agree with me that we cannot afford to let any such 
obstacles stand in the way of a firm and realistic policy in regard to overseas 
territories. If really serious trouble were to break out at any point, we have no further 
forces available to suppress it, and if such trouble were not to be put right at once, I 
am afraid that the Soviet Government might make a serious and perhaps dangerous 
miscalculation as to our real strength, with grave effects on our foreign policy. 
150 CAB 129/33/2, CP(49)67 17 Mar 1949 
'Report by Sir William Strang1: tour in South-East Asia and the Far 
East' (for Mr Bevin) [Extract: introductory section] 
I give below some notes on my recent journey in South-East Asia and the Far East. 
They are not exhaustive. It would be tedious to set down all that I heard or noted. 
What I have tried to do is to pick out the more important trends and note the more 
significant facts, not for the benefit of the specialist Departments, but as being of 
possible interest to the general reader, who will, I hope, draw from this paper some 
impression of current preoccupations and the play of forces in this important region. 
In the present introductory section I make some more general observations. If I 
have, in places, strayed beyond the strict limits of Foreign Office concern, I hope I 
may be excused. 
2. I had no other mission than to educate myself, to meet His Majesty's 
Representatives in the foreign countries visited, to tell them about developments at 
home, to give them a picture of the foreign situation as seen from Europe and, 
generally, to demonstrate the interest of the Foreign Office in Far Eastern and 
South-East Asian affairs. I spent some days each in Karachi, Delhi, Rangoon, 
Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Batavia, Bangkok, Hong Kong, Shanghai and Tokyo, and 
spent nights in transit at Alexandria and Calcutta. I had talks with the Heads of 
Missions and with their chief advisers, political, economic, financial, labour and 
information. I was received by the leading Ministers in each of the countries visited. I 
made a point of meeting and talking to the representatives of Commonwealth 
countries, the United States, France, Benelux and China. I saw leading members of 
the British Community in each place. The British Chambers of Commerce at Hong 
1 Permanent under-secretary, FO, from 1949. 
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Kong and Shanghai entertained me, and I addressed them. I walked through the 
offices of each of His Majesty's Missions and spoke to as many members of the staff as 
possible, of all grades. At the request of the Heads of the Mission I gave a talk to the 
members of the staff at Delhi and Tokyo; and at the request of the Commissioner-
General for South-East Asia, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, I did the same at Bukit Serene 
to a party of British, Malayan and Chinese notables. 
3. It will be observed that my journey, undertaken mostly by flying-boat, covered 
the central and eastern parts of the sea-girt periphery, or what the geopoliticians call 
the Rimland, which skirts the Heartland of Europe and Asia which is at present in 
large measure under Soviet control, and the fate of the western part of which is now 
at issue in the current battle for Berlin. I was interested to find that the significance 
of that battle is not diminished but rather enhanced when looked at from the Far 
East. 
4. The importance of our maintaining control of the periphery, which runs round 
from Oslo to Tokyo, of denying it to communism, and, if possible, defending it 
against military attack, needs no emphasis. Nor is it less important, from the point of 
view of the framing of policy, that we should try to look on the periphery as a whole. I 
found the germ of this thought in the minds of many of our representatives, and also 
the thought that there should not only be a United Kingdom policy, but, if possible, a 
Commonwealth policy (in spite of divergencies of outlook); and that that policy 
should, if possible, be concerted with the United States, since American resources 
would be indispensable. 
5. In all this, the Indian sub-continent has a special importance. It lies at a place 
about half-way round the periphery. If India tends to look eastwards, Pakistan looks 
both east and west. The sub-continent should not be regarded in isolation as a 
separate section. India, in particular, has an important role to play in peripheral 
politics-as a Great Asian Power; as a possible member of the Commonwealth; as a 
country with whom the United Kingdom has now an opportunity to develop relations 
on a new basis; as a country with political, cultural and economic interests in 
South-East Asia, which we should try to carry with us in the framing of policies and 
the development of action in that region. The Delhi Conferences on Indonesia and 
Burma may be pointers to the future. 
6. From this peripheral point of view, the establishment of the Middle East Office 
in Cairo and the Commissioner-General's Office in Singapore were moves in the 
right direction. The need for them has not diminished. I found the minds of some of 
His Majesty's Representatives turning in the direction of say, yearly regional 
meetings of Heads of Missions, and of the association of Commanders-in-Chief, 
Colonial Governors, and United Kingdom High Commissioners or their representa-
tives in some measure, if possible, with such conferences. The suggested groupings 
for this purpose might be first, from Greece or Turkey round to Pakistan, and 
secondly, from Pakistan to Japan. For the first group or part of it, the suggestion 
would be for a meeting in London next summer. For the second, a meeting similar to 
that recently held in Singapore, but with more extended membership than before, 
and some co-ordination with the similar conference of Colonial Governors. This 
would carry with it close contact between the Foreign Office, Colonial Office and 
Commonwealth Relations Office in London. It would also be useful if senior officials 
of the Foreign Office could visit South-East Asia and the Far East from time to time, 
possibly about the period of the Singapore meetings. 
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7. There is a good deal that is dark in the Far Eastern picture, but there are some 
brighter features. On the darker side are-
(a) the ever-present food shortage, which will be a long-term problem for India 
and Japan and may be an immediate one for Shanghai if United States assistance is 
cut short; 
(b) the present disorders in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and Indo-China; 
(c) the revolution in China and the menace that it brings for South-East Asia with 
its great Chinese communities and for foreign interests in the whole area; 
(d) the need of all these countries, in greater or lesser degree, for outside financial 
assistance; 
(e) the population problem in Japan, which the war has done nothing to cure but, 
indeed, has tended to intensify, and any attempt to solve which must, at the best, 
mean strong and growing competition with United Kingdom exporters and may, at 
the worst, in the long run, bring some new Japanese explosion. 
On the brighter side we may note-
(f) the success of the International Emergency Food Council and the 
Commissioner-General's Office in securing fair allocation and due delivery of the 
rice crop, thus making the most of available resources; 
(g) the buoyancy of rice production in Siam and of tin and rubber production in 
Malaya; 
(h) the easing of tension between India and Pakistan; 
(i) the demonstration by Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan that, given peace and 
good order, a settled administration and a reasonably stable currency, the great 
productive and trading aptitudes of the population come into play. Siam points in 
the same direction; 
and from a more specifically British point of view-
U) the maintenance of our good name, political influence and economic interests 
thanks to the example set to the world by the British people in their efforts towards 
recovery; 
to our act of policy in India; 
to our policy of non-intervention and unperturbed watchful waiting in China; 
to the zeal, demeanour and resource of our representatives, whether of 
the foreign, Colonial, Commonwealth or armed services, and the growing spirit of 
collaboration among them, matching the endeavours of our people at home; and 
to the integrity, experience, enterprise and flexibility of reactions to new 
conditions shown by our business communities, the growth of a team spirit 
among them, and of confidence between them and the official side. 
8. This would suggest that we have a part to play in this area which can be played 
by no other Power, though we clearly cannot play it alone. It can be best played by a 
combination of British experience and United States resources. 
9. Finally, I would express my sincere thanks to you Sir, for making my journey 
possible; to my colleagues of the Foreign Service whose generous and thoughtful 
assistance multiplied the benefit and lightened the burden of the tour; and to His 
Majesty's High Commissioners at Karachi and Delhi, the Commissioner-General at 
Singapore, the Governors of Singapore and Hong Kong and the High Commissioner 
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of the Federation of Malaya and their staffs for all the courtesies and the very great 
kindness which I received at their hands .. . . 
151 FO 800/445, ff79-80 18 Oct 1949 
[Communist subversive activities in the colonies I: minute by Mr Bevin 
to Mr Attlee 
I have seen the Colonial Secretary's minute No. P.M(49)45 of October 3rd sending 
you a draft despatch to Colonial Governors regarding the importance of countering 
Communist subversive activities. I have also seen your Private Secretary's letter of 
October 5th saying that you have asked for the opinion of the Lord Chancellor, the 
Law Officers and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations on this 
proposed despatch. I see that Lord Addison has already expressed his concurrence . 
. 2. I should like, if I may, to express the hope that a very early decision may be 
reached in this matter. The Communist successes in China have already led to an 
important movement of opinion among the Chinese communities in South-East Asia 
in favour of the new Chinese Communist Government, and I do not think there can 
be any doubt that we must expect greatly increased pressure from the Communists 
in all the territories of South-East Asia as well as a general increase of pressure in the 
Colonial sphere. 
3. It will be most inconvenient, to say the least, if incidents occur in British 
overseas territories which require movements of troops to restore order in the 
coming months, and I think it is important that Colonial Governors should be 
instructed to consider in good time how they can prevent any such trouble arising, as 
proposed by the Colonial Secretary. 
4. I trust, therefore, that an early decision may be reached and that the Colonial 
Secretary may be authorised to issue instructions on the general lines contemplated 
in the draft despatch as soon as possible. 
5. I am sending copies of this minute to the Lord Chancellor, the Law Officers 
and the Colonial Secretary. 
152 CAB 129/37/1, CP(49)208 18 Oct 1949 
'European policy': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Bevin on creation of a 
'third world power' or consolidation of the West 
This paper, which is circulated for the information of my colleagues, discusses the 
question whether the aim of European policy should be the creation of a third world 
power or the consolidation of the Western World. 
I. Introduction 
Until about the end of 1947, when the Great Power system known as the Council of 
Foreign Ministers broke down, it was assumed, with decreasing confidence, that the 
general structure of peace would be based essentially on co-operation between the 
United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, which to some extent 
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might be taken as representing the British Commonwealth and Empire. The 
breakdown on the question of Germany, however, destroyed this conception, perhaps 
temporarily, perhaps for ever. Although the United Nations was maintained as a kind 
of symbol of a real world system, and no doubt in the expectation that it would 
ultimately prove possible to revert to it, it was then clearly necessary to cast around 
for some alternative system of security which would be capable of maintaining peace 
for a long period to come. 
2. This process of consolidating the non-Communist world really began in June 
1947 with the announcement of the Marshall Plan and my acceptance of it. It passed 
from the economic to the political and military sphere early in 1948. At that time I 
envisaged action in three stages. The first stage was the conclusion of the Brussels 
Treaty, described as the hard core of the European system. The second stage was its 
reinforcement by the power and wealth of North America. The third stage was the 
extension of the European system. The first stage was completed by the signature of 
the Brussels Treaty on 17th March, 1948. The second stage was completed by the 
signature of the Atlantic Pact, which, for the first time, committed the United States 
and Canada to the defence of Western Europe. The third stage has now been initiated 
with the signature of the Statute of the Council of Europe. It therefore seems 
desirable to consider carefully what is to be the ultimate aim of this policy. 
3. For the moment the Brussels Treaty and the Atlantic Pact provide a military 
alliance of those free democracies of the West which are threatened by the Soviet 
Government. But it has been suggested that this should be a temporary phase, and 
that the real object should be to organise Western Europe into a "Middle Power," 
co-equal with and independent of the United States and the Soviet Union alike. The 
supporters of this proposal admit that for a considerable period of time, and notably 
for such period as Western Europe is dependent for its very existence on American 
economic support, the European political organisation, whatever it may be, will have 
to lean heavily towards America and away from the Soviet Union. At the same time it 
is suggested that the underlying aim of an organisation of Europe should be the 
eventual creation of a system which would enable Western Europe, plus the bulk of 
the African continent, and in some form of loose association with other members of 
the Commonwealth, to run an independent policy in world affairs which would not 
necessarily coincide with either Soviet or American wishes. 
4. This concept of a Third World Power has had many advocates. In this country 
it has appealed particularly to those who find American capitalism little more 
attractive than Soviet Communism, and to those who feel a natural dislike of seeing 
this country in a dependent position. But the policy is not without its advocates in 
the United States itself. These have included, at one time at any rate, the Planning 
Section of the State Department, who thought that the best way to consolidate the 
Western world was to build up another power-unit with a strength equivalent to that 
of America and Russia. It has also found favour among the isolationists, who feel that 
if this unit came into existence it would provide America with an axcuse for retiring 
into her shell and leaving the task of containing Russia to the Third World Power. 
5. Another school of thought, more common perhaps on the Continent of Europe 
than in the United States or the United Kingdom, has suggested that a Third World 
Power of this kind, even if its physical power were less than that of either of the other 
two great Powers, would by remaining neutral develop an influence out of proportion 
to its strength, since it could hope to be courted by both sides. The ability of a weak 
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State to exploit its neutrality in this manner is illustrated by the conduct of Bulgaria 
in 1914-15 and Italy in 1939--40, though the subsequent experiences of these two 
countries are not encouraging. 
6. All these schools of thought, different as they are, have in common the 
assumption that it is possible to create a workable Third World Power, independent 
equally of Russia and America. The object of this paper is to consider whether this 
assumption is justified; whether, if the creation of a Third World Power is possible, it 
is also desirable; and, if not, what the alternatives are. 
Il. Possible composition of a Third World Power 
7. The first question that requires consideration is what the composition of a 
Third World Power might be. The only serious suggestions that have been made are 
that it should consist of the Commonwealth, or of Western Europe (including the 
United Kingdom) with its overseas territories, or of these groups combined. These 
suggested groupings may be examined under three headings, political, economic and 
military. 
Commonwealth 
(a) Political 
8. There are no political tendencies in the Commonwealth to-day which suggest 
that it could successfully be consolidated as a single unit. The Commonwealth is not 
a unit in the same sense as the United States or the Soviet Union. It has no central 
authority and is unlikely to create one, and its members are increasingly framing 
their policies on grounds of regional or local interests. The only member of the 
Commonwealth which might assume a position of leadership within it is the United 
Kingdom, and it seems unlikely that any proposals originating in London for a closer 
co-ordination of Commonwealth policy would be welcomed at present. It should not 
be assumed that centrifugal forces are certain to increase, and it remains true that 
concerted action may well be achieved in a crisis. The substantial identity of view 
among Commonwealth countries is undoubtedly an important influence for world 
peace. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that a common policy will be followed. 
(b) Economic 
9. Since the creation of the O.E.E.C. machinery, the economic planning of the 
United Kingdom is tending to become more closely tied in with Western Europe than 
with the Commonwealth. The general trend of O.E.E.C. planning has so far been 
satisfactory to the sterling members of the Commonwealth. The United Kingdom, 
however, needs to be able to speak with greater authority in Paris as the 
representative of the whole sterling area. Moreover, a greater mutual exchange of 
economic information within the Commonwealth is needed if the central gold and 
dollar reserves of the sterling area are to be fully safeguarded. There is little sign that 
the other members of the Commonwealth would accept collective planning arrange-
ments for the Commonwealth similar to O.E.E.C., but we may well hope to persuade 
them increasingly to discuss their long-term problems individually with the United 
Kingdom. Even so, Commonwealth countries are likely to take the view that their 
needs for investment capital for industrial development cannot be met by co-
operation with the United Kingdom and Western Europe alone but that dollar 
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assistance will be needed. The Americans have shown reluctance in the past to use 
the United Kingdom as a channel for extending dollar aid to the rest of the 
Commonwealth. 
(c) Military 
10. The military picture is similar. As a result of the Brussels Treaty the United 
Kingdom has gone much further in military planning with Western Europe than it 
has with the Commonwealth. Moreover, the Commonwealth is not a strategic unit, 
and here again it must be clear to other Commonwealth members that their defence 
cannot be assured without United States support. For example, the Commonwealth, 
even with the help of Western Europe, will not in the foreseeable future be strong 
enough to hold the Middle East, which is vital to its security. 
(d) Conclusion 
11. Despite the possibility of improved economic consultation, there seems little 
prospect of the United Kingdom being able to unite the Commonwealth as a single 
world power. The attraction exerted by the pound sterling and the Royal Navy is now 
less strong than that of the dollar and the atom bomb. An attempt to turn the 
Commonwealth into a Third World Power would only confront its members with a 
direct choice between London and Washington, and though sentiment might point 
one way interest would certainly lead the other. 
Western Europe (including the United Kingdom) with its overseas territories 
(a) Political 
12. The progress so far made in such directions as Benelux and the Italo-French 
Customs Union is primarily economic in character, although there are political 
implications. These experiments have, however, not yet reached a sufficiently 
advanced stage to permit of optimistic conclusions regarding prospects of more 
far-reaching political unity. The new Council of Europe may gradually create in this 
old Continent a consciousness of European unity and a will to play an independent 
part in world affairs. But it must be recognised that centrifugal tendencies are still 
strong and there is a danger that the Council of Europe may seem to give Europe a 
greater cohesion and strength than it in fact possesses and so encourage the 
Americans to retire into an isolation dangerous both for themselves and for Europe. 
Whatever the tendencies may be, the fact remains that the military and economic 
situation of the Western European nations is now such that there can be no 
immediate prospect of welding them into a prosperous and secure entity without 
American help; and even with American help it is uncertain whether this can be 
achieved for some time to come. 
13. The above has been written without special regard to the problem of 
Germany. The problem of including Germany, in whole or in part, in Western 
Europe and the effect which this would have on the possible constitution of a Third 
World Power, cannot be dealt with fully within the limits of this paper. There are 
many schools of thought on this topic. Some claim that Western Europe could only 
hope to achieve security and independence if it included the whole of Germany. 
Others feel that the inclusion of all Germany in any Western European group would 
involve a serious risk of its eventual domination by a revived Reich, and moreover 
that Western Europe would thereby become involved in quarrels about Germany's 
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eastern frontiers which it would be highly desirable to avoid. Others again say that 
the inclusion of Western Germany in the Western European group is now a foregone 
conclusion, that the addition of the Soviet Zone, if that ever became practicable, 
would not be of such weight as to alter the whole balance, and that ways can and 
must be found of integrating a united Germany into the European family of nations. 
In any event if Western Germany, or even a unified Germany, is, after a period of 
years, fully integrated in the economy of Western Europe, that would probably not in 
itself result in Western Europe becoming an independent Power of the same order of 
magnitude as the Soviet Union or the United States, unless indeed the military as 
well as the economic potential of Germany was fully developed-and it is difficult to 
see this being accepted by the Soviet Union or even by the Western democracies 
themselves. 
(b) Economic 
14. Western Europe, including its dependent overseas territories, is now patently 
dependent on American aid, although in the longer run it should be able to pay its 
way. It is, however, always likely to be dependent for the maintenance of a reasonable 
standard of living on a large exchange of goods and services with the Eastern bloc, 
with the Commonwealth and with the United States. Although the O.E.E.C. 
countries and their dependent overseas territories now enjoy a preponderance of 
economic potential over the Soviet orbit, this preponderance may well disappear 
within ten years if Soviet plans are fulfilled. Soviet plans may be particularly limited 
by commitments to the satellites and by high military expenditure, or even by 
technical shortcomings in Russia itself. But it is safest to assume that, even if the 
economy of Western Europe is closely linked with that of the United States, their 
present joint margin of superiority over the Soviet economic system will tend to 
shrink. 
15. It is true that O.E .E.C. has shown the beginning of satisfactory economic 
co-operation, but the impetus has been given by the United States in the conditions 
which they imposed as a price for dollar aid. There are already signs that as the 
individual countries become economically stronger and more self-sufficient the 
centrifugal tendencies are likely to increase, and it may well be that when American 
aid ceases altogether the present limited degree of European economic co-operation 
will not survive. We should in any case be wise not to place undue reliance on it at 
the expense of our relations with the Commonwealth and the United States. 
16. Moreover, from the United Kingdom point of view, economic integration 
with Western Europe involves great risks which would only be worth taking if we 
could be confident that economic integration would create a unit economically and 
militarily strong enough to be capable of resisting aggression. For the moment there 
seems little prospect of such a development and we might, if we went too far along 
this road, find Europe over-run and our own segment of the economy unable to 
function on its own. 
(c) Military 
17. From the military point of view, the situation is that even with American help 
there is nothing at present to stop the Russians occupying the entire Atlantic coast of 
Europe. In ten years' time Western Europe might possibly be able to hold out until 
full American assistance could be brought into play. Even this limited defensive role 
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involves an expenditure which may well be too heavy for European national incomes. 
Unless therefore we are prepared to effect a drastic lowering of our present standards 
of living or to accept the remilitarisation of the Reich, any thought of a Third World 
Power in Europe being militarily capable of resisting Russia by itself can be 
dismissed. 
18. In actual military strength Russia is now, apart from weapons of mass 
destruction, vastly superior to the United States and Western Europe combined and 
although, as has been said, our economic potential may for the time being be greater 
than that of the Russians, the difference will lessen with time. Moreover, owing to 
the Soviet Union's present ability rapidly to overrun Western Europe, there is a 
danger that American potential will be left with no area in which to deploy itself. 
(d) Conclusion 
19. Whereas in the case of the Commonwealth the principal difficulties in the 
way of consolidation as a Third World Power are political, in the case of Western 
Europe the difficulties lie mainly in the economic and military weakness of its 
members, though the political will to union must always be doubtful. 
The Commonwealth and Western Europe combined 
20. Unfortunately the objections to either group in isolation are not removed by 
their combination, and this alternative is therefore not examined in detail. Political 
cohesion of the Commonwealth countries with Western Europe is even less likely 
than with the United Kingdom, and the dangerous choice between London and 
Washington is not eliminated. Moreover, the economic and military weaknesses of 
Western Europe are not significantly diminished by the addition of the Common-
wealth countries other than the United Kingdom, and the need for American support 
remains. Incidentally, this need for American support underlines the danger of even 
trying to create a group which could give the United States an excuse for believing 
that a buffer State had been created and that accordingly America need not exert 
herself strenuously on behalf of Western civilisation. 
General reflections on a Third World Power 
21. The preceding paragraphs suggest that none of the possible combinations of 
Powers is likely in the near future to amount to a unit capable of pursuing a policy 
independent both of the Soviet Union and of the United States. There is, moreover, a 
further argument which is valid in regard to any possible combination of Powers. 
The belief in the ability of a Third Power to exploit its independence by a policy of 
neutrality and by playing off the other two Powers against each other is based on a 
total misconception of Marx-Leninist ideology. It is surely essential to take at their 
face value the frequent assertions by Soviet leaders that Marx-Leninism is the basis of 
their policy. This being so, they would not be prepared to establish any lasting 
agreement with a neutral, non-Communist Third World Power; at the most they 
might be prepared to make a show of reaching such an accommodation for tactical 
reasons. A policy of neutrality would in fact only encourage the Soviet Union to 
swallow its opponents one by one and, from the point of view of the United Kingdom 
especially, would afford no protection for our vital interests in the rest of the world, 
notably in the Middle and Far East. 
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Ill. Consolidation of the West 
22. The conclusion seems inescapable that for the present at any rate the closest 
association with the United States is essential, not only for the purpose of standing 
up to Soviet aggression but also in the interests of Commonwealth solidarity and of 
European unity. The form which such an association should take is a matter for 
another paper, but it is perhaps worth recording the negative conclusion that the 
mobilisation of general collective security on the basis of Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter does not seem a promising method. The probable result of such a 
process would be the establishment of a new United Nations organisation without the 
Soviet Union or its satellites, resulting in an unwieldy bloc of countries with no 
organised leadership, in which the special interests of single countries or groups of 
countries would be liable to paralyse action by the organisation as a whole. 
23. The positive arguments in favour of the consolidation of the West, in which at 
first, at any rate, the United States would be the largest single unit, may be 
summarised as follows:-
(a) As long as Russian policy continues to be based on the Marx-Leninist 
philosophy which regards all non-Communist Governments as enemies, these 
Governments will be forced to combine, and in this sense the consolidation of the 
West will come about as a natural process. 
(b) The combination produced by this natural process, of which the Atlantic Pact 
is the first example, represents such a vast effort that once achieved it may in 
practice be very difficult to dissolve. 
(c) The association of the United States, Western Europe and the Commonwealth, 
different though their cultural backgrounds and political philosophies may be, has 
at least in its favour a sufficient number of common traditions to make the group 
workable. 
24. There are of course some arguments on the other side. It must be recognised 
that in a Western system the United States will be the most powerful member, will 
inevitably take the lead in a number of fields , and will no doubt expect her views to 
prevail to a considerable extent. This, however, was already the case before the 
signature of the Atlantic Pact. In all fields in which the United States makes the 
major contribution, whether financial, military or otherwise, it is inevitable that 
proportionate (although not always determining) weight must be given to her views. 
25. At the same time experience has shown that it is usually possible to reconcile 
British and American views. As United States policy evolves from isolation to the 
assumption of increasing responsibility in world affairs, her outlook (e.g., over 
colonial dependencies) is evolving also, and it has so far proved less arduous for us to 
find a common approach towards world problems with the Americans than with 
most other Powers. While, therefore, extremely difficult adjustments of policy, which 
are inevitable in any partnership, will have to be made under a Western system, there 
are not so far sufficient grounds for the fear that partnership with the United States 
in a Western system would involve the United Kingdom in dangerous dependence on 
the United States. There is sufficient kinship of ideas to make this unlikely. We are in 
fact more likely to find it difficult to reach a common approach with Western 
European countries, and most of all with Germany. 
26. The fear is sometimes expressed that the United States might be tempted to 
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indulge in adventurous policies, and that too close a partnership with them would 
add to the risk that the United Kingdom and its other partners might be involved 
against their will in the consequences of such policies. Although the possibility of 
their adopting ill-considered and therefore dangerous policies is always with us, the 
likelihood of the United States embarking on an aggressive policy is extremely 
remote. In spite of occasional violence of talk, American public opinion and the 
American Congress are both peace-loving and cautious, and more likely to err on the 
side of prudence than of rashness. Moreover if the United States were nonetheless to 
embark on adventurous policies the United Kingdom would almost inevitably be 
involved in the consequences in any case, and it may reasonably be expected that 
partnership with the United States in a Western system would increase rather than 
diminish the opportunities for the United Kingdom to apply a brake to American 
policy if necessary. 
27. The possibility must also be considered that a slump might occur in the 
United States which would have serious repercussions on the economies of the 
United Kingdom and of Western European countries. This is true. But the effect 
would be much the same whether a Western system comes into being or not. 
Moreover, here again the existence of a Western system improves the outlook for 
fruitful discussion on economic policies between the members. 
28. There is no necessary contradiction between the consolidation of a Western 
system and a much greater unification and strengthening of Europe. It is only the 
concept of Western Europe as a Third World Power acting independently both of the 
United States and of the Commonwealth, in other words as a Third World Power in 
the strict sense of the term, which is inconsistent with the consolidation of Western 
system. 
29. During the next ten to twenty years the economic dependence of Western 
European countries on the United States ought to disappear, and their ability to 
make a valid military contribution to a Western system ought to increase. Even 
to-day it is a mistake to regard the relationship of the Western European countries, 
and particularly of the United Kingdom with the United States as one of complete 
dependence. In fact the United States has no desire to find herself confronted with a 
Western Europe under Communist domination, or a Western Europe which is 
completely neutral. On the contrary, the United States recognises that the United 
Kingdom and the Commonwealth, and to a lesser extent the Western Continental 
Europe, are essential to her defence and safety. Already it is, apart from the economic 
field, a case of partial interdependence rather than of complete dependence. As time 
goes by the elements of dependence ought to diminish and those of inter-dependence 
to increase. The United Kingdom in particular, by virtue of her leading position both 
in Western Europe and in the Commonwealth, ought to play a larger and larger part 
in a Western system. 
30. It must, however, be appreciated that the Western system is coming into 
being under the pressure of Soviet policy. It is probably fair to say that it is a system 
desirable in itself, since had it been in existence at the time the wars of 1914 and 
1939 might well have been avoided. But whether this is so or not, it might well prove 
that, if Soviet pressure were relaxed as a result of some major tactical deviation, the 
development of the system might be arrested in proportion as the compelling cause 
of the danger from the Soviet Union diminished. This aspect of the question will 
form the subject of another study. 
X 
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31. There are two further points which require to be borne in mind in connexion 
with the consolidation of the West, though they cannot be fully developed within the 
limits of this paper. The first is that consolidation of the West cannot be solely a 
matter of agreement between governments. It must also involve an internal 
consolidation of the peoples of the Western countries and a rejection of Communist 
influence. 
32. Secondly, it may prove to be the case that the consolidation of the West in a 
passive sense will not prove to be enough, and that the only final hope for a settled 
world will be that the ideas it represents and the system which incorporates these 
ideas should spread eastwards. 
IV. Conclusions 
33. The general conclusion of this paper may be summarised as follows:-
(a) The Commonwealth alone cannot form a Third World Power equivalent to the 
United States or the Soviet Union. 
(b) Commonwealth solidarity is more likely to be promoted by the consolidation 
of the West than by the formation of a Third World Power independent of America. 
(c) A weak, neutral Western Europe is undesirable and a strong independent 
Western Europe is impracticable at present and could only come about, if at all, at 
the cost of the remilitarisation of Germany. 
(d) The best hope of security for Western Europe lies in a consolidation of the 
West on the lines indicated by the Atlantic Pact. 
(e) During the next 10-20 years, Western Europe, provided it continues on its 
policy of co-operation, should emerge from economic and even from military 
dependence on the United States but the two areas will remain interdependent. 
(0 The United Kingdom will have an increasingly important part to play in the 
consolidated West, and must also seek to maintain its special relations with the 
United States of America. 
153 CAB 129/37/1, CP(49)204 
'Council of Europe': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Bevin 
Summary of recommendations 
24 Oct 1949 
[Extract] 
4. The following are the recommendations which I ask my colleagues to approve 
in connection with the forthcoming meeting of the Committee of Ministers. They 
derive from the general conclusions set out in the later paragraphs of this paper:-
( a) His Majesty's Government should continue to support the Council of Europe 
and to play an active part in its development. 
(b) Under existing policy, however, we cannot agree to any proposals which mean 
our getting involved in the economic affairs of Europe beyond the point at which 
we could, if we wished, disengage ourselves. There are no grounds for abandoning 
this policy. 
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(c) Any surrender of political sovereignty in matters of vital importance would 
jeopardise our ability to maintain the policy at (b) . We must therefore maintain a 
very strict reserve in regard to schemes for the pooling of sovereignty or the 
establishment of European supra-national machinery. 
(d) Subject to (b) and (c) above, we should adopt a positive attitude towards 
proposals for co-operation in the political, social and cultural fields and should 
welcome the development of the Consultative Assembly into a responsible 
quasi-parliamentary body in which European points of views are advocated. We 
need not object to amendments to the Statute designed to give the Assembly 
greater independence or to increase its efficiency and prestige, so long as they do 
not enable it to stray beyond its consultative function. (This would mean opposing 
the proposal that the Assembly should have a veto on new accessions). By the same 
token we should agree to the provision of finance for the Standing Committee, the 
General Affairs Committee and (until its work is finished) the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure; but should not provide for the permanent maintenance of the other 
committees which the Assembly have set up. 
(e) We should not support the proposal for a Special Session early in 1950. 
(0 In order to maintain the principle that the elaboration of agreement between 
Governments is the business of the Committee of Ministers rather than of the 
Assembly, we should support where necessary the establishment of sub-
committees of the Committee of Ministers for the purpose of studying proposals 
submitted by the Assembly and of preparing texts for agreement between 
Governments. · 
(g) Wherever it is clear that proposals under discussion at Strasbourg can more 
effectively and economically be dealt with in the context of O.E.E.C. or other 
European international organs we should support their reference to those bodies. 
We should bear in mind at all stages the strain placed upon national administra-
tions by the multiplication of international organisations. 
(h) In the cultural and social fields we should support the widest practicable 
degree of co-operation between Members. In particular we should advocate the 
extension of some of the non-military work of the Brussels Treaty into the wider 
field of the Council of Europe; and we should look favourably in principle upon the 
conclusion of a Convention of Human Rights. 
(i) We should endeavour to get the Committee of Ministers to issue a statement 
to the effect that if the German Federal Republic desires to be invited to join as an 
Associate Member and accepts the principles of the Statute, an invitation will be 
issued to it. If necessary in order to secure French agreement to this we could 
agree to the admission of the Saar as an Associate Member at the same time. The 
question of Austria should be left over until the results of the Peace Treaty 
negotiations are clearer. 
General discussion 
5. His Majesty's Government are committed by Treaty to support the Council of 
Europe and its aims as defined in the preamble to the Statute, which include the 
achievement of "a greater unity between its Members ... ".Apart from this general 
and paper obligation the Government are committed, if only by the prominent and 
effective role which Ministers played in the critical opening session this year, to 
350 INTERNATIONAL POLICY [153) 
encourage the development of the Consultative Assembly as a serious quasi-
parliamentary institution, independent of Governments but having the duty of 
advocating European points of view on all matters within its competence. 
6. Judged as an experiment in European parliamentary association and within 
the limits which were set, the Consultative Assembly can be said to have made a 
successful start. Many of the fears felt beforehand as to what might emerge from an 
Assembly consisting of delegates not responsible to their Governments were falsified 
in the event, and on the whole the Assembly steered its way successfully between 
empty talk on the one side and excessive ambition on the other. For this success the 
British Delegation had a large responsibility. The very success of the experiment 
from the point of view of organisation and publicity, however, may increase our 
difficulties in dealing with the practical implications. It is inevitable and natural that 
any body of this kind should tend to favour the creation of supra-national machinery 
which would in effect increase its own powers; and by its very existence it will 
constitute a form of pressure in favour of speedier and more radical unification in 
Europe than Governments are willing to accept. There will therefore be a growing 
possibility of conflict between the Governments and the Assembly. 
7. The Council of Europe is an important element in the structure which we have 
been building up in Europe with the object of creating a feeling of confidence and 
unity amongst the Western nations. Together with the Brussels Treaty, the O.E.E.C., 
and the Atlantic Pact, it is one of the major weapons in the cold war. Whatever, 
therefore, may be our opinion as to the ultimate relationship between this country 
and the Continent, or between the continental nations, we should do nothing now to 
undermine the general hopes of solidarity and co-operation which the Council of 
Europe has aroused in Europe. Stated in purely strategical terms, the most 
immediate task is to prevent war by the double method of deterring an aggressor and 
encouraging a mood of resistance in our Allies. Therefore the "cold war" and the 
building up of Western European morale must have a high priority in our thinking. 
Any ostentatious weakening of British support for the Council of Europe might have 
disastrous effects on opinion in France, Italy, the Benelux countries and elsewhere. It 
might also destroy all hope of bringing Germany into close political association with 
the West. 
8. Account must also be taken of American views. It is difficult to estimate what 
United States public opinion or Congress think about economic union in Europe and 
the position of the United Kingdom in regard to it, as the balance of opinion is apt to 
shift from time to time. There is a strong body of public feeling in the United States 
which expects Europe, with or without the United Kingdom, to get together 
politically and economically as a price for the continuance of United States aid. This 
school of thought has in particular many adherents in the Economic Co-operation 
Administration. Any appearance on our part of sabotaging such enterprises as the 
Council of Europe would certainly have serious results on American opinion. The 
truth is probably that most Americans do not expect this country to enter into any 
exclusive political or economic association with continental countries, and current 
American official policy is against it. But we should still be attacked in the United 
States if we could be shown to be preventing European unification by what might be 
represented as a selfish attitude. 
9. It is clear that His Majesty's Government must maintain certain basic reserves 
in regard to the Council of Europe. The careful phraseology of the Statute and the 
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obvious caution of the Governments in their approach to it cannot conceal the fact 
that the Assembly provides a forum where His Majesty's Government will be exposed 
to continuous pressure, not only from the representatives of the other count[r]ies 
but also from British enthusiasts for European union, to undertake measures of 
unification beyond what they consider desirable or acceptable to the British people. 
Already the Assembly have declared (paragraph IV(l) of the enclosure to M. Spaak's 
letter of 9th September reproduced as Appendix A to the report annexed to 
C.P.(49)200) that they regard one of their aims and objects as being "the establish-
ment of a European political authority with limited functions but real powers." We 
cannot accept such a doctrine as an aim of British policy. On the economic side in 
particular our existing policy, which is set out in E.P.C.(49)6 of 25th January, 1949, 
lays down that, though we may make considerable sacrifices for the sake of European 
economic co-operation, we should not run risks which would jeopardise our own 
chances of survival if the attempt to restore Western Europe should fail , and that we 
should not involve ourselves in the economic affairs of Europe beyond the point at 
which we could, if we wished, disengage ourselves. I know of nothing which should 
lead us to modify this policy; in fact the recent Conference of Commonwealth 
Finance Ministers and the Washington conversations point rather the other way. The 
economic implications and justification of this policy lie outside the scope of this 
paper. It seems clear that our general attitude towards the economic resolution of 
the Assembly should be one of great caution; but for tactical purposes it may well be 
best, during the forthcoming meeting of the Committee of Ministers, that I should 
endeavour to induce my colleagues to show their hands first. Otherwise the tendency 
of the Committee of Ministers will undoubtedly be to try to fasten on the United 
Kingdom all the blame for their inability to proceed with European economic unity 
on the lines which the Assembly obviously desires. 
10. It is clear therefore that there exists a potential conflict between a policy of 
full participation in the Council of Europe and the wider interests which His 
Majesty's Government are always obliged to keep in mind. Our relationship with the 
rest of the Commonwealth and, almost equally important, our new relationship with 
the United States ensure that we must remain, as we have always been in the past, 
different in character from other European nations and fundamentally incapable of 
wholehearted integration with them. How soon or how sharply this conflict may 
come to light in Strasbourg or elsewhere is hard to say. One of the principal 
disadvantages of the Council of Europe from the point of view of His Majesty's 
Government is that by its nature it brings such issues under the glare of public 
discussion, where it is much more difficult than it would be in an ordinary 
governmental context to sustain the traditional non-committal and two-way facing 
policy of this country. Much will depend on the extent to which other European 
Governments, as distinct from their representatives in the Assembly, desire to press 
for the acceptance of proposals involving political or economic integration. It is not 
likely that such pressure will arise at once. Even in the Assembly there was not a 
majority in favour of schemes for immediate economic or political union and it was, I 
understand, largely fortuitous that the economic recommendations were not 
remitted for further study to a Standing Committee, as were the various proposals 
for political union. None of the Governments has declared itself to be in favour of 
schemes of this kind and if we show a certain caution we shall certainly not be alone. 
It is also worth noting that there is now a divergence of opinion in the Opposition on 
352 INTERNATIONAL POLICY [153) 
this subject, and that as a purely internal, political proposition the campaign for 
European Union, as conducted by Mr. Sandys1 and the European Movement, is 
unlikely to commend itself in its extreme form to any party in the House of 
Commons. 
11. It should, in my view, be our object to postpone as long as possible being 
faced with a choice between, on the one hand, overstepping the limits of safety in 
integration with Europe and, on the other, appearing to abandon the ideas of the 
Council of Europe. To this end it will be necessary for us to balance our caution in 
the matter of economic and political integration with a policy of encouragement and 
support for co-operation in other fields. There are, I think, three ways in which we 
can do this. First we can support the requests of the Assembly in regard to its own 
independence and activities so long as these stay within the limits of a consultative 
body. We can agree to the amendments proposed in the Statute for giving the 
Assembly complete control over its agenda. I do not believe that it is practicable or 
worth while to oppose the wishes of the Assembly on these issues. The control which 
the Statute gives the Committee of Ministers over the Assembly's agenda is 
impossible to exercise in practice, and any self-respecting body of parliamentarians 
would be bound to resist it. We should, of course, retain the ban on any discussion 
relating to defence. We could also well allow the Assembly to abolish substitutes and 
increase (but not double) the number of representatives, and we could agree to the 
appointment of an additional Deputy Secretary-General to serve the Assembly. I 
think the Committee of Ministers should approve and provide finance for the 
Standing Committee and the General Affairs Committee which the Assembly has set 
up, because it is only natural that an Assembly which can only meet once a year 
should require some continuing machinery to prepare its work and represent its 
interests. In addition, it is reasonable to allow the Committee on Rules of Procedure 
to meet out of Session until it has drawn up revised Rules of Procedure for the 
Assembly. I do not think, however, that we should agree to finance the operation, 
between Sessions, of the other Committees which the Assembly has set up. To do so 
would be to make the Assembly to all intents and purposes an all-the-year-round 
institution, contrary to the intentions of the Statute. We must also strongly oppose 
the suggestion that the Assembly should be given the right of veto over candidates 
for membership that have been approved by the Committee of Ministers. To give the 
Assembly such a right would undoubtedly diminish the power of Governments to 
take decisions in the field of foreign affairs. After all, the Assembly consists of 
individual parliamentarians who only represent themselves, and it seems to follow 
that Governments cannot possibly divest themselves of any of their responsibilities in 
favour of an Assembly constituted in this way. 
12. Secondly, we should endeavour to be as forthcoming as possible in regard to 
all proposals which do not involve committing His Majesty's Government to political 
and economic union. In particular we should look favourably upon the idea of a 
Convention of Human Rights and, in principle, upon the social and cultural 
resolutions. In these fields the five Brussels Treaty Powers have a particular 
contribution to make and I propose to recommend that they should submit a full 
report to the Committee of Ministers on the work so far achieved by them, together 
1 Duncan Sandys, chairman of international executive ofthe European Movement, 1947-1950; Conserva-
tive MP from 1950. 
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with suggestions as to how this could be expanded to cover the twelve Members of 
the Council of Europe. 
13. Thirdly, I think we should do well in the Committee of Ministers to make 
arrangements for setting up suitable intergovernmental bodies to examine the 
majority of the recommendations which the Assembly has made. These inter-
governmental Committees might meet at intervals at Strasbourg during the coming 
year for the purpose of investigating such matters as human rights, social security 
and so on, and their very existence should, I think, do something to discourage the 
Assembly from insisting on the establishment of too many Committees on its own 
account, and at the same time give it the impression that its recommendations are at 
any rate being taken seriously by the Governments concerned .... 
154 CAB 128/16, CM 62(49)5 
'Council of Europe': Cabinet conclusions 
27 Oct 1949 
The Cabinet considered memoranda by the Foreign Secretary (C.P.(49)200 and 2041) 
on the work of the Council of Europe at its first session. 
The Foreign Secretary said he had circulated with C.P.(49)200 a comprehensive 
report on the first session of the Council of Europe. In C.P.(49)204 he had made 
detailed recommendations on future policy towards the Council and on the line to be 
taken on the specific proposals and resolutions adopted by the Consultative 
Assembly. The Assembly's recommendations on economic matters were discussed 
separately in C.P.(49)203 (see Minute 6 below). In general, he thought that the 
United Kingdom Government should continue to support the Council of Europe and 
to play an active part in its development. But it had been agreed that we should not 
involve ourselves in the economic affairs of Europe beyond the point at which we 
could, if we so wished, disengage ourselves, and we should therefore treat with strict 
reserve any schemes for the pooling of sovereignty or for the establishment of 
European supra-national machinery. Provided that our position was safeguarded in 
this respect, he thought it right to adopt a positive attitude towards proposals for 
co-operation and his detailed recommendations on the resolutions of the Consulta-
tive Assembly were based on this principle. He thought it important to secure the 
early participation of the German Federal Republic in the work of the Council, and 
he hoped he might be able to persuade the Committee of Ministers to issue a 
statement to the effect that, if the German Federal Republic desired to be invited to 
join as an associate member and accepted the principles of the Statute, an invitation 
would be issued to it. It might be necessary to make a similar declaration in respect 
of the Saar in order to induce the French Government to acquiesce in the admission 
of Germany. He thought, however, that the issue of an invitation to Austria at this 
stage would seriously jeopardise the prospects of reaching early agreement with the 
Soviet Government on the Peace Treaty for Austria. 
In discussion the following points were made:-
(a) The Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested that the Assembly's resolutions on 
economic matters should be referred to Governments with a view to action being 
1 See 153. 
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taken on them through the machinery of the Organisation for European Economic 
Co-operation. He thought it would be preferable to adopt this procedure rather than 
to refer these proposals back to the Assembly or to refer them for examination by a 
Sub-Committee of the Committee of Ministers. 
There was general support for this suggestion. 
(b) The recommendations in paragraph 4 (d) of C.P.(49)204 would be welcomed 
by the Consultative Assembly. The proposal that the Assembly should have a veto on 
new accessions had been inspired by the fear that the Council of Ministers might 
invite Spain to become a member of the Council of Europe. If some assurance on this 
point could be given, the proposal would not be pressed. 
(c) The French Government would be less likely to press their objections to the 
accession of the German Federal Republic if the Assembly's proposal for a special 
session was rejected. 
(d) Some doubt was expressed whether it would be advisable to support the 
proposal for the accession of the Saar. This might create an embarrassing precedent 
for similar claims for the admission of parts of other sovereign States; and it was, in 
any event, unreal to suppose that the Saar could ever become a full sovereign 
member of the Council. Against this, it was argued that it would be unwise 
altogether to exclude the possibility that the Saar might eventually achieve political 
independence while remaining integrated economically with France under some 
form of Customs Union; and it need not therefore be assumed that, if admitted as an 
associate member, she would be left permanently with that status. 
(e) There would be great difficulty in drafting a Human Rights Convention in a 
form generally acceptable to the members of the Council. In the Assembly's 
discussions on this subject, a number of specific proposals had been made which 
would be unacceptable to the United Kingdom Government. 
(0 Support should not be given to those proposals of the Assembly on cultural 
and scientific affairs which would involve the dupl ication of existing bodies. 
(g) In several of the countries of Western Europe there existed a state of political 
and social tension which their present Governments were unable to resolve; and the 
enthusiasm for the Council of Europe was largely inspired by the feeling that a 
solution for these conflicts could be found only through an appeal to some external 
authority. It was therefore important that we should not only give every encourage-
ment to projects for the political and economic integration of Western Europe, but 
should ourselves seek to make a constructive and positive contribution to it. In 
particular we should not discourage those on whom fell the main burden of 
resistance to Communist pressure by pursuing a needlessly cautious policy. 
On the other hand, it was agreed that the United Kingdom, by reason of its 
geographical position and of its political and economic relations with the Common-
wealth and the United States, could not enter into any exclusive political or 
economic association with Continental countries. While, therefore , our policy must 
not be negative or unhelpful, it must take full account of the reservations mentioned 
in C.P.(49)204. 
The Cabinet:-
(1) Took note of C.P.(49)200. 
(2) Subject to the point recorded in paragraph (a) above, approved the recom-
mendations made in C.P.(49)204. 
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'Note on the aims, strategy and procedure of the communists in 
Africa': brief no 13 for the London meeting of foreign ministers 
Communism in Africa, whether considered as an organisation of Moscow-directed 
agencies or as a pattern of local growth, is in its early stages. The immediate aim is 
therefore to foment trouble and unrest rather than to seize power. The avowed 
long-term aim is "to overthrow imperialism" and so oust the Western Powers from 
the Continent of Africa. The first step towards achieving this goal is to support all 
nationalist and racial discontent, and so far as possible to canalize it in the direction 
of agitation for total independence. 
Communist tactics have a pattern similar to that familiar in the recent past in 
Asia. It is perhaps important to note that present directives to the latter area have 
outstripped those to Africa and have inaugurated a phase of revolutionary action. 
1. Existing communist machinery 
(a) Colonial and quasi-colonial territories . The most powerful machinery for 
Communist agitation is in French territory. Overt or covert activities in colonial 
or quasi-colonial territories are normally directed by the Communist Parties of 
the colonial power concerned, and the strength of the Communist Party in France 
is reflected in Africa. In French West and Equatorial Africa, the area most affected 
by Communism in the whole continent, the principal agency of agitation is the 
Communist-dominated nationalist movement, the Rassemblement Democratique 
Africain (R.D.A.). The R.D.A. receives its direction from Paris and a certain 
amount of financial assistance. There are Communist organisations in Algiers, 
Tunis and French Morocco. There are no Communist Parties in British West or 
East Africa. although there are Communist individuals who are known to be in 
touch with the British Communist Party, and Communist agitation seeks to 
stimulate and exploit nationalists like Nkruma\ and to penetrate the Indian 
communities. There is a Communist centre in the Belgian Congo which receives 
direction from the Belgian Communist Party. There are few signs of Communism 
in the former Italian colonies, and none reported from Spanish or Portuguese 
territories. 
(b) Independent territories. There is a Communist Party in the Union of South 
Africa and its influence is considerable among the native, Indian and coloured 
labour elements. Two Communist groups exist in Egypt, but they have so far failed 
to unite and form a party. There is little Communist activity in Abyssinia. There is 
a Communist-inspired "National Liberation Front" in the Sudan. 
2. General tactical line 
Radio Moscow, echoed by other Communist sources, has laid down the following 
tactics for Africa. 
(a) Like the peoples of Asia, the peoples of Africa have resolutely embarked on the 
1 Sic, ie Kwame Nkrumah, founder and leader of the Convention People's Party in the Gold Coast from 
1949; later first prime minister of Ghana. 
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fight for liberation and follow their example: but the time for armed rebellion has 
not yet arrived. 
(b) Communist Party leadership in the national liberation struggle is claimed for 
the following regions: French West and Equatorial Africa through the Rassemble-
ment Democratique Africain; Tunis, Algeria, Morocco; and South Africa. 
(c) Communist leadership is not claimed for U.K., Belgian or Portuguese 
territories. The Communists are not yet dominant in the following organisations 
leading the "liberation struggle": the National Council in [sic] Nigeria and the 
Cameroons; the Bataka in East Africa; the Council of Headmen and Negro League 
in Uganda; the African Union in Kenya; the National Front in Sudan; the Youth 
League in Somaliland. But the democratic elements (i.e. Communists) in these 
organisations are establishing contacts with "progressive centres" such as 
Communist Parties, W.F.T.U., I.F.D.W., Partisans of Peace and others. 
3. Use of international movements 
There are four main Communist-dominated international bodies involved in the 
anti-colonial campaign: 
(1) the International Union of Students, headquarters Prague; 
(2) the World Federation of Democratic Youth, headquarters Paris. 
These two organisations are engaged in the indoctrination of students, the organisa-
tion of international missions and congresses of varying types, and the publication of 
material attacking colonialism. 
(3) The World Federation of Trade Unions: which seeks to exploit labour 
organisations and has some success. 
(4) The Women's International Democratic Federation, headquarters Paris. 
All these organisations are related to a Colonial Bureau established in Prague as the 
main seat of anti-colonial agitation: it uses inter alia scholarships to Prague 
University as a means of indoctrination. 
4. Links with Moscow 
Soviet and satellite representation in Africa is thin and there are few signs of direct 
links with Moscow. The Soviet Legation in Addis Ababa puts out an Information 
Bulletin which appears from time to time in Elisabethville (Belgian Congo) and the 
Soviet Consuls-General in Algiers and Cape Town are alleged to be active. This year 
D'Arboussier2, R.D.A. representative, has visited Moscow. 
Generally speaking, it is the detribalised native who responds best to Communism, 
as he misses the narrow confines of tribal life and a leader on whom to bestow his 
loyalty. This gives the Rand, with its inflow of immigrant labour, its special 
importance in the diffusion of Communism in Africa. The semi-educated Indians also 
take readily to Communism, but the stand against Communism which has been 
taken in India and Pakistan influences them also. Communism has made the least 
progress where the influence of Islam is strongest. Though in the past year the 
Communist picture has been one of retrogression on some fronts, there are signs of 
increased interest in anti-colonialism from Moscow. 
2 Gabriel D'Arboussier, French colonial administrator, elected in 1945 to the French Constituent 
Assembly as one of the deputies for French Equatorial Africa; general secretary of RDA, 1949. 
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156 CAB 128/17, CM 29(50)3 8 May 1950 
[Anglo-American relations]: 'London meeting of foreign ministers': 
Cabinet conclusions 
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C.P.(50)92) 
reporting the progress made in the early stages of the discussions between officials of 
the United Kingdom, the United States and France in preparation for the forthcom-
ing meeting of Foreign Ministers. 
The Foreign Secretary said that the Ministerial discussions, which were to open on 
the following day, would be developed in three stages. First, there would be 
Anglo-American conversations: secondly, there would be tripartite discussions 
between the United Kingdom, the United States and France: and, finally, there would 
be the meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Concurrently, opportunity would be 
taken to discuss matters of common concern to the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Canada, including certain questions relating to atomic energy research. 
The Foreign Secretary said that throughout these talks his primary objective 
would be to secure a closer understanding with the United States Government on 
major questions of policy in relation to Europe and the Atlantic area, the Middle East 
and the Far East. In all matters of foreign policy and defence policy there could be no 
doubt that our interests would best be served by the closest co-operation with the 
United States and Canada. It was clear that, even with the support of the 
Commonwealth, Western Europe was not strong enough to contend with the 
military dangers confronting it from the East. To withstand the great concentration 
of power now stretching from China to the Oder, the United Kingdom and Western 
Europe must be able to rely on the full support of the English-speaking democracies 
of the Western Hemisphere; and for the original conception of Western Union we 
must now begin to substitute the wider conception of the Atlantic community. 
One of the problems which we should have to face in the forthcoming discussions 
was how our financial and economic policies could best be related to this general 
conception of political and defence policy. It was clearly desirable that the objectives 
which we were pursuing in our relations with the United States Government on 
matters of foreign policy and defence should be in harmony with the aims of our 
financial and economic relations with the United States. The United States author-
ities had recently seemed disposed to press us to adopt a greater measure of 
economic integration with Europe than we thought wise; and there was some risk 
that the United States might join with the countries of Western Europe in accusing 
us of lack of co-operation in economic policy. One possible solution of this difficulty 
would be to obtain from the United States Government a further declaration of their 
determination to support the stability of sterling, and an assurance that in the 
context of collaboration in foreign policy and defence no pressure would be put on us 
which might impair the strength of our economic and financial position. 
Another grave problem to be faced was the position of Western Germany in 
relation to this new conception of the Atlantic community. The Foreign Secretary 
had circulated a separate memorandum (C.P.(50)80) on policy towards Germany. 
Western Germany now contained a formidable industrial community of about 40 
million people which, having been cut off from its former sources of food supply in 
Eastern Germany, must now live largely upon its exports. It was a challenging task 
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for statesmanship to bring this community into association with the Western world, 
in a peaceful and constructive spirit, by means acceptable to public opinion in 
France. The first instinct of the French people had been to insulate Western 
Germany from the Atlantic community, and to limit her association with Western 
Europe to the economic questions handled in the Organisation for European 
Economic Co-operation (O.E.E.C.) . The President of the French Republic had, 
however, adopted a rather more conciliatory attitude in his remarks about French 
policy towards Germany in a speech which he had made on the previous day on the 
occasion of the fifth anniversary of the German surrender at Rheims. If Western 
Germany were allowed to evolve as part of a European organism, through association 
first with the O.E.E.C. and with the Council of Europe, France might in time be 
persuaded to modify her present insistence that Germany should be insulated from 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. This, however, was not a process which 
could be rushed; for it must not be forgotten that both France and Italy were 
genuinely apprehensive about a resurgence of German militarism. 
The forthcoming talks with the United States Secretary of State would also provide 
ah opportunity for a frank exchange of views on policy towards China and Japan. 
There were as yet no indications that the United States Government had been able to 
formulate any fresh policy towards China; and the continuing uncertainty about 
American policy was undoubtedly embarrassing to a number of the other countries 
of the Commonwealth. Nor were there any signs that the United States Government 
were yet ready to consider the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. Although the 
conclusion of such a treaty would be greatly to our advantage, it was difficult to see 
what pressure we could effectively bring to bear to induce the United States 
Government to face these issues. 
In the third phase of these discussions, when the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council opened, the Foreign Secretary hoped that it might prove possible to frame a 
formal declaration of policy to be made on behalf of all the North Atlantic Treaty 
Powers. The Cabinet would, of course, be given an opportunity of seeing the draft of 
any such declaration before it was fully adopted. 
In conclusion the Foreign Secretary said that in the forthcoming discussions 
various economic and defence questions were likely to be raised which were of close 
concern to other Ministers. He would be glad if he could have his colleagues' 
assistance on these matters, as they arose; and he proposed that, as the discussions 
developed, he should keep in close touch with the Ministers most directly concerned. 
Discussion showed that the Cabinet fully endorsed the Foreign Secretary's 
ultimate objective of merging the original conception of Western Union into the 
wider conception of the Atlantic community, and thereby ranging the United States 
and Canada in support of the countries of Western Europe in their resistance of any 
Communist encroachment from the East. There was general support for the Foreign 
Secretary's view that the strength of the Soviet Union and her satellites could not be 
matched by the Commonwealth and Western Europe without the full support of 
North America; and that, from the point of view of foreign policy and defence, 
reliance must be placed on the greater strength of the Atlantic community. 
In discussion the following points were also made:-
(a) In paragraph 8 of C.P.(50)92 it was stated that, in the official discussions 
preceding the Ministerial talks, the United States and French delegations had been 
prepared to consider the possibility of further negotiations with the Soviet Govern-
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ment, but that United Kingdom officials had taken the line that general negotiations 
with the Soviet Union were unlikely to succeed until the Western Powers were able to 
negotiate from a position of strength. It was suggested that the Government would 
be placed in a difficult political position if any report were circulated that the United 
States and French Governments had been in favour of making an approach to 
Moscow and that this had been prevented only by the unwillingness of the United 
Kingdom Government to associate themselves with such an approach. 
The Foreign Secretary explained that these were preliminary discussions only, and 
it was not yet known what view would be taken by United States and French 
Ministers on this point. His own attitude was clear. No good would come of 
negotiations with the Soviet Government unless the Western Powers knew precisely 
what their objectives would be in such negotiations and had some grounds for 
believing that they could secure them. If the Russians gave any indication that they 
were ready to discontinue the cold war and genuinely anxious to negotiate a general 
settlement, he would be quick to seize any opportunity for full and frank discussion 
of all outstanding issues. But experience had shown that, in dealings with the Soviet 
Union, it was useless to negotiate from weakness. 
The Cabinet fully endorsed the Foreign Secretary's view on this question. They 
considered, however, that there was force in the point that the attitude of the United 
Kingdom Government might be misrepresented if reports became current that the 
Americans and the French had favoured a final attempt to secure a peaceful 
settlement with the Soviet Union by negotiation. The Foreign Secretary undertook 
to bear in mind the importance of ensuring that the United Kingdom Government 
could not be misrepresented as having been alone in placing obstacles in the way of 
any such negotiations with Moscow. In this connection it was suggested that, if the 
Americans showed any disposition to favour general negotiations with the Soviet 
Government, we might suggest that we should be prepared to enter into such 
negotiations on the basis of an agreed agenda including the question of atomic 
energy. This, it was thought, would induce the Americans to adopt a more realistic 
attitude towards such a proposal. 
(b) With reference to paragraph 6 of C.P.(50)92 it was urged that in the discussion 
on economic questions we should make it clear that we were not prepared to adopt 
policies which would prejudice our prospects of attaining economic viability by the 
end of 1952. There was general support for this view. 
(c) The Cabinet endorsed the Foreign Secretary's statement on future policy 
towards Germany. It was essential that Western Germany should be brought into 
closer association with Western Europe, and that France should be persuaded to 
adopt a realistic view of the future place of Western Germany in Europe. The first 
experiment in this direction could be taken in the Council of Europe. But, before 
long, it would be necessary to consider how Germany could best contribute towards 
the defence of Western Europe-though this raised grave questions which would 
require most careful consideration. French and Italian anxieties about a resurgence 
of German militarism were among the reasons for substituting, for the original 
conception of Western Union, the wider conception of the Atlantic community. For, 
in the wider context of the North Atlantic Treaty, France and Italy could feel greater 
assurance of security against German aggression and would therefore be more 
justified in taking the risk of agreeing to some measure of German rearmament. 
(d) In connection with the defence of Western Europe, reference was made to the 
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importance of building up the great potential military strength of France. Import-
ance was also attached to the need for a more complete integration of the machinery 
established under the Brussels Treaty and under the North Atlantic Treaty. 
(e) It was agreed that the Commonwealth Relations Office should arrange to be 
kept informed of all matters arising in the course of the forthcoming discussions 
which would be of direct concern to any of the other self-governing members of the 
Commonwealth. 
The Cabinet:-
Endorsed the Foreign Secretary's statement; and took note of C.P.(50)80 and 92 
and of the points raised in the discussion. 
157 CAB 129/40, CP(50)120 2 June 1950 
'Integration of French and German coal and steel industries': Cabinet 
memorandum, report by committee of officials on Schuman Plan1 
(Chairman, SirE Bridges2) 
[This document has been printed in DBPO, series II, Vol I, no 77.] 
The French Government have indicated to us that it is essential that we and the other 
countries concerned should agree to a communique about the Schuman coal/steel 
proposals in the form given in Annex 13 to this note, on the ground that this 
expressed the unity of view which is indispensable for the successful prosecution of 
the negotiations. They have further indicated that, if the United Kingdom Govern-
ment is unable to subscribe to this communique, the French Government will open 
negotiations on the stated conditions with the other countries which have accepted 
them as a basis. In that event they will keep the United Kingdom Government 
informed of the progress of the negotiations in their desire to enable the latter to join 
in whenever they feel able to do so. 
2. In our view this latest French proposal is basically no different from the earlier 
one. It essentially seeks to commit us in advance of negotiations to the principle of 
pooling European steel and coal resources and to the surrender to an independent 
authority of sovereignty over an important sector of our economy. We think it wrong 
to commit ourselves in this way, not because we necessarily preclude any possibility 
of some measure of pooling or some surrender of sovereignty, but because we think 
it wrong to pledge ourselves on these matters without knowing more precisely the 
nature of the commitment we are being invited to accept. 
3. On this basis we would, therefore, have to contemplate the prospect that the 
others may go ahead without us . Our provisional view is that the economic 
arguments in favour of coming in or staying out of an international association of the 
kind contemplated by the Schuman plan are not conclusive one way or the other, 
and on this score there need be no cause for alarm if at this stage the French decided 
to proceed without us. 
4. The main issues are really political. The exchanges with the French Govern-
1 R Schuman, French minister for foreign affairs, 1948-1953. 
2 Permanent secretary to the Treasury . 3 Annexes I and 11 not printed. 
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ment have brought out that their proposals, which started in a Franco-German 
context, have now been given a wider application. It is not merely pooling of 
resources, but also, in the first place, the conception of fusion or surrender of 
sovereignty in a European system which the French are asking us to accept in 
principle. M. Schuman's original memorandum said in terms [sic] that his plan 
would be a step towards the federation of Europe. It has been our settled policy 
hitherto that in view of our world position and interests, we should not commit 
ourselves irrevocably to Europe either in the political or the economic sphere unless 
we could measure the extent and effects of the commitment. This is in effect what we 
are now being asked to do. It is a commitment of this kind which in essence the 
French Government is now seeking, and at the very moment when the decision has 
been taken to develop and give greater meaning to the Atlantic community. 
5. The most important aspect of the French proposal is that it represents a new 
and constructive approach to the problem of Franco-German relations. This is very 
much in our interest, from the political, as also the defence, point of view. If we 
abstain from the present phase of the negotiations the possible effects of our action 
on the progress of Franco-German rapprochement will have to be borne in mind. 
6. The other Governments who have accepted the French communique in 
principle are not in the same position as the United Kingdom Government either 
politically or economically. Yet even they have not accepted the French formula 
without mental and, in the case of the Dutch, explicit reservation. We shall be kept 
informed of the progress of discussions; and it is unlikely that by refusing to join in 
now on the French terms we shall be prevented from participating in European 
discussions in some manner later on. 
7. It will be seen, therefore, that there is a real difference of view between 
ourselves and the French which cannot be glossed over by mere verbal ingenuity in 
the drafting of a communique, and in our view it is better to face this issue now 
rather than later. For the above reasons we recommend that the latest French 
proposal should be rejected. 
8. In order to avoid misunderstanding and misrepresentation of our position, it 
will be essential that our attitude should be made clear in a public announcement. A 
draft of such an announcement is appended (Annex 11) for consideration. 
158 CAB 128/17, CM 34(50) 2 June 1950 
'Integration of French and German coal and steel industries': Cabinet 
conclusions on British policy 
[This document has been printed in DBPO, series II, vol I, no 78.) 
The Minister of State1 said that, in spite of the numerous diplomatic exchanges 
which had taken place during the past few days, it had proved impossible to reach 
agreement with the French Government about the terms on which the United 
Kingdom could join in the examination of the French proposal for the integration of 
the coal and steel industries of Western Europe. The French Government were 
1 At the FO, Mr KG Younger. 
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insisting that all Governments participating in the proposed examination of this 
proposal should commit themselves in advance to accepting the principle of the 
scheme before it was discussed in detail. Since the matter had last been mentioned at 
the meeting of the Economic Policy Committee on 25th May, a further attempt had 
been made to overcome the French scruples by suggesting that the position of the 
United Kingdom Government should be explained in a final paragraph to be added to 
the proposed communique announcing the initiation of the discussions. This 
paragraph (reproduced in Foreign Office telegram No. 491 to Paris of 31st May) 
would have stated that the United Kingdom Government would participate in the 
proposed conversations in a constructive spirit in the hope that, as a result of the 
discussions, there would emerge a scheme in which they would be able to join; but it 
would have made it clear that the United Kingdom Government could not at this 
stage enter into any more precise commitment. This suggestion had, however, been 
rejected by the French Government, who had now invited us to accept the revised 
form of communique set out in Paris telegram No. 141 of 1st June (Annex I of 
C.P.(50)120). This would involve the participating Governments in a public declara-
tion that they "set to themselves as an immediate aim the pooling of their coal and 
steel production and the institution of a new high authority" whose decisions would 
be binding upon them. The proposed communique also foreshadowed the prepara-
tion of a treaty; and it was known that the French Government desired that a treaty 
embodying the general principles of their plan should be concluded and ratified 
before the participating countries proceeded to the detailed examination of a 
practical scheme. The French Government had stated that, if we were unable to 
assure them by 8 p.m. that day that we would join in the discussions on the basis 
which they now proposed, they would feel compelled to go forward without United 
Kingdom participation. 
Officials of the Departments directly concerned had met that morning to consider 
the position, and their recommendations were set out in C.P.(50)120.2 It was their 
view that there was a real difference of approach between the United Kingdom 
Government and the French Government which could not be glossed over by mere 
verbal ingenuity in the drafting of a communique, and that it was better that this 
should be faced at the present stage rather than later. They therefore recommended 
that the latest French proposal should be rejected; and that, if the French 
Government decided to hold their proposed discussions without United Kingdom 
participation, our attitude should at once be made clear in a public announcement 
on the lines of the draft in Annex 11 of C.P.(50)120. 
The Lord President3 said that he and the Minister of State had been able that 
morning to discuss the position with the Foreign Secretary, who also felt that this 
latest French proposal must be rejected. The Foreign Secretary considered that a 
communication should at once be sent to the French Government on the following 
lines. It should make the point that the United Kingdom Government were unable to 
accept the French proposal by 8 p.m. that evening, since they were still without any 
information about the practical details of the scheme and were therefore unable to 
estimate its possible effects on their programmes for economic development and 
defence. They were acting in good faith in this matter, and were anxious to do their 
best to see whether a workable scheme could be devised which would be fair to all 
2 See 157. 3 Mr H Morrison. 
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concerned and likely to promote peace, European solidarity and economic and social 
progress. They felt, however, that the best way of achieving this was, not by the 
continued exchange of notes, which had led only to misunderstanding and delay, but 
by a meeting of Ministers of the countries concerned, which could consider by what 
means the examination of the French proposal could best be handled. If, however, 
the French Government rejected this offer of a meeting of Ministers and went ahead 
with their plan without our participation, we should certainly lose no time in making 
a public announcement which would make our position clear. 
In discussion there was general agreement that the United Kingdom could not 
participate in the proposed discussion of the French proposal on the basis of the 
communique suggested by the French Government in the telegram reproduced in 
Annex I of C.P.(50)120. This would commit us to accepting the principle of the 
French proposal before any of its details had been made known to us. No British 
Government could be expected to accept such a commitment without having had any 
opportunity to assess the consequences which it might involve for our key industries, 
our export trade and our level of employment. There was, therefore, general support 
for the proposals which the Lord President had put forward in the light of his 
conversation with the Foreign Secretary. 
Other points made in the discussion were:-
(a) The bulk of public opinion in this country, as reflected in Parliament and in 
the Press, was likely to support the view that the Government could not be expected 
to commit themselves in advance to accepting the principle of this proposal before 
they knew what practical shape it would take and what it was likely to involve. There 
would doubtless be some criticism from groups which were disposed to favour 
almost any scheme for European integration; but most people would think that the 
course now proposed was not unduly cautious. 
(b) There was some risk that our attitude might be regarded by public opinion in 
the United States as a further sign of our reluctance to promote European union; and 
it was specially important from th is point of view that, if the French decided to hold 
their conversations without our participation, the reasons for our attitude should be 
made clear without delay. 
(c) It was important that, as proposed by the Foreign Secretary, a further attempt 
should be made to dissuade the French from going forward on the basis proposed 
without our participation. It was unreasonable that we should have been presented 
with an ultimatum that, if we did not concur in their proposal within 24 hours, the 
French would proceed without us; and it should be made clear to the French 
Government that we were surprised to receive such summary treatment in a matter 
of this importance. 
In this connection it was suggested that use might be made of the argument that 
the German Government were not free to engage in these discussions without the 
permission of all the Occupying Powers. It was pointed out, however, that th is 
argument could hardly be used at the present stage, since the Prime Minister, in his 
statement in the House of Commons on 11th May, had already welcomed the project 
for Franco-German discussion of this proposal. At a later stage it might be 
appropriate to make it clear that German adherence to a treaty entrusting control of 
her basic industries to an international authority would require the concurrence of 
the Occupying Powers. 
(d) Some Ministers thought that the French Government must have some 
y 
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underlying political motive for urging this precipitate acceptance of the principle of 
integrating the coal and steel industries of Western Europe. They might perhaps 
envisage this plan as a means of avoiding the additional commitments for the defence 
of Western Europe which had been foreshadowed in the recent meeting of the North 
Atlantic Council. Alternatively, they might be strengthened by knowledge that the 
United States Government would support their efforts to secure agreement on the 
principle of their plan. 
(e) Although the other European ·Governments invited to participate in the 
discussions had accepted the latest French formula, some of them had done so with 
reservations. It would, however, be undesirable for the United Kingdom Government 
to take this course; for nothing would be more likely to exacerbate Anglo-French 
relations than for us to join in the discussions with mental reservations and 
withdraw from participation at a later stage. 
(f) Our position was different from that of the other European countries by 
reason of our Commonwealth connections; and we should be slow to accept the 
principle of the French proposal without consultation with other members of the 
Commonwealth, especially as it appeared to involve some surrender of sovereignty. 
The Cabinet agreed that if, despite the further representations which were to be 
made to them, the French Government decided to hold their proposed discussions 
without United Kingdom participation, an announcement should be made without 
delay explaining the attitude of the United Kingdom Government towards the French 
proposal. This should follow the general lines of the draft set out in Annex II of 
C.P.(50) 120. It was, however, agreed that the reference to the Atlantic Pact at the end 
of that draft should be omitted; and that the whole of paragraph 5 of the draft might 
with advantage be recast on the lines that the United Kingdom Government would 
have wished to be associated with the examination of this proposal and regretted that 
French insistence on a prior commitment in principle had made it impossible for 
them to do so, having regard to their obligations to Parliament and to the public. 
The Cabinet:-
(1) Agreed that the United Kingdom Government should not participate in the 
examination of the French proposal for the integration of the coal and steel 
industries of Western Europe on the basis set out in the telegram reproduced in 
Annex I of C.P.(50)120. 
(2) Invited the Minister of State to arrange for a communication to be sent 
forthwith to the French Government, on the lines approved by the Cabinet, 
suggesting that they should convene in Paris a meeting of Ministers of the 
countries concerned to consider by what means the examination of the French 
proposal could best be handled. 
(3) Agreed that if, in spite of these representations, the French Government 
decided to discuss their plan with the other Western European countries 
concerned without United Kingdom participation, a public announcement should 
be made without delay explaining the attitude of the United Kingdom Government 
on the general lines of the draft in Annex 11 of C.P.(50)120; and authorised the 
Lord President to settle the final text of that communique in consultation with the 
Minister of State. 
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159 CAB 129/41, CP(50) 153 3 July 1950 
'Integration of Western European coal and steel industries: Common-
wealth implications': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Gordon Walker 
(CRO) . Appendixes: A and B 
[This document has been printed in DBPO, series Il, vol I, no 130.] 
At their meeting on 22nd June (C.M.(50) 38th Conclusions, Minute 5) the Cabinet 
invited me to prepare a memorandum on the Commonwealth implications of the 
Schuman proposals. 
2. The whole nexus of our relations with European countries in recent years-in 
the Brussels Treaty, O.E.E.C., the Council of Europe and, to some extent, the 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation-has inevitably brought into question the United 
Kingdom's relation to the rest of the Commonwealth. 
3. In all the discussions aimed at bringing about closer unity of Europe, our 
policy has been governed by two factors :-
(a) the need to play our full part-and, indeed, to take the lead-in revivifying 
Europe, while at the same time-
(b) not engaging ourselves in anything which was likely to do damage to our 
relationship with other Commonwealth countries. 
4. Our difficulties have been fully recognized by our partners in the Common-
wealth, who have throughout realised that we have a role to play in Europe and have 
recognised that we ourselves have been scrupulous in bearing in mind the interests 
of the Commonwealth as a whole. At the O.E.E.C. Council meeting in Paris on 1st 
November, 1949, the Chancellor of the Exchequer publicly stated our policy in the 
words-"We have made it clear from the beginning that our task was to try to 
combine our responsibilities and interests as a leading member of the Common-
wealth and of the sterling area with support for the development of unity in Europe . 
. . . Our position, therefore , is such that we could not 'integrate' our economy into 
that of Europe in any manner that would prejudice the full discharge of those other 
responsibilities that I have mentioned." The Chancellor's statement was, of course, 
communicated at the time to all other Commonwealth Governments , and the 
Australian Government, in particular, expressed their satisfaction at the line taken. 
5. Similarly, the whole question of our relationship with Europe was considered 
at the Colombo Conference in January, and the meeting recorded the conclusion-
"The representatives of the other Commonwealth Governments expressed the view 
that there need be no inconsistency between the policy followed by the United 
Kingdom Government in relation to Western Europe and the maintenance of the 
traditional links between the United Kingdom and the rest of the Commonwealth." 
6. There would therefore be no danger in going forward with increasing 
international co-operation with Europe. The other Members of the Commonwealth 
would be likely to be disturbed by the setting up of a supra-national authority. If the 
United Kingdom steel industry were placed under an Authority beyond the control of 
the Government, this would give rise to the fear that the supply of steel and capital 
goods to Commonwealth countries might be jeopardised. 
7. Moreover, such a supra-national authority would suggest that we were moving 
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towards a European Federation that would fundamentally alter the United King-
dom's relation to the Commonwealth. 
8. It is fair to say, however that all Commonwealth countries would not 
necessarily react alike (e.g., the Asian members of the Commonwealth would be 
more concerned about capital goods than about political developments; Australia and 
New Zealand would react more sharply against integration with Europe than would 
Canada and South Africa). 
9. On the other hand, it does not seem that the modified scheme recommended 
in the report by the committee of officials annexed to CP(50)128 would be open to 
the same objections on the part of other Commonwealth countries. The report 
recommends that the authority should not be supra-national, with binding powers, 
but international, and with powers mainly advisory, though mandatory in certain 
limited and unobjectionable matters; the final responsibility would remain with the 
member Governments. A scheme, broadly along these lines, would be seen as playing 
its part in the general effort to restore European economy without raising the fear of 
Britain's being ultimately swallowed up in the Continent and cutting her ties with 
the Commonwealth. 
10. There are certain possible implications in relation to strategic interests and to 
Imperial Preference which are dealt with in the report by the working party of 
officials annexed to C.P.(50)128 (see respectively, paragraph 101 and paragraphs 92 
and 93 of that report). As regards strategic interests the proposal that the right to 
protect speciality production vital to defence should be reserved is clearly a welcome 
one from the Commonwealth point of view. As regards Imperial Preference there are, 
first, the preferences we enjoy in other Commonwealth countries: while we could 
forego these unilaterally, we should not wish to do so. Secondly, there are the 
preferences which we accord to imports, particularly those of pig-iron from India, of 
semi-finished steel from Australia and of semi-finished and finished steel from 
Canada (a table showing imports of iron and steel from members of the Common-
wealth in 1949 is attached in Appendix A). We would /not wish to withdraw the 
preference on these imports and could not do so without the concurrence of the 
other Commonwealth Governments concerned. 
11. The Plan might affect United Kingdom companies who operate not only in 
the United Kingdom but also through subsidiaries of associated companies in other 
Commonwealth countries, e.g., in the case of steel, Stewart and Lloyds in India and 
Lysaghts in Australia. 
12. It is essential that we should keep other Commonwealth Governments closely 
informed of all developments about the discussions of the Schuman proposals. They 
were informed by telegram of the negotiations leading up to the publication of the 
French and United Kingdom communiques of 3rd June and they are being kept 
currently in touch with subsequent developments both through the Commonwealth 
Liaison Committee and by telegram. Appendix B summarises comments received on 
24th June from United Kingdom High Commissioners on the attitude of Common-
wealth Governments and Press. There have been no further significant reports since 
that date. 
13. To sum up, I think that the Commonwealth countries would look askance at 
any departure from our present policy of combining our responsibilities as a Member 
of the Commonwealth with support for the development of European unity, and 
would probably react sharply to any "integration" of our economy into that of Europe 
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in any manner which they regarded as prejudicing their vital interests. On the other 
hand, they have hitherto accorded a general welcome to the steps we have so far 
taken to ensure a better balance in Europe and they would probably welcome a 
scheme for the integration of Western European coal and steel industries, provided it 
contained adequate safeguards. Indeed, given this proviso, most other Common-
wealth countries would be likely to regard United Kingdom association with such a 
scheme as a helpful contribution to stability and peace in Western Europe. 
Conclusion 
14. Subject, therefore, to the observations in paragraphs 12 and 13 above and to 
any views which other Commonwealth Governments may themselves express at a 
later stage, there is no objection from the Commonwealth point of view to 
participation by the United Kingdom in a plan for the integration of European coal 
and steel industries broadly on the lines recommended in C.P.(50)128. 
Appendix A to 159: Note on imports of irdn and steel from Commonwealth countries 
The following figures show the tonnages and values of imports of iron and steel from 
Members of the Commonwealth for the calendar year, 1949. 
Exporting Pig Iron Semi-finished steel Finished steel 
country 
Tons £ Tons £ Tons £ 
Australia ... 13,175 194,559 1,047 54,677 
Canada ... 3,617 137,208 232 114,572 
India ... ... 21,980 277,876 6 1,204 
New Zealand ... - 107 
South Africa ... 7 2,803 
Total ... ... 21,980 277,876 16,792 331,767 1,292 173,363 
All these items came in free of duty, but would have been subject to import duties if 
they had come from sources outside the Commonwealth. 
Appendix B to 159: Summary of High Commissioners' reports (24th June) on the 
attitude of Commonwealth governments and of the Commonwealth press to the 
Schuman proposals 
There has been some tendency in Canada to consider the United Kingdom 
over-cautious about European integration generally, and regarding the Schuman 
proposals official and public opinion would probably be gratified if we found 
ourselves able to participate in conversations with the French and others whilst 
protecting ourselves from premature commitments. The tendency to criticse the 
United Kingdom attitude is diminishing, however, and the impression is gaining 
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ground that her original hesitations were justified. In Australia there have been no 
indications that the Government have given detailed consideration to the implica-
tions of the plan, though Mr. Spender1 made a non-committal reference to it in a 
speech on fore ign affairs on 8th June; general outside comment shows some 
disappointment that United Kingdom Government were unable to participate even 
with reservations. The South African Government press has also been critical of the 
United Kingdom attitude and there is no perceptible appreciation of possible 
difficulties in respect of Commonwealth obligations. In New Zealand, on the other 
hand, the press has in general supported the United Kingdom refusal to take part in 
discussions on the plan on the French terms. 
In India, Pakistan and Ceylon there has been no expression of Government 
opinion and the press has confined itself to factual reports. 
1 Australian minister for external affairs . 
160 CAB 129/41, CP(50)200 30 Aug 1950 
'Review of the international situation in Asia in the light of the Korean 
conflict': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Bevin 
[This paper, outlining general policy towards South and South-East Asia, was approved by 
the Cabinet on 4 September 1950 (CAB 128/18, CM 55(50)4) . Bevin is recorded as saying: 
'It was his aim to induce the United States Government to look at Asia as a whole and to 
pay due regard to the desire of Asiatic countries to avoid any appearance of domination by 
the West. The United Kingdom Government has recognised the emergence of new forces 
in Asia by the grant of self-government to India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma; but the 
United States had been much slower to recognise the new spirit of independence in Asia'.) 
I am circulating separately for consideration by my colleagues memoranda on Korea 
and Formosa. In addition, I think it necessary to review the whole position in Asia in 
the light of the Korean conflict, 'and to consider the policy of His Majesty's 
Government in relation to that part of the world. This is particularly important in 
view of the forthcoming Tripartite Ministerial Talks in New York which I shall be 
attending. 
2. Review of the policy of His Majesty's Government 
Since the end of the war, the policy of His Majesty's Government in South and 
South-East Asia has been to encourage the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of 
that area for independence. In accordance with this policy independence was given to 
India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma and with the exception of the last -named all these 
countries chose to remain in the Commonwealth. In Indonesia our efforts were 
directed towards the attainment of nationalist aspirations by legitimate means and by 
non-violence. After some anxious and troubled years Indonesia became a sovereign 
independent State as a result of the ultimate recognition by the Netherlands of the 
wisdom of granting independence. In Indo-China, His Majesty's Government have 
recognised Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia as Associate States of the French Union, 
and have at the same time done what they could to persuade the French Government 
of the necessity of increasing the measure of independence accorded to these States. 
In our own dependent territories His Majesty's Government are pursuing an 
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enlightened policy of progress towards self-government within the Commonwealth, 
while seeking to improve the social and economic welfare of the people . 
That the policy pursued by His Majesty's Government has been the right one there 
can be no doubt, and our support of nationalism in South and South-East Asia 
provides the best possible counter to communist subversion and penetration. The 
relations between the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth and foreign Govern-
ments of the area are cordial, and where matters of disagreement arise it can be said 
that it is possible to discuss these matters in an atmosphere conducive towards their 
settlement. There is a very strong fund of goodwill towards the United Kingdom in 
South and South-East Asia which should stand us in good stead. 
The United Kingdom's position in the Far East was much weakened as a result of 
the war. The United States on the other hand, who played the principal part in the 
defeat of Japan, found themselves in the predominant position. The policy of His 
Majesty's Government in the Far East immediately after the war was to try to 
re-establish our commercial position in China and Japan and through the Far 
Eastern Commission to try to exercise such influence as was possible upon the 
post-surrender policies for Japan. In Korea the issue was almost entirely between the 
United States and the Soviet Union as occupying powers, and His Majesty's 
Government held what was little more than a watching brief. 
This comparatively negative policy of the United Kingdom which was dictated by 
our post-war weakness and our many commitments elsewhere has meant that while 
on the one hand we were unable to exercise much influence upon the course of 
events, we were, on the other hand, less immediately involved in the debacle in 
China and Korea and are therefore to-day to some extent freer than the United States 
to determine our policy for the future in the Far East. 
3. United States policy in Asia 
The United States have tended since the war to regard South and South-East Asia as 
primarily a British interest. Indeed, until 1949 they were not disposed to give very 
serious consideration to the matter apart from the anxiety which they shared with us 
to see a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Within the last year, however, the United 
States, largely owing to the Communist threat, have been disposed to take a closer 
interest in developments in South-East Asia to the extent of being prepared to give 
military and economic aid to certain countries within the scope of existing 
appropriations. It is hoped that they will eventually be prepared to take part in 
economic development in South and South-East Asia. In general the United States 
expect the United Kingdom to take the lead, and show a welcome disposition to 
consult His Majesty's Government before taking any kind of action. This is 
satisfactory and should be encouraged. 
In the Far East, however, the United States have tended to be a law unto 
themselves since the end of the war, with results which have been far from happy. In 
Korea, up to the outbreak of the Korean conflict, United States policy had met with 
no great degree of success, and there is reason to believe that had South Korea fallen 
a victim to the North by processes similar to those which overthrew the existing 
Governments in Eastern Europe, the United States would have accepted the fait 
accompli. In China, the late President Roosevelt's policy of cultivating the friendship 
of that country failed dismally for the reason that American support was given to a 
regime which, through its failure to introduce promised reforms, eventually lost the 
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confidence of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. The United States 
Government, having denounced this regime in a White Paper, on the same occasion 
proclaimed its hostility to the Communist regime even before it had been set up. Yet 
at the same time they continued and still continue to give support to Chiang 
Kai-shek. Thus it is true to say that the United States lack all direction in their policy 
towards China. That this state of affairs is dangerous is demonstrated by the 
Formosan situation, which is discussed in C.P.(50)194. 
A similar lack of direction is apparent in United States policy towards Japan. 
Initially the disarmament and demilitarisation of Japan was accomplished by General 
MacArthur with efficiency and despatch. But now, five years after the end of the war 
with Japan, the United States appear to have no clear idea as to the direction in which 
they are going. The Far Eastern Commission is virtually a dead letter, and 
consultation with other Powers is non-existent, even though the United States are 
not entitled to settle the Japanese problem by themselves. The dangers of such a 
situation need no emphasis. Japan is a country of more than 80 million people which 
cannot be ignored in the context of Asia. The treatment of Japan will determine 
whether in the future she is with us or against us. The lack of direction in United 
States policy offers no guarantee that the treatment will be the right kind, and clearly 
this is a matter in which friendly Powers should be consulted and consulted soon. 
Nor is there any need for the Korean conflict to preclude such consultation. 
4. The effect of the Korean conflict and Formosan situation upon Asia 
The immediate reaction of Asian countries (excluding China) to the North Korean 
aggression and to the United States intervention, which was subsequently endorsed 
by the Security Council, was good as has been demonstrated by the measure of 
support given to the Security Council resolutions. But second thoughts were 
induced not only by successive American defeats in Korea but by the situation 
created by President Truman's declaration on Formosa. Nothing in United States' 
Far Eastern policy since the war has inspired Asian countries with confidence, and 
the declaration on Formosa has caused both alarm and despondency because of the 
possibility which it has created of a conflict between the United States and China, 
with all the repercussions upon Asia which would be likely to follow. The doubts and 
fears to which the American action over Formosa have given rise have been given 
most expression in India, who has always been suspicious of American "imperialism" 
and is specially worried now lest American action should jeopardise the friendly 
relations which India herself is bent on establishing with China. But the feeling is 
probably more widespread that the United States is intervening in Asia and seeking to 
determine its future in a way unpleasing to the peoples of Asia and likely to be to 
their detriment. Though countries like Siam and the Philippines pay lip service to 
the United States they are not themselves held in high repute. India, on the other 
hand, has an undoubted influence upon Asian opinion. 
There is therefore a distinct possibility that, unless United States policy towards 
China, Japan and Korea takes more account of Asian opinion and Asian susceptibili-
ties, we shall find that Asia is gradually alienated from the West, which could only be 
of benefit to the Soviet Union. 
5. Internal difficulties of the United States administration 
Unfortunately United States Far Eastern policy is bedevilled by internal politics. The 
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bi-partisan foreign policy does not effectively extend to the Far East. For some time 
past China has been the subject of increasingly bitter controversy. The Korean 
conflict has given rise to accusations of unpreparedness and there has developed a 
tendency to search for scapegoats and to blame the Administration for the failure of 
its Far Eastern policy, and to ignore the fact that it is precisely because the Far East 
has become a party political issue that the Administration's policy has been so 
negative. The situation is rendered more acute by the fact that elections for the 
whole of the House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate are due in 
November. It may therefore be expected that the temperature on Far Eastern 
questions will rise rather than fall during the next three months, just at the time 
when both China and Korea will be in the forefront of international debate in the 
United Nations Assembly. The recent clash between President Truman and General 
MacArthur over the latter's statement on Formosa, which was published in spite of 
the President's veto, is likely to increase the party political tension. Added to all this 
is the fact that American public opinion is in a highly emotional state, which is 
attributable in part to the Korean situation itself and in part to the sense of 
frustration induced by the feeling that in fighting the North Koreans, Americans are 
not coming to grips with the real enemy. In such a state of mind the American public 
is likely to be irrational in its outlook, and unreasonable towards the United 
Kingdom where our policy diverges from that of the United States. 
6. The problem 
The problem before us is to seek, at a time when the general atmosphere in the 
United States is least favourable for such a course, to persuade the United States 
Administration not to adopt policies in relation to the Far East which will fail to 
command general support amongst friendly nations and which will antagonise Asia. 
The immediate issues are those of Korea and Formosa and the question of Chinese 
representation in the United Nations. These are discussed in separate papers before 
the Cabinet. It is sufficient to say here that, as regards Korea, it is essential to try to 
maintain intact the solidarity which has already been demonstrated by the 53 [sic] 
members of the United Nations Organisation. On China, including Formosa, the 
United States are likely to be more intractable, and it is on Chinese questions that the 
greatest difficulties are likely to be experienced in view of the atmosphere in the 
United States, which I have described. No effort is likely to succeed which, just before 
elections, has the result that the United States Administration appears to have given 
way to United Kingdom pressure. We cannot expect the Administration to do things 
which will lead to its certain downfall. 
7. The method 
Clearly, therefore, the United Kingdom should not be obtrusive in its efforts to 
influence United States policy in the right direction, nor must the onus fall on us 
alone for bringing about a change in American policy, if that can be effected. 
The position is by no means hopeless. For the first time since the war the United 
States Administration have shown a desire to consult with us on Far Eastern Affairs 
and to give consideration to the views which we express, and they are also showing 
signs of appreciating the importance of Asian (and particularly Indian) opinion in 
dealing with these matters. Certain interchanges are already in progress between His 
Majesty's Ambassador in Washington and the State Department, and I am not 
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without hope that these will pave the way for the further developments which I have 
in mind. 
Though the United States Administration, as I have indicated, will not change its 
policies in response to purely British suggestion, it may be willing to modify those 
policies in response to a majority view in the United Nations Assembly, provided an 
agreed view emerges as a result of debate and consultations. 
I have it in mind, therefore, after the discussions which are going on with the 
State Department, to try to get them to agree to consult with other Powers, in 
particular with Commonwealth countries, with France and possibly with some other 
European countries. If the support of these can be secured, the next step would be to 
try to get the broad agreement of other friendly members of the United Nations, and 
thus build up a common front against any manreuvres of the Soviet Union, whose 
main purpose will be to create a split. 
The task will obviously be a difficult one, but it offers the best hope for reconciling 
United States and Asian opinion and of enabling the Commonwealth to keep in line 
with the United States. Only by pursuing this course can we hope to avoid open 
divergence with the United States on China and the related question of Formosa, and 
the unfortunate consequences which might ensue in the present highly-charged 
atmosphere in the United States. 
I invite my colleagues to endorse the course of action which I propose. 
161 CAB 129/42, CP(50)236 19 Oct 1950 
'The Council of Europe': Cabinet memorandum by Mr Bevin [Extract] 
[This document has been printed in full in DBPO, series II, vol I, no 172.] 
The general policy of His Majesty's Government 
10. The line which I shall have to take in Rome must clearly conform to the basic 
policy which His Majesty's Government have accepted hitherto and to which we must 
stick, of avoiding commitments in Europe which would affect our position as the 
leading member of the Commonwealth, our special relationship with the United 
States and our responsibilities as the centre of the Sterling Area. We must therefore 
decline to accept limitations, in a purely European association, on our ability to take 
basic decisions of policy (including those of an economic character) on our own 
responsibility, and we cannot agree that any organs of the Council of Europe to 
which we belong should acquire authority of a supra-national character. I assume 
that my Cabinet colleagues will be in full agreement on this point. 
11. On the other hand, it would be very wrong, in the present state of morale in 
Europe, for His Majesty's Government to take up a position which obstructs the 
endeavours of other European Powers to achieve closer unity. There has always been 
a certain danger that a refusal by Great Britain to take a full part in the movement 
towards European unity might lead to the creation of a bloc of European Powers 
inimicable [sic] to our interests, especially if Germany were to get control of such a 
bloc. Traditionally, British policy has always been to prevent the formation of any 
such grouping on the Continent, but the emergence of the Soviet Union as an 
[162] FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES 373 
overriding threat to Europe has altered the basis on which this policy was founded. 
Subject to careful watch on the revival of German influence and power, I do not 
think it need any longer be regarded as necessary for His Majesty's Government to 
work against the creation of close groupings, even of a federal character, between 
Western European countries. Furthermore, such is the present material and moral 
weakness of countries such as France and Italy that they are in danger of losing the 
will to survive as separate independent nations; and it might be fatal to the 
preservation of democracy in Western Europe if we were openly to discourage the 
conception of European unity which is reflected in the Council of Europe. 
12. For these reasons, I think we have to steer a course between becoming too 
deeply involved ourselves in European union on the one hand, and, on the other, 
standing in the way of greater continental cohesion. While, therefore, I admit that 
the Council of Europe has many features which are objectionable to us and is not an 
institution in which Great Britain can ever find a wholly satisfactory position, we 
must nevertheless do what we can to prevent its collapse and to assist it to do useful 
work and to play a sensible part in the revival of Western Europe. The proposals 
which I set out below are designed to create conditions in which His Majesty's 
Government can continue to play a valuable role in the Council in its present limited 
form, while allowing other Governments, if they so wish, to enter into closer 
commitments with each other on specific subjects within the framework of the 
Council ... . 
162 FO 371/124968, no 24/2 11 Aug 1951 
'Some notes on British foreign policy': memorandum by Sir R Makins 
(FO) 
[Sir Roger Makins, deputy under-secretary of state at the FO, described his paper as 'a 
quick sketch', arising out of doubts and questionings in Whitehall about the soundness of 
British foreign policy, especially on Europe: viz, concern about Britain's economic and 
military weakness, about growing American power, and about weakness in the Middle 
East. It was sent to the private secretaries of Cabinet ministers. Sir W Strang believed it 
was an analysis and exposition 'both brilliant and sound'. Morrison made a number of 
marginal comments (minutes, 11-30 Aug 1951), including a suggestion to refer to the 
need for a policy which was 'lively, adaptable and imaginative'; he felt the stress on 
dependence on the USA was crude, and specially the phrase 'they are paying the piper'-a 
gift to The Daily Worker, he believed (see para 8, note 1). Sir G Jebb (30 Aug 1951) 
thought Makins's paper a bit summary on the United Nations: it had an important role, 
especially if Britain ever reached a modus vivendi between East and West for 
negotiation-a point which Makins accepted.] 
Periodically, we all have qualms about the soundness of our foreign policy and need 
to be reassured. Since some of these qualms have been expressed recently, it may be 
useful to examine the grounds for reassurance. 
2. It is a truism to say that the object of British policy is to secure peace, because 
it is the case that a peaceful world is a major British interest. All our actions should 
be subject to this major purpose. 
3. Foreign policy is based on national strength, and cannot safely get too much 
out of line with the resources, moral and material, which a country can control. 
British foreign policy in recent years has sought to recognise this fact, and has rested 
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on the basic assumption that neither the United Kingdom and Commonwealth alone, 
nor the United Kingdom and Western Europe alone, nor even the United Kingdom, 
Western Europe and the Commonwealth alone, possess sufficient resources to resist 
the forces arrayed against them. The second basic assumption is that these forces are 
those controlled by the Soviet Union and are being used to weaken, undermine and 
ultimately to dominate the democracies of Western Europe, by all means short of 
war, and, in certain circumstances possibly even by war itself. The resources and 
support of the United States of America are therefore essential to the security of the 
United Kingdom and indeed to the free world. 
4. We believe that the British "way of life," which is a convenient expression to 
use for our political and social system, is more enlightened than that of other 
countries; we believe also that British influence is on the whole moderately and 
wisely exercised in the world, and consistently used to promote the peaceful 
development and economic welfare of our own and other peoples. So long as we 
believe this (and if we cease to believe in our mission we shall soon go down) it must 
be our objective to maintain our position as a great Power, and this has, indeed, been 
our main purpose since 1900, when British power was at its zenith. It can be argued, 
and it was so argued before the last war, that our resources are no longer equal to 
this task, and that we ought to content ourselves with a more modest role; and if we 
survey the resources which we physically own, there is something to be said for this 
view. But our resources are not only physical; they are in large measure intangible 
and imponderable: our prestige, our technical and political skill, our reputation for 
fair dealing and wise counsel, our national will, and consequently the support which 
we obtain not only from the Commonwealth and Empire but also from foreign 
countries. Secondly, if we accepted a lesser role, it would be so modest as to be 
intolerable. We have plenty of enemies and if we relaxed our grip scarcely a British 
interest outside the United Kingdom would survive. 
5. It follows that we must continue to aim at the maintenance of our power and 
influence in the world at the highest possible level. 
6. The strategy we are following in pursuit of these objectives is fourfold-
(a) to maintain the maximum cohesion in the Commonwealth and Empire, and to 
hold the sterling area together; 
(b) to maintain a partner relationship with the United States; 
(c) to promote the cohesion of Western Europe; 
(d) to strive for the fullest measure of economic independence and strength for 
the United Kingdom. 
(a) The Commonwealth 
7. It is a delicate task to maintain the Commonwealth as a world force. Much has 
been done in recent years through frequent ministerial meetings, and the Colombo 
Plan was a success. But too much pressure would defeat its purpose; and, in 
particular, any rift between the United States and United Kingdom would put an 
unbearable strain on the Commonwealth relationship. Not all the members would 
necessarily choose the United Kingdom side. The problem of Commonwealth 
cohesion in foreign and economic policy is likely to get more difficult as the 
members of the Commonwealth develop their own nationhood, and to it will soon be 
added the analogous problems of the emancipated countries like the Gold Coast, 
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Nigeria and Malaya. The greatest weakness in the Commonwealth, politically, 
strategically and morally, is the India-Pakistan dispute. 
(b) Relationship with the United States 
8. The maintenance of close and friendly relations with the United States is not 
only desirable in itself, but necessary, since American support is essential to the free 
world. It is a problem of increasing difficulty to manage our relationship with them 
and to maintain the conception of Anglo-American partnership, for the power and 
resources of the United States are increasing so much faster than our own. But the 
task is not impossible. The Americans continue to regard the British in a special way, 
and we can keep this special relationship on two conditions: first, that we avoid 
another internal economic crisis and so keep ourselves independent of general 
economic aid, and secondly, that we do not expect the Americans always to do things 
the way we want them done. 1 
(c) Western Europe 
9. Our policy is, very broadly speaking, to support and co-operate with the 
Western European countries to the fullest extent short of entering into an organic 
relationship with all or any of them. This is the most difficult of the three facets of 
our policy, since we are of, but not in, Europe. The Europeans are conscious of their 
own weakness and are trying to pull us in, and some Americans are sometimes trying 
to push us in. We want Europe to be strong, but if we were classed as just a European 
Power and bound in an organic relationship to a predominantly Latin and Catholic 
grouping, we should soon lose our world position and a great deal of our liberty of 
action without strengthening either Europe or ourselves. 
(d) Economic independence 
10. This is vital to our world position and the key to a strong foreign policy. It is 
also the strand of our policy which is in the greatest danger of breaking. 
The Atlantic community 
11. It is evident that th is policy which we are pursuing is a very difficult and 
complicated one, and that there is some risk of our falling between several stools. In 
order to guard against this risk we must constantly try to find a synthesis of our 
objectives, and this is for us the supreme importance of the concept of the Atlantic 
community. It forms a nodal point for the four main strands of our policy. But we 
must recognise that the development of the Atlantic concept has its difficulties. 
Some of the European members, particularly the French, are not very enthusiastic 
about N.A.T.O., ostensibly because it is too militarist, but really because it is too 
predominantly Anglo-Saxon for their taste . They hanker after a small European 
grouping in which they would expect to be top dog. Norway, and to some extent the 
Netherlands, as non-Latin mainly non-Catholic countries, are more solid in their 
support. Some Americans are not enthusiastic, because in the Atlantic community 
1 Although the printed version reproduced here retained the original date of Makins's memo, a number of 
amendments were incorporated as a result of Morrison 's comments. At the end of para 8 the original 
typescript read: 'After all, they are paying the piper, and in the last analysis we are dependent on general 
American support for our security'. In response to Morrison's comment, this was omitted. Makins noting 
(14 Aug 1951): 'I agree with the Secretary of State's comment. Omit last sentence' . 
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they are bound by common obligations to less powerful nations and lose some 
freedom of action; it is much more comfortable and agreeable to sit on the side and 
push the Europeans around. Only Canada, for the same reasons as the United 
Kingdom, is at present a whole-hearted supporter of the Atlantic concept. Finally, 
the present Atlantic grouping is not really wide enough for some purposes, which 
need the co-operation of all nations of the free world (vide the International Materials 
Conference). Nevertheless, N.A.T.O. is making headway and we must persevere with 
it. It is our best bet by far. 
United Nations 
12. The United Nations and its agencies were designed to work on a basis of four-
or five-Power co-operation and cannot fulfil their purpose in present world 
conditions, but they must be mentioned since it is to our interest to preserve these 
institutions intact. They may play an important role if the existing tension between 
East and West subsides. 
Longer-range aims 
13. The present policy of the Western democracies, which is fully supported (with 
some faint-heartedness on the French part) by all the members of N.A.T.O., is the 
containment of Soviet Communist imperialism, and has been well described as 
"building up positions of strength." Though it has many positive aspects, this is 
basically a negative policy which must give way as soon as possible (i.e., as soon as 
the West is strong enough) to the positive purpose of reaching an accommodation, or 
rather a modus vivendi (in the precise meaning of the phrase) , with the Communist 
half of the world. There seems no reason why it should not be possible to reach a 
state of equilibrium in which resources, both material and technical, on each side 
can be turned back from armament production to economic and social development 
and the raising of living standards. This in turn might reduce the appeal and perhaps 
alter the character of communism and bring about a transition to a new and, it may 
be, a more prosperous period of human society. 
Doubts and difficulties 
14. Many pitfalls beset this rather optimistic programme. First and foremost it 
requires strong nerves and a willingness of the part of Western peoples to accept 
immediate hardships and efforts for future benefits: "Peace before Plenty" on a world 
scale. There are also more specific hazards which must be considered briefly from a 
United Kingdom standpoint. 
(i) Europe 
15. (a) Federal tendencies. The most disturbing thing about Western Europe is 
the lack of what is loosely called "morale." This is the product of defeat and national 
divisions in the war. Its symptoms are a loss of trust in the national State, a large 
Communist element, weak Governments, and unwillingness to introduce the 
necessary social reforms. One result has been the move for federation, which is partly 
escapist, partly insincere, but still a move to be taken seriously. Specifically, the 
French back it because they see in it an instrument for the re-establishment of 
French influence and prestige and the possibility of containing the resurgence of 
Germany. They regard it as a French project because, as the saying is, when a 
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Frenchman says "Europe" he means "France." The Germans back it for a similar 
reason; they think it will be the means by which German leadership in Europe can be 
restored. The Americans back it for various reasons, but basically because they are 
naive enough to think that contemporary Europe will be saved by the remedies 
prescribed for the thirteen colonies in 1776. It is sometimes argued that it is 
dangerous to our interests to permit Western Europe to federate without the United 
Kingdom, since it would be a break with our traditional policy of not permitting 
Europe to be dominated by a single Power (in this case the "Community"). But we in 
our turn must avoid anachronistic thinking. Europe is already divided between East 
and West, and the Power grouping is no longer on a European, but on a world scale. 
There are admittedly risks, political and economic, in allowing a restricted grouping 
of Western European States to consolidate itself. They must be taken since they are 
less than the risks of joining. Moreover, if the movement is genuine and continues to 
enjoy enthusiastic American support, we cannot prevent its progress: and it does 
hold out perhaps the only prospect of Franco-German rapprochement. We can 
explore every method of associating ourselves closely, in appropriate cases, with any 
federal or quasi-federal institutions which may be developed. There are also 
safeguards. The federal elements will be part of the Atlantic grouping; we should 
continue to have the support of the Scandinavian countries, with which our links 
should become closer; and the federation, in view of the latent rivalry within it of 
French and German ambitions, will stand in need of our collaboration and influence. 
(b) Germany 
A divided Germany is unstable; a united Germany might again be a menace in certain 
circumstances. But we must accept the fact of a divided Germany and seek to 
integrate Western Germany with Europe politically, economically and in defence. 
(ii) United States. Although the United States has made great progress in the 
school of world leadership, her policy is likely to cause anxiety for some time. The 
antiquated political and administrative system, the formidable lack of co-ordination 
in the Government, the emotional disposition of the people, the staggering 
preponderance of power, the tendency to sacrifice long-term objectives for short-
range advantages, the clumsy and insensitive handling of other countries, the lack of 
understanding of the meaning of the word "negotiation," all make her a rather 
awkward ally. And there is always a haunting possibility that she may slip back to a 
new form of isolationism (it would really be a form of imperialism) and try to "go it 
alone," or, alternatively, be tempted to "do a deal" with the other great Power in the 
world. But these are faint prospects; America is an indispensable ally with plenty of 
good will, and we must cajole and counsel her with infinite patience and forbearance. 
It is sometimes suggested that we ought to put more weight on Europe in our 
dealings with America, and form a collective front against American pressure. I think 
this is unsound. Americans resent the idea of "ganging up," and my experience of 
resisting American pressure with our European friends is that they collapse at once 
and leave us to do the resisting. They realise well enough how much they depend on 
the United States, and, while they do a lot of snarling, they have no intention of 
biting the hand that feeds them. The place to face the Americans is in N.A.T.O., but 
round, rather than across, the table. 
(iii) Middle East. The worry here is to hold the Middle East together and to 
maintain our influence and prestige, and the hard fact is that we now need American 
support to keep our end up in this area. We must therefore strain every nerve to 
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bring the Allied Command in the Middle East into being. This has disadvantages, for 
we shall never be free of French spite and Italian intrigue in this part of the world. 
We shall have to guard against it as best we can. The dispute with Persia has dealt a 
heavy blow to our prestige, and we have brought this on ourselves by allowing the oil 
company, in which we have a controlling interest, too much freedom of action 
though vital national interests were at stake. We cannot afford another mistake of 
this magnitude. 
(iv) No money. In our present balance of payments situation we have no resources 
available for overseas investment other than that to which we are already committed. 
This is a serious handicap to the initiation and influencing of policy by His Majesty's 
Government. Governments which initiate policies are normally expected to contri-
bute to their execution. 
(v) United Kingdom economic strength. This is the greatest anxiety. Another 
serious economic or balance of payments crisis leading to instability of sterling and 
the need for general economic assistance, or a production crisis, leading to some 
further reduction in exports, particularly of coal and steel, would paralyse our 
foreign policy and make our already difficult role almost impossible to play. The key 
to success abroad lies in the mines, blast furnaces and factories at home. 
Leadership and dynamism 
16. The United Kingdom is sometimes accused of lack of leadership (by 
Europeans and Americans) and lack of dynamism (by Americans). There are a good 
many things to be said about this. Most Europeans will only follow a lead in the 
direction in which they already want to go (vide our difficulties about leading them 
into N.A.T.O.). It is easier to be dynamic if you have enough steaks. Some Europeans 
and Americans think that international difficulties can be solved by formul<e or 
high-faluting declarations and that progress can be achieved by political conjuring 
tricks. But you cannot pull a rabbit out of a hat unless you have a rabbit in a hat. It is 
unwise to take bold political initiatives unless there are enough resources to back 
them up. At present we have barely enough resources to sustain existing policies. As 
a matter of fact, these criticisms that the United Kingdom is "dragging its feet" are 
mainly misplaced; we exercise a great deal of influence and still do nearly all the 
effective work done by international organisations. It we do not do more, it is 
precisely because we lack "what it takes" to pursue an expansionist policy. 
Public opinion 
17. The success of a policy depends ultimately on the strength of the national will 
and resolve behind it. The foreign policy we are pursuing to-day calls for austerity, 
restraint, and a sustained productive effort from the British people. Unless they 
understand this and are prepared to make the effort, the policy will fail. 
Conclusion 
18. The policy we are following is, in its broad lines, the only feasible one for the 
United Kingdom if we are to avoid sinking to the level of a second or third class 
Power. But there should, of course, be appropriate changes of emphasis and 
modification of tactics (such as we are now making in regard to federal trends in 
Europe). 
19. This policy is a bold one. It strains our resources, both material and moral , to 
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the full, and needs firm resolve, strong nerves, the highest degree of political and 
diplomatic skill and the support of public opinion. United Kingdom policy needs to 
be lively, adaptable, and imaginative, and we should take the lead where we can. And 
we cannot afford to make mistakes. 
20. In particular the policy involves-
(a) a substantial effort from the British people on the basis of "Peace before 
Plenty"; 
(b) the avoidance of an economic crisis in the United Kingdom leading to failure 
in production and exports or to a balance of payments situation in which the 
United Kingdom will need general economic aid. 
163 FO 3711124968, no 24/5 17 Sept 1951 
[Foreign policy in the Middle East] : despatch from EA Chapman-
Andrews (Beirut) 1 to MrYounger (FO) , commenting on Sir R 
Makins's memorandum 
"Some Notes on British Foreign Policy" by Sir Roger Makins, recently circulated in 
Print,2 provides food for thought and I beg leave, with some diffidence, to offer the 
following comments, particularly on the Middle East aspect of the subject. I need 
hardly add that I offer these comments as a public servant, frankly, and without 
regard to United Kingdom parliamentary party politics which, of course, as such, are 
not my concern. 
The premise 
2. Few responsible Englishmen in the Middle East can be without qualms about 
our foreign policy today and I at least find little ground for reassurance in these 
"Notes." I agree that British interests are best served by peace, the maintenance of 
which, for as long as possible, under honourable conditions, must be our object. I 
also agree that in face of the Communist threat, we must be prepared, when 
necessary and up to a point, to sacrifice our immediate national interests in order to 
maintain a resolute common front with the U.S.A., the Commonwealth and other 
states who are determined to fight Communism. I know that the exportable surplus 
of United States' industry exceeds the total industrial production of the United 
Kingdom. I agree that foreign policy must be related to national strength, which, in 
its turn, is best derived from a sound economic and financial position (i .e. national 
wealth), and that the national will is at the root of the production of national wealth 
today. Moreover, a successful foreign policy also stems more directly from the 
national will, of which an informed and coherent public opinion is the expression. 
Finally, I agree that our country still disposes of significant material and moral 
resources (I prefer this order of the two adjectives for application to the Middle East) 
and possesses a wealth of talented and experienced men in the various public services 
of the Crown abroad (armed and civil) and in merchantile [sic] and industrial 
enterprises. 
1 Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at Beirut. 2 See 162. 
z 
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3. One would expect a country with a record and resources such as ours, to enjoy 
a predominant material and moral position. Yet despite victory in two world wars in 
both of which Britain bore the brunt of the desert fighting and which secured 
national independence to the Arab .States and Israel; despite the help we have given 
and are still ready to give to increase national wealth through the proper technical 
development of their resources and services; and finally, despite the fact that British 
forces alone offer the only possibility of a successful defence of the Middle East in the 
early stages of another world war (which all concerned admit to be an imminent 
possibility), our influence throughout the Middle East today has reached a low ebb. 
Background to the Middle East 
4. Before we examine the reasons for the decline of our influence, we must 
consider the not always self-evident facts underlying the political and social state of 
the region today. The following diagnosis applies to the greater part of the region, 
possibly excluding (a) Jordan, where British influence is still strong, and (b) Israel, 
where the controlling influence is still Western European in character. Admittedly 
there is a handful of individuals in most of the countries concerned who are 
exceptions to the general run. 
5. Generally speaking, in the Middle East, nothing succeeds like success, nor fails 
like failure. There is little honesty, public or private. Bribery and corruption are rife 
from top to bottom. "The best is like the worst." To acquire wealth is a virtue in 
itself-the greater the wealth, the greater the virtue. The end and not the means is 
all important. Office is sought for the fruits thereof. Self-indulgence, heartlessness; 
complete indifference to social evils (except for the almsgiving enjoined by Scrip-
ture), and a total incapacity to plan and execute, characterise the people. Owing to 
some defect of mental equipment, they are unable to see more than is immediately 
before them, as a man may see all that is in a room, but be incapable of forming any 
clear mental picture of what is in the other rooms of the house, let alone the terrain 
surrounding the property. Their minds are fixed on the immediate present, though 
certain lobes of the brain are reserved for producing materialistic hallucinations of 
other worlds, including the hereafter. More than perhaps any other people, they are 
vividly conscious of the reality of unseen worlds, perhaps as an escape from the bitter 
reality, for most of them, of the present one. To this is due their susceptibility to 
excitement and passion, particularly religious but also political, so easily aroused by 
eloquence, which can quickly move them to transports of delight, the depths of 
despair, or murderous anger. Words have magic power, being the key to worlds of 
imagery. Logic means nothing. Hence the tremendous power of the demagogue and 
agitator; also of the preacher and prophet. Ceaseless repetition of sounds in speech or 
music allure and fascinate them. What maddens us, enchants them. Hence the power 
of slogans. For some of the mystical sects of Islam, continuous repetition, to a 
sing-song rhythm in ever-quickening tempo, of a phrase of a prayer, will produce 
mass hypnosis or hysteria. I have witnessed this in Cairo. All, through the magic of 
words repeated in unison, have transported themselves to another world, more real 
to them than reality. 
The same with politics. Democracy, social responsibility , even public opinion in 
our sense, do not exist. Unless there be a strong central government acting through 
regional governors and district administrators, a system at best resembling benevo-
lent despotism, there is demagogy, which is only one remove from chaos; and from 
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that to dictatorship is but a step. Thus in the Middle East today, we see peoples 
hovering between mob rule on the one hand and dictatorship on the other. The 
representative institutions of constitutional government which Britain took the lead 
in introducing after the first world war are becoming increasingly unrepresentative 
and therefore unauthoritative, dependent either on the support of the Generals of the 
Army or on the aroused passions of the mob in the street. Dictatorship itself, as a 
political concept, is not repulsive to the native mind, which has been schooled to 
"kiss the hand you can't cut off." There is an innate sense of respect for success, for 
the successful application of overwhelming force, for force itself. A tyrant here, even 
today, may not only be safe, but popular, provided only that he is too strong to be 
challenged, that his actions are swift and effective and that he can be generous. A 
Communist dictatorship would be acceptable to the masses on the same conditions, 
though generosity would doubtless take the form of an all-round share-out of social 
benefits. The Moslem religion would be no effective bar to such a system, provided 
there was no interference with the outward and physical forms of worship and 
observance. 
The British position today 
6. It will, I think, be generally conceded that since the war, despite our efforts, 
our policy in the Middle East has had serious set-backs. In Palestine, by throwing in 
our hand, we have estranged the Arab world and gained nothing in exchange. In 
Israel we have created an enigma if not a Frankenstein. Successive Israeli govern-
ments have affirmed a policy of "neutralism," though the present leaders may be 
ready, without official commitment, to hold out hopes of cooperation in war in 
return for help sorely needed today. Israel's financial demands are gigantic and are 
unashamedly based on a programme of intensified immigration, thus in turn 
accentuating existing problems and laying the sure foundation of future aggression. 
In Arabia, our influence is waning. In Iraq and Egypt, despite the inexhaustible 
patience with which we have tried to explain the strategic realities of the present day, 
and sought by negotiation to reach a compromise between strategic requirements on 
the one hand and the slogans of native demogagy [sic] on the other, reason has not 
prevailed. In Syria we have lost our place, so high in 1943, to the French, who are 
solidly backing and supplying the army which in turn virtually controls the country. 
Even in Jordan, as a result of the influx of nearly half a million refugees from 
Palestine (thus doubling the population overnight), our position has been shaken 
and our staunchest ally assassinated. 
7. What are the causes of these fai lures? 
(a) Palestine. We surrendered the Mandate in despair of finding a solution 
acceptable to all concerned. We refused to impose by force our own judgment of a 
just solution-partition. The situation got out of hand because we recoiled from 
taking the only measures capable of restoring law and order. These would have 
been drastic but not brutal, and, as our military command stated at the time, 
would have quickly succeeded. We recoiled largely for fear of provoking an 
outburst in Congress. Pressure was continually applied by America on behalf of the 
Zionists, allegedly because of the vital importance of the Jewish vote, the power of 
Jewish pressure groups, big business, finance, and control of American publicity. 
American Jewry drove us out of Palestine. But unfortunately, despite the gigantic 
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scale of American finance in Israel, American Jewry still resides and will continue 
to reside in America where it continues to maintain its pressure. 
(b) In Arabia, despite the misgivings of King Ibn Saud at the time (prior to 1945), 
we allowed the Americans to acquire oil development rights and are now 
witnessing the rapid build-up of American power and influence to the detriment of 
our own, while the rulers of the country, once the puritans oflslam, are so dazzled 
by the glittering treasure of an Aladdin's Cave miraculously revealed that the 
Administration has become corrupted from top to bottom. British advice and 
guidance in the proper use of this sudden wealth might have been acceptable if we 
had been the jinni [sic] that produced them. The Americans are unsuited and 
unable to fill the role. -
(c) In Egypt, as previously in India, American public opinion is against "British 
colonialism," as though we were still in the days of the Boston Tea Party. 
Responsible Americans visiting Egypt sympathise with and therefore encourage 
the Egyptian viewpoint. They believe that a hostile Egypt today means a useless 
base in the event of war,-a very doubtful proposition. 
(d) In Persia too, American sympathy was with the Persians in the early stages of 
the present oil dispute and this is probably at least partly responsible for the 
present situation. The Americans already regard Turkey, Arabia and Persia as 
their, rather than our, spheres of influence. 
(e) In Syria, France is backing a virtual military dictatorship with the supply of 
arms, while we have no · arms for anybody largely owing to the urgent need to 
supply our Western all ies, including France. 
(0 Lebanon. Here our prestige is still high though it is in for a slump unless we 
take swift advantage of the opportunities now offered to raise, train and equip 
national armed forces (of which there are next to none at present) and furnish 
certain other expert advice on the modest scale requested. 
To sum up, the first reason for our decline in the Middle East is our eagerness not 
to offend America who in turn, so far as Israel is concerned, is completely in the 
hands of American Jewry. In the case of Syria, we have been supine in the face of 
French activity. Thus our leadership of the Arab world, secure since 1918, has, since 
1945, been successfully challenged by the United States and even by France. Neither 
one nor the other is capable of taking our former place and both are out largely for 
their own hand. 
8. The second reason is our attitude towards U.N.O. The mere two sentences with 
which this subject is dismissed in the "Notes" is disarming. The "Notes" concede that 
"The United Nations and its agencies cannot fulfil their purpose under existing 
conditions," but go on to say that since they may play an important role in a better 
world, it is our interest to preserve them intact. This, in reverse, is as though a man 
should retain his membership of a sick benefit club in case the National Health 
Scheme should crash. This might be understood as an idiosyncracy provided he did 
not allow the sick benefit club with its rules and regulations to run his life, which is 
what we are doing in the case of U.N.O. Here we have an organisation under whose 
rules even purblind Egypt may occupy the Chair of the Security Council and Israel 
have an equal vote with the United Kingdom in the Assembly. Yet Egypt can with 
impunity flout the Council's decision regarding the blocade [sic] of the Suez Canal 
while Israel has not only defied the Council's authority on many occasions, but is 
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guilty of massacring the entire population of the village of Deir Yassin (with the 
imaginative purpose, amply fulfilled in the event, of stampeding refugees elsewhere), 
an act comparable only with the Lidice crime, but conveniently overlooked,-and of 
murdering the United Nations mediator himself-also conveniently forgotten. 
Jordan meanwhile, the State that has suffered most from the Palestine war and yet 
has shown the keenest desire to clear up the mess, remains outside the Organisation. 
The ineffectiveness of U.N.O. is and will continue to be a contributory cause of our 
decline so long as we regard its resolutions as a substitute for action on our part. The 
longer this state of affairs lasts the more will the decisions of U.N.O. be flaunted [sic] 
by those who do not agree with them. 
9. The third reason is our failure to seize quickly such opportunities as occur of 
increasing our influence and expanding our trade. We are admittedly short of skilled 
workers, experts and technicians. We do our best to supply these when called upon, 
but it is a poor best,-a tale of disappointment and delays. The same applies to arms 
and instructors. We are unwilling to take risks and supply even token quantities of 
arms for purely political reasons. This is a mistake under present-day conditions. 
That we cannot spare them is no answer. At a critical stage of the last war, the only 
armoured division fully equipped and ready for service in the United Kingdom was 
despatched to the Middle East. Boldness usually pays. We can spare both arms and 
instructors if we want to and it is only by doing so that we can hope, under existing 
conditions, to build up dependence upon us. Finally we are honest, but slow over 
delivery dates for exports, while our commercial shipping position, so far as the 
Eastern Mediterranean is concerned, is extremely bad, with the result that where 
merchants are able to buy British goods or capital equipment, they are often unable 
to ship for months ahead. It is often impossible for civilians, even British people 
working in the Middle East, to obtain passages from the United Kingdom even to 
Egypt. This is a question of programming in which we should be wise to take more 
· account of the Middle East if, for vital strategic reasons, we must strengthen our 
position here. 
Remedies 
10. These are admittedly difficult to prescribe in detail with the assurance and 
clarity of the diagnosis. But since they must involve a change of attitude on our part, 
it may be more useful to begin by trying to set down what we should not do, rather 
than what positive steps we should take. I suggest the following:-
(a) Fear is a bad counsellor. We should not allow fear of offending our friends, 
whether American or French, or fear of action against us at U.N.O. to stand in the 
way of effective action, if necessary by ourselves alone, when we know we are in the 
right. A Security Council decision or a judgment of the International Court of 
Justice in our favour should not be regarded as ends in themselves, or substitutes 
for action on our part, but rather as moral justification for action. 
(b) We must not even fear provoking another world war when we act in the 
knowledge that our quarrel is just. All are agreed that the great catastrophe will 
not befall unless and until the Soviets themselves decide that the moment is ripe 
and that they will not be forced or rushed into such a decision, nor reach it at all 
on any other grounds than a cold-blooded calculation of their chances of success. 
(c) We must not recoil, in certain circumstances, even from "doing a deal" 
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ourselves with Russia, for example to limit the sphere of a conflict in which we 
have become involved. The "Notes" (paragraph 13) describe as our long-range aim 
that of reaching a modus vivendi with the Communist half of the world. With this I 
fully agree, even though it is not unlike "peaceful co-existence", provided we and 
our friends together are strong at the perimeter and keep on our toes. Indeed, I 
believe that Stalin himself made it clear towards the end of the war that he 
preferred some such arrangement to the project of the United Nations Organisa-
tion. Soviet policy since then, both inside and outside the United Nations, is 
capable of being interpreted as still working towards that end. The elimination of 
buffer states when they prove to be danger areas, should advance the achievement 
of our long-range aims. The partition of Korea is an example, but in any future 
cases the need for a clash of arms may by timely pre-arrangement be eliminated. 
(d) We should not hesitate to exercise our right of veto in the Security Council 
when we take action on demonstrably justifiable grounds, fortified, for example, by 
a decision of the Council itself or the Hague Court. 
(e) We should not offer unsolicited advice unless, in the event of its not being 
taken, we intend to act in a manner that will be disagreeable for the recipient or 
his fr iends. 
(0 We should never fall short of our word, i.e. announce our intention to make a 
test-case of tankers for Haifa and then climb down, or make any public 
announcement, even in association with other powers (e.g. the Tripartite 
declaration on Palestine) unless we are resolved, and make it clear that we are so, 
to implement it, if necessary by force, if necessary alone. 
11. So much for the negative. The positive springs from it:-
(a) Although "it is easier to be dynamic if you have enough steaks" we shall lose 
altogether such stakes as we still have in the Middle East unless we pull ourselves 
together, give a lead and see something (anything) through to a successful · 
conclusion. 
(b) We should strive for the reform of the United Nations Organisation in order to 
make it a more effective instrument. If, for example, it could be established that 
states refusing to execute its resolutions or adopt its recommendations, in other 
words, states that defy its authority, should be expelled, it would be a step in the 
right direction. It is wrong that a state should enjoy such security and other 
advantages as membership of the Organisation affords and yet be able to flaunt 
[sic] its authority with impunity. 
(c) We must seek and seize opportunities for strengthening our position and 
influence, and where we can prove we have just cause, act strongly. We must not 
allow the complexity of modern world conditions so to dull our national instincts 
that we lose faith in ourselves as a great nation whose qualities have been tried on 
many a field, whose greatness is founded on a long tradition of straight and strong 
dealing all over the world, whose courage is not measured by the amount of shot 
left in the locker and whose friendship is worth having and not to be taken too 
much for granted. 
12. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East 
Office . 
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164 CO 537/3702 22 June 1948 
[The future of Hong Kong]: minute by Mr Creech Jones on discussions 
with Mr Bevin about making a statement 
[Long before the situation in Hong Kong was complicated by the Chinese Communist 
victory in China, Mr Creech Jones had been anxious to get some constitutional advance, 
though he realised it would be difficult, especially in view of the effect of the prevailing 
apathy on the working of Hong Kong political institutions: 'We have, however, to put 
ourselves in a strong position vis-a-vis our critics-both the Pacific powers, the Chinese, 
and liberals of USA. The sooner, too, we can get a statement of Government policy as to 
the future status of Hong Kong the better. I am concerned also about our critics here. We 
must do all we can to get our plans completed and a more vigorous policy of development 
operating in Hong Kong-on the assumption that there will be no change of long-term 
policy' (CO 537/1651, 18 Jan 1947). Whatever the legality of the British position, he 
thought they would be faced with increasing nationalist pressure in Asia (CO 537/4805, 
minute by N D Watson, private secretary to S of S, 5 Aug 1949).] 
I appreciate to the full the arguments for a statement regarding the future of Hong 
Kong & have urged them many times to the notice of the Foreign Secretary & 
discussed them at length in the Foreign Office. But Mr Bevin has taken a very strong 
line & I am sure that if we go to the Cabinet the arguments Mr Bevin advances about 
the Far East situation & the international problem will bring a decision which we 
shall disapprove of. It is the political problem which worries the Foreign Secretary 
regarding China-& the effects of any declaration are likely to be very serious-& 
incidentally create new difficulties for us in Hong Kong. There is no question of our 
leaving Hong Kong-declarations usually suggest that we have been considering 
such a possibility. The assumption must be that the status of Hong Kong remains 
unchanged & everything is done in the Colony on that assumption. The more we 
question it & demand it & describe it, the more uncertainty will grow & confidence 
weaken. I cannot break the adamant view of the Foreign Secretary and I am certain 
that the Cabinet will be obliged to support him and I do not relish a decision against 
us. 
165 CAB 128/15, CM 33(49)2 9 May 1949 
'China: defence of Hong Kong': Cabinet conclusions 
[The Chinese People's Republic was formally proclaimed in October 1949. British policy 
sharply diverged from American by according recognition to the new state, despite some 
misgivings that this might give rise to problems in Malaya if the Chinese community 
there assumed this might mean a cessation of punitive measures against the rebels (CAB 
128/16, CM 62(49)7, 27 Oct 1949). However, for many months before this, the victory of 
the communists in China was obvious. The implications for British trade and for Hong 
Kong were discussed by the Cabinet from March 1949 onwards. The COS advised that the 
kind of threat the communist Chinese might pose to Hong Kong was greatly superior to 
previous Chinese army capability, but not of the kind which a major power like Russia 
could mount. On balance, although the immediate danger was from refugees and internal 
subversion, the Cabinet did not favour any specific crack-down on communist activities 
in the colony, lest this should provoke the Chinese authorities. (ibid, CM 18(49)2, 8 Mar; 
CM 30(49)4, 28 Apr 1949) . The governor and the commissioner-general for South-East 
Asia both urged the government to declare their intention to maintain Hong Kong as a 
British colony. Ministers were uncertain of their course: 'any suggestion that the UK 
Government might abandon Hong Kong would have profound repercussions in Malaya, 
Siam and Burma'; but they must be careful 'to avoid drifting into a position in which, 
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after pouring valuable resources into Hong Kong, they had at the end to withdraw with 
great material loss and loss of prestige' (ibid, CM 32(49)2, 5 May 1949). Alexander visited 
Hong Kong, 6---9 June 1949. His conclusion was that 1949 was very different from 1941, 
because Britain had command of the sea and effective air support. He was therefore 
'soberly confident' that, despite its vulnerability in water, food and fuel supplies, a 
military defence of Hong Kong (short of an onslaught by a major power) could be 
successful (CAB 129/35, CP(49)134, 17 June 1949, memo by minister of defence).) 
The Minister of Defence drew the attention of the Cabinet to a telegram from the 
British Defence Co-ordination Committee in the Far East suggesting that, as the 
Commissioner-General for South-East Asia1 and the Commanders-in-Chief of the 
Land and Air Forces in the Far East would shortly be in London, the Chiefs of Staff 
should take this opportunity of discussing with them the effects which recent 
developments in China were likely to have in India and South-East Asia. The 
Committee suggested that there was urgent need for diplomatic, economic and 
military action to form a containing ring against further Communist penetration; 
and that this ring should be formed by the co-ordinated action of many countries, 
including India, Burma, Siam, French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies. The 
Minister added that the Communist forces seemed to be making rapid progress south 
of the Yangtse, and the need for a co-ordinated policy in respect of Hong Kong might 
be more urgent than had been assumed in the Cabinet's earlier discussions. 
The Cabinet were also informed that Mr. L.D. Gammans, M.P.,Z had put down a 
Question for answer by the Prime Minister, asking what approaches had been made 
to the Governments of other Commonwealth countries regarding the possibility of 
their contributing towards the defence of Hong Kong. The Australian Minister of 
Defence was reported to have stated, in reply to questions at a recent Press 
Conference, that the United Kingdom Government had not yet suggested that 
Australia might assist in the defence of Hong Kong. 
In discussion the following points were made:-
(a) Other Commonwealth Governments had been kept informed of developments 
in China and of our decision to reinforce the garrison at Hong Kong. The time had 
probably come to send them a fuller appreciation of possible future developments 
and to mention to some of them the possibility of their making some contribution 
towards the defence of Hong Kong. The Commonwealth Relations Office had been 
inclined to advise that in the first instance this question should be raised with the 
older Commonwealth Governments only; and it was agreed that material support in 
the defence of Hong Kong was more likely to be forthcoming from Australia and New 
Zealand than from any of the other Commonwealth countries. On the other hand, it 
was pointed out in the discussion that the first aim of our policy should be to deter 
the Communist forces in China from making an attack upon Hong Kong and to 
convince world opinion that it was expedient that the British posit ion there should 
be maintained. From this point of view it was perhaps even more important that the 
Commonwealth countries in Asia should express at least their moral support of our 
policy in Hong Kong. India's support, in particular, would have a powerful effect on 
public opinion throughout Asia. 
(b) It would be preferable if Mr. Gammans could be persuaded to withdraw his 
1 Mr Malcolm MacDonald. 
2 Capt David Gammans, Conservative MP for Hornsey, 1941 ; formerly colonial service in Malaya, 
1920-1934; member of parliamentary delegation to Sarawak, 1946. 
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Question, on the ground that it would not be possible at the moment to make any 
public statement about the attitude of the other Commonwealth Governments on 
this question. 
(c) The Cabinet were informed that the proposal made in the telegram from the 
British Defence Co-ordination Committee in the Far East was consistent with the 
Foreign Secretary's general desire for closer political co-operation between the 
various countries of South-East Asia. In discussion, however, doubts were expressed 
about the expediency of attempting to make common cause on this issue with 
French Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies. The Colonial policies of the French 
and the Dutch were regarded with great suspicion by the Asiatic peoples; and there 
would be little prospect of persuading the Government of India to join in discussions 
on China in which the French and the Dutch were to be represented. 
If, therefore, any approach were to be made to the Governments listed in this 
telegram, it should be related to the situation in South-East Asia generally and 
should not give prominence to our anxieties about the future of Hong Kong. 
(d) Ministers should also treat with reserve any suggestion that Hong Kong could 
be used by the Western Powers as a rallying-point for anti-Communist forces in Asia. 
The Government of India were convinced that in Asia Communism was most 
dangerous when it could ally itself with nationalism; and they would regard it as 
playing into the hands of the Communists to represent Hong Kong as an outpost of 
western democracy in the Far East. 
(e) The suggestion was made that in the long run it would prove impossible to 
preserve Hong Kong as a British Colony, and that serious consideration ought now 
to be given to the possibility of giving it the status of an international port on the 
analogy of Trieste. It was, however, the general view of the Cabinet that this was not 
an opportune time to consider so radical a change of policy. 
The Cabinet:-
(1) Agreed that the United Kingdom Government must make every effort to carry 
the other Commonwealth Governments with them in their policy in respect of 
Hong Kong; and took note that the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations would at once formulate, in the light of the discussion, and submit to 
the Prime Minister, specific proposals about the timing and method of the 
approach and the basis on which other Commonwealth Governments should be 
asked whether they would be prepared to assist in the defence of Hong Kong. 
(2) Took note that the Prime Minister would arrange for Mr. Gammans, M.P., to 
be asked to withdraw his Question from the Order Paper. 
(3) Invited the Minister of Defence to consult with the Foreign Secretary, on his 
return to London, regarding the scope of the discussions to be held during the 
forthcoming visit to London of the Commissioner-General for South-East Asia and 
the Commanders-in-Chief of the Land and Air Forces in the Far East. 
(4) Invited the Secretary of State for the Colonies to enquire into the suggestion 
that Chinese Communists deported from Malaya were finding their way into Hong 
Kong. 
(5) Asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies to circulate, for the information 
of the Cabinet, a factual appreciation of the present situation in Hong Kong, 
covering such points as the composition of the population by nationalities, the 
value of British commercial interests and the importance of the Colony from the 
point of view of British interests in China generally. 
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166 DO 121123, pp 227-234 12 May 1949 
[An approach to Commonwealth governments about support for Hong 
Kong policy]: minute by Mr Noel-Baker (CRO) to Mr Attlee 
At the Cabinet meeting on the 9th May1 I was asked to formulate, in the light of the 
discussion, and to submit to you, specific proposals about the timing and method of 
an approach to other Commonwealth Governments regarding our Hong Kong policy 
and about the basis on which they should be asked whether they would be prepared 
to assist in the defence of Hong Kong. 
2. As we see it, it is a question not of just defending an isolated Colony, but of 
identifyin~ Hong Kong as the first point in the East where, if things go wrong, our 
ultimate determination to repel Communist aggression will have to be successfully 
demonstrated. If that be so, other like-minded Governments in the Commonwealth 
association should, in principle, be prepared to support our stand and to assist it. I 
consider that an approach to Commonwealth Governments at the proper time would 
be right and I should expect that some Commonwealth Prime Ministers at least 
would be willing to support our policy. At the same time there are difficulties, both 
general and particular, in the way of obtaining anything more than moral support for 
our policy, to which I feel bound to draw attention. 
3. There is the general difficulty of the well-known reluctance of even the most 
co-operative amongst the other Members of the Commonwealth to commit them-
selves in advance, and in peacetime, to the despatch of military assistance against a 
hypothetical contingency. 
4. In addition there are special considerations in each of the other Common-
wealth countries which are examined below. 
Canada regards herself as far removed from the dangers in China; internal 
political difficulties have prevented her from sending crews to help in the Berlin 
airlift, and she has not forgotten the fate of Canadian troops in Hong Kong in the last 
war. Indeed this is still at intervals a subject of controversy by the Opposition in the 
Canadian Parliament, and the Canadian Government are very unlikely to be willing 
to give any hostage to their opponents before the forthcoming General Election. 
Canada has taken a strong lead in the formation of the Atlantic Pact, but has never 
shewn the same interest in the Pacific and, unless the United States were to 
intervene actively, it is unlikely that Canada would feel able to send any military 
assistance. 
Australia and New Zealand are the obvious countries, from the point of view of 
proximity and self-interest, from which to seek material help, but the Australian 
Prime Minister made it clear last year, when we were wondering whether to approach 
the Australian Government for military help in Malaya, that it was quite out of the 
question that the Australian Government should commit themselves to the despatch 
of troops, and it is very likely that he would take the same stand in the case of Hong 
Kong. This belief is strengthened by the recent refusal of Australia to be associated in 
the joint scheme for assistance to Burma. There is also the history of the arrival of 
the Australian troops in Singapore in the last war in time to become prisoners of the 
Japanese, which is parallel to the memories of Hong Kong in the Canadian mind. 
1 See 165. 
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New Zealand would no doubt in principle be willing to give any help she could, but 
her resources are limited and she could find it difficult to be more forthcoming than 
her partner in the Anzac Pact, which pledges both parties to prior consultation. 
While South Africa has under the present Nationalist Government come a very 
long way in defence co-operation with us, it must be recognised that all Govern-
ments in the Union think in terms of the African Continent only; our objective is to 
stimulate their interest in the defence of the Middle East, while relying on Southern 
Africa as a support area, and we should not wish to prejudice that prospect. Any 
prospect of her helping us in the Far East should be dismissed. 
Very special problems arise in the case of India and I deal with these more fully in 
paragraph 5 below, but it seems most unlikely that in present circumstances Pandit 
Nehru would agree to despatch troops or other material military assistance to defend 
Hong Kong. 
Pakistan might perhaps be more disposed to consider a request sympathetically, 
but she has no suitable forces to send and in any case there would be no prospect of 
her agreeing to send any forces out of Pakistan while the Kashmir question is not 
settled, and she fears the possibility of an attack from India. 
Ceylon has as yet no armed forces that could be used in Hong Kong. 
5. I realise that the most valuable moral support that can be obtained would be 
some statement from Pandit Nehru. It was recognised at the Cabinet meeting that 
the Government of India would regard it as playing into the hands of the 
Communists to represent Hong Kong as an outpost of Western democracy in the Far 
East. I must confess that the prospects of obtaining any favourable response from 
Pandit Nehru seem to me to be very slender in view of his persistent attacks on 
"Colonialism", of his frequently repeated announcements of neutrality and of his 
refusal to join up with either the Eastern or Western bloc. It must also be recalled 
that he gave an appreciation of the Communist threat to China in February last in 
which he tended to write down the menace from this direction (see his message 
quoted in telegram A. No.l3 of 12th February, a copy of which I attach as an 
appendix).2 
6. I have thought it right to set out at length the difficulties in handling this 
question. This does not mean that these cannot be overcome. Paragraph 2 above 
indicates the common interest of all like-minded Governments in meeting the threat 
which faces all of us and we should be letting down the principle of Commonwealth 
consultation if we did not take other Commonwealth Governments as fully as 
possible into our confidence and invite their suppport. (We have, of course, already 
kept them informed of the steps we have taken and shall continue to do this) . We 
have also forwarded to our High Commissioners for communication to the 
Governments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, the appreciation 
by the Chiefs of Staff contained in the Annexes to C.P.(49)100 of 3rd May: the 
appreciation has been sent to the High Commissioners in India, Pakistan and Ceylon 
to enable them to take action if it should be decided to make an approach to these 
Governments. 
7. It does not seem that we can fairly approach Commonwealth Governments 
either for moral or material assistance until we can let them know clearly and 
definitely what our intentions are in the event of a major Communist threat to Hong 
2 Not printed. 
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Kong developing. If Commonwealth Governments are asked to despatch forces to 
Hong Kong they will wish to know whether we intend to hold it at all costs or 
whether there is any thought in our minds of pulling out in the face of a major land 
threat with consequent loss of prestige: equally if they are to support our policy by 
public statements, they must know exactly what the full implications of that policy 
are. Moreover it is important that, in making any request to Commonwealth 
Governments, we should give a precise indication of the timetable involved and make 
it clear whether we are asking for immediate assistance to meet the existing 
emergency, or will require their help at a later stage or will only call for aid if it 
should be necessary to maintain Hong Kong against a major land threat. 
8. There are really two aspects of the problem, involving asking for (a) moral and 
(b) material, support. 
9. As regards seeking moral support, I would, as suggested above, expect that we 
might obtain strong support from a number of other Commonwealth Governments, 
though not perhaps in the case of India. Much depends on developments in the 
campaign, but if any public declarations from Commonwealth Governments are to 
be sought, the timing should be arranged to coincide with any further statement of 
policy to Parliament here. 
The case of India is very special, but is also crucial. Before we decide on making 
any approach to Pandit Nehru, I think it would be most helpful to have the advice of 
Sir Archibald Nye.3 Mr. Malcolm MacDonald is coming home for consultation on the 
18th May and I think it would be invaluable if Sir Archibald Nye could be available at 
the same time. If you approve, I would therefore propose to instruct him to fly home 
at once so as to be available for this purpose. 
10. As regards material support I should not wish to rule out the prospects of 
obtaining help from other Commonwealth countries, though in practice I think that 
any assistance is likely to be limited to Australia and New Zealand. It must be 
remembered that few Commonwealth countries have mobile forces that can readily 
be despatched overseas. Naval vessels and aircraft could perhaps be made available, 
but there is not likely to be in the Commonwealth any substantial body of troops that 
could be moved rapidly to the scene of action: moreover it should be borne in mind 
that generally Commonwealth troops are under no liability to serve overseas. If our 
approach is to have any prospect of success our request must be specific in terms, 
must be related to forces that are likely to be available and must indicate whether the 
forces are required for immediate emergency or will only be called for at a later stage. 
I recommend that the Chiefs of Staff should be asked to examine urgently what 
requirements they would wish to be sought from other Commonwealth sources, 
whether these are likely to be available in Australia and New Zealand and, if so, to 
give a precise indication of the timing involved. For the reasons given in paragraph 7 
above, it would be important that in making any approach to other Commonwealth 
Governments we should be able to give a frank explanation of our intentions in Hong 
Kong in all the contingencies that are likely to arise. 
11. To sum up, I suggest that decisions are required on the following points:-
(i) whether it is moral support only or material support that we desire from other 
Commonwealth countries; 
:J UK high commissioner in India. 
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(ii) if we ask for material support we must make it clear whether help is required 
at once as an immediate measure or only at a later stage as a long-term step. In the 
former case, Commonwealth Governments are likely to assume that any support 
given now would imply a determination to hold Hong Kong in which they would 
be involved. In the latter, we must make it clear at what stage and in what form 
their help is required. In any event the Chiefs of Staff should be asked to examine 
these points in detail, bearing in mind that no Commonwealth countries have 
mobile forces readily available (except India and Pakistan); 
(iii) on the question of moral support, it is equally important that in making any 
approach we should be able to give Commonwealth Governments a clear 
indication of our own long-term policy; 
(iv) in the meantime the Chiefs of Staff appreciation in C.P(49)100 of 3rd May has 
been forwarded to our High Commissioners in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
South Africa for communication to these Governments. The documents have also 
been sent to the United Kingdom High Commissioners in India, Pakistan and 
Ceylon, but will not be passed on to those Governments pending a decision here as 
to an approach to them; 
(v) as an immediate step, Sir Archibald Nye should be recalled for consultation. 
12. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of 
Defence, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
167 CAB 128/15, CM 38(49)3 26May 1949 
'China: defence of Hong Kong': Cabinet conclusions1 
The Cabinet considered memoranda by the Prime Minister (C.P.(49)119), the 
Minister of Defence (C.P(49)118) and the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
(C.P.(49)120) on the defence of Hong Kong. 
The Prime Minister recalled that on 5th May the Cabinet had authorised the 
despatch to Hong Kong of reinforcements sufficient to secure the Colony against 
internal unrest or sporadic attacks by guerillas . Since then the Communist forces in 
Southern China had made substantial progress, and the question now arose of 
sending further reinforcements in order to secure Hong Kong against the risk of 
direct attack by these forces from the mainland. The Chiefs of Staff had advised that 
such an attack might be delivered at any time after September; and that, if it was to 
be resisted with success, an immediate decision should be taken to despatch to Hong 
Kong the further reinforcements set out in the memorandum by the Minister of 
Defence (C.P.(49)118). 
The Prime Minister said that, from consultations which he had held with the 
Commissioner-General for South-East Asia and the Commanders-in-Chief of the 
Land and Air Forces in the Far East he was satisfied that failure to meet this threat to 
the security of Hong Kong would damage very seriously British prestige throughout 
the Far East and South-East Asia. Moreover, the whole common front against 
Communism in Siam, Burma and Malaya was likely to crumble unless the peoples of 
those countries were convinced of our determination and ability to resist this threat 
to Hong Kong. 
1 Previous reference: see 165. 
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In their earlier discussions the Cabinet had been reluctant to commit themselves 
to any long-term policy in respect of Hong Kong; and the Prime Minister had 
therefore considered, in consultation with the Foreign Secretary and other Ministers 
directly concerned, how a decision to defend the Colony could be presented in such a 
way as to command the support of public opinion in the democratic countries of the 
world. He had come to the conclusion that it should be presented as a decision to 
resist aggression; and he recommended that support for such a policy should be 
enlisted from the Governments of other Commonwealth countries and of the United 
States. 
The following points were made in discussion of the political considerations 
involved:-
( a) Policy must take account of the fact that Hong Kong was valuable to us mainly 
as a centre of trade. In the short term, trade would be seriously interrupted, if not 
entirely brought to an end, if preparations for the military defence of the Colony were 
countered by measures of blockade from the mainland. In the long term, if a strong 
Communist Government established itself in control over the whole of China, it 
would be impossible for us to maintain Hong Kong as a trading centre unless that 
Government acquiesced in our continuance there. These considerations seemed to 
suggest that the aim of our policy should be to find a basis on which a Communist 
Government of China could acquiesce in our remaining in Hong Kong. If we made it 
a point of prestige that we should retain Hong Kong as a British possession, it might 
become a matter of prestige for the Communists to force us to withdraw from it. 
As against this, attention was drawn to the importance of our being able to argue 
from a position of strength in any negotiations with a Chinese Government about 
our future position in Hong Kong. If we showed no determination to defend the 
Colony, the risk of its being attacked would be increased; and, if we were forced to 
withdraw from it, we should have little prospect of persuading a Chinese Govern-
ment to allow us to return. In the short term, if we showed ourselves determined to 
remain there, the Communists were unlikely to maintain an economic blockade for 
any length of time; for the continued interruption of the normal flow of trade 
between Hong Kong and the mainland was likely to be as embarrassing for the 
Communists as it would be for the Colony. The temporary interruption of that trade, 
during a period of tension or actual hostilities, would not do it any lasting injury: it 
could soon be revived thereafter, as it had been revived since the end of the war. 
(b) Practical evidence of our determination to defend Hong Kong would have 
important consequences. First, it might well deter the Communist forces from 
making a direct attack on the Colony. Secondly, it would rally to our side the 
wavering elements among the local population and would substantially reduce the 
threat to internal security. Thirdly, it would strengthen the anti-Communist front 
throughout South-East Asia. The maintenance of our trading position in Hong Kong 
was doubtless important; but even more important at the present time was the 
political question whether we must not somewhere make a stand against Communist 
encroachment in the Far East. If we failed to make this stand in Hong Kong, should 
we not find it much harder to make it elsewhere in South-East Asia? 
(c) There were, however, dangers in making at this stage any forthright 
declaration of our determination to defend Hong Kong. Apart from the risk that such 
a declaration might be regarded as provocative by the Chinese Communists, there 
was also the danger that a unilateral declaration by the United Kingdom Government 
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would be interpreted, however it was phrased, as a relic of "Colonialism." We should 
find ourselves in an awkward position if, having made the declaration, we failed to 
enlist a sufficient number of our friends in its support. Although it was fairly clear 
that we should gain the support of Australia and New Zealand, the attitude of some 
other Commonwealth Governments was uncertain and it would be unwise to count 
on the support of public opinion in the United States. Should it not rather be our aim 
to mobilise as many Governments as possible in support of a policy of resisting 
aggression against Hong Kong, so that we might appear to be acting as the 
instrument of an international policy rather than pursuing a selfish policy of our 
own? There was general support for the view that no declaration of policy should be 
made until consultations had been held with the Governments of the other 
Commonwealth countries and of the United States. 
(d) The High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in India2 said that there 
seemed little prospect of persuading Pandit Nehru to make any public declaration of 
India's support of a policy of defending Hong Kong against aggression by Chinese 
Communist forces . First, he might think this inconsistent with his general 
opposition to "Colonialism." Secondly, he would be mindful of the French and 
Portuguese possessions in Pondicherry and Goa; and he would not wish to say 
anything which might preclude him from objecting, at some later date, to any 
proposals for strengthening the French or Portuguese garrisons in those places. 
Thirdly, he had stated that India would not associate herself with power blocs, and 
the declaration made at the end of the April Meeting of Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers had already been criticised by his political opponents and by some of his 
political supporters on the ground that it might limit India's freedom of action in 
international affairs.3 These critics would be greatly strengthened if, within so short 
a time after that declaration, Pandit Nehru publicly voiced his support of a United 
Kingdom policy for the military defence of Hong Kong. In these circumstances our 
best hope was to persuade Pandit Nehru to refrain from making any public statement 
which was critical of our proposed policy in Hong Kong. So long as our action was 
limited to suppressing internal disorders he might well be willing to refrain from any 
such comment. If, however, we were compelled to resist an armed attack by forces 
operating under the auspices of a Chinese Government, he would find it more 
difficult to remain silent. From the point of view of avoiding public criticism in India, 
it would be preferable that we should avoid making any formal declaration of policy. 
The Commissioner-General for South-East Asia said that, from his point of view, 
he would welcome a public declaration of our determination to defend Hong Kong 
against aggression. He recognised, however, that the question whether any such 
declaration should be made must be decided by reference, not so much to local 
needs, but rather to the wider considerations which had been mentioned in the 
Cabinet's discussion. From the point of view of strengthening morale in Hong Kong 
2 Sir Archibald Nye. 
:lA communique issued at the end of the Prime Ministers ' Meeting in April 1949 contained a declaration 
stating that the Government of India had informed the other governments of the Commonwealth of the 
intention of the Indian people that under the new constitution which was about to be adopted India should 
become a sovereign independent republic . The Government of India had, however , declared and affirmed 
India's desire to continue her full membership of the Commonwealth and her acceptance of the King as 
the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such Head of the 
Commonwealth. 
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and in South-East Asia it would perhaps be sufficient that we should despatch to 
Hong Kong reinforcements sufficient for its defence. 
The following points were raised in discussion of the military implications of 
defending Hong Kong:-
(e) To what extent would the successful defence of the Colony be frustrated by 
failure to control an influx of refugees from the mainland? This had proved a serious 
difficulty in 1941. The Cabinet were informed that, although the movement of 
refugees could not be satisfactorily controlled while trade continued between the 
Colony and the mainland, no insuperable difficulty should arise in a state of siege. 
Full preparations had been made for dealing with this situation, and the Governor 
was satisfied that any large-scale influx of refugees could be prevented. 
(f) Was it clear that adequate water supplies would be available under conditions 
of siege? The Cabinet were informed that, as the leased territories would be included 
within the defence area, the water supply should be sufficient to meet the 
requirements of the population and of the increased garrison, provided that control 
was maintained over consumption. It would not be difficult to take precautions 
against damage by sabotage. 
(g) It was hoped that by September the situation in Malaya would have improved 
sufficiently to allow the Guards Brigade to be moved to Hong Kong without undue 
risk. 
(h) The Secretary of State for Air4 said that he was not in agreement with the 
proposal (paragraph 6 of C.P(49)118) to include, in the reinforcements to be sent to 
Hong Kong, a long-range fighter squadron from the United Kingdom. He was 
reluctant to accept this reduction in the strength of Fighter Command; and he 
suggested that on this point no final decision should be taken until it was known 
whether the squadron of Australian Mustangs could be transferred to Hong Kong 
from Japan. 
(i) Some Ministers took the view that it would be undesirable, for political 
reasons, to proceed with the proposal (paragraph 9 (b) of C.P.(49)118) to call up 
Section "A" of the Army Reserve. 
U) The Minister of Defence said that a working party of officials had prepared 
detailed proposals for finding the shipping required for the additional reinforcements 
set out in C.P.(49)118. 
(k) The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he proposed to arrange for a 
representative of the Bank of England to proceed at once to Hong Kong to advise the 
Governor on currency problems . 
The Cabinet:-
(1) Approved the proposal to send to Hong Kong the further reinforcements 
described in C.P.(49)118, subject to further consideration by the Defence 
Committee of the proposals (i) to send a squadron of long-range fighters from the 
United Kingdom and (ii) to call up Section "A" of the Army Reserve; and 
authorised the Service Departments to proceed at once with the preliminary 
arrangements for all these movements save those affected by (i) and (ii). 
(2) Agreed that for the time being no public announcement should be made that 
any fresh decision of policy had been taken in respect of Hong Kong or that any 
further reinforcements were to be sent there . 
4 Mr A Henderson. 
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(3) Invited the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Foreign 
Secretary, respectively, to inform the Governments of the other Commonwealth 
countries and of the United States of the development of the situation in Hong 
Kong and of the decision to reinforce the garrison still further; and to ascertain 
whether those Governments would be prepared to support a policy of defending 
Hong Kong against aggression by Communist forces from the mainland and, if 
need be, to make at the appropriate stage public declarations in support of that 
policy. 
(4) Agreed that final decisions regarding the basis of United Kingdom policy in 
respect of Hong Kong, and the form and timing of any announcement regarding 
it, should be taken by the Cabinet in the light of the views expressed by the 
Government of the other Commonwealth countries and of the United States. 
168 DO 121123, pp 171-174 3 June 1949 
[Defence of Hong Kong]: CRO outward telegram no 7 41 to acting UK 
high commissioner in Canada, on Mr St Laurent's attitude 
We are grateful for your full report of your discussions with Prime Minister1 and 
Heeney.2 At the same time we are perturbed by the line which Mr. St. Laurent took 
and, while we think that the points which you made in reply were entirely right, we 
feel that Mr. St. Laurent failed to appreciate some of the major considerations and we 
hope that the eventual reply promised will take greater account of realities. 
2. In particular we feel that Mr. St. Laurent has failed to take account of the 
following:-
(i) As stated in my telegram No. 697 all we are doing is to take essential 
precautions against a threat of armed aggression. This we are entitled to do under 
the terms of the United Nations Charter. Precise form threat will take is open to 
doubt. Naturally we hope that it will be possible to avoid actual hostilities, but an 
armed attack is not impossible and we are bound to prepare for this contingency. 
Even if Chinese Communist Government, when formed, made proposals for the 
future of Hong Kong, we should have to consider our course very carefully, and 
could not rule out possibility that proposals which, at their face value, seemed 
reasonable, might be followed by an attack on the Colony. Our policy is, as we see 
it, the best insurance against this eventuality; · 
(ii) The vital point, as we see it, is that Hong Kong may be the point in the Far 
East where we shall have to make a stand against Communism. Whatever form the 
Chinese Communist government might eventually take, there can be no doubt 
that the successes of the Communists in China have added immensely to the 
prestige and potentiality for further disruption of other areas in the Far East by the 
Soviet Government. We have been trying discreetly to encourage the peoples of 
South-East Asia to defend themselves against Communist infiltration, and it is our 
hope that some day the territories of this region might form a united front against 
Communism and Russian expansion. If the United Kingdom failed to hold Hong 
1 L S St Laurent, prime minister of Canada and leader of Canadian Liberal Party since 1948. 
2 A D P Heeney, Canadian under-secretary of state for external affairs, 1949. 
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Kong against a Communist attempt to seize it by force, the whole front, which is 
not yet built up, would crumble. Siam and Burma would probably be the first to 
go, and Communist domination over these two principal rice-exporting countries 
of the world would put such power into the hands of the Communists that we 
might expect the whole of that part of Asia to succumb eventually to their 
influence. Such a development could not fail to have a disastrous effect upon the 
Atlantic Pact Powers and the Western Union. We cannot afford to let the whole of 
Asia fall into Communist hands, and that is what we think will happen if the 
United Kingdom suffers a major setback at Hong Kong. The issue is therefore not 
one of Colonial policy, but of world resistance against Communist expansion; 
(iii) Again the issue is not that of thwarting a nationalist demand in Hong Kong 
for its return to China. Provided we can satisfy the Chinese population in Hong 
Kong that we are willing and able to maintain our position there, we are confident 
that the overwhelming majority of them will co-operate willingly in any measures 
we take and will wish to preserve the present status of the Colony; 
(iv) In any case the logic of Mr. St. Laurent's argument is that the whole of the 
dependent Empire should be liquidated forthwith . Surely he can hardly have 
intended this. 
3. There is the further important consideration of the value of trade through 
Hong Kong to China as a whole, which has been immensely enhanced since the 
handing back of the Treaty ports. At present Hong Kong handles about £20 million 
of goods per month, of which it consumes or produces less than three per cent. It 
provides the storage, insurance, banking and shipping facilities for this transit trade 
and is thus of enormous benefit to the economy of China as a whole. Moreover, Hong 
Kong dollars are used as currency very widely in commerce in Southern China and 
so long as Hong Kong remains under its present system of government, it will enable 
China to maintain trade relationships with the Western world. Its whole position is, 
therefore, quite special. And none can believe that the existing services rendered by 
Hong Kong could be continued with the same efficiency, if Hong Kong were to be 
administered as part of China. Indeed, it may well be that the Chinese Communists 
themselves, recognising the economic importance of Hong Kong will, like previous 
Chinese Governments, find it in their interests to accept the position and leave it 
alone. 
4. We are sending you by mail (see my telegram Y. No.65 Saving) a factual 
appreciation of the present situation in Hong Kong by the Secretary for the Colonies. 
5. We shall be glad if, in any further discussions with the Canadian authorities 
you will bring the foregoing considerations to their notice and express the hope that 
they will take them into account in their considered review of the position. While in 
view of the Canadian Election we should not wish to press for an early answer from 
the Canadian authorities, we naturally hope for their eventual support and trust that 
in any case we are right in assuming that there is no chance of Mr. St. Laurent or 
other Canadian Ministers giving public expression to the criticisms of Colonial rule 
which he mentioned to you at your talk. 
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169 CAB 128/15, CM 42(49)5 23 June 1949 
'China: defence of Hong Kong': Cabinet conclusions on the attitude of 
Commonwealth and United States governments1 
The Cabinet had before them the following memoranda on Hong Kong:-
C.P.(49)134: by the Minister of Defence, reporting on the visit which he had paid 
to Hong Kong from 6th to 9th June; 
C.P.(49)135: by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, commenting on certain 
questions which had been raised by the United States Secretary of State when he 
was asked whether his Government would support a policy of defending Hong 
Kong against aggression; 
C.P.(49)136: by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, summarising 
the response of other Commonwealth Governments to the enquiry whether they 
would support such a policy. 
The Minister of Defence and the Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the 
Cabinet that action was already being taken to give effect to the specific recom-
mendations made in paragraph 25 of C.P.(49)134. 
Discussion then turned on the attitude of the other Commonwealth Governments. 
Whole-hearted support, moral as well as material, would be forthcoming from New 
Zealand; and South Africa had given a firm promise of moral support. The other 
Commonwealth Governments were, however, reluctant to commit themselves in 
advance, and evidently entertained misgivings about the long-term prospects of our 
position in Hong Kong. It was specially disappointing that the Australian Govern-
ment should have been unwilling to assume any share of responsibility for 
withstanding Communist encroachment in a part of the world which they professed 
to regard as being of special concern to them. The Cabinet were, however, informed 
that, since C.P.(49)135 was circulated, the Prime Minister of Australia had given a 
categorical assurance that his Government would not raise the question of Hong 
Kong at the Security Council without first consulting the United Kingdom 
Government; and he had also indicated, in confidence, that if an attack were actually 
made upon Hong Kong, his Government might well adopt a different attitude on the 
question of giving material assistance in its defence. The Prime Minister of New 
Zealand had made it clear that, despite representations from the Australian 
Government, he was not prepared to withdraw his offer to send three or four frigates 
to help in the defence of Hong Kong;· and, indeed, he was now considering whether 
he could not also make available some aircraft with crews and ground staff. The 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations said that it might be helpful if he 
now sent to the Australian Government a fresh appreciation of the position in Hong 
Kong, which would take account of the impressions which the Minister of Defence 
had formed during his visit. 
Discussion then turned on the questions raised by the United States Secretary of 
State, which were considered in C.P.(49)135.2 The Secretary of State for the 
Colonies said that, although he had put forward in his paper some tentative 
suggestions about the reply which might be returned to these questions, he felt that 
1 Previous reference: see 167. 2 CP(49)135 is withheld. 
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they raised the whole problem of long-term policy in respect of Hong Kong and he 
thought the time had now come when Ministers must review that problem afresh in 
the light of the changed conditions in China. The Foreign Secretary said that he 
would propose to avoid sending even an interim reply to Mr. Acheson's questions. He 
would prefer to undertake at once a thorough review of long-term policy in respect of 
Hong Kong. From the response to the approaches which had been made to the other 
Commonwealth Governments and to the Government of the United States, it now 
appeared that the United Kingdom Government would have to bear the main 
responsibility for devising effective means of safeguarding British interests in Hong 
Kong; and he considered that Ministers should lose no time in formulating a positive 
policy for dealing with the situation. There was general agreement with this view. 
The Cabinet:-
(1) Invited the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to arrange for his 
Department to prepare, in consultation with the Foreign Office and the Ministry of 
Defence, a fresh appreciation of the situation in Hong Kong for the information of 
the Australian Government. 
(2) Took note that no reply would be sent for the time being to the questions 
raised by the United States Secretary of State, as reported in the telegram annexed 
to C.P.(49)135. 
(3) Invited the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Colonies to 
submit to the China and South-East Asia Committee proposals on long-term 
policy in respect of Hong Kong. 
170 CAB 128/16, CM 54(49)2 29Aug 1949 
'China: future of Hong Kong': Cabinet conclusions1 
[The memorandum discussed at this Cabinet meeting, CP(49)177, has been withheld, but 
the substance of it is given in the following document (171), which summarised the paper 
in re-draft. Originating with Sir C Jeffries, it was a joint paper from the CO together with 
the FO and CRO. Mr Creech Jones accepted it, Sir T Lloyd having given his opinion that it 
was excellent. At the Cabinet, the foreign secretary asked for consideration of possibly 
bringing Hong Kong under some form of international control. J J Paskin in the CO as 
well as Jeffries thought this was impossible. Mr Creech Jones then explained to them what 
they could not know of the Cabinet deliberations: 'There was discussion on the question 
of the status of Hong Kong at some future time in certain eventualities and when some 
other status than the present one may need to be considered. The Foreign Secretary 
refused to commit himself in regard to any particular kind of status whether international 
or otherwise. He was pressed on this after I had said that in the paper I was inclined to the 
view that consideration of any other kind of status was premature and academic. Hence 
the deletions in our paper of the kind of conditions and the kind of Government with 
whom H.M.G. would discuss. But it was suggested that the Foreign Secretary should 
think about the matter in view of the fact that it was necessary for him to speak in 
Washington to the Secretary of State regarding the questions U.S.A. had asked about 
Hong Kong's future. The Foreign Secretary gave no promise committing himself to any 
view & said that he would think over the proposal of some form of international control & 
consider whether it was worth while sounding the S. of S. of U.S.A. on his reactions to 
any such idea. But it was felt to be a matter of great secrecy because of the present 
situation in Hong Kong' (CO 537/4805,nd).) 
The Cabinet considered a memorandum (C.P.(49)177) circulated by the Foreign 
1 Previous reference: see 169. 
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Secretary and the Secretary of State for the Colonies in response to the Cabinet's 
request of23rd June that they should submit their proposals on long-term policy in 
respect of Hong Kong. 
The Foreign Secretary said that he and the Secretary of State for the Colonies had 
reached the conclusion that, while the United Kingdom Government should be 
prepared to discuss the future of Hong Kong with a friendly, democratic and stable 
Government of a unified China, the conditions under which such discussions could 
be undertaken did not exist at present and were unlikely to exist in the foreseeable 
future. Until conditions changed, the United Kingdom Government intended to 
retain their position in Hong Kong and should so inform the Governments of other 
Commonwealth countries and the United States, though they should refrain in 
public from pronouncements which would exacerbate relations with China. They 
therefore recommended that the Foreign Secretary should communicate this 
conclusion to the United States Secretary of State and seek his support for it, and 
that the Lord Privy Seal should similarly inform other Commonwealth Govern-
ments. 
In discussion it was pointed out that the conclusions suggested in this memoran-
dum went beyond the Cabinet's earlier decision (that Hong Kong should be defended 
against aggression), which was based on the principle that force, or a show of force, 
should not be allowed to bring about any change in the status of the Colony. This, 
however, was essentially a short-term policy, and the Cabinet had wished to have an 
opportunity of examining proposals for a long-term policy. Some Ministers believed 
that our only chance of maintaining our position in Hong Kong for any length of 
time was to enlist the support of the United States Government for a policy of placing 
it under an international regime; and it was arguable that, if such a proposal was to 
be put forward at all, it should be put forward quickly before conditions in China 
deteriorated any further. It was also arguable that, from the point of view of British 
prestige in the Far East, it would be preferable to take the initiative in making such 
an offer rather than wait until a Chinese Government formally demanded that Hong 
Kong should be handed back to China. The Cabinet were also reminded that the 
Australian Government had already expressed doubts about the expediency of waiting 
upon events and declining meanwhile to discuss the long-term future of Hong Kong. 
If early agreement could be reached on a system of international control for Hong 
Kong provision might be made for the Government of a unified China, when such a 
Government was established, to take a share in the control. 
On the other side, it was argued that any move over Hong Kong which could be 
interpreted as a sign of British weakness in the Far East would undermine all the 
efforts which were being made to stem the encroachment of Communism through-
out South-East Asia. Moreover, the conception of an international regime for Hong 
Kong was not free from legal difficulties. It was doubtful whether the United 
Kingdom Government would have any right to surrender the Leased Territory to an 
international authority, and the device of granting a sub-lease to such an authority 
might not prove feasible. Finally, if international control were proposed, there might 
be difficulty in excluding the Soviet Government from any share in it. 
In further discussion attention was drawn to the proposal in paragraphs 12 and 16 
of C.P.(49)177 that we should not discuss the future of Hong Kong with a central 
Chinese Government unless that Government were "friendly, democratic, stable and 
in control of a united China." The inclusion in this formula of the condition that the 
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Government must be "democratic" would, if accepted, have the effect of precluding 
us from discussing that question at any time with a Communist Government of 
China. It was the general view of the Cabinet that the conclusion indicated in 
paragraph 16 of C.P.(49)177 might be accepted as an interim policy, subject to the 
omission of the words "and democratic" in the second line of that paragraph; but that 
further consideration should be given in the near future to the possibility of 
establishing some form of international control over Hong Kong and that if, on 
further reflection, the Foreign Secretary thought that this might prove to be a 
practicable course he might take an opportunity of ascertaining, in informal and 
exploratory conversations with the United States Secretary of State, whether the 
United States Government would be likely to support such a policy. 
The Cabinet:-
(1) Endorsed, as an interim policy, the conclusion set out in paragraph 16 of 
C.P.(49)177 subject to the omission of the words "and democratic" from the 
second line of that paragraph. 
(2) Invited the Foreign Secretary to give further consideration to the suggestion 
that Hong Kong might be brought under some system of international control, 
and if he considered such a course to be practicable, to ascertain in informal and 
exploratory conversations with the United States Secretary of State whether the 
United States Government were likely to support such a policy. 
171 CO 537/4805, no 86B 7 Sept 1949 
[British policy in Hong Kong]: CRO outward telegram no 326 to UK 
high commissioners 
Following is appreciation of situation in Hong Kong. Begins. 
In some respects situation is similar to that which faced us-and to some extent 
still faces us-in Berlin. Just as we cannot foresee with certainty how future of Berlin 
will develop but are convinced of necessity of remaining there, so we are impelled to 
remain in Hong Kong without any clear indication of extent or duration of military 
commitments involved. In both cases threat of Russian and Communist expansion-
ism necessitates holding what we have and not withdrawing. 
2. Over and above our unassailable legal right to be in Hong Kong there are other 
cogent reasons for our remaining there, for example, 
(a) real interests and wishes of the inhabitants. (There is no reason to doubt that 
it is to their general advantage that British connection should be maintained and 
there is equally little reason to doubt that this is their real wish; the present 
Chinese population of Hong Kong consists almost entirely of persons, or 
descendants of persons, who come to Hong Kong from other parts of China to live 
and work in British territory and under British administration); 
(b) its value as a safe, free, and efficiently run port and place of exchange for 
international trade in Far East; 
(c) its strategic value; 
(d) expressed or implied undertakings given by United Kingdom Government 
since the war that no alteration of status of the Colony was contemplated. 
A memorandum expanding these aspects is being sent to you by Saving telegram. 
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3. It must be accepted however that both Nationalists and Communists in China 
are likely to aim at eventual recovery not only of leased territories but also of ceded 
areas of the Colony. This could be by one or more of following three means:-
(a) By threat or actual use of force. We have already taken steps to meet this and 
have made it clear that we are not prepared to allow interference by Chinese 
Communists in our own territories. This has strengthened local morale. Were we 
however to withdraw our forces and thus allow it to be implied that we are not 
prepared to stand our ground, results throughout South East Asia would be 
disastrous. Large Chinese communities in neighbouring countries (e.g. Thailand 
where there are signs that the process has already begun) may well support 
Chinese Communist cause unless Governments of South East Asian territories 
make it clear that they are determined to suppress Chinese Communist interfer-
ence in their affairs. For political and strategical reasons we cannot permit South 
East Asia to be dominated by Communism, and from an economic point of view it 
would be a disaster if the area were cut off from rest of the world. Any weakening 
before Communists in Hong Kong would be regarded by peoples of South East 
Asia as beginning of a general retreat and they would immediately turn their 
thoughts towards making terms with the new power of Communism. 
While it is difficult for us in view of our responsibilities elsewhere to accept 
commitment involved in Hong Kong we trust that in doing so we shall receive 
support of other Governments and it is relevant in this connection that United 
States Secretary of State said at recent Press conference that if any action were 
taken against Hong Kong which United States considered a violation of Charter of 
the United Nations, then United States would fully meet its obligations under the 
Charter. 
(b) By the use of pressure. Same considerations as above apply to attempts by 
Chinese Communists to render our position in Hong Kong untenable by stirring 
up internal unrest, strikes, etc. Only evidence that we are prepared to deal with 
these attempts will convince Chinese population of Hong Kong that stable 
government under protection of United Kingdom will continue. Given that 
conviction they will prefer British law and order to Chinese chaos and disaster 
even though they will not admit this in public. If, on other hand they lack that 
conviction they will come to terms with Communists even though they fear and 
dislike them. 
(c) By peaceful negotiation. The Nationalists have in the past raised question of 
termination of lease of New Territories but they did not press the matter and it is 
hardly a Jive issue with National Government today. 
If and when a Communist Central Government of China is set up they may 
attempt to discuss future of Hong Kong wfth United Kingdom Government. This 
pre-supposes that United Kingdom Government together with other Powers have 
entered into diplomatic relations with the new Government. For our part however, 
we must postulate that in addition we should not be prepared to discuss future of 
Hong Kong with the new Government unless it were friendly, stable, and in 
control of a united China. We could not agree to negotiate with an unfriendly 
Government since we should be negotiating under duress. Unless there were a 
stable Government we could not rely on it to preserve Hong Kong as a secure free 
port and place of exchange between China and rest of world. We should be 
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unwilling to discuss Hong Kong with a China which was not united because its 
future would be likely to become a pawn in the contest between conflicting 
factions. 
4. The lease of the new territories expires in 1997. It does not seem likely that any 
Chinese Government will be prepared to renew lease. Without these territories Hong 
Kong would be untenable and it is therefore probable that before 1997 United 
Kingdom Government of the day will have to consider status of Hong Kong. It is not 
possible however, some two generations in advance to lay down principles which 
should govern any arrangement which it may be possible to reach with China at that 
time. A decision at present time can therefore only be taken on an interim policy. 
Ends. 
172 CO 537/6046, nos 11 & 28 4 July 1950 
'Constitutional reform in Hong Kong': notes by HP Hall1 of a 
discussion at a CO internal meeting. Note by Mr Creech Jones (6 Jan 
1950) 
[Constitutional advance in Hong Kong was regarded as still important, but by the end of 
1949 there were doubts about whether the time was suitable for constitutional 
experiments. The gap between British and American policy on China was widening, and 
from April1950 relations with China were clearly deteriorating. Hong Kong was now in a 
state of 'cold siege' (minute by Jeffries, 5 May 1950). In October 1946 the governor, Sir 
Mark Young, had proposed more management by Hong Kong people of their own affairs: 
(i) replacing the Urban Council by a municipal authority, half elected, half nominated by 
unofficial bodies; and (ii) modifying the Legislative Council to reduce the number of 
officials from nine to seven, and thereby giving the unofficials a majority. The British 
government more or less accepted (i) in July 1947. A change of governor then led to 
further reconsideration. By June 1950 Young's successor as governor, Sir A Grantham, 
felt that more than a small unofficial majority was required, and despite the disturbed 
conditions in the Far East, constitutional development must be contemplated. The 
arguments about how to further this went on for the rest of 1950. Then the outbreak of 
the Korean War gave the Colonial Office co~d feet again, arguing that it would not be wise 
to alter a smoothly-working system for an alternative which might take some time to 
settle down; they still found no real evidence of any public desire for constitutional 
change.) 
The Secretary of State said that he had read through the papers again. It appeared 
that in the middle of 1949 the Legislative Council had made proposals which the 
Governor had approved and sent to the Secretary of State, Mr. Creech Jones. These 
proposals were that the Legislative Council should consist of 11 unofficial members 
and 6 official members. Of the 11 unofficial-members 6 were to be elected and the 
franchise was restricted to British subjects giving an estimated total of 17,000. These 
proposals were generally approved by Mr. Creech Jones vide his minute at (11) on the 
1950 file. The Secretary of State gave Sir A. Grantham a copy of Mr. Creech Jones' 
minute to read. The Secretary of State enquired whether the proposals had been 
discussed with Mr. Creech Jones. Mr. Paskin said that they had and that further 
discussions on them were to take place after the Election. The Governor had analysed 
the way the voting might go and appeared satisfied. The Department here were 
1 Principal in CO Hong Kong and Pacific Dept. 
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however doubtful and when Mr. Creech Jones had approved the proposals he had 
thought that if the voting should go wrong the Governor could always use his reserve 
powers. At the discussions after the Election the Department had intended to put to 
Mr. Creech Jones the point that reserve powers are very seldom used and cannot be 
relied upon for carrying out general administration of Government. 
2. The Secretary of State said that the "Young" Plan had certain attractions. 
Hong Kong was growing into a city state and could not afford two big authorities. 
Constitutional advance might therefore be based on building up the municipality. 
These proposals had been dropped for a Legislative Council with an unofficial 
majority which would include a majority of elected unofficials. These proposals were 
now being dropped for something retrogressive. (Which the Secretary of State was 
not inclined to favour as not being in accord with His Majesty's Government's 
general views as to the form which constitutional progress should take.) The real 
reason appeared to be that we did not want to do anything in Hong Kong. He thought 
that the only way in which we could keep Hong Kong in the Empire was to win over 
the population into wanting to remain in the Empire. During discussions with the 
Commissioner General recently the Commissioner General had pointed out that in 
the not too distant future only Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong would not have 
self-government: all the other territories in South East Asia would have it-lndo-
China, Indonesia etc. We therefore did not have very much time in which to plan the 
future of these territories. Mr. Paskin pointed out that this was quite all right in the 
case of Malaya which could be made into a viable country but that Hong Kong had no 
future as an independent state. It must either remain (1) a British colony or (2) 
become absorbed into China. It could not maintain an independent existence as a 
city state. Sir A. Grantham said that Hong Kong would eventually go back to China 
and that this would probably occur when the lease of the New Territories expired i.e. 
in 1998 [?1997]. The Secretary of State suggested that the one chance of retaining 
Hong Kong was to make the population want to stay within the Empire. Mr. Paskin 
suggested that this was not quite the same as in Singapore where the Chinese 
population might be made to think that it was their home. Hong Kong was too close 
to China. Our only hope of staying in Hong Kong was to show that our Government 
there was of use to the people, to China and the world. 
3. The Secretary of State thought that we should wait until the position in the 
Far East was clearer, say in six months time, and then decide what could be done 
about Hong Kong. He could not reject the proposals made in the 1949 despatch 
without consulting his colleagues and would prefer to defer a reply to that despatch 
for the time being. Mr. Paskin said that the difficulty in giving a plausible reply to the 
1949 despatch had been discussed with the Governor and the only device which we 
had been able to think of was the one about the narrowness of the franchise. There 
was a danger in employing this as it would go on record and if at some later date the 
Governor wished to introduce direct election it might be difficult to restrict this to 
British subjects. Sir A. Grantham pointed out that the present proposals go further 
than the Young proposals in that they do in fact give the unofficials bigger control 
than the Young proposals did .... 
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Note with 172: 'Hong Kong constitution' 
I assume that in spite of the Emergency in Hong Kong it is advisable at this stage of 
affairs to go ahead with constitutional adjustments. Last August the Governor 
emphasised the urgency of the matter, after a period of indifference in Hong Kong 
(following the Mark Young plan). 
I assume too, that the matter should not be deferred for the consideration of the 
special Office Committee although I hope that the Despatch of the Governor in 
August, which is extremely instructive, will come to their notice as illustrating the 
problem of meeting both central and municipal interests in small territories. 
Discussion has taken a long time and meantime there has been Parliamentary 
interest. Our new position does not square with our earlier public announcements 
and consequently will bring us no credit. In the light of events and the factors 
brought out in the discussion I accept the Governor's view that the Legislative 
Council should be reformed before a Municipal Council is set up and that the latter 
should be developed from the existing Urban Council. 
This change of front leaves local governments in Hong Kong still unsatisfactory 
and I agree that it would be wise when the Legislative Council has been reformed to 
consider the question of a Commission to study how the Urban Council should be 
developed, local government organised and its franchise extended. 
As to the Legislative Council, its relation to the Executive Council remains the 
same as now and the composition of the Executive Council is untouched. I am not 
sure whether before long both matters should not be looked at again. We may have 
difficulty in containing new wine in some of the old bottles. 
I agree that the franchise should be limited to British subjects as qualified by the 
requirements set out in the Governor's despatch. That includes women as well. 
The Chart at No. 62 is useful. I do not like "communal" blocs and nominated 
members, but at this stage in the circumstances of Hong Kong, I think we cannot 
help but accept the Governor's recommendations. I would make a point in respect of 
each of these matters. As to "blocs" I am mystified at the arithmetic. The Hong Kong 
population is 1,814,000 of whom 14,000 are non-Chinese. The Chinese will be given 
6 seats and the non-Chinese 5! It is also disproportionate when the number of British 
subjects is taken instead of population. There are 16,000 British subjects of whom 
12,000 are non-Chinese (6,500 U.K. and Dominions, 3,000 Portuguese, 2,500 Indian) 
and presumably 4,000 are Chinese. The total seats are the 5 for non-Chinese and 6 
for Chinese, but representation on the basis of election is 2 for non-Chinese and 4 for 
Chinese. 
What the 'rationale' under these figures is I can't see unless it is that the problem 
is not only one of counting heads of British· subjects but also of reconciling to this 
principle racial and other interests in Hong Kong. If we agree that only British 
subjects should be voters then we get the curious result that 4,000 Chinese should 
have 4 elected seats and 12,000 non-Chinese only 2-may be because the Chinese 
British subjects are less likely to be birds of passage and have a more permanent 
interest in Hong Kong. If regard is had to the fact that the population is 
overwhelmingly Chinese some justification is given to the greater number of elected 
seats going to the Chinese: but the population is 1,814,000 Chinese to 14,000 
non-Chinese, yet the total seats (nominated and elected) are allocated 6 Chinese and 
5 non-Chinese. Frankly I cannot discern any principle on which the figures in the 
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Governor's recommendations are based. 
As to nominated members, it would appear that the Governor is concerned about 
"kith and kin" rather than economic interest-a difference in sharp contrast with my 
recent discussions about the Gold Coast constitution. I accept the Governor's view 
but purely as a transitional expedient in achieving a representative institution that 
nomination should be based on nationality or race though I hope the point will be 
brought to the notice of the nominated that they are appointed by the Governor from 
their nationality or race because of their social experience of their individual race and 
they are selected to promote the general and broader interests of the Colony-not 
merely to represent sectional interests. 
I agree that the Leg. Co. will have more elbow room if its number of unofficials is 
11 rather than 9 though I see the apprehensions of the Dept. But the risks are remote 
and I think on practical grounds should be taken. The Governor has reserve powers 
and usually other expedients he can draw on if necessary. There must, too, appear a 
bigger sop to democracy than the figure 9 will allow. Cynical as this may seem, we 
cannot ignore that we want British values and standards established in Hong Kong 
which is an outpost of considerable British significance and influence, while at the 
same time we must accept it as a colony with some political significance surrounded 
by territories proclaiming democracy if practising communism in which full 
responsibility cannot be conceded. The inconsistency makes our situation in Hong 
Kong difficult but we undoubtedly will be faced with a clamour for a fully democratic 
system later on. 
I agree that while we must accept the fact that for the time being the Governor 
should preside over the Leg. Co. the practice should diminish as circumstances 
permit as stated by Mr. Rees-Williams and Lord Listowel. 
173 CO 537/2037 11 and 25 Feb 1947 
[Togoland]: minutes by J S Bennett and K E Robinson on the problem 
of the Ewe people in British and French territories 
[The Ewe were an enterprising people with networks of kinship and commerce across 
three colonial boundaries: there were about 137,000 of them in British Togoland, 175,000 
in French Togo, and almost 400,000 in the north-eastern corner of the Gold Coast, as well 
as cognate peoples in Dahomey. The partition of (German) Togola'nd between France and 
Britain after the First World War had aroused strong protests from the Ewe, but the 
specific movement for their unification chiefly arose out of the Second World War, when 
the French Vichy government closed the frontier between French and British Togoland 
(1940). Following an All-Ewe conference at Accra in 1946, Ewe representations on 
unification were first sent to the UN Trusteeship Council in 1947. The objectives of their 
petitions varied, but initially the strongest demand was for a self-governing, united 
Eweland under temporary British tutelage. The Trusteeship Council responded 
cautiously, and the only concrete action to emerge was the establishment in 1948 of a 
Joint Standing Consultative Commission for Togoland in order to facilitate the discussion 
of common affairs.) 
Now that the Trusteeship Agreements for British and French Togoland have been 
approved and we have a meeting of the Trusteeship Council ahead of us next month, 
I think it is necessary to raise once more the whole question of policy on the Ewe 
situation. 
2. Policy so far has been governed by the agreed conclusions of the Anglo-French 
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discussions in London on 7th September, 1946, as amplified in a despatch and 
covering personal letter sent to the Gold Coast Government (Nos. 72, 79 and 80 on 
25041/19/46). However, this was essentially an interim policy designed only to cover 
us during the recent General Assembly and until the Trusteeship Agreements had 
been approved, and we must now think out how to handle the question during the 
next stage. 
3. The Trusteeship Council has an item on its provisional agenda for the 
examination of petitions, which is, of course, a function allocated to it by the Charter 
itself. I have already sent forward separately papers on the general question of 
petitions to the Trusteeship Council. We know that there are some Ewe petitions 
already in New York. Admittedly the U.K. might be able to say that these petitions are 
technically out of court because they were written before the territories came under 
trusteeship, but it is doubtful whether this legal quibble would now do us any good 
and in any case the Ewes (or Dr. Chapman1 himselO could very quickly write a new 
petition. The latest issue of the "Ewe News-Letter" (No. 3 on this file) shows that the 
All-Ewe Conference is still active, and that it is increasingly relying on an appeal to 
public opinion and international action to secure the aim of Ewe unification. It is 
also important to notice that the Ewes have got hold of the Philippine Resolution 
about Conferences of non-self-governing peoples, even though on a point of detail 
the News-Letter quotes an earlier version of the Resolution and not the one finally 
adopted. They are now trying to raise a fund of £10,000 by March, 1947 to be spent 
apparently on pushing their case internationally. 
4. In these circumstances it is unlikely that we shall be able (even if we wished) to 
stave off international discussion of the Ewe question much longer, and we must be 
ready with a line to deal with any Ewe petitions which may come up at the first 
meeting of the Trusteeship Council. Both we and the French Government will be 
expected to state our position. We might be able to buy a little more time by 
undertaking to examine the petitions and give our comments at the second meeting 
of the Trusteeship Council, but we should not rely for certain on getting approval of 
this, and in any case I do not think anything is really to be gained by trying to put off 
the evil day a few months longer. We have got to make our minds up sooner or later 
whether we will agree to some investigation of the desire of the Ewe people for 
unification and, if so, what means this investigation should take. 
5. It is to be remembered that the Trusteeship Council has the right to make 
visits to trust territories. Its provisional rules of procedure extend this right to 
sending members of the Secretariat _or special experts whom the Council has the 
right to appoint. Thus the Trusteeship Council might quite well wish to send a party 
to British and French Ewe territory, and it would be quite in order for the party to 
include Dr. Chapman, dressed as an international Civil Servant. Admittedly visits by 
the Trusteeship Council have to be at times agreed upon with the administering 
authority (Article 87(c) of the Charter), and we could, if we wished, object to the 
visit. I doubt, however, whether this line would do us much good. The more 
difficulties we raised, the more we should encourage the suspicion that we had 
something to hide and in consequence pressure for the visit to be made would 
1 Dr Daniel Ahmling Chapman, first general secretary, All-Ewe Conference; subsequently area specialist, 
UN Dept of Trusteeship and Information for Non-Self-Governing Territories; head of Ghana civil service 
and secretary to Ghana Cabinet, 1954-1957. 
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increase. I do not think either we or the French would be able to hold out indefinitely 
in these circumstances and a deferred visit forced on us by international pressure 
would, I think, be worse than one which we had freely agreed to in the first instance. 
6. The above summarises some of the international pressures which seem likely 
to develop. On the domestic side, it is also for consideration how long we ought in 
our own interests to repress the Ewe movement and refuse to take any account of it, 
as we are now in effect doing. This is bound up with the attitude of the third party in 
the case, the French Government. 
7. The French have so far adopted a completely rigid and unrealistic attitude. 
They deny that the Ewe movement is a popular or representative one (this is 
contradictory to information supplied to us by the Gold Coast Government) and they 
deny that there is such a thing as the Ewe problem because, they say, it would call 
into question French sovereignty in Togoland-a fatuous argument which would 
carry no weight in the Trusteeship Council, particularly bearing in mind that one of 
the basic objectives of the Trusteeship System is to promote the political advance-
ment of the inhabitants of trust territories and their progressive development 
towards self-government or independence "as may be appropriate to the freely 
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned". Nevertheless, we are morally committed 
by the September discussions to consult the French again when preparing our line of 
action in the Trusteeship Council, and it seems safe to assume that we shall find the 
greatest resistance on their part to adopting anything but a completely negative line. 
8. I cannot help feeling that the time has come, or will very shortly come, where 
we shall be forced to decide between our interests on the one side as an ally of France 
and on the other side our general international standing in colonial matters. On its 
own merits, the Ewe question seems to me to raise one of the fundamental issues of 
African colonial policy and cannot be indefinitely ignored simply to avoid difficulties 
with France. The only result of this would be to alienate the Ewes who live in British 
territory on an issue which is, after all, one of principle affecting the position of 
dependent peoples generally. In the United Nations and other international bodies, 
particularly during the last 18 months, the U.K. Government has on the whole taken 
a very holy line about colonial matters. We have set ourselves up as enlightened 
colonial administrators, who profess the greatest regard for the wishes and interests 
of dependent peoples, whether technically under international trusteeship or not. On 
these grounds we pooh-poohed the Philippine Resolution about a Conference of 
non-self-governing peoples to enable them to "express their aspirations" without 
interference from the colonial powers. We have been accustomed to argue that 
dependent peoples suffer from no disabilities by the mere fact of their colonial status 
and that the problems which arise in colonial territories should be treated on their 
merits on the same footing as in sovereign· states. Our attitude towards the Ewe 
question, which is a practical test of these professions, is becoming increasingly 
difficult to justify. If we continue to refuse either to take any account of their 
aspirations ourselves or to allow some impartial outside investigation, we shall 
justify everything our critics say about the necessity for colonial matters being 
treated as a separate international problem and for the necessity of international 
accountability for colonies. 
9. Up till now our attitude on the Ewe question has been studiously correct but 
not noticeably constructive. For the reasons given, I do not think we can hold this 
position any longer. The choice, therefore, lies between 
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(a) being forced into a defensive alliance with the French, refusing to take any 
action but being put in an increasingly difficult position in the Trusteeship 
Council and elsewhere; or 
(b) taking the initiative in advocating some serious consideration of the Ewe 
claim to unification, attempting to carry the French with us but going ahead alone 
if they refuse to co-operate. 
10. The disadvantages of course (a) have already been discussed. The disadvan-
tages of course (b) will be felt in our relations with France, particularly in the 
colonial field. It has been argued in the past that we must damp down the Ewe 
question in order to avoid damage to our general colonial collaboration with the 
French. I question this argument. If our collaboration on economic and technical 
matters with the French colonies is such a tender plant that it cannot stand the 
shock of tackling one or two serious political problems, I doubt whether it is worth 
weeping many tears over. In any event, we must decide the relative priority of the 
two things. In my judgement, the issues of international and African policy raised by 
the Ewe question are more important than what little value we have so far got or are 
likely to get by collaboration on technical matters with French colonial govern-
ments. 
11. Two possible constructive courses open to us would be 
(i) to attempt to form an Anglo-French commission of enquiry, outside the 
Trusteeship Council but informing the Council what we were doing; or 
(ii) to advocate in the Trusteeship Council the sending of a commission of 
enquiry, which would have British and French members but which would be led 
by a neutral. 
12. The French have already made (during M. Laurentie's2 last visit to London) 
tentative suggestions about an Anglo-French Commission, but they clearly have in 
mind something with restricted terms of reference which would certainly not be able 
to consider fundamental problems. Such a Commission would in my view be worse 
than useless, since it is merely nibbling at this problem to try and deal with it by 
economic palliatives and the Commission would merely raise false hopes. The 
French Government on the other hand would certainly not agree under British 
pressure alone to appoint a Commission which was entitled to consider the 
fundamentals of the problem, i.e. re-drawing of frontiers. 
13. I therefore prefer alternative (ii), which would in my view be the right way of 
using the Trusteeship Council to do a constructive and useful job of work which for 
obvious reasons the two colonial powers directly concerned are unable to settle 
between them. 
14. If this general line is approved, perhaps we might discuss how to launch it 
first on the Foreign Office and then, as would be necessary, on the French by way of 
private advice in advance of the Trusteeship Council meeting. 
J.S.B. 
11.2.47 
I am afraid I have held this up partly owing to general pressure of work and partly 
2 H Laurentie, French alternate delegate on the UN Trusteeship Council. 
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because the problem involved is in my view one of the most difficult confronting us 
in West Africa. I do not, I am afraid, altogether agree with Mr. Bennett's approach to 
the problem in his minute above. I think that it exaggerates the real importance of 
the Ewe question (which I cannot think raises a fundamental issue of Colonial policy) 
and very seriously under-estimates the importance of the Anglo-French alliance. I do 
not wish to spend time arguing at length in minutes but as the person largely 
concerned I feel obliged to take exception to the suggestion in paragraph 10 of Mr. 
Bennett's minute, that our action in the past in relation to the Ewe question has 
been determined by desire to avoid damage to our general Colonial collaboration 
with the French. The issue is not one of "constructive international action" in 
relation to the Ewe question versus the maintenance of Anglo-French collaboration 
in technical matters relating to the Colonies; it is one of allowing the Ewe question 
to endanger the prospects of the Anglo-French alliance to which our foreign policy 
has been closely directed during the last two years and the achievement of which is 
calculated to have effects on the internal politics of France which, as I understand it, 
are considered by H.M.G. to be of major importance .... 
K.E.R. 
25.2.47 
17 4 CO 537/2057, no 48 30 Apr 194 7 
'International aspects of colonial policy-1947': memorandum by J S 
Bennett 
[This paper arose out of preparation in the International Relations Dept for the 
anticipated discussion of colonial policy at the 1947 UN General Assembly scheduled for 
September. In trying to define British policy towards the UN, it rapidly became clear to 
Bennett that the CO needed to go into 'some of the fundamentals of the international 
position of colonies at the present day and the general principles of UK colonial policy'. As 
Bennett himself admitted the result was a 'rather formidable-looking paper ... not the 
sort of document one can consider satisfactorily on an office file', but he hoped it might 
be discussed by the heads of geographical departments and the assistant under-secretaries 
concerned; he sent private advance copies to Cohen and one or two others (minute, 3 
May). Poynton's reaction was that the memo was 'interesting and provocative ... I should 
be reluctant to accept some of the conclusions reached in it although it contains many 
pertinent comments' (minute, 12 May). Thomas welcomed the memo: 'every paragraph, 
especially in the conclusions, invites rejoinder, but we need a lot more fundamental 
thought on the question where we are aiming, and I have personally found No. 48 very 
stimulating' (minute, 16 May). The paper, however, never received the consideration it 
deserved, and the secretary of state apparently never saw it. This pigeon-holing was partly 
the result of Bennett's moving in August to take over the Mediterranean Dept.) 
I. Introductory 
1. This paper is written in an attempt to clear the air before the next United 
Nations General Assembly in September, 1947 as regards questions of colonial 
policy, particularly the line to be taken by the U.K. and other colonial powers in 
handling Chapter XI of the Charter. Experience since San Francisco has shown that 
colonial issues arouse increasing international interest and are certain to be 
discussed in one form or another. The institution of the trusteeship system-now 
virtually completed-has been in the nature of a dress rehearsal, for both the 
colonial and non-colonial powers. It is now necessary to assess the position in its 
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broader aspects. The U.K. is in any case committed to having a policy about Chapter 
XI for discussion with the French and Belgians at the conference in Paris due to take 
place shortly after the conclusion of the Trusteeship Council. It will also be desirable 
to exchange views in good time before the September Assembly with the Dominions 
and with the United States Government. 
2. H.M.G. have declared from time to time that the basis of their foreign policy is 
the United Nations. The extent to which it is desired that this policy should be 
applied in the international aspects of colonial matters (beyond the specific action 
already taken to place three African territories under trusteeship) has not yet been 
closely defined. A number of gradations are possible, between the one extreme of 
making United Nations opinion one of the foundations of our colonial policy and the 
other extreme of taking as little notice of the United Nations as possible consistently 
with the strict letter of the Charter. Pending Ministerial guidance on that issue, it 
appears best to confine this paper to a study in terms simply of the international 
pressures, and the related internal pressures, operating on the U.K. and the other 
colonial powers. 
11. The position in the United Nations 
3. The formal position is that the following colonial matters (leaving aside 
Palestine, which is an exceptional case) may be expected to come up in the next 
General Assembly:-
(a) Trusteeship, in the shape of:-
(i) The report of the Trusteeship Council; 
(ii) Further elections to the Trusteeship Council; 
(iii) Possible further criticism by the Slav bloc of the validity of the existing 
trusteeship agreements. 
(b) Action on information supplied by colonial powers under Article 73(e)-ad 
hoc Committee meeting three weeks before the Assembly. 
(c) Review of action (if any) taken under the so-called "Philippine Resolution" 
(conferences of non-self-governing peoples). 
(d) Future of South-West Africa (and Nauru). 
(e) (Possibly) Establishment of the South Pacific Commission. 
(f) (Possibly) Colonial participation in Specialised Agencies (in view of mem-
bership clauses in draft "relationship agreements" between these agencies and the 
United Nations). 
In addition, we cannot exclude the possibility of other specific colonial issues being 
raised, as a result of developments between now and September (e.g. French action 
in Indo-China and Madagascar, and/or pressure for certain non-mandated territories 
to be brought under trusteeship). 
4. The first to arise in point of time will be that in paragraph 3(b), and it seems 
likely to be the central feature from the point of view of formulating policy since it 
brings up in the clearest and most general form the interpretation of Chapter XI of 
the Charter. 
5. The U.K. (as we have often pointed out) took the lead in putting Chapter XI 
into the Charter. The fact that it was considered desirable to do so is a testimony to 
the depth of present-day feeling that (irrespective of the special case of trust 
territories) colonial policy, at least in its broadest aspects, is a matter of international 
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concern and should be the subject of internationally recognised standards and 
obligations. Since San Francisco, the U.K. and other colonial powers have attempted 
to take up the position that Chapter XI is a voluntary declaration, imposing 
obligations on them alone and conferring no rights of supervision or initiative on the 
United Nations as a whole, beyond the right to receive certain documents "for 
information purposes" under Article 73(e). The debates last year have, however, 
already made it clear that the majority of the United Nations are not content with 
this limited interpretation, and attach great importance to Chapter XI as a means of 
discussing and formulating resolutions on colonial affairs. 
6. It seems superfluous to linger over the legal interpretation of Chapter XI; a 
convincing enough case can be made by the protagonists of either party. The facts 
are that Chapter XI is in the Charter; that under Article 10 the General Assembly may 
discuss any matters within the scope of the Charter; that whether we like it or not, 
the General Assembly wil/1 discuss matters within the scope of Chapter XI; that our 
chances of getting the question of their right to do so referred to the International 
Court, if we so desired, are negligible (bearing in mind the India-South Africa 
dispute) while our motives would certainly be misconstrued; and that even if we 
walked out we could not prevent such discussions, and should merely be allowing 
our own case to go by default. On the other hand the powers of the General 
Assembly, on this as on all other matters, are not executive or mandatory and are 
limited to making recommendations . We are not, therefore, under legal commit-
ment to give effect to the outcome of any General Assembly discussion on Chapter XI 
questions, though (depending on the circumstances of the case) we might find 
ourselves under a strong moral obligation to do so. 
7. The question is, therefore, not whether we should allow General Assembly 
action in respect of Chapter XI to go beyond the strict receipt and pigeon-holing of 
information under Article 73(e), but how we shall treat the inevitable debates on 
matters of colonial policy. That is to say, should we (a) attempt to lead and guide the 
discussions-following up the initiative we took when we put Chapter XI itself into 
the Charter-and take positive steps to explain and justify the broad features of our 
colonial policies to the United Nations and to seek their sympathy and support in 
carrying them out; or should we (b) rest on our oars, defend ourselves if attacked, 
put forward no ideas or resolutions ourselves but try to whittle down those of others, 
and in general adopt the attitude that we do not "recognise the jurisdiction of the 
court" and that it is an act of grace for us to make a statement at all? Behind this 
question of tactics there obviously lies the question of policy whether or not the 
international (and internal) pressures are such that, in any event, what we do in the 
colonies will have to be guided to a considerable extent by those pressures. If that is 
so, then alternative (b) would be self-defeating. 
8. It is unnecessary here to recapitulate in detail the attitude of the principal 
non-colonial members of the United Nations concerned, but the following main 
factors may be noted:-
(a) The U.S.S.R., supported by the Slav group, must be expected to continue their 
pressure for "emancipation" of colonies in general, for reasons of Russian foreign 
policy, and also in part from a genuine (if ill-informed and prejudiced) interest in 
1 Emphasis throughout in original. 
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the question. They may also point to the apparent more rapid progress of the 
Asiatic territories of the U.S.S.R. It is, however, noteworthy that, in a number of 
other United Nations discussions (e.g. in the Commission on Human Rights), a 
practical community of interest between the Colonial Office and the Kremlin is 
beginning to emerge-both insisting on national sovereignty and on reservations 
to cover backward areas, as against the liberalism of the Western Powers, 
including the U.K. itself. 
(b) India, supported by other Asiatic states, will continue to press for the rapid 
liquidation of the remaining European colonial regimes in Asia, and will also try to 
assert Indian influence throughout the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific. 
(c) The Arab League will tend to support (a) and (b) so long as Palestine, Libya 
and French North Africa remain under foreign rule. 
(d) The Latin American states, while having no major axes to grind, will tend to 
follow the "liberal" American tradition, without the counterbalancing factors 
which are beginning to operate in the case of the United States itself. 
9. This combination of pressures, particularly in terms of voting strength 
actually at the Assembly, is very strong. It embraces practically the whole world 
outside Western Europe. 
10. The attitude of the United States is, therefore, of vital importance, both in the 
Assembly and in the world at large. American opinion has traditionally been opposed 
to "colonialism." The desire to see rapid political emancipation remains, but is being 
counter-balanced by strategic and other interests as the United States itself acquires 
colonial or quasi-colonial responsibilities. The early and disorderly dissolution of the 
Western European colonial empires would precipitate a further world redistribution 
of power which might have serious consequences for the United States. There is 
evidence of a growing recognition of the need for the United States, as the greatest 
surviving imperial power, to support its elderly poor relations (e.g. the "Truman 
Doctrine" in Greece and Turkey). On the other hand, while probably well-disposed to 
the continued existence as such of those colonial powers who are members of the 
United Nations, the United States is by no means necessarily committed to the 
colonial policies they at present follow. It may be expected that the need for United 
States support will be increasingly used to bring American influence to bear on the 
strategy of colonial administration (compare war strategy in 1942-5). In particular, 
the American economic system and ideals are far removed from the doctrines of 
planned economic and social development in the colonies which hold the field in the 
U.K. and (to a lesser extent) among the other colonial powers. Yet the United States 
alone possesses the material resources capable of making those doctrines really 
work. 
Ill. Position of the colonial empires 
11. There are many common factors in situations which all the colonial powers 
have to deal with, both internationally and internally. The significant differences are 
rather between one colonial region and another than between one colonial power 
and another. 
12. It is, therefore, not possible to consider U.K. policy without taking account of 
the position of the colonial powers generally. It is an important fact that the Colonies 
(using this term in its broadest sense) are held almost exclusively by the Western 
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European states-the "Western bloc" with all that that implies. With the present 
redistribution of power in the world and the relative decline in strength of Western 
Europe, the colonial empires are subject to severe external and internal pressures. 
Western Europe does not at present possess, and may never possess again, either 
sufficient resources to develop the colonies to the maximum extent which the 
situation demands or sufficient power to maintain the status quo. Spain and Portugal 
are weak and discredited. France has collapsed once already, is still divided 
internally, and serious cracks are already appearing in her overseas empire. Belgium 
and Holland, as colonial powers at least, are largely dependent on the U.K. and 
France. The U.K. itself is seriously weakened economically and in manpower. 
13. Redistribution of power could, broadly speaking, come about in three main 
ways:-
( a) By acceleration of the development of local autonomy or independence (which 
is inherent in the situation even though its recognition as an avowed factor in 
policy has so far been largely confined to the U.K.). 
(b) By the acquisition or increase of influence by present non-colonial powers, 
through some machinery of international accountability designed with greater or 
less sincerity to lead towards (a). 
(c) By direct redistribution of colonial territory. 
Of these, (a) is most in line with the interests (real or at least supposed) of the 
colonial peoples themselves. At the other extreme, (c) is simple power politics. (b) is 
a mixture of the two. Hence it was inevitably included in the structure of the League 
of Nations and of the United Nations, but its practical working out has so far been 
beset by mixed motives and suspicions. The redistribution of colonial territory, 
besides being the least justifiable, would only be accepted by present colonial powers 
under very severe stress, probably only as a result of defeat in war (e.g. Italy). For the 
time being it may, therefore, be ruled out, with certain possible minor exceptions, 
and bearing in mind the uncertain future of the Spanish and Portuguese empires. 
This paper can, therefore, be confined to methods (a) and (b). 
14. Applying the above to the five main colonial regions:-
(1) Middle East and North Africa 
The Middle East proper is now out of the colonial phase save for the wholly 
exceptional case of Palestine. Libya and French North Africa are outstanding. The 
line of pressure is clearly towards independence without any intervening stage of 
trusteeship. Nationalist movements are strong and are supported by the Arab 
League. 
(2) South East Asia 
This region presents a, number of resemblances to Region (1), with the new 
independent India playing a corresponding role to the Arab League. Nationalist 
movements stimulated by the Japanese occupation, are active and increasingly in 
touch with one another. Indonesia has gained virtual independence by the use of 
force, diplomacy and international opinion, and Indo-China looks like doing the 
same. Burma and Ceylon are rapidly reaching independence by more peaceful 
means. The exceptions for the time being are the U.K. territories in Malaya, 
Sarawak and Borneo, where the previous regime has been replaced not by an 
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autonomous structure but by a more direct form of colonial administration than 
before. This measure has, however, only been partly successful and its future is 
uncertain, particularly in view of developments in the rest of the region. In this 
region generally it seems unlikely that either external or internal pressure groups 
would invoke the instrument of international accountability, except in its most 
general sense, for the same reasons as in the Middle East and North Africa. 
(3) Tropical Africa 
Unlike (1) or (2) there is little in the way of indigenous civilisation. Pressure for 
increasing autonomy comes from a small but growing educated class; nationalist 
movements are as · yet undeveloped and when they grow will perhaps be 
pan-African rather than territorial. In these circumstances the external pressures 
outweigh the internal. Independence immediately or in the near future is not 
practicable and the necessity for the continuation of some form of foreign colonial 
administration is generally recognised. International attention is, therefore, 
focussed not on the continued existence of the colonial powers as such but on the 
methods and objectives of their administration. International accountability in its 
formal sense (trusteeship) already applies in certain zones of East and West Africa, 
artificially selected because they were taken from Germany after World War I. 
There is increasing pressure towards widening the area of accountability both 
functionally (e.g. through Specialised Agencies) and territorially (e.g. South West 
Africa). Since the unity of African problems is increasingly stressed by the colonial 
powers themselves, it is politically difficult to draw the line against this spread of 
accountability. 
(4) The Pacific 
This follows very broadly the pattern of Region (3); external pressures exceed 
internal, but both are less acute than in Africa. The trusteeship system is already in 
force in parts of the region for the same reasons as in Africa. The significant 
difference is that for strategic reasons the U.S.A. is involved in this region alone as 
one of the colonial powers. 
(5) The Caribbean 
This region is unique since its population is predominantly European or 
Europeanised, and its continued existence as a colonial region is due to 
exceptional circumstances. Both internal and external pressures exist, but the 
former are on the whole being met by the colonial powers and the latter are 
dominated by the strategic and commercial interests of the U.S.A. in the region, 
which again have been met by the lease ·of bases and the establishment of the 
Caribbean Commission. The Caribbean is a regional rather than a world problem. 
15. From the above it is evident that the key regions for the U.K. (and to a large 
extent for the colonial powers generally) are· South East Asia and Tropical Africa. In 
the Middle East-North Africa region our colonial commitments have been liquidated 
apart from Palestine and Libya (both of which are essentially foreign policy matters); 
France, however, is still deeply committed in this region and there is always the 
danger that the U.K. might become involved in the consequences of French mistakes 
as in the case of Syria. The Pacific and Caribbean regions involve relatively small land 
areas and populations and neither present such acute problems at the moment; in 
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both the influence of the United States is likely to be decisive and it is at present 
being exercised with moderate benevolence towards the existing regimes. The 
Mediterranean Islands and Gibraltar have been omitted from this review because 
their retention is due solely to U.K. strategic regions [sic]. 
16. Of these two key regions, the dominant issue in South East Asia is that of 
nationalism and independence, and in Tropical Africa that of international accounta-
bility. 
N. Trends of British policy 
17. It may be useful to examine in the light of the previous sections some of the 
trends of current U.K. colonial policy; necessarily only the broadest of generalisa-
tions can be attempted. The purpose of the examination is to indicate what particular 
vulnerable points there may be from the international angle at the present time. 
18. While the extension of political liberties has been for a very long time our 
avowed objective, it has usually been carried out slowly and cautiously. The tradition 
of ·U.K. policy has been on the whole paternal. Good administration is in general 
considered a prior objective to the rapid extension of political responsibility. 
19. In recent years, with the much publicized Colonial Development and Welfare 
Acts, the emphasis of British colonial policy has been increasingly placed on 
economic and social development. The need for great improvements in this field is, 
of course, unquestionable. This concentration on colonial development has, how-
ever, also had the indirect effect of strengthening the paternal tendencies noted in 
the previous paragraph. Material development and social progress are to come before 
political development, and "democracy" in the Colonies would be largely meaning-
less without them. Unconsciously the philosophy of British colonial policy has 
adopted what is virtually a Marxist approach. 
20. These factors make for some lack of flexibility in relation to the internal 
pressures for increasing and rapid self government. If the pace of political 
development is to be set by economic and social development, it is bound to be very 
slow. Moreover, it has been shown on a number of occasions that material 
development is not generally acceptable to politically conscious dependent peoples as 
an alternative to political emancipation. Our approach to political development 
appears to be based on the assumption that the Colonies can be treated more or less 
in laboratory conditions and that we are effectively in control of the timetable for this 
sociological experiment. In the light of the previous sections it is doubtful whether 
this assumption is any longer valid (e.g. South East Asia, but the principle applies 
generally). 
21. The modern emphasis on economic and social development has also 
increased our impatience with external "interference." This reaction is equally or 
more marked among the other colonial powers; in its modern phase it dates (perhaps 
significantly) from Vichy's concentration on the colonial empire after the fall of 
France in 1940. Hence resistance to any hint of international accountability is on the 
increase. The creation of the mandate and trusteeship systems has had the accidental 
effect of strengthening this resistance in regard to other colonial territories. The 
African region naturally provides the main example here, but again the principle 
applies generally. 
22. Perhaps the most important vulnerable point is the gap between the 
magnitude of the programme set by the idea of colonial development and the 
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practical ability of the U.K. and the other Western powers to carry it out. Our 
financial material and manpower resources are severely restricted. The augmented 
C.D. and W. Fund is already recognised to be inadequate; but resources on the major 
scale required cannot be diverted to the Colonies now or in the foreseeable future. 
The other colonial powers appear to be even worse off. Hence, in the face of 
international pressure, an appeal to let us alone so that we can get on with the job is 
deprived of a very important part of its justification. Indeed, the chances of 
impoverished Western Europe being able to carry through controlled economic and 
social development of the Colonies within the time which political circumstances 
will allow appear to be distinctly questionable. 
23. It is, therefore, arguable that it is necessary to reconsider the basic 
assumptions of policy with a view either to accelerating the pace of political 
development, or to widening the circle of countries, whose resources can be called 
on for colonial economic and social development, or to both these things. Otherwise 
there is a risk that internal and external pressures may break the "controlled 
experiment" before it is completed, which would obviously be the worst of· all 
conclusions from the point of view of the colonial peoples themselves. 
24. It is interesting to speculate whether on pure grounds of technique, there 
may be lessons to be learnt from the rapid economic and social modernisation of the 
Asiatic areas of the U.S.S.R., where the Marxist approach has been carried to its 
logical conclusion. The Stalinist "nationalities" policy, combined with the exercise of 
remote control by enlisting the local intelligentsia into the Communist Party, seems 
to have found a possible method of carrying through a very authoritarian operation 
quickly, while at the same time providing at least a facade of autonomy. The 
important distinction in technique seems to be that the Russians have found a way of 
absorbing and employing the local intelligentsia while we, in our efforts to maintain 
the highest standards of administration at all costs, have been reluctant to create a 
class of what are called "professional politicians". Nevertheless, the indigestible 
colonial intelligentsia seems to be a growing problem in many territories, and unless 
a more effective political instrument for carrying out economic and social develop-
ment can be found the situation appears to be increasingly vulnerable. 
25. Another factor is the stress recently placed on collaboration between colonial 
powers. In the technical fields there are obvious advantages in this. It is apparent, 
however, that the Western European Powers cannot greatly help one another on the 
real factor which all lack-resources. The constructive importance of colonial 
collaboration on its economic and technical merits should, therefore, not be 
exaggerated. Politically it is a symptom of a common defensive mentality. The danger 
here is that the closer the association becomes, the greater the probability that the 
joint policy of the "Club" must descend to a-lowest common denominator (e.g. are 
we to support South African annexation of South West Africa or French repression in 
Madagascar as the price of colonial solidarity?) From both technical and political 
points of view, the U.K. probably has more to give-or more to lose-than to receive 
as a result of this process. It appears, therefore, that the right perspective is to regard 
colonial collaboration as a secondary technical factor and not as a major instrument 
of policy. 
26. The position of colonies in relation to international functional bodies 
(Specialised Agencies, Commissions of the Economic and Social Council) is 
becoming increasingly important. Here it seems that we have unconsciously been 
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attempting two divergent lines of policy. On the one hand we assert the principle that 
in international economic and social matters political status is irrelevant, no 
distinction should be made between colonies and sovereign states, and no special 
"colonial machinery" should be set up. Yet we and the other colonial powers are busy 
creating just such special colonial machinery in the two Regional Commissions and 
the less formal collaboration with the French and Belgians in Africa; and we resist 
strongly any suggestion that such arrangements for inter-colonial collaboration on 
economic and social matters should be brought into relationship with, or absorbed 
by, the United Nations and Specialised Agencies. If we allowed our declared principle 
of "colonial equality" in the economic and social field to be followed to its logical 
conclusion, there would inevitably be a considerable further spread of intervention in 
these matters in the colonies by the United Nations and its organs; but it is current 
policy to resist this. In fact, economic and social matters cannot be divorced from the 
political superstructure; and it is in the political field that the significant differences 
between colonies and sovereign states lie. The more we try to disarm international 
interference by proclaiming that there is no difference between colonies and 
sovereign states in the economic and social field, the more we shall come up against 
the fact that there is a very real difference in the political field; and it is likely that the 
attempt to have it both ways will merely end in focussing additional international 
attention to the fact of political dependence as the real and central characteristic of 
the colonial system. This fact is already beginning to appear in the course of the work 
of such bodies as the Human Rights Commission, where the Colonial Office has 
continually had to hold the U.K. Representative back with reservations arising from 
colonial conditions. It is likely that in the end we shall have to choose between either 
coming out in favour of special colonial clauses and colonial machinery (thereby 
abandoning our equality principle) or else attempting to bring U.K. policy as a whole 
in regard to Human Rights down to a lowest common factor based on colonial 
conditions. A similar problem arises in our attempts to secure "associate mem-
bership" for colonial territories in Specialised Agencies, which again is based on the 
doctrine of equality of treatment in economic and social matters. It is becoming 
apparent that colonies will only be able to participate effectively in these bodies, and 
will only be accepted as such internationally, when they are politically qualified to do 
so. These examples illustrate in an acute form the dilemma facing us in attempting 
to follow a progressive policy of colonial participation in international functional 
bodies, while at the same time preserving unchanged the principle of exclusive 
sovereignty in the colonies. 
V. Some tentative conclusions for discussion 
27. The greater part of the world is opposed to the continuance, at least in its 
existing form, of our and other colonial empires. This pressure is exerted, for 
different reasons and with varying degrees of intensity, regional and general, by the 
Slav, Asiatic, Middle Eastern, and Latin American groups of states. Western Europe is 
the exception, but closer association between the U.K. and the rest of Western 
Europe on colonial issues is likely to increase our liabilities without proportionately 
increasing our assets. 
28. Peaceful pressure exerted through the United Nations or otherwise need not 
be expected to produce (except in special local conditions) sudden catastrophic 
changes in the status quo. Nevertheless the combination of pressures is more than 
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the U.K. is now in a position to resist indefinitely. The only quarter from which 
effective support is both available and (in favourable circumstances) likely to be 
forthcoming is the United States. But the United States cannot be expected to 
underwrite the British Empire either in toto or unconditionally.2 In consequence, 
the system and objectives of colonial administration as regarded between the two 
wars no longer correspond to the realities of the situation. 
29. Time has, therefore, become the dominant factor. We are no longer (as 
hitherto supposed) in ultimate control of the timetable of developments in the 
colonies; and policies (such as those deriving from the C.D. and W. Acts) which are 
based on that assumption will be shown to be increasingly invalid. If this is so, we 
have broadly speaking a choice of two alternative courses:-
(a) to "hang on," ignoring international and related internal pressures with which 
we disagree, conceding each step ad hoc and only when these pressures become 
overwhelming (as in India); or 
(b) to liquidate as rapidly and satisfactorily as possible those commitments which 
are likely to become untenable, to beat a strategic retreat to shorter and more 
defensible lines (both territorially and functionally), and as a condition of this 
manoeuvre to seek to fortify ourselves with the maximum practicable United 
States support. 
30. There are advantages and disadvantages in either course; though it may be 
worth remarking that, in the United Nations at least, course (a) would appear 
entirely negative while course (b) could be presented positively. Course (a) speaks for 
itself and needs no elaboration. The remainder of these conclusions will, therefore, 
be devoted to deductions on the assumption that course (b) were followed. 
31. Firstly, the outstanding colonial commitments in the Middle East-North 
Africa and South-East Asia regions should be wound up as rapidly as possible. Those 
regions are the most exposed to external pressure, not only the general international 
pressure on colonial matters but also the particular regional pressures exercised 
respectively by the Arab League and by India and the other Asiatic states. The 
internal pressures for self-government are also stronger than in other colonial 
regions, and in consequence United States support for the colonial powers in these 
regions would be more difficult (probably impossible) to secure. In place of the 
existing colonial-type administrations, the aim should be to develop the process 
(already begun by the U.K. in the Middle East) of building up groups of independent 
states associated with the Western powers by community of interests expressed in the 
form of treaties or (in very favourable circumstances) even of Dominion relationship. 
By facing the dominant modern political issue, such a policy would offer the best 
chance, in the long run, of preserving Western friendship and influence in those 
regions, including suitable defence arrangements (though the 1936 Egyptian Treaty 
pattern is now out of date). Scope for continued Western advice and assistance in the 
technical fields, which would be needed, could be maintained through such 
instruments as the already-existing British Middle East Office and Special Commis-
sioner's Office in South-East Asia. 
32. In the Middle East-North Africa region, such a policy would (apart from 
2 Poynton noted in the margin: 'I thought this form of presentation was deail. The point surely is that USA 
must help the British Empire to underwrite the world' [12 May] . 
[174) COLLABORATION AND CRITICISM 419 
Palestine) mean the U.K. (a) supporting an autonomist settlement in Libya and (b) 
exercising pressure on the French to bow before the coming storm in Tunis, Algeria 
and Morocco. Since North Africa is a vital link in the French imperial system, the 
necessity of exercising such pressure would of itself be likely to destroy the prospects 
of close collaboration with the French in the colonial sphere generally. Nevertheless, 
the prior claims of the general colonial strategy presupposed in this section would 
make it essential for this pressure to be exercised. 
33. In South-East Asia, though the French are involved in Indo-China, the main 
responsibility would be on the U.K. Burma is already on the verge of independence; 
Ceylon should follow suit (this may be already in train). There remains Malaya, 
where we would have to run up as quickly as possible the framework of an 
autonomous government, by-passing the intervening stages. This does not mean an 
ideally good or stable government (it would probably be neither-compare India), 
but simply any structure that would just work. Sarawak and Borneo would present 
more difficulty, but at least a start could be made by publicly reversing the policy 
implied by the recent "annexations." 
34. The Colonial Empire proper (leaving aside the strategic islands) would thus 
be reduced to Africa, the Pacific and the Caribbean, of which (for reasons already 
stated) the Caribbean can also be to some extent put aside as a special problem. 
Tropical Africa is obviously the core of the "colonial problem" proper; geographically, 
except for its Indian Ocean coast which is exposed to Asiatic penetration, it is 
relatively remote from special regional pressures; there can be no doubt of the 
necessity for the continuation of external guidance in some form for a continued 
period; and for all these reasons there would be a prospect of United States support 
and assistance being forthcoming. The Pacific echoes these characteristics in a 
minor key. 
35. In Africa (and the Pacific), the new strategy would impose two broad 
objectives:-
( a) to devise a means of tapping American resources in order to accelerate the 
pace of economic and social development, at the price of admitting some degree of 
United States influence in policy generally; 
(b) to accelerate the pace of political development, parallel with (a), by making 
maximum use of the small minority of educated Africans, at the price of some 
lowering in standards of administration. 
36. The first objective could be approached in various ways. A straight American 
Loan for colonies is unlikely. At the other extreme, assistance through the 
International Bank (another route to the same source) would probably be cumber-
some and open to various objections. The first essential would, of course, be vigorous 
presentation in the United States of the case for American "involvement" in Africa in 
the United States' own interests (the U.S. is already "involved" to a limited extent in 
the Pacific and Caribbean). Given this, the creation of the necessary machinery 
might best be approached regionally-the two existing Regional Commissions 
perhaps being used as experimental grounds before the introduction of the full 
principle to Africa. The first step would be to confer on these (or analogous) bodies 
financial powers, i.e. power of allocation and administration over a joint colonial 
development fund contributed by all the participating governments. This would of 
course imply "regionalising" our own C.D. and W. Fund and devolution of Treasury 
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control, which would appear desirable on other grounds too. The objective would be, 
through some such means, to draw not only on United States financial resources but 
also (perhaps equally important during the phase of U.K. recovery) on American 
equipment and technical manpower. The regional "governing body" would obviously 
exercise de facto large influence not only in its own field of economic and social 
development planning but also, indirectly, on the broader field of administration and 
policy generally (compare O.L.L.A [?OLAA] during the war, especially in small 
countries). It would be wiser, and perhaps more acceptable, to leave the exact scope 
of its powers and functions as judiciously vague as possible. We should aim at a 
regional agency broadly of the pattern of the Middle East Supply Centre in 1943/44. A 
necessary corollary would, of course, be to shift a considerable focus of U.K. control 
from Whitehall to a resident U.K. regional authority. 
37. We should attempt to carry the other colonial powers with us in this general 
line of approach, but should begin simply on an Anglo-American basis if they were 
unwilling to co-operate at the outset. 
38. In the internal political field, it would be impossible (and presumptuous) to 
go into details in this paper, but it is clear that the kind of proposals for rapid 
devolution of authority and constitutional reform at present being studied by the 
preparatory committee for the Conference of African Governors would need to be 
carried out rapidly and perhaps extended. An advisory body of Africans might also be 
directly associated with the organisation described in paragraph 36. 
39. The suggested new African regional organisation should not be set up 
actually through the machinery of the United Nations, since its functions would be 
considerably broader than those, for example, of the Economic Commissions for 
Europe and for Asia and the Far East recently set up by the Economic and Social 
Council. It should be made clear from the outset, however, that it was the intention, 
once the new organisation was satisfactorily established, for it to be brought into 
relationship with the United Nations. For this purpose the device of a "relationship 
agreement" with the United Nations as a whole (such as the Specialised Agencies are 
negotiating) should be used in preference to direct subordination to or absorption by 
one of the organs of the United Nations. The device of a carefully drawn up 
"relationship agreement" would preserve the proprieties while allowing the new 
organisation the maximum freedom of action. Similar treatment could be given to 
the existing Pacific and Caribbean Regional Commissions, if reorganised on the lines 
suggested. However, if these regional organisations set up subordinate technical 
bodies, primarily of local composition and functioning in the field of a particular 
Specialised Agency, those subordinate bodies should seek direct recognition as the 
regional branch of the appropriate Specialised Agency. To facilitate this, efforts 
should be made to persuade the U.K. itself to switch over from a "centralising" to a 
more "federalist" concept of the structure of Specialised Agencies. 
40. The very broad generalisations outlined above would, of course, take time to 
examine and work out, and very little could be available to show at the 1947 (or even 
perhaps the 1948) United Nations Assembly. Nevertheless it would be a natural 
corollary of adopting this course that we should abandon a "defensive" attitude about 
Chapter XI and seek instead to explain our objectives in the colonies fully, quoting as 
many concrete examples as the situation gradually permitted. On the one hand we 
could point to such cases as, for example, Ceylon and Burma. On the other, we might 
go over to the attack on Article 73(e) by enunciating the principle of "no 
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representation without taxation"-in the form of a carefully-designed trial balloon 
for the concept of international regional assistance to colonial economic and social 
development. These matters of Assembly tactics would, however, naturally have to be 
determined in the light of circumstances at the time, granted the basic principle that 
we were not going to attempt to remain purely on the defensive under Chapter XI. 
41. The suggestions outlined in this section are purely generalisations thrown 
out for discussion; no attempt has been made at this stage to present them in detail, 
nor to cover considerations arising from the defence and commercial interests of the 
U.K. 
175 CO 537/3151 23 Jan 1948 
[Prospects of Anglo-French economic collaboration in Africa]: minute 
by K E Robinson 
[This forceful minute was not entirely approved of by Cohen: he did not, he commented 
(27 Jan 1948), take such a gloomy view; and in any case ministers wanted the possibilities 
of Anglo-French co-operation in West Africa explored. Kenneth Robinson remained a 
persistent protester about the constant Foreign Office pressures to rush development 
schemes forward because the OEEC and the Americans wanted some concrete develop-
ment projects as soon as possible to ensure dollars and to support requests under the 
European Recovery Programme appropriation-e.g. 'I spoke strongly about the practical 
results of any attempt to rush the conference for political reasons' (CO 795/159/45500/48, 
minute, 14 July 1948)-this with reference to Central African transport (see 130, note). 
Robinson had been put in charge of a Working Party. The brief they drew up stressed that 
trade possibilities were limited by the fact that French and British territories were 
economically substantially similar. Though British planning was 'more centralised than a 
year ago', policy still aimed at setting up a series of development plans for colonies or 
regions rather than a masterplan for the colonial empire as a whole, conceived and 
administered from the centre in the French manner. But because of the need to increase 
the tempo of development ('for the sake of the peoples themselves and to provide more 
food and raw materials for the world at large'), expert assistance and general guidance to 
colonial governments in development planning was being greatly extended.] 
.. . I must confess that my examination of the various problems put on the agenda by 
the French has led me to a very complete agreement with the views expressed by 
Monsieur Peter1 about the merits of these items. My discussions with the French 
Embassy in London and even with Monsieur Monod2 of the French Foreign Office 
had already convinced me that those who had been responsible for the proposals for 
these talks had absolutely no conception of the problems involved, of the work 
already done under the arrangements previously made for Anglo-French collabora-
tion which have been pursued quite a bit, so far at any rate as West Africa is 
concerned, and were actuated wholly by political motives. I fear that there is very 
serious danger that these talks may even result in some deterioration in our relations 
with the French since I believe that if we are to be at all honest we shall have to admit 
that the scope for any additional co-operation in these fields is at best not very great 
and that the proper course to pursue is an intensification of the efforts which are 
already being made. 
2. M. Peter's comment on the 4th item, namely the integration of British and 
1 Director of economic affairs at the French Colonial Office. 
2 Guy Monod of the Mrica Section. 
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with a request which was calculated to involve discussion at the Assembly of 
political problems and which was designed to involve and embarrass and afford a 
platform for scurrilous misrepresentation at the United Nations. 
(b) Committee to examine information supplied. It is likely that a Committee will 
meet each year prior to the Assembly Meeting to examine the information received 
and comment on it; but the Resolution carried, although very near to the margin 
of the authority of the Charter, does safeguard our position. 
(c) Extension of trusteeship of colonies. A Resolution in favour of placing colonial 
territories under United Nations Trusteeship was carried in Committee Four and 
received a tie of votes in the Assembly. This would have been insufficient to carry it 
even on a bare majority. (Actually it was held that a two-thirds majority was 
required.) We opposed this Resolution because (i) as yet there was insufficient 
confidence and experience in the Trusteeship Council; (ii) the matter was entirely 
within the discretion of the Colonial Powers and was not required by the Charter; 
(iii) so far as British Colonies were concerned, the administration was similar to 
that in trust territories and the proposal retarded rather than helped the advance 
to self-government; (iv) Britain had obligations under treaty to the considerable 
part of the Colonial Empire composed of protected peoples and these obligations 
could not be transferred; (v) advance to self-government was a vital part of British 
policy; and (vi) such a step would be resented by the Colonial peoples themselves. 
9. Undoubtedly at United Nations meetings we shall continue to meet a great deal 
of prejudice, ignorance and hostile criticism. In general, however, it may be said that 
the atmosphere was considerably better this year than last. In no case (except the 
final vote on transmission of political information) was there an actual majority of 
the political votes against us, and in no case (except that mentioned) was there a 
margin of more than five votes against us. We must recognise that in these matters 
there is likely to be a "hard core" of inconvertible opponents-namely, the Slav bloc, 
India, and, probably for some time at least, the "coloured" nations (Afghanistan, 
Ethiopia, Haiti, Liberia, Pakistan, Philippines, Siam). The Arab group is apt to be 
capricious. In this Assembly their minds were occupied solely by Palestine and their 
votes were far more influenced by antagonism towards the United States over 
Palestine than by the merits of any case under discussion in the Fourth Committee. 
After the U.S.S.R. had also pronounced in favour of the U.N.S.C.O.P. majority report, 
the Arabs were less intractable on colonial and trusteeship matters. The majority of 
the Latin American States appear to be more sympathetic and it would be well worth 
while trying to educate them. The Argentine, Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay were staunch supporters and almost always 
voted with us. Cuba, Guatemala, Mexico and sometimes Panama were hostile. The 
rest of this group varied: their attitude seems due to ignorance more than hostility. 
The Western European Powers, Greece and Turkey, voted with us on almost every 
occasion. 
10. The fact that the United States have largely come round to our point of view 
in recent years, and the head-on clash between the Western democracies and the 
Soviet group, combined with the increasing indignation on all sides at Soviet 
obstructiveness in almost every aspect of United Nations work, has put us in a 
fortuitously favourable position. This, however, should not be regarded as necessarily 
permanent. The United States are at the present moment too pre-occupied with 
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communism to devote much time to "British imperialism." It is therefore most 
important to do everything we possibly can, while the present exceptional interna-
tional circumstances continue, to consolidate our position and win as much support 
as we can for our colonial policy. We can do much by positive measures and publicity 
to establish confidence among all but the inconvertibles. 
177 CO 537/3151, no 62 24 Mar 1948 
[The Anglo-French colonial talks, 17-20 Feb]: minute by SirS Caine 
... The following summary of the background and resolutions of the Conference 
may be useful. 
2. The general character of the talks was determined by the following:-
(a) They formed a continuation and pulling together of a number of previous 
formal and informal contacts on economic and associated technical matters. Such 
contacts were initiated in the early stages of the war and have been actively revived 
and extended from 1945 onwards. 
(b) We and the French Colonial authorities are inspired by the common objectives 
of developing the resources of our respective dependencies for the benefit of their 
inhabitants, whose standard of living will thereby be increased, and the rest of the 
world which may hope to secure by such development increased supplies of scarce 
commodities. 
(c) On a wider background the talks are related to the general movement towards 
a Western Union emphasised in recent talks between the Foreign Secretary and 
French Ministers, and to the specific organisation of the Western European 
countries in connection with the European Recovery Programme and American 
aid, it being recognised that the development of the Colonial dependencies can 
contribute to the establishment of Western European equilibrium and interna-
tional trade. With this in mind they were attended by the Commercial Minister, 
representing the British Embassy in Paris, and Mr H J B Lintott of the Board of 
Trade, on behalf of the Anglo-French Economic Committee. 
(d) Although the talks were confined to British and French representatives, it was 
fully recognised on both sides that similar close cooperation is needed between 
both countries and other powers having Colonies in Africa and indeed elsewhere. 
3. The actual achievements of these discussions are in one sense modest, but 
intensely practical. The following are principal points:-
(a) We reviewed all the practical issues ~rising in the area of common Anglo-
French interest in Africa covering the four British West African territories, French 
West Africa and French Equatorial Africa, in particular policy in the marketing of 
produce, communications, trade between the territories and coordination of 
development plans. 
(b) In all these fields agreement was reached on full and frank exchange of 
information between London and Paris and between the local authorities in Africa. 
(c) A number of practical issues were taken a stage further, e.g. in the discussion 
of the future supply of coal from Nigeria to French territories, of salt from the 
French to British territories, and in arrangements for further joint investigations 
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of such matters as the extension of the Sierra Leone Railway over the border into 
French Guinea, the survey of the River Niger, the development of meat production 
in Northern Nigeria and the French Cameroons, and joint action in fisheries. 
(d) Definite arrangements were made for detailed examination of our respective 
development programmes with a view to bringing to the notice of the two 
Governments any particular matters in which there was overlapping or in which 
gaps were left so that any necessary coordinating action can be considered. Such 
detailed examination of programmes has hitherto been impossible because we 
have been supplied with no detailed programmes on the French side, while our 
own programmes, which were reasonably complete so far as Government 
development schemes were concerned, did not adequately cover developments in 
the field of private business. Both these difficulties are now being remedied and an 
effective comparison of development programmes on each side will be possible in 
the future. 
4. What is the most important achievement and the most satisfactory feature of 
these and other conversations with the French is the establishment of really friendly 
relations. We believe these to be of much greater importance than the establishment 
of any kind of formal organ of liaison, and that we are on the way to establishing, in 
this field at any rate, the same kind of informalised but close arrangements for 
consultation and discussion as His Majesty's Government has with Dominion 
Governments. 
By common consent no move was made towards the establishment of any formal 
Anglo-French Colonial Committee or similar body, either as an independent organ 
or as some organ of the Anglo-French Economic Committee. Some of the difficulties 
in the way of the creation of any such formal body are:-
(a) Unless it included a number of African representatives, in which case it would 
cease to be administratively workable, it would arouse suspicions and criticisms of 
African opinion, which would suspect it of being a new mechanism of exploitation. 
Such suspicions exist on the French as much as on the British side, and have 
indeed recently been voiced in the Assembly of the French Union. 
(b) As already suggested, it is important that cooperation in these three spheres 
should not be exclusively Anglo-French, but should extend to other Colonial 
powers, e.g., the Portuguese and the Belgians. At present, however, it seems likely 
that better results will be obtained by informalised bi-lateral discussions than by 
the formation of any joint organisation between all four powers, which would not 
only excite to an even greater degree the suspicions of African opinion, but would 
almost certainly lead to requests for participation from other powers, including 
immediately the Union of South Africa and possibly the United States and even 
Soviet Russia. 
(c) In so far as practical cooperation and coordination of activities is needed 
between the Colonial powers in relation to supplies of equipment under the 
European Recovery Programme it seems preferable that cooperation should be 
organised under the aegis of the continuing organisation now envisaged between 
the Western European countries participating in the European Recovery 
Programme. 
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178 FO 371173038, no 5159 June 1948 
'Notes on international colonial co-operation': CO Information Dept 
memorandum no. 20. Annex: programme of conferences 
(1) Africa 
1. Soon after the close of the war in Europe Great Britain took steps to resume 
and extend the Anglo-French collaboration on technical matters of common concern 
to their respective territories in Africa which had begun in March 1940 and been 
interrupted by the war. In November 1945 there were conversations between officials 
of the two Colonial Offices, designed principally to ascertain which particular 
technical questions required a common approach, and how those questions could 
best be made the subject of co-operation between the two countries. Similar talks 
with the Belgians were held in June 1946, and in January 1947 the French and 
Belgians held discussions with one another on similar lines to those which both had 
previously held with Great Britain. 
2. These various bilateral conversations culminated in tripartite Anglo-French-
Belgian discussions held in Paris in May 1947, where a programme of technical 
conferences was agreed upon designed to take us up to 1950. A copy of this 
programme is annexed. Although the initiative in drawing up the programme was 
taken by the United Kingdom, France and Belgium, the Conferences are in no way 
exclusive. Thus in December 1947 discussions were held in London with representa-
tives of the Portuguese Colonial Office to discuss the participation of Portugal in the 
series of technical Conferences in Africa and at the same time to establish liaison 
between the two Colonial Offices. Most of the Conferences will be attended by 
representatives from South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese Colonies, 
whilst some may be attended also by representatives of other countries. 
3. Prior to the drawing up of this programme, however, three International 
Colonial Conferences had been held in Africa as a result of the bilateral Anglo-French 
discussions. These were:-
(a) A Medical Conference held at Accra in 1946, attended by representatives from 
the British and French Colonies in West Africa, Portuguese Guinea, the Belgian 
Congo and Liberia. At this Conference a common service was initiated for the joint 
use of anatomopathological laboratories. Information was exchanged on the 
creation of medical schools for Africans, the training of African nurses, and a 
comparison of the status of British and French African doctors. The Lagos 
Agreement of 1943 for the control of infectious diseases was extended. Joint action 
by medical teams along international frontiers was decided upon, and arrange-
ments were made for the joint preparation and distribution of vaccines. 
(b) A Veterinary Conference held at Dakar in May, 1946, attended by representa-
tives of the Veterinary Departments in British and French West Africa. A study was 
made of plans for a joint effort in combating animal diseases, and as a result there 
now exists close liaison between the British and French Veterinary Departments. 
(c) A Communications Conference held at Dakar in May, 1947, attended by 
representatives from the United Kingdom and France as well as from their West 
African Colonies. The Conference drew up a list of inter-territorial projects for 
improving communications between the British and French Colonies in West 
2C 
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Africa. Work has begun on some of these schemes and closer telecommunication 
links have also been established as a result of this conference. 
4. The first five Conferences foreseen in the attached programme of Conferences 
have already been held, namely:-
(a) A preliminary meeting of United Kingdom, French and Belgian educational 
experts in London in June, 1947. There was a general exchange of views and 
information on African education problems, and in particular on the problems of 
mass education, preparatory to the UNESCO conference at Mexico City. 
(b) A tripartite Conference of Nutrition experts in Paris in December 1947. There 
was an exchange of information on the results of research into nutritional 
problems in Africa, and agreement was reached on measures to raise the physical 
wellbeing of the African. Some preparatory work for a nutrition Conference to be 
held in Africa in 1949 was also done. 
(c) A meeting in Brussels in December 1947 of United Kingdom, French, Belgian, 
South African and Portuguese experts. The Conference discussed steps to control 
plant diseases in Africa, forestry nomenclature and the introduction of a unified 
system of trade names so as to facilitate the marketing of African forest products, 
and plans for a Conference on soil usage to be held in Africa in 1948. 
(d) In February, 1948, a Trypanosomiasis Conference took place at Brazzaville, 
French Equatorial Africa, attended by United Kingdom, French, Belgian, South 
African, Southern Rhodesian and Portuguese representatives from almost every 
territory in Africa south of the Sahara. The evidence for effective control of the 
disease by the different methods employed in the various countries was analysed 
and recorded. Arrangements were made for the mapping of Africa to show the 
incidence of the disease and of the tsetse fly (the principal vector); for the rapid 
exchange of information between workers in the field by means of a Bureau 
established at Brazzaville-Leopoldville; and for co-ordination and guidance of 
future entomological and protozoological research by an International Scientific 
Committee. 
(e) A Labour Conference, attended by some 40 delegates and observers, African 
and European, from all the British, French and Belgian Colonies in Africa as well 
as from the respective Metropolitan countries, was held in Nigeria at the end of 
February. The discussions of the Conference showed that there was a similar trend 
in labour policy in all territories. In particular, the constructive role to be played 
by the African Trade Union movement when wholly representative of workers' 
interests was recognised. Amongst the recommendations adopted were those on 
the desirability of extending voluntary systems of collective bargaining, on general 
conditions of work and especially on wages, and the necessity of improving present 
systems of social security. A further Conference is to be held in 1950. 
5. An Anglo-French meeting to discuss the possibilities of Anglo-French econo-
mic co-operation in the Colonial sphere (and particularly West Africa) was held in 
Paris from February 17th to 20th, 1948, when the following subjects were 
discussed:-
( a) Price and Marketing policy. 
(b) Communications and Ports. 
(c) Inter-Colonial trade. 
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(d) Co-ordination of production plans. 
6. The primary and over-riding object of this co-operation has of course been 
throughout and remains the promotion of the interests of the Colonial territories 
themselves and of their inhabitants: it is in no sense a concerted effort on the part of 
the metropolitan countries to exploit Colonial territories in their own interests, or to 
use them as pawns in a game of power politics. Whilst this co-operation is not a new 
development arising out of the Brussels Treaty, it clearly fits into the picture of 
Western Union very readily. 
In this context the interests of the Colonial territories and of the metropolitan 
countries are complementary to each other. If it is true that the development of 
Africa will strengthen the world position of the Western European countries, it is 
equally true that it is in the interest of the Colonial territories themselves that the 
Western European countries should regain their strength and maintain their 
independent existence. Nor do we doubt that the part which Colonial territories and 
peoples are themselves called upon to play in achieving this end and the opportuni-
ties that will occur in the course of its accomplishment will be to their lasting 
benefit. 
It is thus a practical means of implementing the declaration embodied in Chapter 
XI of the United Nations Charter; in particular, this co-operation between members 
of the United Nations with colonial responsibilities is enjoined upon them by Article 
73(d), as a means of promoting constructive measures of development. 
(2) Caribbean 
7. In the Caribbean a more formal system of collaboration has been established 
between the countries with responsibilities for non-self-governing territories in that 
area. Starting during the war as a purely Anglo-American arrangement it has since 
been expanded to include France and the Netherlands as well as the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America. The Caribbean Commission is an advisory body 
dealing largely with social and economic matters and research. It is in no sense a 
super-Government, the executive authority remaining with the Governments of the 
members of the Commission and the Colonial Governments concerned. Periodical 
conferences are arranged under the aegis of the Commission at wl!ich representa-
tives from all the territorial Governments take part. 
(3) South Pacific 
8. A regional Commission similar to that for the Caribbean has also been drawn 
up for the South Pacific, the members being Australia, France, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The Commission 
held its first meeting in Sydney on the 11th May, 1948 when it gave consideration to 
a number of matters of fundamental importance in connection with the establish-
ment of its organisation. 
(4) The Far East 
9. Collaboration between Governments in the Far East and South East Asia has 
perforce taken a different form from that evolved by the Colonial powers in Africa. 
The peoples of the Colonial territories in South East Asia are better able than those of 
Africa to take part themselves in the discussion of problems common to two or more 
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of their countries. Again, the number of Sovereign States in the area is large, and 
since the war there have been disturbed conditions, and at times rival governments, 
in Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies. 
10. At the conclusion of hostilities with Japan the Supreme Allied Commander, 
South East Asia exercised wide co-ordinating powers over much of the area. It was 
clear that with the restoration of civil government and the end of the Supreme Allied 
Command some co-ordinating authority should continue to operate in South East 
Asia. As part of the constitutional changes planned for the British territories His 
Majesty's Government had decided on the appointment of a Governor-General with 
wide co-ordinating functions whose area of authority would include the Malayan and 
Borneo territories, and Mr. Malcolm MacDonald was appointed Governor-General in 
May 1946. Earlier that year His Majesty's Government appointed a Special Commis-
sioner in South East Asia (Lord Kiiiearn) who, besides being responsible for advising 
His Majesty's Government on problems of foreign affairs in the area, and taking an 
active part in striving for a settlement of the hostilities in Indonesia, was charged 
with a special responsibility for the food supply in South East Asia and for certain 
allied matters. On the 1st of May 1948 the posts of Governor-General and Special 
Commissioner in South East Asia were amalgamated under Mr. MacDonald, with the 
title of Commissioner-General for the United Kingdom in South East Asia, but their 
previous functions have continued unchanged. The Commissioner-General wiii thus 
continue to co-ordinate policy and administration in the British territories in South 
East Asia (the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei). 
He has no direct executive functions, and his staff is small. In discharging these 
duties he wiii continue to be responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
11. In carrying on the duties of the Special Commissioner, the Commissioner-
General wiii be responsible to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The main 
field for international collaboration with which he wiii be concerned covers 
economic affairs. The economic organisation which the Special Commissioner had 
built up consists of a monthly Liaison Officers' meeting, and of an Economic 
Department of Administrative and Advisory staff. At the monthly meetings the 
following territories are represented-Burma, Siam, Ceylon, Federation of Malaya, 
French Indo-China, Hong Kong, India, Netherlands East Indies, North Borneo, 
Sarawak and Singapore, while observers represent the Governments of China, the 
Philippines and the United States of America. They reach agreement on the 
break-down of the rice allocation made twice yearly at Washington by the Interna-
tional Emergency Food Council of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations into monthly shipping programmes, by assessing the availability of 
rice from South East Asia sources, which is distributed among the claimant 
territories in proportion to their allocations. 
12. In agreement with other agencies concerned, the Commissioner-General's 
Economic Organisation also undertakes the allocation of coal to deficit areas in 
South East Asia, and in the Liaison Officers' meeting makes recommendations on the 
allocation of edible oils. 
13. As part of the campaign to produce more food in South East Asia and 
rationalise its distribution a series of Conferences have been sponsored by the 
Economic Organisation. A preliminary Food Conference was held from the 26th 
March to the 28th March 1946, followed by conferences on food (15th April to 17th 
April 1946), nutrition (13th May to 18th May 1946), fisheries (6th January to 8th 
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January 1947), social welfare (23rd August to 26th August 1947), and statistics (27th 
January to 30th January 1948). In addition specialist advisers have visited foreign 
countries in the area, at the invitation of their governments. 
Annex to 178 
Subjects 
1. Preliminary meeting of educational experts (before the UNESCO Conference at 
Mexico) having among its objects the study of mass education. 
2. Meeting of experts on (a) forestry nomenclature (b) phytosanitary legislation. 
Preparatory meeting on soil usage Conference (see 6 below). 
3. Meeting of experts on Nutrition, preliminary to a Conference in Africa. 
4. Conference of Labour Officers in Africa. Agenda to be determined by exchange 
of correspondence between advisers of the three Ministers. 
5. Conference on Tsetse Fly and Trypanosomiasis, including Insecticides. Study 
of the problem from the preventive aspect. 
6. Conference on Soil usage having for its object (a) study of soil conservation in 
relation to indigenous agriculture, with a view to putting into effect the scientific 
conclusions of the Yangambi Conference, (b) study of questions justifying other 
conferences of the same type (for example plant cultivation, grazing and savannah 
problems). 
7. Meeting of experts preparatory to Conference in Africa to study indigenous 
rural economy. 
8. Rinderpest. 
9. Nutrition Conference in Africa. 
10. Medical Conference as indicated by the Accra conclusions. 
11. Conference in Africa on Indigenous Rural Economy. 
12. Conference on African medical education. 
179 FO 371173038, no 5307 26June 1948 
'International study conference on overseas territories of Western 
Europe', Amsterdam, 9-12 June: despatch from BE F Gage (The 
Hague) to Mr Bevin. Annex: report by S Wright [Extract] 
I have the honour to enclose a report on the International Study Conference on 
Overseas Territories of Western Europe, which took place in Amsterdam from July 
[sic] 9th to 12th, written by Mr. Wright, the Press Officer in Amsterdam, who 
attended the conference at my request. 
2. In accordance with the instructions contained in Western Department's letter 
Z4091139/72 of May 24th, every unofficial assistance was afforded to members of the 
British delegation, whom I also entertained informally (together with some members 
of the other delegations) while they were here in order that they might have some 
contact with Netherlands officials. 
3. As is apparent from the enclosed report, no specific resolutions or recom-
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mendations emerged from the conference, owing to its unofficial nature and to the 
preliminary character of its studies. It is however probable that more specific 
conclusions will be reached at the second meeting, which the Portuguese delegation 
took the initiative in suggesting should be held in Lisbon next year. 
4. It was noteworthy that in all fields of general colonial policy, both short-term 
and long-term, there was a considerable measure of agreement between the 
delegations of the five powers represented at the conference. The trend towards self 
government, in which British colonial policy has distinctly played the leading part, 
although not accepted as the ultimate aim by all the other delegations, did not 
arouse the hostility which one might have anticipated in view 'Of the serious 
difficulties being experienced in their colonies by some, notably the Netherlands and 
France. That there should be a steadily increasing measure of self government in 
colonial dependencies was common ground. The Conference did, however, reach the 
almost unanimous conclusion that no colonial territory should be allowed to secede 
from the form of union in which it had its place, if such secession would endanger 
the security of that union as a whole. 
5. Where differences emerged was principally in relation to the future action to 
be taken by the conference itself. As so often in the case of meetings of unofficial 
representatives, there was a sharp distinction between those who wished to tackle 
forthwith every kind of colonial problem, and those who felt that the conference 
could successfully undertake the study of only a limited number of questions. The 
former school of thought urged that, between now and the meeting in Lisbon, there 
should be numerous and regular meetings of small bodies of experts who would seek 
to get action taken on a number of technical questions of common interest to 
colonial powers. It seems however probable that, due to administrative and financial 
considerations if to nothing else, no very ambitious programme will be possible. The 
two sponsoring organisations of the conference, namely the British Society for 
International Understanding and the Netherlands Allied Circle, have no funds with 
which to finance any extensive operations, nor the necessary personnel; nor, I believe 
have any of the existing bodies concerned with the relations between European 
countries and their colonial dependencies. The same difficulties seem likely to 
prevent the fulfilment of the proposal that "publicity machinery" should be created 
to spread enlightenment on colonial questions .... 
Annex to 179 
1. The Conference was held in the Indisch Instituut in Amsterdam between the 
9th and 12th June. It was organised by The British Society for International 
Understanding in conjunction with the Allied Circle in the Netherlands, Amsterdam 
Branch. Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom were 
represented by unofficial delegations (see Annex "A"). The 6 "official" United 
Kingdom delgates (including the Secretary Mr. Sebastian) were accompanied by 
about 35 "unofficial" British representatives .... 
Colonial aims and policies 
8. All delegates agreed that the general aim of their colonial policy was to 
improve and extend the economic and industrial life in the Overseas Territories and 
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so to raise the standard of living. There were, however, widely divergent views as to 
the ultimate aim. 
9. The Portuguese delegation most emphatically stressed that their Govern-
ment's policy was definitely opposed to granting any form of self-government to the 
Overseas Territories. Commodore Alves explained that for centuries they had worked 
for progressive assimilation of the natives. They wanted them to become, in religion, 
language and habits, Portuguese citizens with equal rights, and with equal duties. 
The British and French delegates suggested in discussion that the results of this 
policy had not been as successful as Commodore Alves would like his audience to 
believe, but Mr. Tracy Philips praised Portuguese colonial policy, and it was evident 
that other delegates did not want to antagonise Portugal by going too deeply into 
details. 
10. Professor Marzorati, the Belgian delegate, made it clear that the Belgian 
Government does not intend to grant self-government to the Congo for some time to 
come: only when people had learned to direct their material affairs would they be 
able to govern themselves, and "this does not present an immediate problem for it is 
likely to take a very long time before they reach that stage." But the Belgians were 
not in favour of absorbing the natives of the Congo in the Belgian state, since a great 
deal of work would be necessary "to create amongst the natives a class of men able to 
fill responsible posts in the administration". 
11. The French, Dutch and British, although varying in degree, saw it as the task 
of the European powers to prepare and educate the native peoples towards 
shouldering their own responsibilities. 
12. The French explained that in their present Union various methods of 
government and of education are being applied. Some territories belong to the 
Metropolitan area. Methods of assimilation have been applied in the West Indies, 
Equatorial Africa and Madagascar. In the protectorates and other areas the French 
had made no attempts to change either the habits or the religion of the indigenous 
peoples. 
13. The Dutch delegation explained that the Netherlands Government was trying 
to find a formula whereby all the peoples of the Kingdom would maintain a close 
relationship with each other. While prepared to accept Western democratic forms of 
Government the Dutch did not intend to change the religion or the cultural 
character of the peoples under their care. 
14. Sir Angus Gillan stated that His Majesty's Government were educating the 
native peoples for self-government by giving them a sense of responsibility while at 
the same time taking measures for establishing economic stability in the territory. 
"It is obviously a contradiction in terms to grant independence without self-
sufficiency." He also argued that it was impossible to stop half-way, once the 
educational process had started; in the process of granting self-government it was 
safer to move a little too fast than to move a little too slowly. 
15. This statement was contested by other delegates, especially by the Dutch 
delegate, M. Meijer Ranneft, and by Captain Gammans. But there were also French 
and British delegates who considered that Burma would still be within the Empire if 
Britain had moved fast enough. 
The future of colonial empires 
16. All delegates agreed that the links between Europe and the Overseas 
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Territories should not be severed, although the necessity for reforms was apparent to 
many. All agreed that economic disaster would follow the complete loosening of the 
ties between Europe and the European dependencies. This was clearly expressed by 
Captain Gammans when he discussed Dutch Colonial policy in Indonesia in private 
session. "The Dutch are in a dilemma. They realise that without the Netherlands East 
Indies the economy of the mother country would suffer, or worse, would collapse. 
But it is clearly true without the Dutch in Indonesia the economies in Java and 
Sumatra would soon collapse." The necessity for continued European influence and 
capital in the Overseas territories was not challenged, but widely different views were 
held on the future form of the Empires. 
17. On this question there were two schools of thought: (a) those who regretted 
the nationalist trends because they came too early, but were prepared to face 
realities, and (b) those inclined to brake the nationalist impetus, to maintain the 
links of dependency, but to allow a greater measure of home rule. 
18. Sir Angus Gillan made himself the spokesman of the first school: "It is 
perhaps unfortunate that nationalist trends under the stress of war have been 
expedited to the detriment of economic development under Western tutelage. But we 
have to take things as they are. It is impossible to put the clock back. If we educate 
people we have to go forward. We cannot stop, for if we stop, those elements whom 
we have prepared for administrative responsibilities will develop into unemployed 
intellectuals. They will most likely become self-appointed politicians, liable to create 
grave trouble." 
19. Mr. Meijer Ranneft, on the other hand, firmly believed that by granting 
independence Britain would virtually liquidate her Empire. He furthermore doubted 
whether the nationalist governments would look after the welfare of the natives as 
adequately as the British administration. He argued that Western democracy would 
not work in Asia, and warned delegates that "although you grant freedom to the 
Asiatic peoples, the hatred against you will become stronger"; Asiatics would 
invariably follow the stronger power, and would see in the loosening of ties signs of 
weakness .... 
23. Captain Gammans did not believe that any European nation could retain its 
empire if it had lost the will to keep its Empire; maintaining colonial power was 
impossible when the mother country was politically weak and economically un-
balanced. 
24. Mr. Ivor Thomas failed to see how the European powers could retain the 
colonies against their will. He felt convinced that attempts to oppress the national 
desire would lead to disaster. He wanted to propose Ceylon as the model of what 
ought to be European action. The United Kingdom had not waited until trouble had 
broken out before taking the initiative. The European powers should be one step 
ahead of, rather than behind, events. He agreed that those areas necessary for 
imperial defence should be retained in the Empire, but with the greatest measure of 
home rule .... 
ANNEX A 
Portugal 
M. Lopes Alves, formerly Governor of Angola. 
M.J. Bacellar Bebiano-G.B.E. Engl. A.R.S.M., formerly Minister of Colonies, 
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Chairman of the "Junta das Missoes Geograficas e de Investigacoes Coloniasis" in the 
Ministry for Colonies. 
M. Sales Lane-Eng. A.R.S.M., Director of Colonial Enterprises. 
M.A. Quintela Saldanha-Vice-Governor of the Bank of Angola. 
Netherlands 
M.A.G. Aukes-Secretary of the Africa Institute; Head of the Netherlands Goodwill 
Mission to Ethiopia; Member of the Royal Central-Asian Society. 
Dr. J. W. Meijer Ranneft-formerly Vice-President of the Council of India and 
Chairman of People's Council; Member of the Privy Council. 
Dr. Bemard H.M. Vlekke-Head of the Scientific Department of the Netherlands 
Institute for International Affairs. 
Prof. Dr. E. de Vries-Head of the Economic Department of the Ministry of Overseas 
Territories and Professor at the Agricultural University, Wageningen. 
France 
M. Deschamps-Gouverneur des Colonies, Secretaire du Comite de I'Empire 
Fran<;ais, Ex-Gouverneur du Senegal et de la Cote d'Ivoire. 
M.P.M. Henri-Administrateur des Colonies, Charge a la Direction Politique de la 
mise en oeuvre de la Collaboration Coloniale lnterafricaine. 
Belgium 
Prof. A. Marzorati- Member of the Belgian Colonial Council; formerly Governor of 
the Ruanda-Urundi. · 
United Kingdom 
Captain David Gammans, M.P.-formerly Member of the Malayan Civil Service. 
Sir Angus Gillan, K.B.E., C.M.G.,-Controller of the Empire Division of the British 
Council, formerly Civil Secretary of the Sudan Government. 
Mr. Tracy Philips-Member of the Institut Colonial International. 
Sir Thomas Southom, K.C.M.G., K.B.E.,-Chairman of the British Delegation 
Colonial Service Liaison Officer during the war; formerly Member of the Executive 
Council of Ceylon and Colonial Secretary of Hong Kong; Governor of the Gambia 
1936-42. 
Mr. Ivor Thomas, M.P.-Under Secretary of State for the Colonies 1946-47. 
180 FO 371/73039, no 5989 [9 Aug 1948] 
[Collaboration with the French in Africa]: despatch from Mr Creech 
Jones to all West African governors (draft) [Extract] 
I have etc. to address you on the future work of Anglo-French co-operation in West 
Africa. The programme of collaboration with the French has made great progress 
during the past three years. Close contact both in London and Paris and in West 
Africa has been established in all the more important technical fields. This contact 
has now been extended to the economic field. Finally in discussions held in Paris 
during June agreement has been reached for the exchange of information in the 
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political and constitutional fields. I forward herewith a copy1 of the agreed 
conclusions of the Paris talks, which were attended on the British side by Mr. A.H. 
Poynton, Mr. A.B. Cohen and Mr. W.B.L. Monson, the Chief Secretary of the West 
African Council, who had during the previous week discussed the whole subject with 
the West African Governors at Lagos and was able to present their views. It is the 
political aspect of Anglo-French co-operation which forms the subject of this 
despatch and it may be useful if I start by stating briefly the reasons why this 
co-operation in the political field is regarded as important by the French and British 
Governments. I do so not because I believe that its importance needs any emphasis 
with Governors, but because I am anxious to put my views on record for the 
information of the Service generally. 
2. As was recognised in the recent talks in Paris, the British and French West 
African Territories have many common characteristics and the links between them 
are increasing. These natural links, as well as the increasingly close ties binding the 
two countries in Europe, make it certain that the British and French territories in 
West Africa will not be able to develop in isolation from each other; indeed as 
political evolution proceeds the contacts between them are bound to become 
increasingly numerous. Developments in French or British territory, as the case may 
be, and the actions of the British or French administrations will have an increasing 
influence on the course of events on the other side of the frontier. Both Governments 
aim at the ultimate self-government of the West African Territories in close 
association with Western Europe. It is important, therefore, that the political and 
human problems of West Africa should be viewed as a whole. 
3. Although the ultimate objective both of French and British policy is broadly 
the same, both Governments recognise that the methods of approach in constitu-
tional development are at present different. The two Governments are not seeking, at 
any rate at the present stage, to arrive at a common policy in the political and 
constitutional sphere. Both Governments believe, however, that there is everything 
to be gained from a much fuller exchange of information in these matters leading to 
a closer understanding by both Governments and by French and British officers 
working on West African affairs of the problems in each set of territories and the 
actions being taken by the two governments to deal with them. By close and 
continuous association over the past three years a feeling of confidence arid 
understanding has been built up between the Colonial Office and the Ministere de la 
France d'Outre Mer. The same process has begun in West Africa itself and if it can be 
carried forward in the spirit in which it has been started, and above all if it is based on 
an increasing knowledge of the state of affairs on the other side of the frontier, we 
can hope to achieve not only sympathy with each other's ideas, but a practical system 
of co-operation which cannot fail to be of lasting value to the people of West Africa. 
We are not aiming at an arrangement under which the two Governments would be 
under any obligation to consult each other in advance about measures in the political 
and constitutional field. Since, however, we do recognise that the actions of each 
Government are likely to have their effect across the frontier, this effect should be 
one of the factors to be considered in the formation of policy. In other words what is 
required is something less than consultation and something more than the mere 
exchange of information. This mutual understanding can only be achieved on the 
1 Not printed. 
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basis of real knowledge of the problems facing each Government; it follows therefore 
that steps must be taken to make this knowledge available. The policy of close 
co-operation which the two Governments envisage is fully in accordance with the 
spirit of the Treaties of Dunkirk and Brussels; but it is important that all officers 
working in West Africa should regard the establishment and maintenance of 
Anglo-French contacts not as something imposed upon them by the home Govern-
ments for wider political reasons, but as an indispensable part of their own work 
without which the administration of West Africa cannot in the long run be 
completely successful. 
4. I have already referred briefly to the progress made in the last three years in 
Anglo-French co-operation. In West Africa successful conferences have been held in 
the fields of health, communications, veterinary services, tsetse and trypano-
somiasis, and labour. Following on the meeting in London last November between 
certain of the present West African Governors and the Direction des Affaires 
Politiques of the Ministere de la France d'Outre Mer, personal contacts have already 
been made by the Governors of Nigeria, the Gold Coast, and the Gambia with their 
French colleagues. The Standing Consultative Commission for Togoland Affairs has 
been established under the chairmanship of the Governor of the Gold Coast and the 
Commissaire de la Republique of Togoland under French administration, and the 
first meeting has been successfully held at Lome. All these steps are of much value 
and I take the opportunity of expressing my appreciation of them. 
5. It is generally agreed by Governors that if the policy of co-operation is to be 
fully successful, much closer contacts must be established between individual 
officers, both administrative and technical and both officers at headquarters and in 
the field. Friendly contacts are already maintained between frontier districts. I am 
anxious that steps should be taken to extend these contacts and to provide for 
frequent visits between British and French officers as opportunities permit and for 
the full exchange of information on the problems and policies of the British or 
French authorities as the case may be. As soon as staff conditions make this possible I 
believe that there will be much to be gained by the exchange of visits for rather 
longer periods extending to several weeks in the course of which individual officers 
specialising in particular subjects can study the methods of the other administration; 
such longer visits are recommended in paragraph VIII of the paper agreed in the 
Paris talks on methods of execution. I am also fully in agreement with the 
recommendation made in Paris in paragraph VI of the same paper that meetings 
between officers of neighbouring territories should not be regarded simply as 
courtesy visits, but as forming part of the general programme of co-operation. I do 
not want in any way to minimise the value of social contacts; but I hope that as many 
opportunities as possible can be taken for the exchange of information and ideas. 
6. The Paris meeting laid special emphasis on the importance of associating 
representative Africans with the programme of Anglo-French co-operation. Gov-
ernors will certainly agree with my view that unless means of bringing Africans 
closely into the programme can be found, the whole policy is bound to fail. Africans 
have already played a part in some of the international conferences held in West 
Africa; they undoubtedly have an increasing part to play. I am anxious that 
Governments should consider how best the association of Africans with the 
programme can be arranged, either by participation in international meetings or, as 
recommended in paragraph VIII of the Paris paper, by exchanges of visits between 
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members of territorial and municipal assemblies or other public bodies. I suggest 
also that Public Relations Departments should be asked to give attention to the best 
means of bringing home to the general public the importance of close contact and 
co-operation between the British and French territories. There may be a tendency in 
quarters critical of Government policy to represent the programme as designed 
primarily to safeguard the interests of France and the United Kingdom. It is essential 
to make the West African public realise that they themselves have much to gain by 
closer understanding both by the administrations and the people in British and 
French territories .... 
181 CAB 129/32/2, CP(49)24 7 Feb 1949. 
'United Nations: non-self-governing territories and trusteeship': 
Cabinet memorandum by Mr Creech Jones 
I annex, 1 for the information of my colleagues, a report on the work of the first part 
of the United Nations Third General Assembly in respect of:-
( a) Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories (Chapter XI of the Charter). 
(b) Trusteeship (Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter). 
2. Regarding (a), the United Nations has now realised that the United Kingdom is 
not to be shaken from its refusal to agree to a widening of the Charter so as to permit 
that body either to exercise supervision over the administration of the Colonial 
territories or to discuss the political and constitutional affairs of the Colonies. There 
was considerably less pressure in this direction than at either of the two previous 
sessions of the General Assembly. 
3. As regards trusteeship the situation is less satisfactory. As the report shows, 
there was a serious deterioration in the atmosphere of the Trusteeship Council at its 
Third Session following on the decision of the U.S.S.R. to take up their seat on the 
Council. Thus, in the Report of the Trusteeship Council to the General Assembly, 
prejudice and ignorance of conditions in trust territories combined to produce a 
series of superficial, largely platitudinous and for the most part impracticable 
recommendations. The conduct of the Council's discussions was such as to damage 
its reputation as a serious organ of the United Nations, and to transform it into a 
forum for largely ignorant and often malicious criticism of the Administering 
Authorities, serving ends of political propaganda rather than the interests of the 
inhabitants of trust territories. The bitterness of the debates in the Trusteeship 
Council was also reflected in the discussions on trusteeship matters in the Fourth 
Committee of the United Nations, where the atmosphere during the debates on 
information on Non-Self-Governing Territories had been, on the whole, friendly and 
composed. 
4. The Trusteeship Council has wider powers than those possessed by the 
Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, and if it continues to act 
as it did at its Third Session it can hardly fail, through the effect of its debates and 
recommendations on sections of the local populations, to become a source of 
1 Not printed. 
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embarrassment to the Administering Authorities in their task of governing and 
developing their trust territories. I am much concerned therefore that our policy 
towards the Trusteeship Council and the United Nations on trusteeship matters 
should be such as to minimise these injurious effects. 
5. We must obviously continue to carry out to the best of our ability our 
obligations towards the Trusteeship Council under the Charter of the Trusteeship 
Agreements, and to co-operate with the Trusteeship Council to the full in the 
discharge of its legitimate functions. But this will not prevent some of the 
non-Administering Members from regarding the United Kingdom as an obstacle to 
Colonial progress. As the principal Administering Authority of trust territories, we 
have consistently refused to agree to any extension of the powers of the Trusteeship 
Council inconsistent with the terms of the Charter and the Trusteeship Agreements 
and our own duties and responsibilities as an Administering Authority. We cannot, 
for instance, agree to the principle of prior consultation with the Trusteeship 
Council without making the task of administration an impossible one, and prejudic-
ing our plans for the future development of our trust territories, and particularly for 
the future organisation of East Africa. 
6. It seems necessary to isolate the Soviet representative in the Trusteeship 
Council and to expose the real motives behind the Soviet Government, the 
absurdities and inaccuracies of their attacks, and the conditions in the Soviet Union 
and satellite countries. The Americans should also assist in this. There are other 
non-Administering Members whose doctrinaire and ill-informed criticism is some-
times as harmful as the malicious Soviet propaganda. We should maintain as patient 
and conciliatory an attitude towards them as possible, but at the same time refuse to 
accept compromises that are unreal or result in dangerous conclusions. So far as 
possible our spokesmen should move forward from the defensive and seize the 
opportunity to proclaim and stress before world opinion those positive achievements 
in the advancement of dependent peoples, particularly in recent years, of which we 
have good reason to be proud. 
7. As regards the Administering Authorities, there is nearly always identity of 
views between the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and Australia. Our collabora-
tion with the French and Belgians has been useful and a number of exchanges of 
views have taken place with fruitful results. The attitude of New ·Zealand is less 
helpful and I have recently discussed our policy with Mr. Fraser, who now 
understands our position. So far as other members of the Commonwealth are 
concerned, we are also often at variance with India and, to a lesser degree, Pakistan 
in the Fourth Committee and General Assembly. 
8. The attitude of the United States is of importance, as experience in the 
Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee has shown that, when the United 
Kingdom and the United States are agreed on a line of action and are determined to 
see it through, their combined influence can usually prevent any other solution from 
obtaining a two-thirds majority. The United States do not always see eye to eye with 
us, though recently there has been a steady adjustment of their views to ours. We 
must continue our efforts to secure United States collaboration or at least to prevent 
them from seeking compromise solutions on questions of principle which could 
prejudice our position in our trust territories. 
2 P Fraser, prime minister of New Zealand and minister for external affairs, 1940-1949. 
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9. The United Kingdom has been well served by Sir Alan Burns3 on the 
Trusteeship Council and the appointment of Mr. Grantley Adams5 of Barbados to the 
United Nations Delegation was a successful experiment. The Fourth Session of the 
Trusteeship Council opened on 24th January and promises to be a stormy session. I 
am convinced that the principal Administering Authorities should continue to 
maintain a firm line, for only in this way will they be able to make the Trusteeship 
Council a more workable body, or at least prevent it from prejudicing the 
administration and development of the trust territories. 
3 Permanent UK representative on UN Trusteeship Council, 1947-1956; formerly gov of Gold Coast, 
1941-1947. 
4 G H Adams, member of Executive Council, Barbados; subsequently premier of Barbados, 1954-1958, and 
prime minister of the West Indies, 195~1962. , 
182 CO 537/4611 2 Mar 1949 
[Mrica]: Closer co-ordination of Anglo-French policies in Africa: 
minute by A B Cohen 
[This paper by Cohen was welcomed by Martin as a more positive approach to 
Anglo-French co-operation, and it was initialled by Sir H Poynton (3 Mar 1949). Sir T 
Lloyd agreed that political co-ordination should be made more effective-for foreign 
policy as well as colonial reasons (minute, 12 May 1949). AN Galsworthy reported that 
the secretary of state agreed they should talk to the French about this, but not allow the 
French to feel Britain was out to make them fall into line. In Galsworthy's opinion any 
co-ordination would probably bring France closer to British conceptions than vice versa.) 
I am sure that we ought to be taking stock of our policy of Anglo-French-Belgian, 
etc. co-operation in Africa and of the machinery for carrying out this policy. I am 
particularly sorry to raise this matter at a time when Mr. Galsworthy is on leave, but I 
did have an opportunity of discussing some aspects of it briefly with him and in what 
I say have taken his views into account. I think that he is generally in sympathy with 
my comments on the machinery side. 
We have opposite in these files a series of expressions of view from the French side 
that a much closer co-ordination between ourselves and the French is required in the 
political sphere. M. Laurentie1 said so in No. 1 on the 1948 file. M. Henri2 said so in 
No. 2 on this file. Now both M. Laurentie and M. Garreau3 have said so (Nos. 3 and 4 
on this file). This has again been said at Dakar (see extract from my West African 
report which I am about to submit at No. 5). 
We thus have the French representations at Lake Success, a representative of 
French opinion in Paris and the authorities in Dakar all pressing for closer 
co-ordination-so far we have no official expression of opinion from the Ministere de 
la France d'Outre Mer. The reason for this expression of view is quite easy to see-the 
French are insecure about their future in West Africa. They are frightened that 
international criticism and pressure will drive a wedge between us and them and they 
1 See 173, note 2. 2 See Annex to 179, annex A. 
3 R Garreau, permanent member of French delegation to UN, 1947; president of Trusteeship Council, 
1949-1950. 
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know that they with their centralising policy have more to lose from such pressure 
than we with our decentralising policy. 
I am myself becoming more and more convinced that we cannot go on in West 
Africa with programmes of constitutional development which ignore the great 
differences between ourselves and the French. It is not, of course, possible to leave 
international pressure out of account, but, quite apart from this, internally the 
territories have reached a stage when contacts between them are going to become 
increasingly important. While the official element in a territory was the most 
powerful one it was possible to work in watertight compartments. Now that 
unofficial opinion is becoming more powerful we cannot in my view go on doing so. 
We must therefore in my view recognise that in the long term there will probably be 
some form of association between the British and French West African territories and 
that being the case, we must work to eliminate the differences between our policies 
as far as this may be possible. The Governors at the West African Council meeting in 
Accra in November strongly supported our view that there could be no question of 
changing our own policy in the constitutional sphere. We now know from our 
conversations in Dakar that the French know that they will have to change theirs. 
There are three very strong arguments for attempting a policy of closer 
co-ordination:-
(1) The policy of Western Union demands parallel action in Africa. We shall be 
under increasing pressure to show results in this respect and if we are not able to 
do so by direct discussion with the French Colonial Office, attempts will be made 
to work out a policy of closer African union through the machinery set up for 
Western Union. There is already pressure from both the French and Belgians to 
include this within the scope of the European Assembly. There is a serious danger 
that if the matter is handled in this way it will be handled far too much from the 
point of view of Europe and too little from the point of view of Africa, thus making 
the general policy much less palatable to African opinion. 
(2) Force of circumstance has compelled us to adopt a largely negative approach 
in our international colonial policy. The criticism with which we are faced in the 
United Nations places us always in the position of having to resist pressure rather 
than to take the initiative. The best counterweight to this would b~ a constructive 
policy of closer co-operation between our colonial territories, particularly in 
Africa. 
(3) Marshall Aid demands closer economic co-ordination in Africa. 
It may be said that all this is very obvious and not very new and that we are already 
committed to a policy of closer co-ordination between the colonial powers in Africa. 
That I admit, but I do not think that we are yet equipped to carry this policy very far. 
It is worth examining the various fields involved. 
In the field of technical collaboration we have made considerable progress and 
have held a series of conferences in the educational, medical, agricultural, veterin-
ary, tsetse and communications spheres. These conferences have provided opportun-
ity for valuable exchanges of information; they have enabled British and foreign 
workers in these fields to get to know each other; and they have led in most cases to 
the setting up of more permanent machinery for co-ordination. It cannot, however, 
be said that they have yet achieved very important or striking practical results in the 
various fields concerned. While not in any way attempting to minimise the 
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·importance of these conferences, I do not think that they in any sense provide the 
answer to the need for closer political and economic co-ordination. 
In the economic field we had during 1948 conferences in Europe on closer 
co-ordination in Africa. I attended the French conference and, while it was extremely 
cordial, it cannot be said that it has led to important practical results. This, I think, 
was due partly to the doubts felt by the principals on both sides as to the possibilities 
of such co-operation, partly to the fact that those who took part in the conferences 
for the most part had no detailed knowledge of West Africa, but mainly to the fact 
that there is no effective machinery for following up the recommendations of the 
conference at the West African end. In my view the real possibilities of economic 
co-operation in West Africa (limited as they admittedly are by the parallel economies 
of the West African territories) have not yet been effectively examined. 
In the political sphere we had our conference with the French last June and are to 
have one with the Belgians in the fairly near future. Again the discussions were most 
cordial and the recommendations quite useful. But although exchanges of informa-
tion are beginning in West Africa in a small way, no real practical progress has been 
made towards the aim which we have set ourselves of getting to understand each 
others' policies and problems. Nor, in my view, will this be possible in the absence of 
special machinery in West Africa. 
In the defence sphere as far as I know very little has been done in a systematic 
manner to co-ordinate plans in Africa as between ourselves, the French and the 
Belgians. 
What I think is required is something on the following lines: 
(a) A decision between the British and French Governments at the highest level 
that we must aim in the long run at a much closer co-ordination in the political 
field in West Africa followed by instructions to this effect to the British and French 
authorities in West Africa. 
(b) The establishment of machinery in West Africa in the shape of an Anglo-
French secretariat, preferably at Accra, with the functions described in my note 
opposite.4 
(c) As regards Anglo-Belgian co-operation, the case is much less compelling and I 
think that adequate arrangements for the exchange of informatiqn will probably 
meet the requirements at the present time. If anything is to be done, some staff 
will have to be provided for the purpose by the Belgians and the East Africa High 
Commission, but we shall be going into this in our forthcoming talks at Brussels. 
(d) I am not in favour of the establishment in Europe of any formal machinery for 
securing closer co-ordination. I am extremely doubtful of the utility of attempting 
any form of Anglo-French-Belgian committee for this purpose. This would 
immediately involve the inclusion of the Portuguese, whose whole government 
system is not adapted to the kind of closer co-ordination which I have in mind. 
(Any co-operation with them can best be effected by machinery in Central Africa). 
It would also raise the difficult problem of the relationship of the South Africans to 
any such body, which could only lead to embarrassment. Machinery for the 
co-ordination of programmes on the economic side is already provided for to some 
extent under O.E.E.C. and I think that we have got to leave this side of the 
problem to be handled in that way. 
4 Not printed. 
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The machinery for dealing with Anglo-French-Belgian co-operation in Africa in the 
Colonial Office also requires review. I have had some discussion with Mr. Galsworthy 
on this subject and we are both agreed that the machinery at present is not adequate 
for the tasks which face us. The International Relations Department, he tells me, has 
had to devote by far the greater part of its energies to dealing with current and highly 
urgent problems in the United Nations. He has not been able to give as much 
attention as he would like to collaboration in Africa, nor have I or any of the Assistant 
Secretaries in the African Division. I have some ideas on this subject which I should 
prefer to mention orally. 
I must apologise for this rather disjointed minute. When it has passed round could 
we have a discussion? 
183 CO 537/4589, no 19 [Oct 1949] 
'The attitude of the United Nations towards dependent territories': 
note by Mr Creech Jones for Mr Bevin, brief for Commonwealth 
meeting on foreign affairs. Annexes I-IV 
The problem 
The United Nations Charter gives the United Nations a right of supervision over trust 
territories, but not1 over other dependent territories. 
2. Large majorities in the United Nations have been trying:-
(a) to establish control and supervision over all dependent territories; 
(b) to reduce the position of the Administering Authorities of trust territories to 
that of mere local agents of the United Nations, required to carry out policies 
decided upon at Lake Success. 
3. We have throughout rejected these attempts. We must continue to resist 
United Nations interference. Background and reasons are given in Annex I. 
4. The last Assembly passed a spate of Resolutions seeking to establish powers for 
the United Nations over Colonies and to extend their right of supervision over trust 
territories. As the principal Colonial Power we bore the burnt of the attack, 
sometimes in a minority of one. Things have reached such a pitch that we want to 
rally as much support for our general point of view as we can. 
Attitude of Commonwealth governments 
5. In the past some Commonwealth Governments have been in the opposite 
camp (India and Pakistan). Others have not given us as much support and 
understanding as we could reasonably have expected. Their individual attitudes are 
described in Annex 11. 
Recommendations 
6. We intend to communicate later with Commonwealth Governments on 
questions of tactics and the detailed application of our policy of resisting United 
Nations interference. 
1 Emphasis throughout in original. 
2D 
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7. We hope that at Colombo2 the ground can be prepared in a general way with 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Suggested lines of approach are given in Annex 
Ill. 
8. It would be unwise to raise this question in any way formally at Colombo. The 
problem is one on which we should avoid discussion round the table in conference: it 
would probably drive India and Pakistan to extreme positions on "colonialism" which 
would spoil the whole atmosphere of the Conference. South Africa would also come 
out in open support of our point of view: this would exacerbate Indian and Pakistani 
feelings and embarrass Australia, New Zealand and Canada as well as ourselves. 
9. The best course would be to raise the matter separately, in a private and 
informal way, with the Australian, New Zealand and Canadian Ministers. 
10. India and Pakistan are deeply committed to the policy of trying to subject the 
Colonial Powers to rigorous United Nations supervision and control. It is unlikely 
that they could be persuaded to desist. It is doubtful therefore whether there would 
be any advantage in raising the matter with their delegates at Colombo unless they 
seemed in a particularly receptive mood. If so, or if they raised it themselves, a 
suggested line of approach is in Annex IV. 
11. Ceylon is not as yet directly concerned, as she is not a member of the United 
Nations. But it would nonetheless be desirable to let her know briefly what has been 
going on in the United Nations, and our attitude, and the reasons for it, towards 
these developments. 
12. It is not necessary, and might be undesirable for the reasons indicated in 
Annex 11, to say anything on this subject to South Africa. But if the South African 
Minister himself raises the issue, he might be told that we view recent developments 
in the United Nations with grave disquiet; our policy is to resist interference; and we 
contemplate approaching other Commonwealth Governments in the matter as soon 
as we have specific proposals to put forward. 
Annex I to 183 
A. Background to United Nations attempts to establish supervision and control of 
colonies 
Note : Trust territories are in a different category and are dealt with in Section C 
below. 
Chapter XI of the Charter contains a declaration on non-self-governing territories. 
It affirms the principles which inspired British colonial policy long before the United 
Nations came into existence. The only new obligation it contains for the Colonial 
Powers is that of supplying the United Nations, "for information purposes", with 
certain technical information about their Colonies. Political and constitutional 
information was specifically excluded at San Francisco. 
2. This in no way gives the United Nations any right of control or supervision. 
But they persistently seek to oblige us to furnish political and constitutional 
information as well and to assume the right to supervise our colonial administration 
and to recommend courses of action. There can be little doubt that they aim 
ultimately to dictate the policies we are to pursue. 
2 For the Colombo Conference, see 96. 
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B. Reasons for our refusal to accept United Nations supervision and control of the 
colonies 
There is no basis for it in the Charter. The Assembly cannot amend the Charter just 
by passing Resolutions. 
2. It would be harmful. The United Nations have done nothing to suggest that 
they could make a better job than we do of guiding colonial peoples to self-
government. There is nothing at Lake Success like the old Permanent Mandates 
Commission of the League of Nations, which was composed not of representatives of 
Governments but of individual experts. At Lake Success most delegations voice the 
prejudices of their Governments on colonies. Resolutions on colonies are the result 
of votes cast by an overwhelming majority of States without colonial responsibilities. 
They are thus not themselves in any way affected, and often cast their votes with little 
regard to the merits of the case under discussion. In the General Assembly on 1st 
December, Mr. McNei13 said the Fourth Committee has become a byword for 
irresponsible criticism. 
3. It would be putting the clock back. Peoples of the colonies are rapidly 
assuming ever increasing responsibility for their own affairs. In many colonies they 
already have a greater share in these matters than the peoples of some States in the 
United Nations. To commit our colonial people to policies worked out at Lake 
Success in which they would have no say and which are often misguided and 
impractical, would be a backward step. The Colonies themselves would be the first to 
resent it. None have asked for it. 
4. Strong opposition could be expected in Parliament and the country if we 
yielded to the United Nations on this question. 
5. Economic and social problems in Colonies are not something peculiar there. 
They are the same problems exactly as those which confront sovereign States placed 
in comparable circumstances. Therefore the only proper way to study these problems 
is on a regional or world-wide basis, and in expert technical bodies such as 
U.N.E.S.C.O., I.L.O., F .A. C., and not a purely political body like the Fourth 
Committee. We have always said we wish to work with the Specialised Agencies in 
seeking solutions to these technical problems. But it is absurd that colonies should 
be singled out for special treatment. Disease knows no political frontier. 
6. On the particular question of our refusal to add political and constitutional 
information to the technical information we send to the United Nations our reasons 
are 
(1) that it is not called for in the Charter and was deliberately excluded at San 
Francisco; 
(2) outside interference in this field would be exceedingly dangerous. 
The aim of the anti-colonial countries is the immediate liquidation of colonies, with 
scant regard to their fitness for self-government. We are just as concerned to see our 
colonial peoples achieve self-government, but in conditions in which they really can 
stand on their own, without the risk of subsequently falling under foreign political or 
economic domination, or under the control of an undemocratic minority seeking 
power for its own selfish ends. As a colony assumes greater responsibility for its own 
3 Hector McNeil, MP (Labour) for Greenock Burgh since 1941; parliamentary under-secretary of state, FO, 
1945-1946, and minister of state, 1946-1950; vice-president, UN Assembly, 1947. 
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affairs, so, inevitably, the local political leaders became impatientto have complete 
self-government, at a rate which would not necessarily be in the true interests of the 
people of the territory as a whole. It is at this stage that United Nations interference 
would be most dangerous. The United Nations would have no responsibility in the 
matter, but could be expected to support the demands of the less responsible local 
political leaders. Our task at this critical stage would be made correspondingly more 
difficult. It would, for example, be extremely dangerous if the United Nations had a 
right to intervene in the Gold Coast, where we have recently accepted measures for 
constitutional advance which will confer a very great measure of responsibility on 
Africans, but do not at this stage go as far as some of the local political leaders 
wished. 
C. Position of trust territories 
We accept the right of the United Nations to supervise the administration of our trust 
territories. But we, as the Administering Authority, have full powers and sole 
responsibility for order and good government. The Trusteeship Council and the 
General Assembly have the right to review, to criticise and to make recommenda-
tions. But they have no power to enforce on us policies we consider to be unrealistic 
and ill-advised, and no power to take any part in the actual administration. We 
cannot accept the role of mere agent of the United Nations to which they are seeking 
to reduce us. 
Annex 11 to 183: Attitude of Commonwealth governments 
Canada has no dependent territories of her own, but tends to share with the United 
States a vague 'liberal' attitude based on the feeling that the possession of colonies is 
inherently wrong. It may not be easy to win full support from Canada, where the 
point of view of the United States will inevitably have much influence. But she is 
likely to be responsive and may be expected to take up a responsible attitude. It is 
well worth trying to win her round. 
2. Both Australia and New Zealand administer dependent territories, and are 
members of the Trusteeship Council. In the past they have often been torn between, 
on the one hand, their realisation of their responsibilities for good ·government in 
their territories and the dangers of permitting United Nations interference and, on 
the other, a predisposition to regard international supervision of dependent territor-
ies as desirable in principle. They have therefore been slow to recognise the dangers 
of the latest developments in the Assembly. There were, however, indications that 
their views were changing in the later stages of the Assembly's last session. The new 
Governments in both Australia and New Zealand are likely to lay greater emphasis on 
resisting interference. 
3. The Union of South Africa has, at the recent session of the United Nations as at 
previous sessions, suffered attacks on its own policy in South West Africa. The Union 
Government, in its own interests, will therefore be only too anxious to support us in 
any proposals we may have for resisting the encroachments of the United Nations. 
Our difficulty will be that we do not wish to be too closely associated with a Union 
Government whose native policy is severely criticised throughout the world, and who 
have made plain their desire to press for the transfer of the High Commission 
Territories. Moreover, we must not encourage the Union Government to feel that we 
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are in any way in the same boat as they are vis-a-vis the United Nations and that they 
can look to us for help and support in any difficulties into which their policies may 
lead them. 
4. India and Pakistan are in the van of the "anti-colonial" powers at the United 
Nations, and have consistently supported all the resolutions to which we see strong 
objection. 
5. Ceylon was not of course involved in the recent activities of the United 
Nations. She might well have found it difficult to oppose India and Pakistan on these 
issues in public. But Ceylon Ministers have in the past privately indicated that they 
would have bitterly resented United Nations interference at the time when they were 
in process of emerging to Dominion status. 
Annex Ill to 183: Suggested line of approach to Australia, New Zealand and Canada 
(See paragraph 7 of main brief) 
Australia and New Zealand 
When the United Nations think of Colonies, they think mainly of colonial Africa. 
Consequently the effects of submitting to United Nations control and supervision 
would be felt far more in Africa than anywhere else, and we should be the principal 
target amongst the Commonwealth. But any weakening of our position as the 
foremost African Colonial Power would be detrimental to the whole Commonwealth . 
We have no doubt that to permit United Nations interference in our colonial 
territories would gravely prejudice the attainment of the objective of our colonial 
policy, i.e. the promotion of self-government within the Commonwealth in condi-
tions which wil1 guarantee to our Colonies economic and political stability and 
freedom from domination from any quarter. Could it possibly be said, for instance, 
that the achievement of Dominion status by Ceylon or of internal self-government 
by Malta could have been brought about as smoothly and successfully as it was if we 
had been subjected in the process to the control and criticisms of the United Nations? 
We are gravely disturbed by recent developments in the Assembly. We shall soon be 
communicating our detailed views to the Commonwealth Governments. Meanwhile 
we hope that Australia and New Zealand, as fellow members of the Commonwealth 
with colonial responsibilities and as fellow members of the Trusteeship Council, will 
give us their full support in resisting attempts at interference by the United Nations 
which go far beyond the provisions of the Charter. 
Canada 
This line of approach would also be suitable for Canada, although she has no 
dependent territories. She might also be urged to do what she can to rally moderate 
and "neutral" opinion in the United Nations to a more sympathetic understanding of 
our problems and our position. 
A talking point with Canada is: they will understand from their experience in 
governing their Northern Territories how impossible it would be to run a successful 
show there if they were subjected to the criticisms and control of 58 backseat drivers 
without responsibility. 
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Annex IV to 183: Suggested line of approach to India and Pakistan 
(See paragraph 10 of main brieO 
[184) 
We understand the sincerity of their motives in seeking to bring all dependent 
territories under United Nations supervision and control. We hope they will 
understand that we are equally sincere in our refusal to agree to this. 
We are determined to press ahead with our policy of bringing our colonial peoples 
to full self-government within the Commonwealth in conditions which will guaran-
tee them economic and political stability and freedom from domination from any 
quarter. There is thus no difference between us as to the ultimate objective: the 
difference is purely one of opinion as to the best method. 
We are prepared to co-operate to the full with the Specialised Agencies of the 
United Nations in seeking solutions to the technical problems facing our colonial 
governments and peoples, provided this is done on a regional or worldwide basis: 
that is to say, that these problems are studied on a functional basis irrespective of 
whether they occur in sovereign states or colonies, and colonies as such are not 
singled out for special and exclusive treatment. 
It would not be in the interests of our colonial peoples that they should be 
subjected to the control of 59 [sic] nations at Lake Success, most of whom have no 
knowledge or understanding of their problems. Our colonial peoples are rapidly 
assuming increasing responsibility for their affairs, and would be the last to wish 
their affairs to be decided over their heads by remote political bodies bearing no 
responsibility in the matter. 
We are gravely disturbed by the recent action of the Assembly in passing 
resolutions regarding colonies and trust territories which go far beyond the 
provisions of the Charter. We would regard it as a betrayal of the true interests of our 
colonial peoples to accept any further degree of United Nations supervision than is 
provided for in the Charter, (and that is onlyin relation to trust territories), and we 
are resolved not to do so. We shall be communicating our detailed views on these 
matters in due course to all Commonwealth Governments. Meanwhile we hope India 
and Pakistan may understand our motives and our position, and therefore that at 
least it will be possible for both states to agree to avoid bitterness over this issue at 
Lake Success. 
184 CO 537/4589, no 8 10 Dec 1949 
[The colonial question at the fourth regular session of the UN General 
Assembly, 1949]: memorandum by J Fletcher-Cooke1 (UK delegation 
to UN) 
A. Deterioration of the position since 1948 
As a measure of the deterioration of the position of the administering authorities in 
1949 as compared with 1948, it is only necessary to recall the voting on resolutions 
relating to Colonial questions passed by the General Assembly in 1948 as compared 
with the voting in 1949. In 1948 the Fourth Committee proposed to the General 
1 Counsellor (colonial affairs), permanent UK delegation and alternate UK representative on Trusteeship 
Council. 
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Assembly four resolutions relating to the trust territories and five relating to 
information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. The four trusteeship resolutions 
were not even put to the vote in the General Assembly but were adopted without any 
opposition, while as regards the five "Non-Self-Governing Territories" resolutions, 
the United Kingdom voted for four of them and abstained in respect of one. 
2. In I949 the picture was a very different one. The Fourth Committee submitted 
seven resolutions relating to the trust territories and the United Kingdom voted 
against four of these, abstained on two (in one case only after two objectionable 
paragraphs had failed to get the necessary two-thirds majority) and voted in favour of 
only one resolution. The position as regards "Non-Self-Governing Territory" resolu-
tions was even worse. Here the Fourth Committee submitted ten resolutions and the 
United Kingdom found it necessary to vote against eight of them and to abstain from 
voting on the other two. 
3. The failure of the United Kingdom Delegation to re-insert the "Colonial 
Application Clause" in the Prostitution Convention and the difficulties relating to 
Colonial questions with which the United Kingdom representative in the Sixth 
Committee was faced, provide additional evidence of this serious deterioration. 
B. Main influences at work 
4. Attitude of the Slav bloc 
One remarkable feature of this year's work was the comparative quiescence of the 
Slav bloc. In the Special Committee on information from Non-Self-Governing 
Territories (which met at Lake Success just before the General Assembly convened) 
the representative of the U.S.S.R. was remarkably moderate, and his interventions 
were much shorter and much less violent than those of his predecessor on the 1948 
Special Committee. Similarly, in the Fourth Committee, the Slav representatives 
were remarkably hushed and apart from brief interventions in the Plenary by the 
representatives of Czechoslovakia and Poland, which were quite short and much less 
violent than usual, the Slav bloc did not participate in the debates in the Plenary 
sessions. 
5. It would therefore be a great mistake to assume that the "Anti-Colonial drive" 
has been led by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites. No doubt the Slav bloc are quite 
content to see others make the running in this matter and to derive what advantages 
they can from the embarrassment of the administering authorities. 
6. The attitude of the U.S.A. 
This has been most disappointing and, as will be indicated, of the greatest. 
importance. An analysis of the voting in the General Assembly on the seventeen 
resolutions covering affairs in the Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories dis-
closes the remarkable fact that on only two occasions did the United Kingdom and 
the United States vote in the same sense. Both Delegations found it possible to vote 
in favour of Resolution V (dealing with educational advancement in trust territories) 
and both Delegations voted against the first resolution relating to the Non-Self-
Governing Territories which called for the voluntary transmission of political 
information. On no fewer than ten occasions (out of the seventeen) the United States 
Delegation voted in favour of a resolution against which the United Kingdom found it 
necessary to vote. On four occasions the United States voted in favour of a resolution 
where the United Kingdom abstained, and on one occasion the United States 
abstained where the United Kingdom voted against. 
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7. This analysis of the votes discloses quite clearly a wide divergence of views in 
this matter which it is most important to bridge if we are not to find ourselves in 
open conflict with the United States in these matters. 
8. It must also be borne in mind that the United States took the initiative in 
proposing certain resolutions against which the United Kingdom found itself 
compelled to vote after criticising the proposals in very strong terms. I refer, of 
course, to the original suggestion for the perpetuation of the Special Committee on a 
three-year basis which was first put forward by the United States Delegation in the 
Special Committee, and also to the proposal made in the Fourth Committee by the 
United States and Mexico jointly, to the effect that the Special Committee should 
make a special study of educational problems in the Non-Self-Governing Territories. 
9. I indicated earlier that the attitude of the United States is of vital importance in 
these matters. This was shown quite clearly in 1948 when, working in agreement 
with the United States we were able to secure the deletion from the resolution 
relating to administrative unions of certain objectionable paragraphs which enabled 
us to refrain from opposing in the 1948 General Assembly the resolution thus 
amended. A similar instance occurred this year. Resolution I relating to the political 
advancement of trust territories contained two paragraphs (paragraphs 2 and 4) 
which the United States found objectionable; and with their assistance, we were able 
to muster sufficient votes against these paragraphs to ensure that they did not 
receive the necessary two-thirds majority. The two objectionable paragraphs were 
therefore deleted in the Assembly. 
10. As has already been indicated by U.K. representatives speaking in the Fourth 
Committee and in the General Assembly during the past session, His Majesty's 
Government will have to decline to comply with certain of these resolutions and no 
doubt they will have to ignore others which will be passed in the future. But I do not 
think that it can be emphasised too strongly that our only hope of ever getting 
resolutions passed by the Assembly in a form satisfactory to us, is with the agreement 
of the United States. Last year I came to the conclusion that together we could 
prevent any objectionable resolution being passed by the General Assembly. And I 
was of the same opinion this year-until the Assembly passed the Jerusalem 
resolution in the face of Anglo-American opposition. But it certainly remains true 
that without the United States we can do nothing to moderate the excessive claims of 
the "Anti-Colonial bloc". 
11. I am not, however, very hopeful of being able to persuade the United States of 
the validity of our point of view. The reason for this will be found expressed in an 
article by James Reston in the New York Times of the 23rd November, 1949 (copy 
annexed) .2 Speaking of the General Assembly's decision on the former Italian 
Colonies, he wrote: "The United States was arguing at the end that almost any 
settlement was necessary to 'protect the prestige of the United Nations'. In the 
opinion of responsible officials here, however, that is precisely what this debate has 
not done. It has undoubtedly prevented the Russians from achieving the base they 
originally wanted in Tripolitania and it rejected the Bevin-Sforza plan? Otherwise, 
though it has not 'protected the prestige of the United Nations' ". In other words, the 
United States takes a very short -sighted view of what will maintain the prestige of the 
United Nations. They appear to think that high minded resolutions passed by 
2 Not printed. 3 See part 3 of this volume, 311. 
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overwhelming majorities without any attention either to the limitations of the 
Charter or to the realities of the situation in the Non-Self-Governing Territories 
themselves, will in some mystical way bolster up the prestige of the United Nations. 
The opposite of this point of view was explained by the Minister of State in his speech 
in the Plenary on the ten Resolutions relating to Non-Self-Governing Territories, 
when he concluded with the words "I find no pleasure in having to make a statement 
of this kind. I have to make it because my Delegation must be as jealous for the 
character and reputation of this Organisation as for its own responsibilities ... ". 
12. In short, the United States have failed to appreciate that by associating 
themselves with, and indeed in some cases instigating, this "anti-Colonial drive" in 
the Fourth Committee, not only are they making "the Fourth Committee ... a 
by-word for irresponsible criticism" and thus weakening the United Nations, but they 
are also causing considerable embarrassment to their co-signatories to the North 
Atlantic Pact, and thus playing straight into the hands of the U.S.S.R. 
13. Lack of support from the moderates 
Another remarkable feature of the discussions this year has been the unsatisfactory 
attitude adopted by the "moderate" group, in particular the Scandinavian powers. 
Last year these Delegations appeared to approach these problems more or less 
objectively and refrained from associating themselves with resolutions which 
embodied principles or obligations going far beyond what is contained in Chapter XI 
of the Charter. This year, the "moderates" have failed us completely and in many 
cases they have voted in favour of resolutions which do in fact go far beyond the 
provisions of the Charter. Even where they have not voted in favour of these 
resolutions and thus joined the pack of anti-Colonial hounds, they have weakly 
abstained and have thus precluded . any chance of our securing a rejection of 
objectionable resolutions or parts of resolutions in the General Assembly. These 
remarks apply not only to the Scandinavian countries (and in particular to Denmark, 
which as an administering authority, ought to give a lead to Norway, Sweden and 
Iceland in these matters) but also to a number of "floaters" such as Afghanistan and 
Thailand who were much readier to appreciate our difficulties last year than they are 
this. The only exception to this general criticism of the "moderates" is to be found in 
the case of the representative of Greece, who not only in the Plenary but also in the 
Fourth Committee helped the administering authorities with his voice as well as 
with his vote. 
14. Administering authorities 
Another disquieting feature this year was that quite apart from the blatant defection 
of the U.S.A., a number of the other administering authorities were of no assistance 
at all and were frequently to be found voting with the "anti-Colonial bloc". I have 
already referred to Denmark whose vote on almost all occasions was most 
unsatisfactory, and I might also add here that the Chairman of the Fourth 
Committee, (Dr. Lannung) proved to be a most unhappy choice. I do not think that 
any other Chairman could have been so unsatisfactory from our point of view, and he 
went out of his way to encourage criticism and unfortunate proposals from the 
"anti~Colonial bloc". The Netherlands Delegation was also a great disappointment. 
They were of no assistance either in the Special Committee or in the Fourth 
Committee, and while appreciating their particular difficulties owing to contempor-
ary developments in the Indonesian question, it is, I think, fair to say that one might 
have expected at least abstentions on many of the resolutions which were dealt with. 
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In fact, however, the Netherlands frequently voted with the majority. 
15. Although the Delegations of Australia and New Zealand appeared to be 
anxious to help us, they were on many occasions bound by rigid instructions from 
their Governments (possibly not unconnected with the elections in their respective 
countries) and it was disappointing to have so little support from them. 
16. Even the hard core of Belgium, France and the United Kingdom appeared to 
be on the point of disintegration on a number of occasions; for example, in the 
resolutions relating to the Trusteeship Council, France only voted with the United 
Kingdom on three out of seven occasions, and one of these was in respect of the 
resolution on educational advancement in the trust territories, in favour of which 
both Delegations voted. In fact, only twice did France vote with the United Kingdom 
against a resolution relating to the trust territories. 
17. As regards the ten "Non-Self-Governing Territory" resolutions, France voted 
with the United Kingdom in opposition on five occasions, but left the United 
Kingdom voting against without her support on two other occasions. Despite this 
vacillation, it is only fair to record that the French representative spoke strongly 
against the increase in the life of the Special Committee and against its enhanced 
functions, and he also declined to participate in the elections to the Special 
Committee. 
18. The Belgian Delegation was our most reliable ally, but we could not be 
certain of complete support even from Belgium. As regards the seven trusteeship 
resolutions, the United Kingdom found itself separated from Belgium on three out of 
the seven resolutions, and similarly as regards the ten "Non-Self-Governing 
Territory" resolutions, Belgium deserted us on two occasions. Generally speaking, 
however, the Belgian line was thoroughly sound, although occasionally the Delega-
tion appeared to lose the courage of its convictions when it came to a vote. 
19. The position of the Arab bloc 
The proceedings were throughout complicated by the struggle which is going on 
between the Arab bloc and France in relation to the French North African territories. 
Many of the resolutions directed against the administering authorities and 
vigorously sponsored or supported by Arab representatives were, in fact, aimed at 
France rather than the United Kingdom. A number of Arab Delegations made no 
secret of this fact and the Egyptian representative enlarged on this point at some 
length to me. He explained quite frankly that the Arab bloc wished to change the 
state of affairs prevailing in French North Africa, and that in order to do this they 
could only proceed by way of resolutions directed against all administering 
authorities. He assured me, however, that in his view, Egypt's interests and those of 
the United Kingdom ran along parallel lines, and that he did not wish to do anything 
to embarrass us. He even went so far as to suggest that we should omit from the 
reports and information that we send in certain unsatisfactory features so as not to 
provide the opportunity for criticism in the Fourth Committee. In particular, as 
regards the question of defining a "Non-Self-Governing Territory" (with which the 
Egyptian Delegation was primarily concerned) he made no secret of the fact that he 
did not wish to embarrass us over Malta but that the intention of his Delegation and 
of his fellow Arabs was to bring the whole question of French North African Colonies 
into the open at the United Nations. 
20. Effect of discussions relating to former Italian colonies 
The point I have referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph is undoubtedly 
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linked up with a movement in which the Arabs have taken the lead which aims at 
increasing the functions of the United Nations as a "state-maker" particularly in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East. It is very easy for those who favour this development 
of the United Nations functions to overlook the fact that the disposition of the former 
Italian Colonies was a special case arising out of decisions taken by the four Foreign 
Ministers who agreed in advance that if they failed to settle the question among 
themselves, it would be referred to the United Nations and that they would accept the 
latter's decisions. Deliberately or unwittingly the Arabs and those who think like 
them, have overlooked the particular circumstances surrounding the submission of 
the Italian Colonies question to the United Nations and have evolved and encouraged 
the theory that it is a proper task for the United Nations to create independent states 
out of non-self-governing territories as frequently and as quickly as they can, 
particularly in those cases where there is a large Arab population. I have no doubt 
that sooner or later the Arabs will find ways and means of bringing the whole 
question of the French North African non-self-governing territories before the 
United Nations; that is indeed the purpose of the Egyptian resolution which has 
entrusted to the Special Committee the task of deciding whether any territory is or is 
not a territory whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government. 
James Reston's article on the Assembly's decision on the former Italian Colonies to 
which I have already referred and of which a copy is attached [is] of significance in 
this respect. 
21. Other members of the "anti-colonial bloc" 
There is nothing new to record as regards the line taken by the other two component 
parts of the "anti-Colonial bloc". The Latin Americans led by Cuba, Guatemala and 
Mexico, who were particularly objectionable throughout the proceedings, followed 
their usual line, although it was refreshing to find that from time to time the 
representatives of Chile, Peru and Uruguay made some common sense interventions. 
The representative of Brazil, although he went out of his way to commend H.M.G. for 
many aspects of its Colonial policy, (and in particular for the firm line they were 
taking vis-a-vis the Government of the Union of South Africa in respect of the three 
protectorates) was nevertheless "anti-Colonial" in outlook, and appeared to be 
particularly disturbed by the effects which the economic development of Africa would 
have on the economies of Latin America. The Far Eastern members were led by India 
and the Philippines. As anticipated last year, the Indian Delegation took an even 
stronger line in all the questions with which the Fourth Committee dealt. One of his 
arguments, which it might be possible to rebut (and which was to a certain extent 
rebutted by the Minister of State in his speech in the Plenary), was to the effect that 
any reduction in the activities of the Special Committee, any stopping up of the flow 
of "anti-Colonial sentiment" as exhibited in the Fourth Committee, would have 
widespread repercussions in the Non-Self-Governing Territories themselves. It 
would be useful, if it were possible, to produce evidence to show quite emphatically 
that the peoples of these territories do not seek or desire this interest in their welfare 
which members of the Fourth Committee regard as their self-appointed task. The 
representatives of China and Pakistan were also Far Eastern members of the pack, 
and the only moderating influence in this quarter of the globe came from the 
representative of Thailand, who, although he almost inevitably voted with the 
majority, did put a common sense point of view forward on a number of occasions. 
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C. Conclusions 
22. I fully appreciate that any decision which may be taken to modify the attitude 
hitherto adopted by H.M.G. as regards participation in the work of the Special 
Committee will be a decision of the greatest importance and will have to be taken at 
the highest level. Nevertheless, I am firmly convinced that only by not participating 
in the work of the Special Committee can we hope to bring the United Nations to a 
sense of its responsibilities (and its limitations) in this crucial question. It has been 
argued in the past that if we do not participate in the work of the Special Committee, 
we shall in absentia be subjected to most virulent criticism and that we shall find 
that completely unacceptable resolutions emerge from the Special Committee for 
the consideration of the Fourth Committee and ultimately of the General Assembly. I 
think that the events of this year will have shown clearly that this argument is no 
longer valid, since we are quite unable by our presence either to restrain this 
criticism or to prevent the Committee from adopting "unreasonable" resolutions. 
23. I appreciate that if it is decided that we shall not attend the Special 
Committee, a second question of necessity presents itself; namely, shall we attend 
the Fourth Committee when the report of the Special Committee is considered? I 
realise that it would be a much more serious step to absent ourselves from the 
Fourth Committee when information from the Non-Self-Governing Territories is 
discussed than it would be not to participate in the work of the Special Committee, 
but I feel, nevertheless, that we should do this because it seems to me perfectly 
logical to argue as we have argued, that the Fourth Committee was never intended to 
discuss this information. The very name of the Fourth Committee (i.e. the 
Trusteeship Committee) shows clearly that its proper function is to discuss the 
report of the Trusteeship Council. It is obvious, of course, that we should attend the 
Fourth Committee when that item is being considered. 
24. But as we have argued time and time again that in our view this information 
should be canalised by the Secretariat to the specialised agencies and should be 
considered there in a non political atmosphere by experts as parts of various world or 
regional problems which will ultimately come up for consideration in the Economic 
and Social Council and in the Second or Third Committees, it seems to me that it 
would be quite logical to lend weight to that contention by declining to participate in 
any further discussion of this information by the Fourth Committee. 
25. As I have already said, I appreciate that this is a most important question, and 
that any decision which may be taken will require the most careful consideration, 
and consultation with other administering authorities. Moreover, there may well be 
other and wider considerations which would render it undesirable to take such a 
step, but looking at it from a purely "Fourth Committee" point of view, I have no 
doubt whatever that the logical projection of all that we have said and done during 
the past three years is to absent ourselves from the Special Committee next year and 
also from the subsequent discussion of the Committee's report in the Fourth 
Committee. 
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185 CO 537/4735, no 21 15 Dec 1949 
[Territorial claims against British possessions]: minute by Sir H 
Poynton, commenting on a CRO paper 
[These reflections were prompted by a memo by I M R Maclennan of the CRO (CO 
537/4735, no 20, 3 Dec 1949), attempting to suggest some common principles of policy. 
Two in particular seemed to emerge: (i) that the wishes of the inhabitants should be 
ascertained in accordance with the right of people to choose their own future, 'as in India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon', and (ii) that a solution by force-on either side-must be excluded. 
It also seemed important to the CRO that nothing should be done in any one case which 
would prejudice the position in other disputes. The two principal claims were identified as 
those concerning Hong Kong (from China) and the High Commission Territories (from 
South Africa); in both the British position should be sustained. Of lesser significance were 
various Central and Latin American claims, notably those of Guatemala to British 
Honduras and Argentina to the Falklands (the latter in 1949 somewhat dormant). 
Reaction in . the CO was to accept the necessity of treating particular claims within the 
general context of territorial claims (some eighteen or so in number), but to reject the 
two CRO general principles. Existing Cyprus policy contradicted (i), and 'ascertaining 
opinion' would not be expedient there or elsewhere, while Hong Kong contradicted (ii) 
because they were prepared to use force in its defence. The CO approach was rather that 
(i) force should be excluded except to preserve the British right of self-determination 
against aggression, and (ii) a territory should remain British unless disproved legally in 
the International Court (ibid, no 22, letter, W I J Wallace to I M R Maclennan, 17 Jan 
1950).) 
I have been looking at the memorandum by the Commonwealth Relations Office 
about territorial claims in respect of overseas territories, which we are to discuss at a 
meeting on Monday afternoon. In anticipation of the meeting, I have jotted down one 
or two ideas which I hope may prove helpful. 
I agree generally with the basic principle of the memorandum, namely that all 
Departments concerned ought to look at all these cases together so that there is no 
danger that our action in one case may prejudice our interests in another case. I may 
be unduly suspicious, but I think the Foreign Office and, to a lesser extent, the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, are both much more likely to go and do something 
prejudicial to the Colonial Office than vice versa, and it is therefore to our advantage 
that we should try and get some interdepartmental coordination on these matters. 
On the other hand, there are passages in Mr. Maclennan's memorandum which 
rather alarm me. I think he has spoilt his presentation of the case by introducing, 
under the text of "self-determination", the examples of India, Pakistan and Ceylon. I 
cannot see that the evolution of a non-self-governing territory into a self-governing 
Dominion is in the least relevant to the problem of territorial claims by other 
countries against us. In any case, I do not think we have ever accepted the doctrine of 
self-determination in respect of the Colonies as an absolute criterion of their future. 
Is it really our policy that if at any time Cyprus says it wants to go to Greece we are 
calmly to let it go? We have an interest and a legitimate right to concern ourselves 
with their future. I remember that when we were discussing the draft of the United 
Nations Charter at San Francisco, Lord Cranborne, (now the Marquis of Salisbury) 
strongly opposed this doctrine, and you will find that in Article 76(b) which deals 
with the ultimate political destiny of the Trust territories, we have carefully avoided 
using the phrase "self-determination", though the Russians pressed very hard to get 
it in, and we do not even say that their future will necessarily be in accordance with 
the wishes of the inhabitants. I also remember very clearly the United States 
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representative, Governor Stassen, getting up and saying that if California or Texas 
asked to secede from the United States and set up in business on their own, they 
would certainly not be allowed to do so. However, if it is generally agreed that this 
question of Colonial evolution is quite irrelevant to the problem of territorial claims 
by a foreign country, then I think we probably need not argue at great length about 
whether we accept the principle of self determination in our Colonial policy. 
When we come to claims made by other countries, I should like to draw a clear 
distinction between foreign countries and Commonwealth countries. The transfer of 
a territory from, e.g. H.M.G. in the U.K. to H.M.G. in New Zealand does not alter the 
British status of the territory. A transfer of Cyprus to Greece, or British Honduras to 
Guatemala, does. If one of our islands in the Pacific expressed a desire to be governed 
in future by New Zealand, and New Zealand was willing to do it, I do not know that I 
should greatly mind-but then the New Zealanders are stoutly British and can be 
trusted. If South African policy towards Africans were on the same lines as New 
Zealand policy towards the Maoris I do not think anyone would object to handing 
over the South African High Commission Territories to the Union Government, 
which, _on economic and administrative grounds, and probably on defence grounds 
as well, is the obvious thing to do. Politically, however, it is obviously out of the 
question. 
Then again, I would draw a distinction between the kind of case where another 
country claims that a certain territory belongs to it in international law, and that we 
are wrongfully in occupation of it. That is the essence of the Guatemala-British 
Honduras dispute, however weak on legal grounds we think the Guatemala case to 
be. That kind of case, however, does admit of reference to the International Court of 
Justice, and that is the proper way of dealing with such a case, and that is what we 
have offered to do about British Honduras, though Guatemala has never accepted. 
Lastly, there is the kind of case which is not supported by any legal claim, but is 
simply due to political pressure, and there I think one has to consider whether the 
pressure comes from the foreign country wanting to annex our territory, or whether 
it comes from within the Colony anxious to go to another country. China and Hong 
Kong is an example of the first, Cyprus and Greece an example of the latter. In such 
cases there could be no question of reference to the International Court, and, while it 
might be feasible to take the matter to the United Nations if the initiative came from 
a foreign country, it would be a very tricky thing to do in the present anti-Colonial 
atmosphere of the United Nations, and would obviously be a most dangerous thing to 
do in a case like that of Cyprus and Greece. 
Finally, I should like to get it clearly recognised that mere territorial continguity is 
quite irrelevant; the classical example of this is, of course, the Egyptian claim to the 
Sudan. This is an example of my old friend the salt water fallacy .1 
I think we want to get the problem clearly analysed, but I am very doubtful 
whether it will be possible to evolve any standard policy or set of principles. I believe 
that when we have done all this paperwork we shall end up where we started, namely 
that each case has to be considered on its merits. 
1 At a speech to the UN on 3 Oct 1947 Poynton identified 'five fallacies' about colonial systems, one of 
which was that there were no land-based expanding empires (CO 847/36/4, no 27) . 
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186 CO 537/4589, no 24A 22 Dec 1949 
[United States attitude towards colonial and trusteeship matters at the 
UN]: inward telegram no 5896 from Sir 0 Franks (Washington) to FO 
Your telegram No. 11550: United States attitude towards colonial and trusteeship 
matters at the United Nations. 
Your telegram reached me just when I was about to inform you by despatch of my 
increasing concern on this subject. Already, before the recent meetings at the United 
Nations, I had been concerned at the general atmosphere of malaise and misunder-
standing which seemed to surround our dealings with the United States administra-
tion on matters concerning the non-self-governing territories. This state of affairs 
was largely due to the growing influence exercised by the bureau of United Nations 
Affairs (and in particular by its Dependent Areas Division) in the State Department. 
This section of the State Department is not as realistic or understanding of our 
difficulties as the geographical departments concerned and, in their dealings with 
the Embassy, were frequently inclined to treat British representations with consider-
able reserve and mistrust. 
2. This already unsatisfactory situation has, of course been aggravated by the 
recent events at the United Nations. There is now a real risk that, in addition to 
having misunderstandings [? words omitted] the colonial problem with the United 
States administration, we shall find ourselves at odds with American opinion as well. 
Although, as reported in my telegram No. 516 Saving, the debates at the United 
Nations did not arouse a very great deal of interest here, such comment as there was 
on the United Kingdom attitude was almost uniformly critical and markedly 
unreceptive to the arguments in support of the United Kingdom case. The feeling of 
anti-colonialism is, of course, always latent in American opinion and there must be a 
real risk of serious trouble in the Anglo-American public relations field if there is a 
repetition of recent events at the United Nations. 
3. Quite apart, however, from the public relations aspect of this problem, it is 
highly desirable that early steps should be taken not only to dispel the present 
misunderstandings between our two Governments on this matter, but to try to reach 
a common policy between them. If the present state of affairs is allowed to continue, 
it can only do harm to the general relations between our two countries. It will 
provide a useful opportunity for Soviet propaganda to try to drive a wedge between 
the two Governments, and must, I imagine have a disturbing effect in the overseas 
territories themselves. It is, too, manifestly undesirable that the misunderstanding 
should be allowed to continue since, despite the anti-colonial inheritance on the 
American side, there is no real difference of principle in the policies which both 
Governments wish to see pursued in respect of the areas in question. Both 
Governments are anxious that the native populations should be enabled to achieve 
self-government as soon as possible and in an orderly and sensible fashion. Both 
Governments are anxious that the economies of the territories should be developed 
in such a way as not only to raise the standard of living of the inhabitants but to 
contribute to the overall increase of world trade. Both Governments are anxious that 
in their political and economic development the territories should continue to look 
to the West and not to Moscow for inspiration and that they should present a firm 
front against Soviet infiltration. 
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4. Certain sections in the State Department are known to be worried over the 
matter and concerned lest if something is not done soon to remove the present 
misunderstanding real damage may be done to Anglo-American relations before 
much longer. Mr. George Kennan,1 for example, recently spoke to Sir Roger Makins 
of his anxiety on this score. He agreed that it was not to the advantage of the United 
States Government to make difficulties for His Majesty's Government in their 
overseas territories and said that he felt that the time had come for the State 
Department to re-examine their whole attitude in the matter with a view to reaching 
some common policy with His Majesty's Government. In this connexion it is, 
perhaps, significant that, although Kennan is now to take one or two years Sabbatical 
leave from the State Department beginning next summer, he is to visit Africa before 
doing so. Furthermore only yesterday some other senior members of the State 
Department, when discussing with His Majesty's Minister possible sources of 
Anglo-American trouble at the present time, spontaneously brought up the colonial 
issue. Inspired, no doubt, by their own United States experts, they were inclined to 
emphasise their fears lest the United Kingdom in its anxiety to preserve its own 
position, might deal a series of damaging blows to the United Nations. They did not, 
however, deny the suggestion that there was no real fundamental difference between 
our two countries over the colonial issue. They fully agreed that it was very desirable 
to prevent, if possible any repetition of the recent situation at the United Nations 
where we and the Americans found ourselves on different sides, and that something 
ought therefore to be done soon to bring about a "meeting of minds" between the 
two Governments on the whole matter. 
5. I hope you will agree that it is desirable that we should try to reach such a 
"meeting of minds" with the Americans. But if we are to achieve success in this, a 
real effort of self-interpretation and imaginative understanding of the other view will 
be involved. As in so many other discussions with the Americans where we on the 
whole think they want to go too fast and they think we are too slow, a thorough 
quasiphilosophical examination of principle and policy is necessary before the 
Americans can really see and believe that administrative difficulties and the like are 
not excuses for inaction and evidence of an ill will. We shall have to remember that, 
apart from their tradition of anti-colonialism and the suspicions which some 
Americans still have that we are not sincere in our professions about encouraging 
self-government or that we wish to keep American capital out of the overseas 
territories, the United Nations Administration [sic] are genuinely concerned to 
maintain and strengthen the prestige of the United Nations. We may, perhaps, feel 
that the Americans attach too much importance to this point. They, on the other 
hand, feel that we lay too much emphasis on legal issues or on administrative 
problems, that we oppose resolutions - admittedly on good theoretical grounds -
when we might on practical grounds equally well have simply abstained, that we are 
too prone to resist any suggestion of outside interest in the affairs of the colonies and 
that, even when we have accepted some degree of international collaboration in such 
matters e.g. the Caribbean Commission, we do not pursue the policy of collaboration 
as energetically as we might. 
6. Hitherto, our approach to the State Department in the attempt to get United 
States spokesmen at the United Nations to adopt a more cooperative attitude has 
1 G F Kennan, US foreign policy theorist; diplomat in Moscow, 1945-1956 and 1952-1953. 
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been based primarily on the necessity of taking a common Anglo-Arr '!rican line in 
order to combat Soviet propaganda. We are not however, I think likely to achieve 
much with the State Department if we merely stick to this line of attack. A discussion 
of the sort I have in mind would give a great opportunity of expounding our whole 
approach to the problems of undeveloped peoples and of eliciting from the Americans 
a heightened interest and understanding of our role in the common approach to the 
world issues of the Point 4 Programmes.2 Such an understanding would, in my view, 
have a highly beneficial effect on Anglo-American relations in general. 
7. I shall be reporting more fully by despatch. In the meantime you may care to 
consult Sabben-Clare3 (who has just relinquished his post as Colonial Attache here) 
and Allen4, both of whom are due to arrive in the United Kingdom in a few days time. 
2 A reference to President Truman's inaugural address of 20 Jan 1949, in which he declared as his Fourth 
Point: 'We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and 
industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas'. Subsequently, 
Truman asked Congress for 45 million dollars as a first year's appropriation for technical assistance to 
underdeveloped countries, to be given partly under bilateral arrangements and partly through the UN 
programme of technical assistance. 
3 E E Saben-Clare, seconded to CO, 1940-1947; colonial attache, British Embassy, Washington, and 
commissioner, Caribbean Commission, 1947-1949; subsequently headmaster of Leeds Grammar School, 
1963-1970. 
4 R Alien, head of UN (Political) Dept, FO, 1949 (see also 188, note 1). 
187 CO 537/5698 9 Feb-14Apr 1950 
[Relations with the United States and the UN]: minutes by AB Cohen, 
Sir H Poynton, and AN Galsworthy 
I suggest that it would be very useful to have an internal discussion under Sir T. 
Lloyd's chairmanship, in view of the major importance of this subject, before all this 
is discussed with the Foreign Office. I should be much interested to attend such a 
discussion but this may not be possible if it has to be held next week. 
Perhaps I may record some rather general comments:-
(1) I am sure that in the light of what the Ambassador says we must agree to and 
indeed welcome an early and high level discussion with the State Department. I 
believe that this ought to take place in London rather than Washington. It is true 
that if it took place in Washington it would be easier to put across our case to a 
relatively large number of people in the State Department. On the other hand, if it 
took place in London we should, I believe, be able to make quite an impressive 
showing to the United States delegation. Quite apart from any discussions on 
particular United Nations or other issues, we could arrange for a whole series of 
people to meet the United States delegation and give them an account of what we are 
doing in the particular fields which interest them. From what I have heard from 
visitors to Washington this is the kind of meeting which the Americans themselves 
very much like and I believe that if a sufficiently high level American delegation came 
here we could do a lot of good by such a process of exposition. 
(2) If this procedure were to be adopted it would, I think, be necessary to give the 
Americans in advance an agenda of the subjects which we were intending to cover. I 
should want to give a good deal of thought to the African subjects which I should 
2E 
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suggest in such circumstances; but prima facie I believe that the following should be 
included:-
(a) Our constitutional policy in West Africa. What we are doing and planning in 
Nigeria, the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone can be fully and frankly explained to the 
Americans in a good deal of detail and I do not see how it could possibly fail to 
impress them. The only danger would arise if the American delegation included, as 
it well might, a member with direct experience of the British West African 
Territories. Such people tend to be more royalist than the King about British 
policy. 
(b) Our regional East and Central African policy and problems. Here we should 
seek to show the Americans that we are determined to safe~uard African interests 
and opportunities for African political advancement in the two regions, while at 
the same time securing as much as we can of the benefits of economic 
development on a regional basis. 
(c) Our policy in local government. Here there is a great deal to be said which 
would be new to most Americans in spite of the documentation which '"e send to 
the State Department. We could make an impressive showing of our plans and the 
progress now being made in many areas. 
(d) Our community development policy. This needs no comment. 
(e) Our policy in higher education. No doubt we should cover the whole Colonial 
Empire in this. 
(f) Education questions generally, including technical education. 
(g) Our plans for the improvement of African agricultural technique and org-
anisation. Here the Americans will have obtained a good deal of recent information 
from such travellers in Africa as the E.C.A. Agricultural Mission and Dr. 
Lowdermilk. We shall be on more difficult ground on this subject but could still, I 
think, make a pretty impressive showing. 
(h) Our plans and programme in trypanosomiasis research and the fight against 
tsetse. 
(i) Our successful measures against locust infestation. 
(j) Regional planning for research generally in Africa. 
The list is not intended to be exclusive. 
(3) It is important, as the Ambassador says, to be able to continue to keep the 
State Department informed of developments. In fact we already send them a great 
deal of information through the officer in the Embassy in London who deals with 
colonial questions. This channel would, I feel, be a good deal more effective if they 
would appoint a higher-powered officer. While we had Mr. Stratton Anderson1 the 
arrangements probably worked fairly well, although I doubt whether he cut much ice 
in Washington. Now we have a woman who is, I imagine, of lower status. They ought, 
I feel, to send somebody first-class to fill this post. My impression is that in view of 
the vast amount of reading matter current in the United States it is unlikely that 
from written reports the higher people in the State Department can get a very 
up-to-date impression of our policy and problems. Periodical discussions by means of 
visits to London or Washington would be much more effective in keeping the 
Americans informed. 
1 Waiter Stratton Anderson, second secretary and counsellor, US Embassy in London, 1946-1949. 
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(4) If it is as important as the Ambassador suggests to put across our point of view 
publicly in the United States- and no doubt he is right in this respect- then H.M.G. 
obviously ought to make more dollars available for this purpose. I understand that 
the British Information Services in the United States are hampered by a shortage of 
dollars. Very few lecturers can go to the United States at the present time. It is 
equally necessary that the Colonial Attache in Washington should be both raised in 
status and provided with a more adequate staff. I am well aware of the difficulties 
which have prevented this in the past. But if the job is to be done on a scale which its 
importance deserves the means must obviously be provided. 
(5) The point raised in paragraph 9 of the Ambassador's despatch is a difficult one. 
We cannot afford to cut adrift from the French in our relations with the United States 
over colonial questions. If the French felt that we were concerting a policy with the 
Americans without consulting them the effect on our relations with them would be 
deplorable. I have no doubt that it will be felt that in relation to the United Nations 
questions which will have to be discussed with the State Department (para. 6(0 of the 
Ambassador's despatch) we shall have to discuss our line with the French and 
Belgian Governments in advance. No doubt the actual discussions would take place 
separately in the respective capitals. (This is another argument for having the 
discussions in Europe rather than Washington) . Possibly Sir 0. Franks's point might 
be made by confining the concerting of our line to the United Nations questions 
alone and having quite separate discussions with representatives of the State 
Department, as suggested above, on the main lines of British colonial policy. 
I have sent a copy of this minute to Sir T. Lloyd. 
Sir T. Lloyd 
A.B.C. 
9.2.50 
As arranged in your absence, I saw Sir Oliver Franks this morning to discuss with 
him Anglo-American relations arising out of the particular subject of our attitude 
towards the United Nations on the Colonial question. It was just a tete-a-tete between 
the two of us . Sir 0. Franks started by making a number of cautionary reservations 
about what he was going to say, the main gist of which was that he had not himself 
taken any fi rst-hand part in the proceedings at Lake Success and that his information 
was second-hand information derived mainly from two sources, namely (a) indiv-
iduals in the State Department, some of them fairly highly placed; and (b) the Press 
and individual journalists and commentators. He was, therefore, quite prepared to be 
told that he had only got a one-sided view of the picture. He emphasised that he was 
not concerned and did not wish to intervene in the substance of our policy as such, 
but he was legitimately concerned with its -effect upon relations with the United 
States. The position seemed to have been deteriorating in this respect during the last 
year and he felt that if we followed substantially the same tactics at the next assembly 
as we had followed at the 1949 assembly this would lead to a further deterioration in 
our relations with the Americans which might spread from the Colonial to wider 
fields of collaboration. His main point seemed to be that in our presentation of our 
case at the United Nations we tended to be far too much legalistic and far too much 
on the defensive. We handled our case as able administrators but without proper 
regard to the political issues. There was insufficient rhetoric and we should do far 
better to make more of our positive achievements instead of niggling over the terms 
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of inconvenient resolutions. He suggested too that we might make more use of the 
technique of introducing counter resolutions to regain lost initiative. He referred 
briefly to the general American attitude towards the Colonial question, but did not 
say much more than in his despatch of the 14th January and certainly nothing that 
was new to us. 
2. I had not enough time to develop the Colonial Office case as fully as I should 
have wished, as Sir 0. Franks had another engagement afterwards and is leaving 
England to-day, but I made time to say a good deal. I explained that I was not now 
directly involved in United Nations affairs, but reminded him that from 1945 to 1947 
I had probably had greater experience than anyone of this subject as I had attended 
all the United Nations meetings from San Francisco up to the 1947 Assembly. I found 
it frankly a most frustrating task, but, before coming to details and tactics, I thought 
it well to make clear that there were certain points of principle which I regarded as 
being absolutely sacrosanct, and from which I did not think the Colonial Office 
would ever agree to be moved. The two points which I made were, first, that we were 
not going to recognise the principle of accountability to the United Nations for 
territories not placed under the international trusteeship system, and, secondly, that 
we were not going to consent to supply to the Secretary General information on 
political and constitutional developments, having regard to the history of Article 
73(e), of which I reminded him. I am glad to say that Sir 0. Franks entirely agreed 
with both these principles and said that he would certainly not wish to do anything 
that would embarrass us in standing firm upon them. (I ought perhaps to have added 
as a third major principle the necessity of preventing the Trusteeship Council 
intervening in the administration of the Trust territories, rather than exercising 
their role of supervision, but I am afraid I forgot this one. But I don't think it 
matters.) I pointed out to Sir 0. Franks that if the two principles I had mentioned 
were accepted that did not leave much room for manoeuvre, since almost every 
resolution introduced by the non-Colonial powers would be found to offend against 
one or other of them. In particular, I did not see how we could avail ourselves of the 
device of introducing counter resolutions to regain the initiative when the whole 
point of principle was that resolutions on these themes were contrary to the Charter 
in the first place. Sir 0. Franks admitted this difficulty. 
3. I said that while obviously he was properly concerned with the effect of our 
policy and tactics upon the American public and upon Anglo-American relations, the 
Colonial Office had to consider what would be the effect of any different policy upon 
the public opinion in Great Britain and in the Colonies themselves. I referred to the 
very outspoken remarks that had been made to us by Mr. Grantley Adams on this 
subject in 1948, and also to the recent motion in the Singapore Legislative Council. 
Sir 0. Franks admitted that this was a fair point. 
4. I said that in my view the whole of this difficulty arose from the attempt to 
consider Colonial problems in isolation from the similar problems of sovereign 
states, and developed the well-worn theme which I need not repeat here. This did, 
however, give me a cue to say that I felt the Colonial Office had legitimate grounds 
for complaint that they got so very little help, and indeed a good deal of hindrance, 
from the permanent officials of the Foreign Office. This showed itself in two ways. 
During the sessions of the United Nations, it was extremely difficult for the Colonial 
Office representative ever to get any sympathy or constructive support at our own 
delegation meetings because, quite frankly, the Foreign Office officials were not 
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interested in the Fourth Committee and regarded the Colonial question as being 
rather a nuisance. The Foreign Office view seemed to be that we could well afford to 
make gestures with the Colonial Empire in order to make their task in other 
committees easier. They seemed to think that this was "taking a broad international 
view", whereas the Colonial Office thought that it was a standpoint based on 
short-term expediency which ignored fundamental points of principle. At the same 
time, on the other side, when we did get the Minister of State to speak in the General 
Assembly he did so admirably, though, of course, still without affecting the voting 
because by the time that matters reached the final plenary session of the General 
Assembly the other delegations' minds were already made up. I referred particularly 
to the difficulty of getting the Foreign Office to collaborate with us in preparing 
comparable information about some of the more critical sovereign states. They only 
seem to be interested in counter-attacking the Soviet group. Although we did 
manage to get quite a lot of information from the Foreign Office Research 
Department, the Foreign Office itself was very luke-warm about giving us any help in 
this direction and were very reluctant to allow us to use any such information 
because it would hurt the feelings of Cuba or whoever it might be. Sir 0. Franks said 
that this was new to him and he thought the Colonial Office certainly ought to be 
entitled to rely upon the help of the Foreign Office in safeguarding the essential 
principles which I had outlined at the beginning. 
I said that I had studied Sir 0. Franks's despatch of the 14th January, and that we 
should be preparing a general commentary upon it for the Foreign Office. I thought 
that he had under-estimated the amount of publicity work that we were doing and I 
gave him some particulars of the close liaison which exists between us and the 
Americans both in London and in Washington. I referred to the presence of American 
officials at some of our summer schools, and to the good impressions gained by 
almost every American official that had visited parts of the Colonial Empire, e.g. the 
"three wise men". 
We did not get down to details about American investment, though I did have time 
to say quite briefly that we had gone into all this in an interdepartmental committee 
under the Treasury and that in our view the real difficulty was due partly to the fact 
that the Colonial field was unattractive to the private American investor, and partly 
to restrictions imposed by the Americans themselves ("tied loans"). 
All this was new to Sir 0. Franks, and he admitted, as I left the room, that his 
despatch of the 14th January was not based on his personal knowledge, but that, 
while of course he took full responsibility for everything that was said in it, it had 
been "drafted by the chaps". I did not think it proper to ask him whether he meant 
his chaps in Washington or whether he meant the chaps in the Foreign Office, but I 
should not be at all surprised if the material had not been sent out to him from the 
Foreign Office privately with a request that he might send in a despatch on these 
lines in order to help the Foreign Office in their battle against the Colonial Office. It 
is, incidentally, odd that a despatch of this kind should be sent from the British 
Embassy in Washington just during an interregnum between Colonial attaches. I 
cannot imagine that Mr. Sabben-Clare can ever have seen the draft or been consulted 
about its terms. On the whole, however, the discussion was extremely friendly, and I 
think I succeeded in showing Sir 0. Franks that a more forthcoming attitude by the 
Colonial Office was not so easy as might appear at first sight. It is, I think, 
satisfactory that he admitted to me that our basic principles were sound and that we 
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were entitled to the full support of the Foreign Office in safeguarding them. 
I am sending four copies of this minute to Mr. Martin for distribution within the 
Office as he thinks fit. 
A.H .P. 
14.2.50 
. .. I have had a good deal of discussion with the F.O. about the Colonial side of the 
talks with Mr. Dean Acheson.2 The F.O. are still engaged in a rapid exchange of 
telegrams with Washington on the subject of the talks generally. But the present 
position, so far as we in the Colonial Office are concerned, is as follows: 
(a) The Americans have proposed that the object and scope of the discussions as a 
whole should be "to clarify our fundamental common objectives in such a manner 
as to bring our separate and collective abilities most effectively to the solution of 
key specific problems" . Colonial issues will, of course, be only one part of the talks; 
but this quotation gives us the general setting in which they will be discussed. 
(b) The idea is that the talks will begin on an Anglo-American basis. At this stage 
there will be a brief discussion with Mr. Dean Acheson of general policy on 
Colonial questions in the United Nations for the guidance of later bilateral talks 
(see (d) below). 
(c) After a day or two of bilateral talks, the French will come in. So far as Colonial 
issues are concerned, the item in the tripartite Anglo-French-American talks will 
be the same as for the bilateral Anglo-American talks - i.e. a brief discussion of 
general policy on Colonial questions in the United Nations. 
(d) In the bilateral Anglo-American talks under (b) above, the idea is that U.K. 
Ministers should press Mr. Acheson to agree to the subsequent bilateral Anglo-
American talks on Colonial affairs on the official level being held in London. At 
present the Americans are thinking in terms of such talks being held in 
Washington; but the F.O. fully agree with us that it would be far better for the 
talks to be held in London. This will, of course, be our real field-day; and the object 
of the Ministerial talks with Mr. Acheson which, so far as Colonial matters are 
concerned, will obviously be confined to broad matters of principle only (and, as 
indicated above, will largely centre on policy towards the U.N.) will largely be to 
ensure that the American officials who come to London for the subsequent 
bilateral Colonial talks come with a readier understanding of our difficult ies in the 
U.N. and under a general directive from Mr. Dean Acheson as favourable as 
possible to our point of view. 
(e) The F.O. are now preparing a short draft paper for the consideration of 
Ministers on the question of tactics on Colonial issues in the U.N. This paper will 
be based on the conclusions reached in the discussion with Sir W. Strang. They 
hope to send us over the draft on Monday. As the time-table is so very tight, I have 
suggested to the F.O. that it may not be necessary to have a full Cabinet paper, but 
simply a submission to the Ministers directly concerned. The F.O. themselves 
favour this idea, but feel that the Prime Minister should also be consulted on the 
paper. I imagine this is right. 
(f) Once this paper has been approved by Ministers, the idea is that we should 
2 Dean G Acheson, US under-secretary of state, 1945-1947; secretary of state, 1949-1953. 
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have discussions with the French and Belgians on the question of tactics in the 
U.N., prior to the Ministerial talks with Mr. Dean Acheson. 
3. For the purpose of the Ministerial talks with Mr. Dean Acheson, we must 
prepare a brief for Ministers. I have ... discussed this with Mr. Blackburne and Mr. 
Evans,3 and Information Department and l.R.D. are collaborating in producing a 
memorandum which will set out 
(a) what we are aiming at in the Colonial Empire, in the fields of political, 
economic, social etc. development; and 
(b) what we have achieved so far, and what difficulties we are encountering.4 
Under (b) we will, of course, set out the difficulties caused by anti-colonialism in the 
U.N., and the dangers it represents for the attainment of the objectives of British 
colonial policy. We will endeavour to show that the Colonial Empire is at present 
passing through perhaps the most critical phase in its history and that the next few 
years are likely to be decisive for the success or otherwise of our colonial policy. We 
will emphasise that at this time more than any other outside interference of the type 
we could expect from Lake Success would be harmful and prejudicial, and explain 
why accountability to the U.N. (save in the limited field of the trust territories) would 
be retrograde and quite impracticable. We will then stress the tremendous import-
ance of the United States supporting us as a Colonial Power in the U.N., instead of 
hunting with the anti-colonial pack as they did at the last Assembly. In this 
connection we will also set out how far we are prepared to go in the direction of 
adopting more flexible tactics in the U.N. in the hope that Mr. Acheson will be able to 
indicate that, if we adopt these tactics, the United States will give us their full 
support in resisting any further U.N. encroachment upon our position and responsi-
bilities as a Colonial Power. 
4. We hope to have the draft of this paper ready by the middle of next week, so 
that the F.O. can add their own contribution to it. This will largely take the form of 
rubbing into the Americans how essential it is from the American point of view that 
nothing should be done to weaken us as a Colonial and Commonwealth Power, and 
indeed that it is in the Americans' own interest to lend us their full support in 
maintaining our position as the centre of the Commonwealth, and in pressing on 
with the full implementation of our Colonial policy free from harmful outside 
interference. We are drafting the memorandum in such a form that U.K. Ministers 
could, if they so wished, hand it to Mr. Acheson. Any purely domestic matters can 
then take the form of a separate short covering brief for Ministers. . .. 
A.N.G. 
14.4.50 
3 KW Blackburne and S H Evans, director and deputy director respectively of CO Information Service. 
4 See part 1 of this volume, 72. 
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188 CO 537/5698, no 66 3 May 1950 
'London Conferences: Anglo-American talks on colonial problems': 
note of a meeting in the FO of British and United States officials on 
major colonial issues1 
Agenda 
(a) Basic objectives of British Colonial policy. 
(b) Difficulties in the United Nations on Colonial Matters. 
(c) The future of Africa. 
(d) Economic development. 
1. Mr. Wright explained that the object of the sub-Committee should be to 
produce a paper which would be eventually considered by Mr. Bevin and Mr. Acheson 
identifying (a) the extent of Anglo-American agreement on the subject under 
discussion and (b) the points of disagreement. The sub-Committee should attempt to 
bridge any disagreements, but if it failed it should direct its efforts to minimising the 
effect of this disagreement on general policy. 
Mr. Wright observed that it was generally agreed that the United States and the 
United Kingdom have the same general objectives of policy, namely, to build up the 
strength and common unity of the free world. Both countries had common interests 
all over the world and thus our relationship had a very important bearing and in fact 
was a crucial factor in the stability of the free peoples of the world. We must therefore 
examine those areas in the world in which our views diverge and where, as a result of 
this disagreement, our unity of purpose is weakened. The Colonial field is one in 
which serious differences exist between our two countries. Yet the relations between 
Britain and her Colonies is a great factor in Britain's position in the world as a whole, 
and the United States also had certain "Colonial" responsibilities. 
Mr. Wright therefore suggested that the Committee should examine firstly, any 
major differences of approach on long-range objectives between the two countries; 
and secondly, the handling of Colonial matters in the United Nations by the 
Delegations of the two countries. The representatives of the two countries had 
elsewhere agreed that as a matter of principle it is undesirable that the United 
Kingdom and the United States should be at cross purposes in the United Nations. 
Discussion of Colonial matters in the United Nations has in the past given rise to 
serious differences between the two countries. Mr. Wright explained, however, that 
while the Committee should try to identify problems dividing the two countries so 
that the Committee could make its contribution to the discussions at Ministerial 
level, the details of these Colonial problems should be discussed in a future series of 
1 Present: FO M R Wright, assistant under-secretary of state (chairman), R Alien, head of African Dept 
(from Feb 1950), C C Parrott, head of UN (Political) Dept, D HT Hildyard, grade 8 officer, UN (Political) 
Dept; US State Dept RA Hare, deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian and African 
affairs, W Sanders, special assistant to the assistant secretary for UN affairs, L D Stinebower, director, 
Office of Financial and Development Policy; US Embassy, London J Pal mer, first secretary and counsellor, 
M J Tibbitts, attache; CO J M Martin, AB Cohen, AN Galsworthy, W A C Mathieson, counsellor for colonial 
affairs, UK delegation, New York, P A Carter, principal, Mediterranean Dept, A G Wilson, principal, 
International Relations Dept 'A'. In the original CO document, Sanders and Miss Tibbitts are named as 
Saunders and Tebbitts. These errors have been corrected in the text reproduced here. 
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talks concerned only with Colonial matters. These talks should preferably be held 
well before the 1950 General Assembly, and the British for their part hoped very 
much that they would be held in London so that individual experts on very many 
branches of British Colonial policy and administration would be available to 
contribute to them. 
2. Mr. Hare said that he hoped the sub-Committee would devote particular 
attention to Africa. The United States Government had been examining its attitude to 
Africa and attempting to work out a long-range policy which could be fitted into the 
general scheme of United States thinking on world affairs. They felt that this 
examination could only be satisfactorily concluded by an examination of African 
problems on the very widest basis and that it was essential to deal with much deeper 
and more fundamental problems than that of economic development. He agreed that 
the Committee should discuss United Nations problems and suggested that it should 
direct its attention principally to that point and to the future of Africa in all its 
aspects. 
3. Mr. Wright agreed with this programme and arrangements were made to 
secure Mr. Cohen's attendance at the meeting for the African discussions later in the 
meeting. Meanwhile, Mr. Wright felt, it could be useful if the Committee could study 
the question of the respective approaches of the United Kingdom and the United 
States to the basic aims of Colonial policy. 
4. Mr. Martin outlined the object of British Colonial policy as the development of 
self-government within the Commonwealth in conditions which would ensure to the 
peoples a fair standard of living and freedom from oppression from any quarter. He 
emphasised that this ideal did not imply self-government without qualification. If 
self-government were the aim without qualification it could be granted to every 
Colony tomorrow, but the result would simply be political chaos in the territories 
concerned. Very many urgent problems had to be solved, among them the 
establishment of satisfactory standards of health, education and production. It was 
not generally realised that the British had only been at work in most of the African 
territories for about half a century. At the time of our arrival there, the inhabitants of 
most of the territories which were now British Colonies were in a state much less 
advanced than that of the inhabitants of Britain at the time of the Roman invasion. 
Yet within 50 years some of these peoples had been brought to the verge of 
self-government and, in West Africa especially, the establishment of responsible 
self-government was very near. This rapid progress from pre-history to the 20th 
century inevitably placed many stresses and strains on African society and social 
outlook. The next five or ten years was therefore a very delicate period in the history 
of the territories concerned, and it was important both for ourselves, the African 
peoples and the world as a whole that Britain should not withdraw from its 
responsibilities in Africa too quickly, leaving a vacuum which would be filled by 
warring political factions and irresponsible extremist leaders. Our aim should be to 
leave behind us stable societies. 
5. Mr. Hare wished to make it quite clear that the United States Government does 
appreciate the serious responsibilities of the Colonial Powers in the territories 
dependent upon them. The "revolutionary" tradition in the United States still existed 
and, on occasions, tended to express itself, perhaps unfortunately. On the other 
hand, it was unlikely that the United States would be prepared to go to the opposite 
extreme and be completely uncritical of the activities of Colonial Powers. Their 
2F 
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balanced view was that the record of the Colonial Powers was one to be proud of. 
At the Conference of American representatives in Africa, which had recently been 
held at Louren~o Marques, a tentative conclusion had been reached as to the 
American view of the basic aim to be followed in relation to dependent peoples. This 
aim could be expressed as the progressive development of all dependent peoples to 
the goal of self-government and where suitable, independence. In certain backward 
areas, some sort of orderly and guided development to political maturity would be 
needed for a considerable time. In social and economic matters there was probably 
basic agreement as to aims between the United Kingdom and United States 
Governments. Mr. Stinebower said that the United States had been disappointed 
about the failure of negotiations between the International Bank and the Colonial 
Development Corporation, and had hoped that the International Bank would have 
been able to help in the economic development of the Colonies. Mr. Sanders 
confirmed that there was probably no difference in the United States and United 
Kingdom objectives for dependent peoples but that there might be some divergence 
as to timing and methods, especially in the United Nations where the two 
Governments were subject to pressure. The question of timing was very acute in that 
body, and the test there is not so much our objectives but how quickly we move 
towards thr.m. 
6. Mr. Hare suggested that before the subsequent talks referred to by Mr. Wright 
were begun, it might be useful to identify the differences between the two countries 
on United Nations issues so that we should approach the later talks with a common 
Agenda. Mr. Wright agreed with this suggestion and suggested that the Committee 
should now consider whether, in fact, there was any difference between the two 
countries on the basic objectives of Colonial policy. Mr. Martin explained that the 
aim he had already stated did not imply that there would be any coercion of 
dependent peoples to remain within the Commonwealth once they achieved 
self-government. It was in fact the hope of His Majesty's Government that such 
peoples would remain within the Commonwealth since a widening nucleus for a 
stable world society was thereby being gradually established. He hoped that the 
United States would understand that it was entirely up to the peoples concerned to 
decide whether or not they remained within the Commonwealth, and although, as he 
had said, H.M.G. hoped that they would, he realised that the United States could not 
be expected unreservedly to endorse this hope. He felt, however, that the United 
States might appreciate the value of maintaining and extending the strength of the 
Commonwealth and he hoped to that end that the use of the term "independence" in 
the American policy described by Mr. Hare was not interpreted by the United States 
as implying independence outside the Commonwealth. Mr. Sanders said that the 
United States certainly favoured some relationship between a metropolitan Power 
and its dependent territories which achieved self-government. It was the case, 
however, that some sections of opinion in the United States and in many other 
countries interpreted the word "independence" as meaning self-government outside 
the British Commonwealth. He did not think it was universally realised that fully 
self-governing members of the British Commonwealth were in fact completely 
independent. Mr. Wright observed that the United Kingdom would be glad if, when 
in talking on these matters the United States representatives would avoid a 
categorical and unqualified use of the word "independence" where it could be 
construed as meaning separation from the Commonwealth. Mr. Hare felt quite sure 
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that there was no material difference between the United Kingdom and the United 
States' view of the future of dependent peoples. The difference between our 
respective formulae was simply one of words and not of meaning, and difficulty arose 
not from any divergence of view between the United States and the United Kingdom 
on the interpretation of those formulas, but from the fact that other people tended to 
assume that the word "independence" meant in fact separation from the Common-
wealth. 
7. Difficulties in the United Nations on colonial matters 
Mr. Martin explained that the chief difficulty in the United Nations from the British 
point of view was that very many members of the General Assembly were attempting 
to establish a right of the Assembly to supervise the Colonial Powers in the 
administration of their dependent territories. He could understand that the advo-
cates of Colonial accountability took their stand on the moral view that one people or 
country should not be in a position to determine without supervision the destinies of 
any other people. Nevertheless the United Kingdom felt that in present world 
conditions such a view was unrealistic and was not prepared to compromise in its 
opposition to the idea of accountability as a matter of principle. Mr. Martin then went 
on to consider the question of accountability for those territories to which Chapter 
XI of the United Nations applies (non-self-governing territories other than trust 
territories). The United Kingdom acknowledged the desire of the advocates of 
accountability to bring discussion of Colonial affairs into the open and the United 
Kingdom was in fact quite prepared to accept that its conduct of Colonial affairs 
should be exposed to world opinion. But in fact, the anti-Colonial Powers in the 
United Nations wished to discuss and pronounce upon the information submitted 
under Article 73(e) and to this end they had attempted to establish a Special 
Committee to carry out this supervision and act as a permanent parallel to the 
Trusteeship Council. 
The United Kingdom felt that it would be a backward step to submit Colonies to 
international supervision at a time when devolution of authority to the peoples of 
those territories from London had progressed so far. An example of the incongruity 
of attempting to establish accountability to the United Nations arose in connection 
with the Colonial Application articles of the International Convention. The anti-
Colonial Powers alleged that we are trying to keep the benefits of international 
agreements away from our Colonial territories. This was untrue. The fact was that 
the United Kingdom Government was not in a position to apply International 
Agreements involving legislation to Colonial territories without the consent of the 
Legislatures of those territories, and this was especially true where unofficial 
majorities existed in those Legislatures. In short, the Colonial territories themselves 
and not His Majesty's Government had the right to decide whether or not 
International Agreements should be applied to those territories. It was true that the 
United Kingdom had reserved powers vested in the Governor and in His Majesty's 
Government itself, but in practice those powers are never used except in certain 
restricted cases. This state of affairs was a particular example of the fact that control 
from London over the whole range of Colonial affairs is now non-existent and 
impracticable. Control from Lake Success would be even less practicable. Furth-
ermore, he said, only eight of the Members of the United Nations had any experience 
of the administration of dependent peoples. This meant that the vast majority-51-
of members of the United Nations, if they exercise supervision over Colonial affairs, 
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would be invested with power with no concomitant responsibility . It was also 
unfortunately the case that very many members of the United Nations were strongly 
prejudiced against the United Kingdom and did not appreciate what we had and were 
achieving in the Colonies. We must accept the fact that this prejudice arose from 
historical or emotional sources, but it meant in practice that if our Colonial policies 
were subjected to supervision in the United Nations we should be in the position of a 
defendant before a prejudiced and ignorant jury. Again, unfortunately, decisions at 
Lake Success were not always reached on the merits of the case under review but in 
accordance with the dictates of political expediency and lobbying at Lake Success. 
For these reasons the United Kingdom could not consider accountability to a body 
which had shown itself to be irresponsible and unqualified to act as a judge on 
Colonial matters. 
8. Mr. Sanders agreed with Mr. Martin's identification of the problem. In practice 
the move to establish Colonial accountability was exemplified in the United Nations 
in three ways and there was a difference of opinion between the United Kingdom and 
the United States on each of these three points. They were: 
(a) The responsibility of the General Assembly for Colonial affairs: the United 
States had been instrumental in establishing the Special Committee for a period of 
three years; 
(b) The question of submission of political information under Article 73(e): the 
United States did in fact submit political information in respect of its dependent 
territories; 
(c) The question of who was to decide whether a people is or is not self-governing. 
Mr. Martin agreed that Mr. Sanders had defined the practical aspect of the main 
problems. Aspects (b) and (c) were largely interlocked. The legitimate and natural 
development of nationalism in Colonial territories inevitably lead to the emergence 
of extremist political leaders. If stability was to be maintained in the territories 
during the delicate period of transition to responsible self-government it was 
essential that the metropolitan Powers should keep a firm grip on the political 
situation and prevent the perversion of nationalist sentiments by these extremist 
leaders. But if the political affairs of Colonies were to be discussed in the General 
Assembly in an atmosphere of ignorance and prejudice it was inevitable that 
subversive elements in the territories would be encouraged. On occasions in the past, 
the British had formed the impression that there had been a deliberate United States 
policy of appearing as the champion of dependent peoples in order to attract these 
peoples away from leaning towards the Soviet Union. In the British view such 
implicit encouragement of extremist forces was very dangerous and, in fact, futile 
since the Soviet Bloc could always outbid the western democracies by reason of the 
fact that it had no responsibility for administration in the territories concerned and 
that its ends were best served by political confusion. Mr. Martin agreed that the 
establishment of the Special Committee was a practical example of attempts to 
implement the idea of accountability. It may well be that the Special Committee was 
a better forum for the discussion of Colonial Affairs than the Fourth Committee, but 
the fact remains that it and its deliberations provided a continuing focus for the 
activities of anti-Colonial Powers. The United Kingdom had been especially disturbed 
by the fact that, on United States initiative, the functions of the Special Committee 
had been extended to include studies of the three functional fields covered by Article 
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73(e). In the British view, the Special Committee was quite the wrong body to give 
advice on technical matters such as education: the proper forum for the discussion of 
such matters was in the relevant Specialised Agencies. 
Mr. Wright said that for the present the sub-Committee might confine itself to the 
definition of the differences between the two countries and that those differences 
could be discussed in detail at the later talks. 
9. Mr. Sanders said that the United States felt that if the General Assembly was 
given more information on Colonial matters the position of the Administering 
Powers would be considerably eased. The difference between the United Kingdom 
and the United States in the United Nations lay mainly in the difference of their 
respective approaches to the Assembly. He felt that we must face the fact that of the 
59 Members of the General Assembly, only 8 were administering powers and that 
therefore 51 members of the Assembly were ignorant of Colonial problems. Our aim 
should be to acknowledge this fact and attempt to take control of and direct the 
majority of those 51 members to a more responsible outlook. So far as the 
submission of political information is concerned, Mr. Sanders agreed that legally the 
Administering Authorities were not required to submit such information. But the 
United States felt that no harm could be done in submitting it and that in fact its 
submission would be positively helpful in the educative process he had suggested. He 
admitted that there may be other methods of approach than this of the United 
States-that of the United Kingdom, for instance, was to oppose any attempt to 
discuss the political affairs of non-self-governing territories. But he felt that the 
source of the difference between the two countries lay in their judgement of how to 
handle the Assembly. The United States believed that if it had voted against the 
establishment of the Special Committee, Administering Powers would have been 
faced with a permanent Committee. As it was, the United States accepted the 
establishment of a Committee for three years in the belief that we could gradually 
guide the Assembly onto the right lines, and that part of this educative process could 
be carried out by discussion of Colonial issues in the Special Committee. 
Mr. Hare explained that Mr. Sanders had outlined what had hitherto been United 
States thinking on these subjects. But he wished to stress that now the United States 
had a perfectly open mind on these problems and wished particularly to have a good 
look round the problems at later talks so as to arrive at a solution of as many of them 
as possible. Mr. Wright and Mr. Martin both agreed that this was precisely what the 
United Kingdom hoped to get out of the subsequent talks. Mr. Martin explained that 
although the United Kingdom was not prepared to compromise on the principle of 
accountability to the United Nations for Colonial affairs, he felt that discussion of the 
tactics employed by our respective countries in the United Nations would serve a 
most useful purpose. 
10. Summing up, Mr. Wright said that the Paper which the sub-Committee 
would put forward for the consideration of Ministers should make the point that our 
two countries were basically agreed on the objectives of Colonial policy though the 
wording in which each expressed this aim may differ; and that Ministers should be 
informed that it was intended to hold subsequent talks at which the following 
subjects would be discussed: 
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(a) Problems arising from Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter (Non-Self-
Governing Territories). 
(b) Accountability to the United Nations on Colonial issues. 
(c) Submission of Political Information under Article 73(e). 
(d) Who decides whether a people is non-self governing or otherwise. 
Mr. Wright also suggested that Ministers be advised that later talks should be held as 
soon as possible. 
11. Turning to the question of Trusteeship, Mr. Martin observed that the 
atmosphere in the Trusteeship Council had recently improved and he expressed the 
thanks of the United Kingdom to the United States for their sympathetic attitude at 
the Sixth Session of the Council. It was the case, however, that difficulties still 
existed between our two countries when trusteeship matters were discussed in the 
General Assembly. The core of these difficulties lay in the need for a definition of the 
respective duties of the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council towards Trust 
Territories. The United Nations' proper function in this respect was to supervise the 
development of Trust Territories , but it had shown an increasing tendency to try to 
interfere in the actual administration of the territories and especially to establish the 
principle of prior consultation, i.e. to require that administering authorities, before 
putting into practice any particular policy in a trust territory, should seek the prior 
approval of the General Assembly to that intention. It was impossible for Administer-
ing Authorities to administer Trust Territories under such conditions and the 
General Assembly must trust the Authorities to carry out their task conscientiously 
in accordance with the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement. A particular example of 
this tendency arose in connection with the General Assembly's flag resolution. The 
flying of the United Nations flag alongside the flag of the Administering Authority in 
a Trust Territory would imply that the United Nations shared with the Administering 
Authority responsibility for the administration of the territory. This was not, in fact, 
the case and the flying of the two flags could only lead to confusion in the minds of 
the local people. Conversations he had had with Colonial Service officers from 
Tanganyika confirmed that this belief, which was the fundamental reason behind the 
United Kingdom objection to the flag resolution, was well founded. Mr. Galsworthy 
observed that a further problem arising from the existence of Trusteeship was that of 
the relation between the functions of the General Assembly and the Trusteeship 
Council in respect of Trust Territories. In correspondence between the United 
Kingdom and the State Department on the flag resolution it became clear that there 
was a fundamental difference of viewpoint on these relative functions. The United 
Kingdom was convinced that the Trusteeship Council was free to record its opinion 
independently of any expressed by the General Assembly. The State Department on 
the other hand, thought that the Trusteeship Council was obliged to follow the 
instructions of the General Assembly on any matter affecting Trust Territories. Mr. 
Parrott observed that it was implicit in this attitude that the idea of parity between 
Administering Powers and non-Administering Powers upon which the membership 
of the Trusteeship Council was based would be invalidated since any decision arrived 
at in the Council could be overborne in the General Assembly, and similarly, any 
measure passed against the wishes of the Administering Authorities in the General 
Assembly would also be endorsed in the Trusteeship Council since if the State 
Department's attitude were to be accepted the Administering members of the 
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Council would be unable to record their disapproval of this measure. 
Mr. Sanders agreed that the points of difference had been well defined and could 
be discussed in detail at the subsequent talks. He did not wish to comment upon 
them at present and felt that they could be stated as follows:-
(a) The problem of distinguishing between supervision and administration of 
Trust Territories. 
(b) The division of power between the Trusteeship Council and the General 
Assembly. 
Mr. Alien said that it might be useful to consider the situation arising from the fact 
that Italy, though not a member of the United Nations, was now an Administering 
Authority. Italy had a certain amount of influence with the Latin American States 
and it may be that the United States and the United Kingdom by enlisting Italy's 
support could thereby attempt to influence the attitude of the Latin American States 
to Colonial and Trusteeship matters. 
Africa 
(Mr. Cohen joined the sub-Committee for discussion of this item of the Agenda). 
12. Mr. Hare explained that the American object in placing this item on the 
Agenda was to put before the United Kingdom recent United States thinking on 
Africa. In the past the United States had tended to base its policy on expediency, that 
is, its actions had not conformed to any long term plan of policy, but had been the 
product of pressures applied on the State Department at any given moment, for 
example, in connection with problems in the Near East. It was only recently that the 
United States had begun to develop its long term thinking on South East Asia. Africa 
also is one of the areas with a future in which the United States wished to develop a 
continuing interest. The United States therefore felt that it would be most helpful if 
United States and United Kingdom thinking on Africa could be lined up. Over the 
past year, the United States had given a good deal of thought to the problem of Africa 
and he offere,d the following very tentative ideas which had been worked out over that 
period and set out for the first time at the Conference of American officials at 
Louren<;o Marques:- , 
(a) While the United States had always realised to some extent the problems 
facing the Metropolitan Powers in Africa he could say that now there was positive 
appreciation on the part of the United States of the great difficulties to be dealt 
with in Africa and the achievements of the Metropolitan Powers in solving those 
difficulties. 
(b) It is the common interest of the western powers to have in Africa conditions of 
political, economic and social stability sufficient to resist domination by 
unfriendly movements or powers either through aggression or subversion. 
Long-range as well as short-range stability should be the object. 
(c) The United States believes that the advancement of the social, political, 
economic and educational condition of the African peoples and of harmonious 
relations between the Africans themselves and between the Africans and the 
Governments with which they are associated is to be desired. 
(d) The United States believes in the advancement of the economic and, where 
suitable, the strategic advantages to France and the United Kingdom of their 
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Colonies and Trust Territories. The United States expects that equal economic 
treatment will be given to American capital and American nationals who engage in 
trade in the African Colonial areas. 
(e) The United States favours the progressive development of all dependent 
peoples towards the goal of self-government and the development of dependent 
territories, where conditions are suitable, towards independence. The United 
States is sympathetic to the efforts which the French and British Governments 
have taken towards the development of such conditions. 
(f) The United States favours the strengthening of the relationship between the 
Metropolitan Powers and the Colonial territories so long as the people within the 
territories desire such development. 
(g) The United States believes that an increase in total African production and 
trade and greater participation of Africa in world trade will be beneficial not only to 
Europe and the United States but to the African peoples. In so far as possible the 
United States is prepared to assist the United Kingdom and France in their efforts 
towards this goal. 
(h) The United States wishes to develop its trade, transportation and investment 
interests whenever and wherever possible and practicable. The United States 
desires to have access to raw materials, air and sea facilities, air routes and 
communications points and to guaranteed right of equal economic treatment in 
the African Colonial territories. 
(i) The United States believes that the possibilities of European immigration to 
Africa should be carefully studied with due regard to the serious social, political, 
economic problems which such immigration may create.2 
(j) With regard to United Nations activities affecting Africa, the United States will 
give careful consideration to the views of the Metropolitan Powers in determining 
what position the United States may adopt on specific issues. At present this 
matter is being carefully studied. 
(k) The United States desires the fullest possible mutual co-operation and 
understanding with the United Kingdom and France on African matt~rs and their 
understanding of the United States. The United States assures France and the 
United Kingdom that whatever may be United States interests with regard to 
Africa, it is the United States desire that they be co-ordinated with France and the 
United Kingdom. 
Mr. Hare wished especially to emphasise the duality of the United States approach 
to African problems-their desire to further and assist the interests of the indigenous 
peoples and the Metropolitan Powers alike-and also the fact that the United States 
had no national aspirations in Africa: they sought only to increase Africa's 
contribution to the stability of the world. 
13. Mr. Cohen said that his first impression was that the United Kingdom would 
be in general agreement with every one of the points made by Mr. Hare and felt 
certain that when those points were examined in detail, complete identity would be 
found to exist between the two countries. But, he felt, much more than a general 
alignment of policy on African problems was required. It was essential that a careful 
examination of detailed policies and their application should be made and this could 
2 Galsworthy noted against (i) in the margin: 'The American delegation also made it clear that they did not 
regard Africa as a convenient dumping-ground for surplus Italian (or other European) manpower! A.N.G.' 
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only be done in lengthy discussions which, he felt, were now very much overdue. At 
such talks the United Kingdom would explain in detail what it proposed to do in 
Africa. For the moment he did not wish to enter into details on these issues, though 
later he would want particularly to show what our long term objects in political and 
economic spheres in Africa involved. He emphasised particularly the danger of short 
term expediency. In the political sphere in West Africa the United Kingdom was often 
criticised for pursuing short term ends. But this was not true, our policy there was 
the only one likely to keep British West Africa inside the western world and to 
maintain tranquil relations with the territories at a time when self-government was 
very near, but when technical assistance was still badly needed by the emerging 
peoples. It should not be overlooked also that when self-government has been 
achieved by these peoples they would wish to unite with other peoples, for example, 
under French control. We ourselves hoped that the West African peoples would stay 
within the Commonwealth but it was entirely for them to decide how they would 
approach the question of union with adjoining territories. Sooner or later some sort 
of rapprochement between French and British territories on this question would be 
needed. Mr. Cohen said that the United Kingdom would particularly like to discuss in 
detail our political policy in Africa which we believed was the only possible policy to 
secure the future stability of the territories and the prevention of the spread of 
communism. In carrying out such a policy, only strength in the Metropolitan Powers 
would secure the support of moderate peoples and prevent the usurpation of political 
power by extremist oligarchy. World opinion, and above all United States opinion, 
can exercise a great influence on this process and assist especially in restraining and 
eventually defeating extremist and subversive elements. In East Africa problems were 
rather different. Though the territories themselves may in some cases be more 
developed industrially and economically than in West Africa, the Africans themselves 
were more backward. Although European immigration had been to some extent 
encouraged in the past, it seemed clear that a limit to this immigration was now 
being reached unless we were prepared to grant self-government to the territories at 
a time when the Africans were not in a position to take their full share in local 
administration. Our main problem was to narrow the gap between Africans and the 
non-Africans and this would probably prove to be a lengthy process. We shall be in 
future under constant pressure from Europeans for more political progress and since 
the African policies of the United Kingdom and South Africa inevitably clash it was 
possible that Europeans in East Africa may look to South Africa for support. At 
present our policy in Africa must be to safeguard the Africans, but in future it may be 
that we would have to secure the place of the Europeans and Asians in East Africa in 
the face of developing African participation in political and economic institutions. 
Although our aim in East Africa was the same as in West Africa, namely, the 
development of the territories towards responsible government inside the Common-
wealth, the steps by which that aim could be achieved were not so clear. The 
presence of the stratified racial communities presented us with an almost insoluble 
problem since unless we could assure security to the various communities within the 
self-governing territories the result would be mutual racial suspicion and disintegra-
tion of political institutions. 
Mr. Hare said that United States officials would welcome full and detailed talks on 
African problems outside the sub-Committee and also outside the present formal 
London Conferences. 
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It was agreed that Mr. Cohen and representatives of the United States should hold 
an informal talk on African problems on the lOth May.3 
Economic development 
14. Mr. Mathieson considered that since the sub-Committee was primarily 
concerned with identifying points for special consideration by Ministers, it was only 
necessary at this stage to review briefly the aspects of Colonial economic develop-
ment which were of Anglo-American interest. In most cases it would be found that 
consultative machinery was already in existence and operating. He pointed out that 
such problems (which were to a considerable extent linked with the Western 
Hemisphere/Sterling Area problem) were receiving consideration in the Tripartite 
Continuing Committee in Washington and were, moreover, under discussion with 
the Economic Co-operation Administration in London and Paris. Among the 
European Colonial powers themselves there had been considerable consultations on 
these same problems, commencing soon after the end of the war and continuing 
both without and within the machinery set up by the Organisation for European 
Economic Co-operation. 
It was the view of His Majesty's Government that the principal way in which the 
United States could help in the economic development of Colonial territories was by 
taking all governmental action possible to provide a stable and remunerative market 
for Colonial primary products. By far the most important of these were tin and 
rubber. The prosperity of these industries was vital to the economic position of 
Malaya, and their dollar earnings were of the greatest importance to the sterling 
area's balance of payments. Support for these industries was a natural and effective 
way of strengthening the economy of the Colonial Empire and was of greater value to 
us than short-term assistance in the form of dollar grants or other temporary 
expedients. 
Mr. Mathieson outlined the difficulties which the United Kingdom had experi-
enced in making use of the forms of assistance made available by E.C.A. for the 
purpose of accelerating Colonial development, remarking that he hoped this 
experience might prove useful in relation to the Fourth Point programme. The 
failure to make extensive use of E.C.A. technical assistance for the Colonies had not 
been due to lack of appreciation of a generous offer but to the problems inherent in 
any effort to apply American technical skill to underdeveloped countries. In the first 
place, neither the United Kingdom nor E.C.A. have considered it appropriate to ask 
American experts to fill routine vacancies in the normal technical establishments; for 
these posts men were required who would serve for long periods and would therefore 
get to know both the Government machine with which they worked and the people 
for whom they worked. Recruitment for these posts of British subjects was steadily 
improving as training establishments in the United Kingdom filled the gap caused by 
the suspension of training during the war years. It was generally agreed that the 
right way to use American experts was to engage them for a limited time to attack 
special problems, where the intensive application of special skills over relatively 
short periods was required. There was no doubt that such problems existed in very 
large numbers in the Colonial territories. It was not enough, however, to find the 
American expert and have his basic dollar salary paid by the United States. Under 
3 Galsworthy noted in the margin: 'The Americans were subsequently obliged to call this off. A.N.G.' 
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E.C.A. procedures, and no doubt also under the Fourth Point programme, quite 
substantial sterling sums have to be found in addition for transport, local allowances, 
facilities in the form of housing and laboratory accommodation, and ancillary 
technicians to work with the expert and apply the results of the work when he has 
gone. All this has meant that the experts could not be employed unless there were 
sufficient supporting resources of men, money and materials, in the territories 
concerned, and here questions of priority have arisen for Colonial administrations. 
In all territories careful plans have been made to use the resources which exist to the 
best advantage; it has been only in exceptional cases that Colonial Governments have 
been in a position to reorganise their programmes to tit in American experts. Nor has 
experience shown that these experts exist in unlimited numbers, of the high 
qualifications required to perform the special assignments for which they were 
sought. The problem was more complex than one of simply finding an American 
technologist and paying his basic salary. 
As regards the second form of current E.C.A. assistance, that of providing 
equipment for development projects, the United Kingdom's efforts to use the funds 
earmarked for this purpose were being defeated by the very success of the European 
Recovery Programme. E.C.A. was prepared to find dollars for equipment required 
from the U.S.A. but had to be satisfied that the equipment could not be obtained 
elsewhere than in the U.S.A. United Kingdom production (not to mention other 
European production) was now reaching a level at which there was very little 
equipment which could not be obtained here for Colonial development projects. An 
analysis of a range of economic projects which at first sight appeared to have a large 
dollar element has revealed that that part of the cost which must be met in dollars 
was at the most about 8%. An examination of the whole field of Colonial development 
would probably reveal that the dollar element over-all was as low as 2%. It was 
therefore apparent that little use could be made of a form of assistance limited 
exclusively to the purchase of essential requirements from the dollar area. 
Finally, Mr. Mathieson mentioned the problem of bringing U.S. external invest-
ment, both institutional and private, to bear on economic development in the 
Colonies, with particular reference to some earlier remarks by Mr. Stinebower 
concerning the disappointment felt in U.S. Government circles on the failure of the 
loan negotiations between the Colonial Development Corporation and the Interna-
tiortal Bank. The problem inherent in accelerated Colonial development was not now 
primarily a monetary problem, as he had attempted to indicate in his comments on 
E.C.A. assistance. The difficulties that arose in the case of E.C.A. assistance applied 
similarly to loans from the Export-Import Bank which were tied to purchases in the 
U.S.A., and to loans from the International Bank which was inhibited by its articles 
from permitting the expenditure of its loans for purchases in the currency of the 
borrower. It was the U.K's experience that even the potential U.S. private investor, 
who was in any case not attracted by the low and often deferred return on the basic 
development which is the primary requirement in most Colonial territories, usually 
made it a condition that a part or the whole of the capital provided by him should be 
spent on the importation of equipment from the U.S., even though such equipment 
could very often be obtained no less advantageously from the sterling area or from 
soft currency sources. What was required was assistance made available in the form 
of funds which could be used anywhere in the world. 
In reply Mr. Stinebower expressed his appreciation of the difficulties occasioned by 
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"tied" loans, and remarked that the Export-Import Bank had in fact made a few 
loans which could be regarded in some measure as "untied", although the relaxation 
was relatively slight. He referred generally to the studies on the development of 
under-developed territories at present being pursued by the Economic and Social 
Council as evidence of world-wide interest in this problem and stated that the U.S. 
Government was also giving considerable attention to it. He noted that the question 
of tin would be discussed separately and expressed the view that adequate machinery 
existed for Anglo-United States discussion of the other issues raised. 
In discussion the Sub-Committee were of the opinion that in the case of two issues 
on which further consultation was desirable-the support of the market in tin and 
the mobilisation of U.S. external investment-the former was covered by special 
arrangements for consultation outside the field of the present Conference and the 
latter could be left to the Tripartite Continuing Committee. 
It was agreed that the sub-Committee should confine itself to noting the existence 
of these problems and drawing the attention of Ministers to them. 
Future talks 
15. Mr. Wright said the United Kingdom hoped that the subsequent talks to be 
held between the two countries on Colonial affairs would cover the whole field of 
Colonial problems, including Africa and economic problems and would not be 
confined simply to problems arising from the United Nations' interest in the 
Colonies. Mr. Hare said that the United States had hitherto thought that the later 
talks would be confined to the United Nations point only and he would like to refer 
back to Washington to discover whether the other subjects mentioned by Mr. Wright 
should be included. He emphasised that the United States would not wish to delay 
talks on the United Nations questions if it were not found practicable to include other 
subjects at the same time. After United Kingdom representatives had emphasised 
that it would be difficult to consider United Nations problems satisfactorily except 
against the background of our other and especially African Colonial problems, Mr. 
Hare agreed to seek instructions from Washington as to the scope of the subsequent 
talks. As to the timing of the talks, the United Kingdom representatives suggested 
the period lOth to the 20th June in London and the United States representatives 
agreed to refer this question to Washington also. Mr. Hare pointed out that hitherto 
the United States had felt that the talks should be held in Washington but in view of 
the United Kingdom request that they be held in London so that experts on every 
aspect of Colonial affairs would be able to contribute, he would ask the State 
Department to give consideration also to the place at which the talks were to be held. 
On the question of the form of the later talks, in reply to a request from Mr. Martin 
for information as to whether the talks would be bipartite or quadripartite, Miss 
Tibbitts said that the United States had been thinking of bipartite talks between the 
United States and France, Belgium and the United Kingdom, the talks being held 
consecutively with each Metropolitan Power. 
At the end of the meeting the American representatives were handed a paper 
prepared by the United Kingdom officials setting forth United Kingdom views on the 
subjects discussed by the sub-Committee.4 
4 See part I of this volume, 72. 
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189 CO 537/5701, no 25 7 June 1950 
'The United Kingdom and the UN': FO memorandum for Permanent 
Under-Secretary's Committee [Extract] 
The United Nations and British objectives 
The purpose of this paper is to try to assess the profit and loss accruing to the United 
Kingdom from her membership of the United Nations. 
2. The high hopes placed on the United Nations in 1945 have not been fulfilled. At 
that time His Majesty's Government officially regarded the United Nations as the 
cornerstone of their foreign policy. Now it is clear that many of the objectives of 
British foreign policy are being pursued independently of the United Nations and 
some indeed, perhaps in spite of it. 
3. The major objectives in the medium term of British foreign policy at present 
may be said to be: 
(a) Maintenance of peace, provided always in the last resort that British vital 
interests are not put in jeopardy. 
(b) Maintenance of the United Kingdom's position as a world power and as the 
leading partner in the Commonwealth. 
(c) Specially close relations with the United States of America. 
(d) Resistance to the expansion of Kremlin-inspired Communism, leading to 
(e) Consolidation of the free, non-Communist world. 
(0 Political and economic stability in the Middle East. 
(g) A stable and prosperous Asia friendly to the West. 
4. Pursuit of these objectives does not preclude ultimate attainment of an 
effective world security system based on the Unjted Nations. Clearly this goal is still 
very far distant and His Majesty's Government cannot yet rely on the United Nations 
to this extent. But this conclusion does not answer the question whether, on balance, 
in the British view the United Nations in its present form plays a useful contributory 
role or is merely a tiresome encumbrance of the international stage, and whether, 
again on balance, it may be said to assist the attainment of the objectives of British 
foreign policy .... 
Conclusions 
57. (a) On balance the existence of the United Nations is an asset to United 
Kingdom policy because:-
(i) it aims at encouraging the growth of international cooperation for many 
purposes but, above all, for the maintenance of peace; 
(ii) it encourages United States and Commonwealth interest in world affairs and 
assists the United States Government in pursuing a forward foreign policy; 
(iii) it provides a way of presenting to the peoples of Asia and the Middle East 
schemes which, if presented outside the United Nations, might be suspect as an 
attempt to impose Western supervision; 
(iv) it has forced the Western Powers to meet the Soviet propaganda challenge, 
on the whole with advantage to themselves, and it has thereby enabled them to 
expose Soviet aims and policy before a world-wide audience. 
(v) it is a forum in which political and economic matters of world-wide 
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importance can be discussed and is often the best place for reaching a solution of 
international problems. 
(b) The advantages of the United Nations to United Kingdom policy are limited by 
the following main factors:-
(i) ideological disputes between the Soviet bloc and other nations not only 
hamper effective practical action, but also to some extent discourage those who 
hope to see the Organisation lead to effective cooperation between really united 
nations; 
(ii) the possibility, under the system of "one State, one vote", for small nations 
to exert an undue influence may endanger the ability of the United Kingdom and 
Commonwealth to preserve their essential interests from United Nations 
interference, particularly when, as is so often the case, many countries cast their 
votes, not on the merits of the case at issue, but as a result of a bargain behind 
the scenes; 
(iii) the hopes placed by the United States opinion on the United Nations 
sometimes lead the United States Government to regard the theoretical claims 
of the United Nations more highly than the practical interests of the Western 
Powers. (Such an attitude would be particularly dangerous if it led the United 
States Government in an emergency to put their obligations to the Security 
Council higher than their obligations to their Atlantic allies). 
(c) The following action should help to limit these adverse factors :-
(i) The United Nations should be encouraged to concentrate on work likely to 
produce concrete results, particularly in the social and economic sphere. 
(ii) Constant consideration should be given to the possibility of securing useful 
and practical results in any given discussion in the United Nations, and these 
possibilities should as a general rule take priority over the prosecution of the 
ideological conflict. 
(iii) The United Kingdom should consult constantly with all other like-minded 
Powers to frame their policy at the United Nations so that the organisation will 
contribute to Western consolidation (including the under-developed non-
Communist countries). 
(iv) Efforts should be made to avoid being driven onto the defensive on colonial 
questions. For this purpose it may be necessary to adopt a less uncompromising 
attitude and to avoid raising unnecessarily matters which invite attack. 
(v) Representation on delegations should wherever possible include Ministerial 
spokesmen and, on colonial questions, representatives of the Colonial Empire. 
(vi) A thorough reform should be instituted to reduce the number of subordin-
ate bodies (particularly under the Economic and Social Council) which do not 
produce effective action. 
(vii) Efforts should be made to improve the quality of the Secretariat and to 
reduce its total numbers. 
(viii) The United Kingdom representatives should maintain constant vigilance 
to ensure that the expenses of the United Nations are kept as low as is consistent 
with efficiently achieving its aims. 
(d) While every effort should be made on these lines to further the general 
objectives of the Western Powers (including the Atlantic Powers and Common-
[190) COLLABORATION AND CRITICISM 481 
wealth countries) this policy should not be pushed to such a point that the Soviet 
Union and its satellites are forced out of the United Nations. 
190 CO 537/5699, no 89A 16 June 1950 
[Colonial questions in the UN]: minutes of a CO meeting with Mr 
Younger (F0) 1 
Mr. Griffi.ths opened the Meeting by suggesting that Mr. Younger's letters of the 31st 
May should form the basis of discussion. He asked Mr. Younger to open the 
discussion. 
Mr. Younger said that it was essential that we should gain the support of the 
moderate members of the United Nations, especially the United States and the 
Commonwealth countries, for our attitude on Colonial questions. We should, 
therefore, go to Washington with a positive policy, and be as forthcoming as possible 
in our talks with the Americans. 
Mr. Griffi.ths said that he was in general agreement with the Foreign Office point of 
view. The United Kingdom was undoubtedly the most progressive of the Colonial 
Powers, but had been depicted as the most reactionary. We had to face an ideological 
battle in the world, especially in the Colonies. The Communist Party worked by 
getting other bodies to pass resolutions on the lines they desired, and remaining in 
the background themselves. If they could get the United Nations to pass resolutions 
helpful to them, this would be a great triumph for them. He agreed that so far we had 
been far too much on the defensive, and that in future we ought to put our case 
across positively. The next ten years would be very difficult ones for us as a Colonial 
Power, and indeed in many places it might be touch and go. All over Africa tension 
was rising. It was therefore essential that we should put our case across well in the 
United States [sic], and that we should secure the maximum support from the more 
reasonable and moderate members. 
Mr. Griffiths then turned to the points raised by Mr. Younger in his letter of the 
31st May: 
1. Accountability to the United Nations in respect of non-self-governing territories 
other than trust territories 
Mr. Griffi.ths and Mr. Younger agreed there could be no question of accepting the 
principle of accountability to the United Nations, and the question was therefore one 
of presentation. 
Mr. Martin said that the best line seemed to be to stress that accountability would 
be a backward step, since control of their own affairs was being rapidly devolved upon 
the Colonies themselves. 
Mr. Younger said that it was important to avoid giving the impression of lecturing 
to other members of the United Nations, or of concentrating all the time on our 
experience and their inexperience. 
1 Present: CO Mr Griffiths, Mr Dugdale, J M Martin, AN Galsworthy: FO Mr Younger (minister of state), 
M R Wright, C C Parrott, D H T Hildyard. 
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' 2. The Special Committee on information transmitted under Article (73(e) 
Mr. Younger said that the Soviet Union had walked out of all United Nations bodies 
when defeated on the question of Chinese Representation, and that all the other 
members of the United Nations, and the United Kingdom in particular had stated 
that this was an intolerable way to behave. It would, therefore, be very embarrassing 
for us to walk out of any United Nations body ourselves because we did not agree with 
the line the majority were taking. 
Mr. Griffiths agreed that withdrawal, although it might be desirable for many 
reasons, would put us in a very embarrassing and difficult position. He was not sure, 
however, that he agreed with Mr. Younger's suggestion that we should be repre-
sented by a very junior official, since in that case we might well have the worst of 
both worlds. Nor would it be desirable for our representative to be much junior to 
the United States representative. 
Mr. Martin said that it would probably be better to remain in the Committee, but 
our representative should be some one capable of meeting criticism; if he remained 
silent, the effect both at home and in the Colonies would be very bad. He suggested 
that Mr. Fletcher-Cooke from the United Kingdom Delegation in New York should be 
our main representative, and that he should be assisted by Mr. Ward of the 
Educational Branch, who would be very good at putting over our positive achieve-
ments and plans. Their role, of course, would not be an easy one. Mr. Martin 
suggested that, if we did continue to participate in spite of the embarrassment it 
would cause us, this would be a concession to the United States, and therefore 
possibly could be used as a bargaining counter. 
It was agreed that the United Kingdom should continue to participate in the 
Special Committee, and should adopt as positive an attitude as possible. Since this 
would to some extent be a concession to the United States, we should ask in return 
that they should give us as much support as they could. 
3. The submission of political and constitutional information 
Mr. Younger said that we should not miss opportunities of putting ourselves in the 
most favourable light. It was just in the political field that we had most to show, and 
we had a very good case to put over. The information was available anyway in the 
United Nations Library. 
Mr. Martin said that if information was transmitted formally it would immediately 
become a subject of debate. As things were we could say that any discussion of 
political questions was ultra vires, but if political information had been specially 
tabled, we could not use this argument. 
Mr. Galsworthy said that we could send political information to each member of 
the United Nations without any damage being done, as once we tabled it it would be 
debated. If we submitted short outlines as had been suggested, the Anti-Colonial 
Powers would not be satisfied, and would only think that we were weakening. 
Mr. Martin said that although our record was very good, constitutional questions 
were our most vulnerable point, since whatever we did, there were bound to be 
groups who were never satisfied. 
Mr. Griffiths said that he realised that we might be in a difficult position in our 
talks with the Americans, since the United States did, in fact, transmit political 
information. 
Mr. Martin said that during the London Conferences the United States did not 
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press us to transmit political information but said that they thought it would be a 
good idea because it would help to educate the other members of the United Nations. 
Mr. Galsworthy said that the Anti-Colonial Powers complained that they could not 
properly understand the information on educational, social and economic conditions 
without knowing the political background, but that this was merely a blind, as they 
could easily get the information. 
Mr. Parrott said that reading through the Secretary General's Summaries and 
Analyses the absence of political information was very noticeable, and he thought 
there was some basis for the complaints. 
After some discussion Mr. Dugdale said that he thought the crux of the matter was 
whether we could avoid a debate on constitutional matters or not. If we could not, it 
would be far better to transmit information so that the debate was as well informed 
and sensible as possible. 
Mr. Galsworthy said that we had avoided debate for four years, and he thought that 
unless we actually transmitted political information members of the United Nations 
would be very loath to create a precedent which might be awkward for them later by 
discussing questions which had not been tabled, and which were in any case matters 
of domestic jurisdiction. 
Mr. Younger said that he was impressed by the arguments against the transmis-
sion of pol itical information. He hoped, however, that we could preserve an open 
mind for our talks with the Americans, in case they felt very strongly on this point, 
and appeared likely to make it a condition for their general support. He did not think, 
however, that this was likely, and if we were co-operative on other points it might be 
possible to persuade the United States to support us on this one. 
It was agreed that we should, if possible, try to persuade the United States to 
support us in our refusal to transmit political information, but that we should keep 
an open mind, and if the United States attached great importance to our supplying 
this information, we should consider the matter further. It was agreed, however, that 
it would be much more difficult to make a concession on this question than on any 
other except accountability itself. 
4. H!ho decides when a people become self-governing? 
Mr. Griffiths said that Colonies which became self-governing for internal purposes 
might be considered to be creating a new class of nations who were neither 
non-self-governing, nor eligible for membership of the United Nations. Assembly 
resolution 222(III) regarding cessation of the transmission of information seemed a 
very reasonable request. 
Mr. Martin said that certain safeguards in the sphere of defence and foreign policy 
etc. had to be maintained, even when a Colony became self-governing for internal 
purposes. Dissident groups who were dissatisfied with these arrangements would 
press any country they could find to support them to raise the question of the 
Colonies' status in the United Nations. 
Mr. Younger said that the object of Chapter XI was to provide a safeguard where 
one nation had power over another, and that this could be entirely nullified, merely 
by stating that the territory in question was self-governing. He thought that the 
request containing the Assembly Resolution was reasonable. 
Mr. Galsworthy said that if we complied with the Resolution we might risk 
upsetting everything at the eleventh hour after we had taken such care to keep 
2G 
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political and constitutional questions out of the United Nations until that moment. 
He pointed out that the resolution passed at the fourth session (334/IV) stating that it 
was within the responsibility of the General Assembly to express its opinion on the 
principles which might guide the members concerned, indicated that the Assembly 
meant to decide this question for itself. The words "subject to constitutional 
limitations" in Article 73(e) had been inserted on the proposal of the United Kingdom 
with cases such as that of Malta in mind. Whereas Parliament had the right to assure 
itself that the Secretary of State for the Colonies was no longer responsible for the 
internal affairs of the Colony, the United Nations had no such right. 
Mr. Younger said that he thought we ought to comply as a matter of courtesy, and 
refusal would be unreasonable. 
Mr. Wright said that if we did not comply on matters such as these we would 
certainly lose the support of the moderate and reasonable members of the United 
Nations. 
Mr Galsworthy said that although the Americans had voted in favour of this 
resolution, they were worried about submitting constitutional details regarding 
Alaska. 
Mr. Griffiths asked what would happen if a Colony raised the question itself in its 
own legislature, in which case its constitution would be debated openly. He said that 
he would like to discuss the whole question further with his advisers . 
Mr. Younger said that he felt much more strongly that we should be forthcoming 
on this question than on the transmission of political information. 
It was agreed that the Secretary of State for the Colonies should discuss th is 
question further with his advisers, and the Colonial Office should then get into touch 
again with the Foreign Office. It was noted that the Foreign Office considered that a 
concession might well be made on this point. 
[5.] Memorandum on the proceedings at the last Assembly on trusteeship and 
colonial questions 
Mr. Griffiths said that he agreed that the memorandum should be a joint Foreign 
Office-Colonial Office publication, and should be published after the Washington 
talks. 
Mr. Younger said that he thought it would be better if the memorandum instead of 
stating our past attitude reflected any modified line that we might agree with the 
Americans. 
Mr. Dugdale said that the Colonial Office draft was being revised to make it much 
shorter. 
Mr. Martin asked that if the Foreign Office had comments on particular sections, 
they should be sent to the Colonial Office to be included in the revised draft. 
It was agreed that the memorandum should be a joint Foreign Office-Colonial 
Office publication, and should reflect any modified line that might be agreed with the 
United States at the Washington talks. 
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191 CO 537/5699, no 102 13 July 1950 
[Anglo-American talks on colonial and trusteeship matters, Washing-
ton 5-7 July]: despatch from Sir 0 Franks (Washington) to Mr Bevin. 
Annex: record of first meeting [Extract] 
I have the honour to enclose three copies of the United Kingdom record of the 
Anglo-American talks on colonial and trusteeship matters which took place in 
Washington on July 5th, 6th and 7th. 
2. I have no hesitation in saying that the talks were successful. The United States 
Delegation made it clear from the outset that they had a genuine admiration for our 
colonial achievements and a keen desire to help us obtain full credit for those 
achievements in the eyes of world opinion. They were especially gratified to learn 
that we intended to adopt new voting tactics in the United Nations, that we were 
proposing to make greater use of the United Nations forum to publicise the 
developments we were encouraging in the colonies, and that we had decided to 
participate fully in the Special Committee. Mr. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of 
State for United Nations Affairs, who presided at the talks, said at the final session 
that the United States Delegation was "more than delighted" with the attitude which 
the United Kingdom Delegation had taken. He hoped that, as a result, it would be 
possible for the United States, while not abandoning its anti-colonial traditions, to do 
a good deal more to help us in the United Nations, not only during the debates but by 
speaking in advance to a number of governments whose delegates had been 
unreasonably critical of us in the past. 
3. It was not necessary to speak about conditions in the colonies and trust 
territories at very great length because, partly owing to the Louren<;o Marques 
Conference, the United States delegates were to a considerable extent aware already 
of the progress achieved in the territories for which we are responsible. But the 
British Delegation's exposition of developments and difficulties in the field was none 
the less valuable because, as became apparent as the talks progressed, in the small 
number of cases where complete identity of view on future United Nations policy was 
not achieved, the difference was almost entirely due to the over-riding British 
concern about the effect of the proposed policy in the colonies themselves, while the 
United States placed more emphasis on the repercussions in the wider arena of world 
political opinion. 
4. There were, in fact, only two points of importance on which complete 
agreement was not achieved. These concerned the submission of political informa-
tion about non-self-governing territories, and the flying of the United Nations Flag in 
trust territories. 
5. On the first question, the United States Delegation said that the United States 
had suffered no ill effects from submitting political information about their 
non-self-governing territories. The Americans seemed, however, to recognise that it 
did not necessarily follow that this would be the case if we were to transmit political 
and constitutional information about our territories and they did not press us to give 
this information against our better judgment. On the contrary, they affirmed 
repeatedly that it was for us to weigh the advantages and disadvantages, both inside 
and outside our territories, of the submission of political information. The British 
Delegation stated that, after a very careful examination of the arguments on both 
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sides, they remained convinced that the formal transmission of political and 
constitutional information in such a way that it would become the subject of debate 
and recommendation in the United Nations would be neither right nor expedient, 
having regard to the risk of dangerous repercussions in our Colonial territories 
arising from debates at Lake Success on political and constitutional questions. At the 
same time, the British Delegation indicated that they thought it would be perfectly 
feasible for the United Kingdom representatives in the Fourth Committee and the 
General Assembly to take suitable opportunities of drawing attention in their 
speeches to our achievements in the field of political and constitutional develop-
ment, without running the risks that would be involved in the formal transmission of 
this information under Article 73(e) of the Charter which would have the effect of 
placing the examination of this information on the agenda. The American Delegation 
appeared gratified with this suggestion. 
6. On the question of the United Nations Flag in the trust territories, the United 
States Delegation said that there would almost certainly be an acrimonious debate in 
the General Assembly now that the flag resolution had been blocked in the 
Trusteeship Council. They suggested that in order to forestall this, the administering 
authorities should arrange for the matter to be raised again at the current session of 
the Trusteeship Council and that instead of voting against the resolution (which in 
the view of at least some of the United States Delegation would leave the 
administering authorities with complete discretion to fly the flag where and when 
they chose) the United Kingdom representative should abstain on the vote, since if 
one of the five administering authorities who had voted against the resolution at the 
Sixth Session of the Trusteeship Council felt able to abstain, this would be sufficient 
for the resolution to be adopted. The United States Delegation suggested that, in 
abstaining on the vote, the United Kingdom representative should make a statement 
to the effect that we naturally assumed that the administering power would be left to 
decide the exact manner and locations at which the flag would be flown: we might 
then fly the flag, for example, on United Nations Day and on other specially suitable 
occasions such as the visit of a United Nations Mission. The United States Delegation 
considered that it would be better tactics to accept the resolution as it stood than to 
seek to amend it in the sense suggested by the New Zealand Delegation at the Sixth 
Session of the Trusteeship Council . . .. 
8. But these differences were small by comparison with the great number of 
problems on which a common view was achieved. Apart from certain questions of 
tradition and definition, the two delegations found themselves in harmony on such 
important matters as the basic objectives of colonial policy, the degree to which a 
metropolitan power is accountable for its administration of colonial and trust 
territories respectively, voting and lobbying tactics to be adopted in the United 
Nations, the relationship of the General Assembly to the Trusteeship Council, and 
the necessity for a Colonial Application Clause in international conventions to which 
colonial powers are a party. It can reasonably be said, therefore, that the area of full 
Anglo-United States agreement has been greatly enlarged and that, beyond this, even 
where differences of approach and policy still remain, a real measure of mutual 
understanding now exists, and a respect for the considerations which give rise to 
those differences. 
9. How permanent is this understanding? The United States must be expected, of 
course, to deviate somewhat from time to time from the course of cooperation 
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mapped out during the present talks. This is inevitable in a field where United States 
interests are indirect and are due mainly to factors connected with the well-being 
and preservation of the Western World in general and the Anglo-United States 
partnership in particular. But in the main I think we may reasonably expect an 
appreciable increase in United States understanding and helpfulness in these 
matters. In the foreseeable future the extent of this helpfulness may well depend on 
two things:-
(i) the extent to which we are able to maintain informal exchanges on general and 
particular issues in this field, especially before the attitude of both sides has 
crystallised. At the very least it should be possible by advance consultation to avoid 
those unexpected head-on collisions in the United Nations which are embarrassing 
and damaging to us both; 
(ii) the extent to which we are able to live up to United States expectations that 
our new policy at the United Nations will avoid unnecessary criticism, will deal 
effectively with criticism that cannot be avoided, and will not fail to ensure that 
the triumphs of British colonial policy are publicised as much as its shortcomings. 
I earnestly recommend that constant attention be paid to these two points. If this is 
done (and continuing United States assistance is assured) our difficulties in the 
United Nations should be appreciably reduced, though they will of course be far from 
ended. In particular I would emphasise the importance of encouraging a continuing 
exchange of views on colonial topics between ourselves and the Americans, whether 
by the periodical visits of United Kingdom officials to Washington or of occasional 
tours of the British colonies by United States officials. 
10. I hope to report later on the results of the talks which the Americans are 
holding with the French and Belgians. With the full agreement of the State 
Department, we have informed the French and Belgian Embassies frankly of the 
tenor and content of our own discussions with the Americans. The United States 
Delegation consider that the satisfactory outcome of their talks with us has improved 
the chances of their reaching a reasonable measure of understanding with the 
French and Belgians. But they are not by any means over-optimistic that they will 
find the latter equally amenable. 
11. A detailed oral account of the course of our own talks with the Americans has 
already been given to representatives of the Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and 
South African Embassies here, who were informed that the Commonwealth 
Relations Office would probably be able to make a written account available to their 
governments at a later date. No action has been taken here with respect to India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon. The case of India especially is, however, immensely important. 
The Americans considered that India was by far the most influential of the 
anti-colonial powers. They were inclined to believe, as I am myself, that a direct 
approach by us to Pandit Nehru might be well worth making, even though it could 
not be completely successful. 
12. I should like to express my appreciation of the imaginative understanding 
displayed by the Colonial Office members of the United Kingdom Delegation who 
came from London. They may justifiably feel, I think, that, as a result of their efforts 
in this somewhat newly developed field of endeavour, the chances of obtaining a fair 
hearing for their achievements elsewhere have been enhanced. At all events, I am 
glad to report that the situation from the point of view of Anglo-American relations 
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seems a great deal brighter now than it did when my despatch No. 32 of January 14th 
was written .... 
Annex to 191 
The United Kingdom Delegation consisted of:-
British Embassy, Washington-Sir Oliver Franks, Sir Derick Hoyer Millar, Mr. J. K. 
Thompson, Mr. Gerald Meade, Mr. Donald Tebbit; Colonial Office-Mr. John M. 
Martin, Mr. A. B. Cohen, Mr. Arthur Galsworthy; Foreign Office-Mr. J. R. Cotton 
[Africa Dept]; U.K. Delegation to the United Nations-Mr. Dennis Laskey. 
First meeting, 11 a.m.-1 p.m. July 5th 
Mr. Hickerson welcomed the British Delegation. He then suggested the following 
arrangements for the Conference:-
(!) There should be no agreed minutes, since it was the purpose of the talks to 
exchange views and not to draw up a Convention. Each side should keep whatever 
record it desired. 
(2) It was desirable, so far as possible, to avoid publicity without, however, going 
to extremes to achieve this. He tabled a draft which he suggested might be used as 
a basis on which to reply to any press enquiries. This read as follows:-
"The Department of State announces that beginning on July 5 discussions will 
take place in Washington with representatives of the United Kingdom on 
general problems in dependent areas. These discussions will be held on the 
working level. This informal exchange of views constitutes an example of the 
consultation on problems of common interest which it was agreed at the recent 
ministerial meetings in London should be held frequently between officials of 
the two Governments". 
(3) He suggested that two meetings should be held each day for three days and 
that an endeavour should be made to keep strictly to this time-table. 
(4) The draft agenda should be used merely as a general guide and need not be 
adhered to rigidly. Either side should feel free to raise matters which did not 
appear on the agenda. 
The British Delegation indicated that all these arrangements were acceptable on 
their side. 
Mr. Hickerson said that the present talks arose from the uneven voting in the 
Fourth Committee of the General Assembly. This uneven voting had occurred in 
spite of close contacts between the British and United States Delegations. Since the 
last session of the Fourth Committee there had been a number of useful inter-
changes of view on this problem, especially during the London talks . There were, 
however, still a number of important problems remaining. Mr. Hickerson thought 
that hitherto our interchanges in this field had not been as frank as in others. He 
hoped that, as a result of the present talks, our relations in Colonial and Trusteeship 
matters could be made just as frank as in other fields. 
Mr. Hickerson went on to say that he suspected that the feeling on the United 
Kingdom side was that the United States identified itself too closely with the forces 
marching towards independence. The true United States position was certainly not 
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that she wished to see the British Empire liquidated: the British Empire was a great 
force for stability. Moreover, especially in the last six years or so, the United Kingdom 
had achieved a magnificent record in Colonial matters for which it had received no 
credit at all. The United States wanted to help break this vicious circle. 
For historical reasons there was an understandable feeling in the United States 
against Colonialism. The United States attitude had been well summed up by Mr. 
Cordell Hull, 1 when he said-" Every people is entitled to self government and 
independence when it is ready to assume the responsibilities as well as the privileges 
of the same". If this criterion had been adopted, the foolish decision of the United 
Nations to give independence to Italian Somaliland after ten years would never have 
been adopted. "It would not", Mr. Hickerson remarked, "be possible to get the 
Somalis down from the trees in ten years". 
The forces of independence could not be stopped. We therefore had to endeavour 
to give wise direction to these forces so that communism did not take control of 
them. 
If the present talks were successful the United Kingdom might perhaps be able to 
change its tactics in the United Nations while the United States might be able to use 
its influence to stop the "free wheeling" in the United Nations which allowed 
delegates of certain countries to take an unreasonable attitude without check from 
their governments. 
Sir Oliver Franks said that United Kingdom history had been the opposite of that 
of the United States in Colonial matters. Both our attitudes necessarily reflected our 
ancestral history. 
Sir Oliver Franks suggested:-
(!) That an attempt should be made to devise means of handling Colonial matters 
in the United Nations more to the mutual satisfaction of the United States and the 
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom, for its part, was not bound to its previous 
tactics. He was glad to understand from what Mr. Hickerson had said that the 
United States was similarly free to revise its tactics. 
(2) The United Kingdom Delegation would like to have some general talk on what 
the United Kingdom was doing in the Colonies and the problems which had to be 
faced. They hoped to demonstrate the practical conditions existing in the Colonies 
on which their consideration of the policy to be adopted in the United Nations was 
based. The examination of these practical problems would show where areas of 
flexibility existed for tactical purposes. 
(3) The British aim was to work for the self-government of dependent peoples. In 
leading peoples towards self-government or independence, the economic and 
educational factors were relatively easy to gauge. There was, however, a further 
element which was much more bothersome. The contrast between the cases of 
India and Ceylon, on the one hand, and Burma, on the other, was striking. One of 
the reasons why India and Ceylon had fared so much better than Burma since they 
had achieved independence was that at the time when power was handed over, 
roughly nine-tenths of the people holding responsible positions in India and 
Ceylon were locally recruited. This was unfortunately not the case in Burma. In 
building up a local administration the time factor was important. The process had 
1 US secretary of state, 1933--1944. 
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to be thought of in terms of decades at least. If the time factor were disregarded, all 
the educational and economic advancement would be in vain. Only an experienced 
administration composed of the peoples of a territory could ensure stability 
throughout the period of transition and so ensure that political evolution did not 
end in chaos. 
Sir Oliver Franks went on to say that one of the subjects on which there was bound to 
be a good deal of discussion during the talks, was the important question of 
accountability. The United Kingdom recognised that it was, in a broad sense, 
accountable for its Colonial policy at the bar of world public opinion. But it was not 
accountable in the sense of being subject to outside supervision and direction. It was 
a matter of principle that a Colonial Power could not divest itself of, or share the 
responsibility which it had. But apart from this point of principle, there were also 
practical reasons why the United Kingdom could not share or shed its responsibility. 
In many of the British Colonies the real power had already passed to local 
governments. These local governments, having ceased to be accountable to the 
metropolitan government over a wide field, were not willing to accept accountability 
to the United Nations. Furthermore, the discussions in the United Nations so far had 
been such as to make the process of transferring power to local governments more 
difficult. We were taking a real calculated risk in the rate at which we were turning 
over to the inhabitants of the territories real political responsibility. Our chances of 
success depended on the ability of the Colonial Power, during the transitional period, 
to give advice to the local governments in an atmosphere in whi.ch that advice stood a 
good chance of being accepted. During the transitional period there was bound to be 
a fluid situation in which guidance was needed. If the atmosphere became charged 
with ill feeling, owing to intemperate statements made at the United Nations, our 
guidance was less likely to be heeded. 
Sir Oliver Franks also pointed out that our Colonies were in many different stages 
of development. At one extreme, there was the case of British Somaliland, where we 
still maintain fairly direct control. At the other end of the scale were the West African 
Colonies which had already a very large measure of self-government and in which 
there were legislative assemblies with elected majorities. The attitudes which we 
took up at the United Nations were conditioned by the practical considerations of the 
varying conditions existing in the Colonies. If, therefore, the two delegations were to 
begin by talking around the problems as they existed in the territories, it would be 
possible to locate areas of tactical flexibility. 
Mr. Rusk2 said that it was important to remember that the subjects about which 
we were talking affected not only Anglo-U.S. relations but also the relations between 
us both and a great part, perhaps three-quarters, of the rest of the world. In view of 
the achievements of the United Kingdom it was anomalous to have the General 
Assembly sp/ often taking the United Kingdom to task at a table surrounded by 
nations/ _who owed their freedom to the United Kingdom. If the United Kingdom 
attitude at the Assembly could be closer to the standard of her peformance in the 
Colonies, this would be of great benefit to our relations with a large part of the rest of 
the world. 
2 Dean Rusk, US assistant under-secretary of state for UN affairs, 1949; deputy under secretary of state, 
1949-1950. 
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Mr. Hare pointed out that the time factor (which Sir 0. Franks had mentioned) 
and the public relations sense (which Mr. Rusk had said was needed) went together. 
It was necessary to create a consciousness that progress was being achieved within 
the time available. 
Sir Oliver Franks said that the British Delegation were very much aware that a 
large number of the peoples of the world had a Colonial history. They agreed that the 
wider relationship, to which Mr. Rusk had referred, was very important. The broad 
unity of Anglo-U.S. policy had not only to exist but had to be demonstrated. The 
harm which was done by our appearing on opposite sides of the fence in a particular 
field was not limited to that field alone. 
Mr. Rusk pointed out that the United States also had responsibilities to dependent 
peoples. The United States Delegation were conscious that whenever one pointed 
one's fore-finger at somebody else three fingers were pointing at ones-self. 
Mr. Cohen said he proposed to use Africa as an illustration of the kind of problems 
with which we were faced. The Colonial Office warmly welcomed the increased 
interest which the United States had been taking in Africa, and had been encouraged 
by the statement which Mr. Hare had made in London regarding the outcome of the 
Louren<;o Marques Conference. 
The United Kingdom had two basic objectives: the first was to help Colonial 
peoples to build up self-governhg communities; the second was to ensure that those 
communities would have real economic and political viability. It was extremely 
difficult to keep these two objectives in proper relationship to each other because the 
second objective demanded time, while the first entailed a show of progress. An 
indispensable need was to build up local government beginning with the smallest 
units. 
Economic and technical development, which was so much in evidence in current 
United States thought, was also in the forefront of United Kingdom thinking. A great 
deal of United Kingdom money, and money from the Colonial territories themselves, 
had in recent years been devoted to the development of basic services, research 
institutions in the field, and above all to agriculture. A great deal of money had also 
been devoted to education. A large number of trained personnel from the United 
Kingdom had gone out to the Colonies and four new university colleges had been set 
up since the war. In the past, too little attention had been given to technical 
education, but now three new polytechnic institutes were being started. In addition, 
more attention was being paid to the education of women and girls. It was one of our 
major objectives to get people working on small development schemes. 
In the political field there were a very large number of territories which were no 
longer under the close direction of the metropolitan power. In East Africa there were 
complications owing to the existence of plural communities. In Kenya, for example, 
the transfer of power to the European residents could not go forward without 
prejudicing the future of the Africans. In these circumstances, control from the 
Colonial Office had to be maintained. But even here, actual direction was limited as a 
rule to major policy, defence and direct United Kingdom services to the territories. 
In West Africa, much greater political progress had been possible. In the Gold Coast, 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone it was hoped in the next year or so to establish a system of 
government in which African Ministers would be directly responsible to elected 
legislatures. The Governors would retain ultimate responsibility and would have 
reserve powers, only to be used in exceptional circumstances; and there would be 
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only a minority of European officials on the Executive Councils (three in the case of 
the Gold Coast). Mr. Cohen went on to say that the question was sometimes asked 
whether we were not perhaps going too fast in giving political responsibility to 
territories in West Africa which were under-developed from an economic, education-
al, administrative and social point of view. The answer to these doubts was that we 
had to establish a political system which could be expected to continue smoothly for 
the comparatively long period of time during which we were helping the territories 
towards full self-government, which we hoped would be within the British Common-
wealth. For this purpose, an official, bureaucratic system was impossible. It was 
necessary to put new arrangements into effect now because the sooner we took 
action the more influence we were likely to have for a longer period. The policy of full 
participation in government was already paying dividends. The people were being 
given a chance to contribute to the working out of their own Constitutions. Another 
example of the success of the policy of full participation was the West African 
Marketing Boards. 
Mr. Foot3 reminded the meeting of the tremendous progress which had been made 
in the West Indies. The West Indies Conference had unanimously recommended that 
a Federated Dominion should be established. The plan of the West Indies Conference 
had now been referred back to the local legislatures. If they approved it, he thought it 
likely that the plan would go into effect within about two years. The West Indies 
might well achieve full Dominion status in about five years.4 When one remembered 
that the representatives of the individual territories first met together to discuss all 
this only three years ago, the progress which had been achieved was remarkable. 
Similarly, in Nigeria, it was only four years ago that representatives of the different 
parts of the territory first agreed to sit together in the same body. Now they had 
already agreed on a scheme of government for the entire colony. It was, therefore, 
fantastic that anybody should call the pace slow. The pace was terrific. But the 
method worked and the local people had risen to the responsibility given them. The 
case of Mr. Bustamente5 in Jamaica was a good illustration, for only a few years ago 
he was nothing more than a mob leader. It was certainly the case that the 
bureaucratic method of government, if applied in Nigeria, would bring chaos within 
ten years. The policy of direct participation, though involving tremendous difficul-
ties, really would work. For example, when placed in positions of responsibility, the 
Africans often decided that it was necessary for the good of the country to employ 
foreign experts at high wages. It would have been quite impossible for British 
officials to take decisions of this sort. 
Mr. Hickerson said that the United States Delegation was glad to hear of the good 
job which was being done in the Colonies. He admitted that there had been some 
feeling on the United States side that self-government was being given too rapidly. 
But they had to remember that self-government was a hysterical subject among the 
ex-colonial countries. For example, when he had suggested to the Indian Delegate at 
Lake Success that it was foolish to reduce the term of preparation for Libyan 
3 H M Foot, chief secretary, Nigeria, who attended this session only. 
4 Galsworthy noted in the margin: 'Mr Foot made it clear that in this he was expressing a purely personal 
opinion. It was in response to a specific question put to him by the U.S. delegation. A.N.G.' 
5 W A Bustamante, minister for communications; subsequently (as Sir Alexander) prime minister of 
Jamaica, 1962-1967. 
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self-government from ten years to two, the Indian Delegate had replied that of course 
the Libyans could be ready in two years. In the case of the Philippines, there had been 
a 40 or 50 year period of preparation and, while he did not admit that independence 
had been given too soon, the new country still faced formidable difficulties. 
Mr. Bourgerie6 asked how political progress in East and Central Africa compared 
with that in West Africa. Mr. Cohen replied that in West Africa political advance had 
preceded economic and social advance; the economic and social factors could catch 
up later. In East Africa, political advance had been hampered by the existence of 
plural communities. The Africans who had begun to participate in government had 
not yet caught up to the standard of the Europeans and Indians. It would be a long 
time before the Africans would be able to play a full and equal part. It was impossible, 
therefore, to proceed to a further stage of self-government until the Africans could 
come in and pull their full weight. There were really three problems:-
(a) How could an Executive be developed without prejudicing the future of the 
Africans as opposed to the Europeans and the Indians? 
(b) What was the correct method of representation (he thought that communal 
representation could not be avoided at present)? 
(c) How could a sense of security be given to the different racial communities? 
Up to the present, the Europeans had been willing to vote money for the 
advancement of the Africans. It was to be hoped that they would continue to take this 
enlightened view. 
Mr. Hare asked to what extent a sense of nationhood was being achieved. Was 
there, for example, a feeling of being a Nigerian? Mr. Foot replied that in Nigeria, the 
great political problem certainly was the difference between the Moslem North and 
the Christian and Pagan South. Internally it could not be said that the different 
peoples yet regarded themselves as Nigerians to any great extent. When they left 
Nigeria, however, representatives of the different sections certainly did have a sense 
of regarding Nigeria as a whole. This applied both to the Nigerians who attended the 
recent African Conference in London and to the Nigerian football team. 
Mr. Cohen said that in East Africa the Europeans and Moslem Indians by and large 
regarded themselves as belonging to Africa. There.was a tendency on the part of the 
Hindus to look back to India as their native land. Trade Unions were being developed 
as a means of helping the Africans to achieve equal status with the Europeans and the 
Indians .... 
6 E H Bourgerie, US assistant director, Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs. 
192 C0537/7137,no17 9Mar-5Apr195l 
[Colonial questions at the UN]: minutes by J M Martin and Mr Griffiths 
on future plans for Anglo-American talks. Annex: proposed agenda 
At the conclusion of our talks with the State Department last July about Colonial 
questions at the United Nations we felt that it would be useful to arrange similar 
Anglo-American talks from time to time in the future. We are now examining with 
the Foreign Office a proposal that the next such talks should be held in London in 
May. Our idea is that they should not last more than one week at most, should be at 
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the official level (up to Assistant Under-Secretary of State), and should primarily 
relate to specific subjects likely to come up in the United Nations this year. Starting 
with discussion of the general approach of the two Governments to the various 
United Nations bodies concerned, the talks would go on to deal with tactics in these 
bodies and the preparatory work to be done before their sessions. I attach a copy of 
the agenda as at present envisaged by us. 1 
Advantage could, if thought desirable, be taken of the presence of the American 
officials to discuss with them any other Colonial questions (outside the United 
Nations) of common concern and indeed the Americans themselves may wish to raise 
some matters of the kind (e.g. certain aspects of the Caribbean Commission). Any 
such extension of the scope of the talks, however, involves the difficulty that the 
Americans would probably find it difficult to discuss any special subjects without 
adding the appropriate experts to their delegation. I think, therefore, that it would be 
best to confine the talks very largely to United Nations matters-with, if time 
permits, a few informal discussions on general topics (e.g. education, health, 
political development) in which advisers could take part, designed to educate the 
Americans on our Colonial policy.2 •.• 
J.M.M. 
9.3.51 
I approve & hope I shall be kept informed of how the talks go. Last year we had a 
good press for our attitude at UNO-Cyprus may this year be the most difficult 
problem. 
Annex to 192 
J.G. 
5.4.51 
I The United Kingdom representatives would propose to begin the talks by giving a 
brief informal review of the general trends of our policies with regard to the political, 
economic and social development of the Colonial Empire, of the present position 
with regard to the implementation of those plans, and of the principal problems now 
being tackled. This would afford a general background to the discussion of specific 
issues that will arise in the United Nations this year . 
Note: The Colonial Office would be very glad to arrange for the United States 
representatives to have informal discussions with experts on any individual subjects 
in which the United States representatives would be particularly interested e.g. 
education, health, economic policy etc. 
11 Review of tactics in dealing with colonial and trusteeship questions in the United 
Nations in 1951. 
(a) The extent to which United Nations bodies can be used by the Administering 
1 Not in fact attached. The copy annexed here is taken from CO 537/7137, no 21, as forwarded to FO on 6 
Apr 1951. 
2 Cohen minuted here: 'I doubt if this is essential [? ] for African political questions'. He was not in favour 
of discussing general African questions. 
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Powers for publicising their policies and achievements in Colonial and Trusteeship 
Territories. 
(b) The use of comparative statistics relating to non-self-governing territories and 
sovereign states. 
III List of the detailed items that will arise in the United Nations during 1951 which 
the United Kingdom representatives would like to discuss. 
(a) In the view of the United Kingdom the most important single items for 
discussion would be:-
(i) The Ewe problem; 
(ii) Cyprus; 
(iii) General Assembly resolution 334(IV) (territories to which Chapter XI of the 
United Nations Charter applies) and the examination of political and constitu-
tional information supplied under Resolution 222(III); 
(iv) Administrative Unions. 
(b) The following items would also require discussion:-
(i) The General Assembly Resolution on Rural Economic Development in Trust 
Territories. (The study that the Trusteeship Council is now embarking upon 
raises questions of major importance to the future of Tanganyika); 
(ii) The handling of the 1951 Special Committee, including the General 
Assembly Resolution on the implementation of the Declaration of Human Rights 
in non-self-governing territories, and including the question of the revision of 
the Standard Form for the transmission of information under Article 73(e) 
(including the possibility of making arrangements whereby the smaller colonial 
territories would be required to transmit information at intervals longer than 
one year); 
(iii) Relations between the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly; 
(iv) Action arising out of General Assembly resolution 436(V) : information on 
the implementation of Trusteeship Council and General Assembly resolutions 
relating to trust territories; 
(v) Revision of the Trusteeship Council's Provisional Questionnaire; 
(vi) Colonial Application Clause. 
VI[?IV] The question of further diplomatic approaches to other member states of the 
United Nations prior to the 1951 General Assembly. 
193 CO 936/56/6, no 3 [Oct 1951] 
'Anglo-American talks on colonial and trusteeship questions in the 
United Nations, 1951': general introductory note to CO briefs 
During the 1949 Session of the United Nations General Assembly it became evident 
that there existed a serious divergence of opinion between the Colonial Powers (and 
especially the United Kingdom, France and Belgium) on the one hand, and the 
majority of the members of the United Nations on the other, on the extent to which 
the United Nations Organisation should concern itself with the affairs of non-self-
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governing and trust territories. Of 17 Resolutions adopted by the 1949 Assembly on 
Colonial and Trusteeship affairs, the United Kingdom was able to vote for only one; 
we voted against 12 and abstained on 4. The bitterness of the debates, and the 
isolation in which the Colonial Powers found themselves, made it evident that unless 
some means could be devised of improving the atmosphere in which Colonial and 
Trusteeship questions are debated at Lake Success, the prestige and influence of the 
United Kingdom in the United Nations would be seriously weakened, and further that 
by persistent misrepresentation the worth of our aims and achievements in the 
dependent territories would be discounted or ignored by the majority of member 
states. 
2. In consequence, in the month preceding the 1950 Assembly, three major steps 
were taken in an attempt to bring about the desired improvement:-
(a) It was decided to revise United Kingdom debating and voting tactics so that, 
while preserving the principles upon which our attitude to the United Nations on 
Colonial questions are based, we should abandon a purely negative attitude and 
vote for or abstain on, with suitable reservations, rather than vote against those 
resolutions which are not entirely acceptable to us. 
(b) Detailed conversations were held with the United States State Department in 
Washington in July 1950 as a result of which the United States came to understand 
our attitude more fully, agreement was reached that the United States and the 
United Kingdom would, wherever possible, vote in the same sense, and, most 
important, that the United States would use its influence with other member 
states to induce them to adopt a less intransigent attitude towards the Colonial 
Powers than in the past. 
(c) Diplomatic approaches were made, by both the United Kingdom and the 
United States Government, to the Governments of the great majority of the 
member states of the United Nations in an endeavour to impress them with the 
need to approach Colonial and Trusteeship questions in an objective and 
constructive way, and to accept the sincerity of our aims and the magnitude of our 
achievements in the Colonies and Trust territories. These diplomatic approaches 
were made before and during the first weeks of the 1950 Assembly. 
3. In the event, the proceedings of the 1950 Assembly were much more 
satisfactory than in any previous year. Of 18 resolutions adopted relating to 
non-self-governing and trust territories, the United Kingdom voted for 12, abstained 
on 3 and voted against only 3. There can be no doubt that this improvement was 
largely due to the factors mentioned above; it was, however, clear that few member 
states are genuinely convinced of the merits of our attitude to Colonial questions in 
the United Nations. Under the pressure applied to them, most members refrained 
from bedevilling the debate in the same way as in 1949, but this improvement did not 
take the shape of any exhibition of a desire to understand the difficulties of the 
Colonial Powers or of a constructive examination of the problems discussed, but was 
shown simply in preserving silence when in 1949 they would have attacked the 
Colonial Powers. It may be assumed that their moderation in 1950 was the result not 
so much of a conviction that our Colonial policies, or even "colonialism" itself, could 
be beneficial to the peoples of the colonies, as of a fear that by attacking the Colonial 
Powers they would weaken one of the main safeguards against Communist 
infiltration into the backward areas of the world. 
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4. Whatever their reasons, however, many delegations did in fact adopt a more 
moderate attitude and, perhaps more important, the solidity of the Latin American 
(i.e. the main anti-Colonial) bloc showed signs of cracking. In order to press home 
the advantage thus gained, it is intended to develop the steps taken last year to 
improve the position of the Colonial Powers in the United Nations. To this end 
diplomatic approaches are being despatched to the Governments of most member 
states of the United Nations before the 1951 General Assembly, and, in order to 
preserve and extend our close and very fruitful co-operation with the United States, 
Anglo-American talks on Colonial and Trusteeship questions are to be held in the 
week beginning September 1951, in London. 
Nature of the Anglo-American talks 
5. The agenda for the talks is attached as Annex I to this paper.1 
6. It may be assumed that, as a result of the 1950 Anglo-American talks, and of 
the close co-operation between the United States and ourselves since July 1950, it is 
no longer necessary to "educate" the Americans to any considerable extent in the 
aims and practical achievements of the United Kingdom in Colonial and Trust 
territories. The main purpose of the September talks will be to go through, with the 
Americans, the agenda for the 1951 Fourth Committee, in order that a meeting of 
minds may be reached as to the tactics to be adopted by our respective Delegations to 
those bodies. It is envisaged that these talks on United Nations Agenda items should 
be conducted mainly at the working level (i .e. between departmental officials of the 
State Department, the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, and where appropriate the 
Commonwealth Relations Office). It is of course unlikely that, as a result of the talks, 
any concrete agreement will be reached between the Americans and ourselves as to 
the precise tactics to be adopted in respect to particular items on the agenda of 
United Nations bodies and it may be that it would be fruitless for us to attempt to 
reach such precise agreement. For this reason our main object in talking to the 
Americans should be to sketch in the main outlines of our attitude to the various 
items on the agenda of United Nations bodies, and to attempt to discover United 
States reactions both to the subjects to be discussed under those items and also to 
our proposed attitude towards them. In the light of the elucidation of the probable 
American attitude thus obtained, we can prepare the working Briefs for our 
Representatives to the bodies concerned, in the hope that we shall then be able to 
provide them with guidance which will enable them to maintain close and effective 
relations with the United States' Delegations to those bodies. 
7. The Briefing for the United Kingdom Representatives at the talks will consist 
of a series of notes covering each item of the agenda. Since the individual United 
Kingdom Representatives will already be thoroughly familiar with the background to 
the various items to be discussed, all but the essential historical material has been 
omitted from these notes, and they consist mainly of an outline of the principles 
followed by the United Kingdom in its approach to the respective items, together 
with a general sketch of the tactics which might be adopted in the Fourth Committee 
when these particular items come up for discussion. The tactical section of the notes 
will inevitably be expressed in very general terms, since we are not necessarily 
wedded to any particular tactical line, and shall of course be prepared to accept any 
1 Not printed. 
498 INTERNATIONAL POLICY [194) 
American suggestions which seem to us to improve our chances of maintaining the 
principles set out in the "policy" sections of the notes. 
194 CO 537/7137 22 Oct 1951 
[Anglo-American colonial talks, London, 10- 12 Oct]: minute by J M 
Martin 
. . . In comparison with the Talks in Washington last year, our recent conversations 
were on a lower level of interest and importance, but, as far as they went, they were 
most successful and certainly served to confirm and consolidate the good relations 
established with the State Department in 1950 on the handling of Colonial questions 
in the United Nations. 
We have every reason to be satisfied with the improvement achieved. The 
Americans, of course, look at these questions from a very different standpoint from 
ours and the causes of our differences are too deep-seated to be moved, at any rate in 
the immediate future; but at least we seem to have dispelled the misunderstanding, 
distrust and impatience which had accumulated in Washington and, if owing to our 
different approach we continue to have disagreements from time to time on 
particular tactical questions which arise, we can at least feel sure that those with 
whom decisions lie in the State Department will consider our point of view with real 
goodwill and a considerable measure of understanding. The atmosphere is now one 
of, I believe, sincere cordiality and in dealing with Americans that is probably of more 
importance than tying them down to agreement on particular points . ... 
